JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL, District Judge.
BioSante is a specialty pharmaceutical company focused on developing products for female sexual health and oncology. BioSante developed LibiGel, a low-dose testosterone gel that is applied to the skin on the upper arm. LibiGel was meant to treat women with hypoactive sexual desire disorder ("HSDD"), which is a form of female sexual dysfunction ("FSD"). Stephen Simes is BioSante's Vice Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer. Plaintiffs Thomas Norgiel and Jeffrey Rennell assert that they purchased shares of BioSante at an artificially inflated price. They filed this case on behalf of themselves and others who purchased BioSante shares during the class period.
BioSante and Simes have moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint's fraud allegations do not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) or the pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 et seq. Alternatively, they contend that their forward-looking statements are protected by the PSLRA's safe harbor, the complaint fails to allege facts that demonstrate scienter, and the plaintiffs' claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b), is unavailing as they failed to establish that a defendant is directly liable under the Act.
For the following reasons, the court finds that the complaint fails to satisfy the PSLRA's pleading requirements. All of the defendants' remaining arguments turn, in whole or in part, on allegedly false and misleading statements allegedly made by BioSante or Simes. As detailed below, the court cannot ascertain which statements were allegedly misleading, the reason or reasons why each statement was misleading, and whether the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts creating a strong inference of scienter. Thus, the motion to dismiss is granted, and the court will not reach the defendants' alternative arguments. The plaintiffs are given 28 days to amend their complaint if they choose to do so.
Clinical trials typically have three phases:
Compl. at ¶ 66 (Dkt. 90).
Treatment with LibiGel in a 2004 Phase II double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial demonstrated significantly increased satisfying sexual events in surgically menopausal women with FSD. According to the plaintiffs, BioSante's 2004 Form 10-K represented that "the Phase II trial showed `statistically significant' results for the primary endpoints of the study. The study consisted of 46 surgically menopausal women, and was powered to determine which dose of LibiGel would have the greatest effect on women's sexual activity." Id. at ¶ 69. BioSante also reported a "238 percent increase from baseline (p < 0.0001) 10 in the frequency of satisfying sexual events as measured by individual patient diaries" and characterized the result as "significant versus placebo (p < 0.05)." Id. BioSante Phase II's data indicated there was "an effective LibiGel dose for the treatment of HSDD in women, and that LibiGel was well-tolerated during the course of the trial, and had a safety profile similar to that of the placebo, with no women discontinuing use due to adverse events." Id.
BioSante subsequently conducted three Phase III double-blind, placebo-controlled studies of LibiGel. Two studies were meant to examine efficacy, and the third was a cardiovascular and breast cancer safety study.
On April 5, 2011, Simes spoke at the Biocentury and Thomson Reuters Future Leaders in the Biotech Industry Conference. He commented on the LibiGel Phase III clinical development trials, stating:
Id. at ¶ 39.
On April 15, 2011, Simes presented at the Future Leaders in the Biotech Industry Conference and told attendees:
Id. at ¶ 95.
During an October 21, 2011, presentation at the BioCentury Newsmakers in the Biotech Industry Conference, Simes again commented on LibiGel, stating:
Id. at ¶ 40.
In addition, during an October 25, 2011, presentation at the BioTechnology Industry Organization Investor Forum, Simes stated:
Id. at ¶ 41.
A former BioSante employee who served as the Senior Project Manager for the LibiGel Phase III safety study from March 2008 through September 2011 is a confidential witness in this case. She stated that a typical clinical trial dropout rate ranges from 5% to 10%. She believed that the LibiGel Phase III efficacy and safety trials had unusually high dropout rates,
In addition, the confidential witness observed that investigators at investigative sites associated with the LibiGel trials received relatively expensive gifts from BioSante, such as iPads and iPhones, that did not comply with regulations restricting the value of gifts. She also noted that Simes was authorized to make decisions about patient eligibility to participate in the safety trial. Specifically, questions about a patient's eligibility to enroll in the Phase III trial safety trial would occasionally arise. Certain BioSante executives brought these eligibility questions to Simes, who decided whether to enroll the patient in the study.
The plaintiffs claim that BioSante was aware of significant disagreements in the scientific community regarding FSD and took advantage of investors by inaccurately claiming that insufficient testosterone levels caused HSDD and failing to disclose the "controversial nature of diagnosing and treating HSDD." Id. at ¶ 55. According to the plaintiffs, the source of female sexual dysfunctions such as HSDD are unknown. They assert that medical and pharmaceutical communities disagree about whether HSDD is a physiological or psychological issue or a combination of both. They also contend that because HSDD has a psychological aspect, a greater number of women participating in clinical trials who receive a placebo report a greater perceived improvement in their HSDD condition than would be the case when testing drugs for other conditions. The plaintiffs call this the "placebo effect."
The plaintiffs also point out that the American Psychiatric Association decided to remove HSDD from the diagnostic manual used by psychiatrists because, among other things, it believed that the word "hypoactive" incorrectly implied that a testosterone deficiency caused the disorder. In addition, they allege that the defendants "undoubtedly were aware of the controversial nature of the HSDD condition within the medical community." Id. at ¶ 53. In support, they note that before HSDD was removed from the diagnostic manual, BioSante entered a Special Protocol Assessment agreement with the FDA.
In December of 2011, BioSante announced the results of the two Phase III
In a conference call in December of 2011 immediately following the release of the Phase III efficacy trial results, Simes stated:
Id. at ¶ 60.
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, against BioSante and Simes (Count I). It also alleges violations of § 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), against Simes (Count II).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court takes all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiffs' favor, although conclusory allegations that merely recite the elements of a claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth. Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206,
Allegations of fraud are subject to a heightened pleading standard. Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b). This means the plaintiffs must, at a minimum, provide the time, place, and content of the alleged false representations, the method by which the representations were communicated, and the identities of the parties to those representations. Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir.2001); see also Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 569 (7th Cir.2012) ("[T]he plaintiff must allege the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud.") (internal quotations omitted).
In addition, under the PSLRA's pleading standards, a securities fraud complaint must: (1) "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed"; and (2) "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(2).
The court's consideration of the motion to dismiss begins and ends with Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA's pleading requirements. BioSante contends that the fraud allegations in the complaint are insufficient because they consist of "large blocks of text from Defendants' public filings, press releases, conference calls and speeches" which the plaintiffs characterize as "false and misleading." Dkt. 95 at 4. In their response, the plaintiffs state that the bolded and italicized sections of the 14-page section of the complaint entitled "false and misleading statements issued during the class period" (not the entire section) form the basis of their fraud claim.
It appears that the plaintiffs intend the court and the defendants to parse through their complaint in an attempt to: (1) locate reasons why the plaintiffs believe that the italicized/bolded statements are misleading; and (2) find specific facts corresponding to those statements that "giv[e] rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2). These supporting details might be in the sections of the complaint labeled "false and misleading statements issued during the class period," "the truth regarding the failed trials is revealed," "scienter allegations." They could be elsewhere in the lengthy complaint as well.
The salient point is that the court cannot ascertain which allegations are meant to match up with the italicized/bolded portions of the complaint. As one of the court's colleagues noted when dismissing a similarly confusing complaint:
Conlee v. WMS Indus., Inc., No. 11 C 3503, 2012 WL 3042498, at *4 (N.D.Ill. July 25, 2012).
The italics/bolding system described in the plaintiffs' response to the motion to dismiss further adds to the confusion as the complaint contains words that appear to be italicized and bolded for emphasis. For example, the plaintiffs allege:
Compl. At ¶ 82 (emphasis in original).
The italized/bolded words in this paragraph are cryptic. The words "
In sum, neither Rule 9(b) nor the PSLRA allows a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss based on the length of a complaint alone. Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts necessary to support his fraud claim in a clear and understandable manner. Because the current iteration of the complaint fails to meet this standard, it is dismissed.
The defendants contend that the court should dismiss this action with prejudice because amendment would be futile. It is true that under Delaware law, if a defendant files a motion to dismiss and the plaintiff files an answering brief opposing the motion instead of an amended complaint, a subsequent dismissal of the plaintiff's claims pursuant to the defendant's motion will be with prejudice unless "dismissing with prejudice would not be just under all the circumstances." Braddock v. Zimmerman, 906 A.2d 776, 783 (Del.2006). Nevertheless, such a remedy is "drastic." King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1151-52 (Del.2011). It is conceivable that the plaintiffs could correct the defects identified in this order by amending their complaint. Accordingly, in an exercise of its discretion, the court will afford the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend. See Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 698 (7th Cir.2008) (the decision to grant leave to amend is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard).
Consistent with this order and counsel's Rule 11 obligations, the plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within 28 days of the issuance of this order, if they choose to do so. When preparing their amended complaint, the plaintiffs should focus on the quality, not the quantity, of their allegations. They should also bear in mind that the current complaint "is disjointed as to the factual ground it covers and the statements it identifies. The amended complaint (if any) may be shorter, but it may even be longer. The key point for this case is to present the allegations in an easier-to-follow format." Conlee, 2012 WL 3042498, at *5 n. 1.
The court also notes that it considered addressing the remaining arguments in the motion to dismiss in the hope that it would help streamline this litigation. It was unable to do so, as these arguments are necessarily based on the allegations in the complaint and, as discussed above, these allegations are deficient. Thus, the court will allow the plaintiffs to amend and will not reach the defendants' remaining arguments at this time.
For the above reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss the consolidated class action complaint [Dkt. 94] is granted. The plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within 28 days of the date of this order.