OPINION AND ORDER

JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, David Pennington, Nancy J. Thorner, Paul M. Tait, and James P. Economos, have filed a four-count class action complaint against defendants ZionSolutions LLC ("ZionSolutions") and Bank of New York Mellon ("BNY Mellon") to enforce their rights under two decommissioning trusts established by Commonwealth Edison ("ComEd") with respect to a nuclear power plant in Zion, Illinois. Relying on the Illinois Public Utilities Act ("IPUA"), 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 et seq., plaintiffs request an injunction enjoining improper payments made to ZionSolutions (count I), the appointment of a qualified trustee to manage the trusts (count II), the return or credit of the assets in the trusts (count III), and an accounting of the assets in the trusts (count IV).1 Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss and strike plaintiffs' class action complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f). For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 486 (7th Cir. 2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis, but must also establish that the requested relief is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At the same time, the plaintiff need not plead legal theories. Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010). Rather, it is the facts that count.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs are electricity service customers of ComEd, an Illinois public utility. Between 1974 and 2001, ComEd operated a nuclear power plant in Zion, Illinois ("the Zion plant") under to two commercial reactor operating licenses issued by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). In 1998, ComEd ceased operating the Zion plant as a nuclear power plant for economic and market reasons. ComEd began decommissioning the Zion plant, which is the process by which a nuclear power plant's facilities and equipment are dismantled, nuclear by-products are safely decontaminated and disposed of or entombed, and land is restored for beneficial use. Decommissioning is a labor-intensive operation requiring significant financial backing due to the potential risk posed by radioactive material.

To assure that adequate funds are available for decommissioning, licensees such as ComEd are required by NRC regulations to establish what are known as nuclear decommissioning trust funds. Under Illinois law, the monies used to fund the decommissioning trusts is paid by ComEd customers after the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC") authorizes those charges to customers. See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-201.5(a). After the completion of the decommissioning process, any excess monies from the trust funds are to be returned to ComEd customers. ComEd established two trust funds to pay for the expenses related to decommissioning the Zion plant.

In 2001, ComEd transferred the Zion plant, along with the rest of its nuclear power generation fleet, to Exelon Generation Company ("ExGen"). Because ComEd was an Illinois public utility, the sale required approval by the ICC, which ultimately approved the deal. In connection with this transfer, ExGen assumed the obligation to continue decommissioning the Zion plant. ComEd transferred the assets in the decommissioning trusts to ExGen; however, the transaction required that ComEd continue to collect from its customers through 2006 for the decommissioning trust funds. ComEd did so through 2006. In total, between 1998 and 2006, plaintiffs and other ComEd customers paid hundreds of millions of dollars into the Zion plant's decommissioning trust funds.

On September 1, 2010, ExGen transferred the Zion plant to ZionSolutions, a single purpose entity formed to decommission the Zion plant. As part of the transfer, ExGen transferred nearly all of the assets into new decommissioning trust funds established by ZionSolutions ("the Zion trusts"). ZionSolutions also assumed, with some limited exceptions,3 the decommissioning liabilities associated with the Zion plant. ZionSolutions appointed BNY Mellon trustee of the Zion trusts, which currently have assets of more than $700 million. Pursuant to the Zion trusts' terms, any excess remaining after decommissioning will be returned to ExGen,4 which will then return any remaining assets to ComEd customers, who initially funded the decommissioning trusts.5

Since September 1, 2010, ZionSolutions has withdrawn over $10 million in connection with the dismantling of the Zion plant purported for claimed costs and profits associated with the project. Plaintiffs allege that ZionSolutions is using the trusts funds without any independent oversight to determine whether the expenditures meet all the requirements of Illinois laws governing trust funds. Examples of ZionSolutions's alleged improper use of the Zion funds unrelated to decommissioning include: (1) self-dealing claimed profits estimated to be in the range of 15 to 20 percent; (2) using tens of millions of dollars for deferred operating and other non-decommissioning costs including charges for preparing regularly produced spent fuel for storage or disposal; (3) making unspecified charges for a $200 million letter of credit procured in connection with the transfer of the Zion plant from ExGen to ZionSolutions; and (4) other excessive and unnecessary expenses. Plaintiffs further allege that ZionSolutions has also stated that it intends to withdraw approximately hundreds of millions of dollars, and possibly the Zion funds in their entirety.

ANALYSIS

I. Counts I, II, and III (Claims to Recover Payments under the IPUA and Appoint a Trustee)

Plaintiffs allege that the class of ComEd customers whom they represent are the beneficiaries of the Zion trusts, as the IPUA requires the appointment of a trustee to manage the trusts and eventual return of the balance of those trusts to them. Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because the IPUA is inapplicable.

The purpose of the IPUA "is to ensure that funds are available to pay the decommissioning costs when a nuclear power plant is closed." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 775 N.E.2d 113, 129, 332 Ill.App.3d 1038, 266 Ill.Dec. 551 (2002). In connection with the decommissioning6 of a nuclear power plant, Section 5/8-508.1 of the IPUA requires that every public utility that owns a nuclear power plant establish two decommissioning trusts holding funds to pay for decommissioning costs.7 See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-508.1(b)(1); (2). Distributions from a decommissioning trust can only be made for decommissioning costs and to pay administrative costs, income taxes and other incidental expenses of the trust. See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-508.1(c)(3)(i). Any assets in the decommissioning trust exceeding what is needed to pay for decommissioning costs are to be refunded to the public utility that established the decommissioning fund for the purpose of refunds or credits, as soon as practicable, to the customers. See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-508.1(c)(3)(ii).

The IPUA applies to public utilities, which it defines as an entity engaged in "the production, storage, transmission, sale, delivery or furnishing of heat, cold, power, electricity, water, or light." See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-105(a)(1); see also Danville Redipage, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 410 N.E.2d 328, 329, 87 Ill.App.3d 787, 43 Ill.Dec. 328 (1980) (regulation by the ICC is not a prerequisite for an entity to be considered a public utility). ZionSolutions — a company formed for the purpose of decommissioning the Zion plant — does not fit within the IPUA's definition of a public utility. Plaintiffs argue that while ZionSolutions may not fit within the statutory definition of a public utility, the assets that fund the Zion trusts are the same assets ComEd collected to fund the decommissioning trusts and are thus still subject to the IPUA. To find otherwise, argue plaintiffs, would nullify the IPUA's statutory protections against mismanagement.

This is not necessarily so, in that NRC regulations restrict licensees such as ZionSolutions from misappropriating funds for purposes unrelated to decommissioning.8 NRC regulations require (1) reasonable assurances that funds be available for decommissioning; (2) that the trust fund's assets be invested consistently with the prudent investor standard; and (3) that the withdrawal of trust funds be for expenses associated with legitimate decommissioning activities. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(a); (h)(1)(i)(B); (h)(1)(iv); § 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A). NRC regulations additionally obligate ZionSolutions to prove a detailed annual report; and the NRC has the right to review the status of a decommissioning trust at any time. See id. § 50.75(f)(1); (e)(2). Further, the Zion trust agreement may not be amended without prior notice to the NRC, see id. § 50.75(h)(1)(iii), and ZionSolutions must give notice to the NRC of any disbursement other than for decommissioning costs and other administrative costs and fees during the life of the plant. Id. § 50.75(h)(1)(iv). In addition, the regulations prohibit (1) investment of the trust assets in "securities or other obligations of the licensee" or companies that own or operate nuclear power reactors; and (2), with certain limited exceptions, the licensee and its affiliates from acting as investment manager or having day-to-day management direction of the funds' investments. Id. § 50.75(h)(1)(i)(A); (h)(1)(ii). Violation of the NRC regulations carries civil and criminal penalties. See 42 U.S.C. § 2273(a); (c).9

As a licensee, ExGen is subject to NRC regulations. See In re Commonwealth Edison, 2001 WL 1033288, at *31 (Ill. C.C. Feb. 21, 2001) ("As an NRC licensee, after the transfer [ExGen] will be subject to NRC regulations regarding decommissioning planning, record keeping and reporting. The NRC will be the federal regulatory agency responsible for determining that [ExGen] has provided reasonable assurance that funds will be available for the decommissioning process, as provided in 10 C.F.R. § 50.75 relating to financial assurance for decommissioning funding."). In approving the sale to ExGen, the ICC addressed the scenario that unfolded here and ruled that the transfer licensee would have to comply with NRC requirements:

In re Commonwealth Edison, 2001 WL 1033288, at *32.

That the ICC contemplated that the NRC would continue to govern in the event of a sale to an unregulated third party undercuts plaintiffs' argument that ZionSolutions's management of the Zion plant is not subject to oversight. The court concludes that the IPUA statutory framework is inapplicable to ZionSolutions as it is not a public utility under Illinois law and the NRC regulations provide adequate assurances to prevent mismanagement. Cf. Commonwealth Edison, 775 N.E. 2d at 131 ("[S]ection 8-508.1 [of the IPUA] requires only that public utilities establish the decommissioning trusts; it does not prohibit other business entities from maintaining or collecting money for them.").

To redress their concern that ZionSolutions is mismanaging the decommissioning trust funds, plaintiffs can petition the NRC to institute proceedings against ZionSolutions. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.206(a) ("Any person may file a request to institute a proceeding . . . to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or for any other action as may be proper . . . The request must specify the action requested and set forth the facts that constitute the basis for the request."); §2.206(b) ("Within a reasonable time after a request pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section has been received, the Director of the NRC office with responsibility for the subject matter of the request shall either institute the requested proceeding in accordance with this subpart or shall advise the person who made the request in writing that no proceeding will be instituted in whole or in part, with respect to the request, and the reasons for the decision."); see also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 741, 105 S.Ct. 1598, (1985) ("Congress intended to vest in the court of appeals initial subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to Commission denials of § 2.206 petitions."); 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4). Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss counts I, II, and III of plaintiffs' class action complaint is granted.

II. Count IV (Action for Accounting)

Plaintiffs additionally argue that they are entitled to an accounting from BNY Mellon of all trust assets and expenditures. "An equitable accounting is an adjustment of the accounts of the parties and a rendering of judgment for the balance ascertained to be due." Triple Canopy, Inc. v. Moore, No. 04 C 3265, 2005 WL 1629768, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2005). To state an equitable claim for an accounting, plaintiffs must show that they have no adequate remedy at law in addition to at least one of the following: "(1) a breach of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a need for discovery, (3) fraud, or (4) the existence of mutual accounts which are of a complex nature." Kempner Mobile Elec., Inc. v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 428 F.3d 706, 715 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Glovaroma, Inc. v. Maljack Prods., Inc., 71 F.Supp.2d 846, 857 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ("An accounting claim is improper without a specific, recognized factual predicate."). Plaintiffs have not alleged that they have no adequate remedy at law warranting an accounting nor any of the other elements of the claim. Indeed, as noted supra in § I, plaintiffs may petition the NRC to address their concerns regarding alleged mismanagement. Their request for an accounting is thus denied. Accordingly, count IV is dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' class action complaint is granted. This case is terminated.