MARY M. ROWLAND, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Grzegorz Skutnik filed this action seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for Disability Insur-ance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 423 et seq. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
To recover DIB, a claimant must establish that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). "An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disa-bled." Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
Plaintiff applied for DIB on December 7, 2010, alleging that he became disabled on November 4, 2010, because of back problems. (R. at 41). The application was de-nied initially and on reconsideration, after which Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing. (Id. at 12, 41-44). On May 11, 2012, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Id. at 19-40). The ALJ also heard testimony from Linda Gels, a vocational expert (VE) (id. at 29-31, 35-36), and Laura Rosch, D.O., a medical expert (ME) (id. at 25-29, 37-40, 48).
The ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits on June 7, 2012. (R. at 48-57). Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity from November 4, 2010, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 50). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's arthritis of the left knee and status post total left knee replacement are severe im-pairments. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the severi-ty of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (Id. at 50-51).
The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on August 16, 2013. (R. at 1-3). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by § 405(g) of the Act. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regula-tions. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in gen-eral, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004). "Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).
Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Court must critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ has built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent mean-ingful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff has a history of back problems. He underwent surgery in Poland in 2007. (R. at 26, 186, 242, 277, 302). Plaintiff's symptoms included pain radiating to his extremities and loss of sensation (id. at 186-91), and were probably exacerbated by operating a jackhammer for a long period of time in an awkward position (id. at 242). These symptoms caused Plaintiff to exhibit an unbalanced gait and muscle weakness, and led Plaintiff to seek various modes of treatment, culminating in a second surgery. (Id. at 204-20, 222-25, 228-30, 270-71, 307-08). Plaintiff's im-pairment prevented him from taking work as a bricklayer, his longtime occupation. (Id. at 24, 50).
In January 2010, Plaintiff sought treatment for low back and right leg pain. (R. at 228-30, 247-59). Following referral by Andrzej Indyk, M.D., Plaintiff underwent radiology examination. (Id. at 248-57). An MRI revealed moderate degenerative changes at L3-L4, L4-L5, and L5-S1 with myositis ossificans extending from the left transverse process of L2 to the left transverse process of L5. (Id. at 250-51, 256-57). Examination showed sizable L4-L5 central disc herniation, mild disc bulging at L3-L4 with minimal bilateral foraminal stenosis and bilateral facet arthropathy, and small disc herniation
On February 24, 2010, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Cabin, who noted weak-ness on dorsiflexion, a "very antalgic" gait,
On December 4, 2010, Plaintiff reported low back pain, and began chiropractic treatment with Allen Buresz, D.C. (R. at 204-20, 317). Dr. Buresz opined that con-servative treatment would not be effective, and that Plaintiff should schedule sur-gery. (Id. at 317). Treatment from Dr. Buresz included spinal manipulation, mas-sage, homeopathic medicines, and ultrasound. (Id.). Plaintiff complained of pain in the back, gluteal region, and legs, (Id.), the latter being more severe when sitting, (Id. at 206, 207). During this time, starting in Feb 2011, Plaintiff returned to treat-ment with Dr. Indyk, and was administered epidural blocks.
On February 18, 2011, Dilip Patel, M.D., examined Plaintiff at the request of the DDS. (R. at 186-191). Dr. Patel noted intact strength and sensation, and a normal gait without need of an assistive device, a positive straight leg raise on the right at 40 degrees, and negative on the left. (Id. at 187). Dr. Patel found that Plaintiff was able to heel-toe walk with difficulty, to squat and arise with moderate difficulty, and to get on and off the exam table with difficulty, and observed moderate muscle spasm. (Id. at 188). The doctor found a reduced range of motion to 50/90 flexion, 5/25 extension, and 10/25 lateral bending. (Id. at 189). The doctor diagnosed lum-bosacral degenerative disc disease, a prolapsed disc with radiculopathy symptoms. (Id.).
On March 2, 2011, Frank Jimenez, M.D., a DDS consultant, reviewed the medi-cal records and completed an RFC assessment. (R. at 196-203). He concluded that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, and could stand, walk, and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. (Id. at 197). Dr. Jimenez further concluded that Plaintiff could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Id. at 198).
In September 2011, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Indyk and cleared for surgery. (R. at 274).
In a postoperative examination on November 11, 2011, Dr. Sokolowski was op-timistic. (R. at 307). He noted negative straight leg raise, symmetrically intact strength with respect to quadriceps, dorsiflexors, plantar flexors, and EHL.
The ME testified that Dr. Sokolowski's post-operative examinations did not demonstrate evidence of straight-leg positive pain, atrophy, antalgic gait, use of an assistive device, claudication, foot drop, and focal neurologic deficits. (R. at 27). Nor did Dr. Sokolowski order additional EMGs or consider additional surgeries. (Id.). Thus, the ME concluded that Plaintiff's alleged limitations were not supported by the medical record. (Id.). The ME opined that prior to surgery, Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work and post-surgery to light work. (Id. at 28).
Plaintiff raises three arguments in support of his request for a reversal and re-mand:
(1) the ALJ improperly weighed the opinion of Dr. Sokolowski, the Plaintiff's treating physician; (2) the ALJ's credibility determination was patently wrong; and
(3) the ALJ's RFC determination was erroneous. (Mot. 1, 7-16). The Court address-es each argument in turn.
Treating physician Dr. Sokolowski saw Plaintiff five times, twice both before and after surgery, and once in performing the surgery. (R. at 269-71, 297, 301, 307, 308). The relationship continued from late September 2011 to January 2012. (Id.). A few days after the surgery, Dr. Sokolowski opined that Plaintiff would not be able "to return to his prior occupation for at least 12 months." (R. at 306). Following a post-surgery examination, Dr. Sokolowski opined that Plaintiff should not push, pull, or lift more than 10 to 15 pounds "to minimize [the] risk of recurrence," (R. at 308), while "[s]itting and standing are limited to 15-minute increments with a need for break in between." (Id.). Dr. Sokolowski recommended these limitations be ob-served "going forward on [an] ongoing basis in light of the chronicity of [Plaintiff's] symptoms." (Id.).
The ALJ gave Dr. Sokolowski's opinion little weight:
(R. at 55). Instead, the ALJ afforded "great weight" to the ME's opinion. (Id. at 54). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly limited the weight afforded Dr. Sokolowski's opinion. (Mot. 7-8). Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to weigh Dr. Sokolowski's opinion using the factors described in Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2009), and failed to provide a sound explanation for rejecting the doctor's opinion. (Id.).
By rule, "in determining whether a claimant is entitled to Social Security disa-bility benefits, special weight is accorded opinions of the claimant's treating physician." Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003). The opinion of a treating source is entitled to controlling weight if the opinion "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not in-consistent with the other substantial evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); accord Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2008). A treating physician typically has a better opportunity to judge a claimant's limitations than a nontreating physi-cian. Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 1996); Grindle v. Sullivan, 774 F.Supp. 1501, 1507-08 (N.D. Ill. 1991). "More weight is given to the opinion of treat-ing physicians because of their greater familiarity with the claimant's conditions and circumstances." Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). There-fore, an ALJ "must offer `good reasons' for discounting a treating physician's opin-ion," and "can reject an examining physician's opinion only for reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record; a contradictory opinion of a non-examining phy-sician does not, by itself, suffice." Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); other citation omitted). In determining what weight to give a treating physician's opinion, an ALJ shall "consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the physician's specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and sup-portability of the physician's opinion." Moss, 555 F.3d at 561.
After careful review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ's opinion is sup-ported by substantial evidence, and provides sufficient "detail and clarity." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).
To be afforded controlling weight, medical opinions need to be based on tests and observations, and not amount merely to recitation of a claimant's complaints. Ketel-boeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008); Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004). Here, Dr. Sokolowski parroted Plaintiff's reported limitations without modification. (Compare R. at 308 (Plaintiff reporting that "he can stand for about 15 minutes before he needs to take a break secondary to back pain"; "he can sit for about 15 minutes before he needs to change position"; and "he is unable to lift more than 10 to 15 pounds without significant pain") with id. (Dr. Sokolowski con-cluding that Plaintiff's "[s]itting and standing are limited to 15-minute increments with a need for break in between" and limiting Plaintiff "to pushing, pulling, or lift-ing no more than 10 to 15 pounds")). Plaintiff posits that Dr. Sokolowski's "opinion was not based on [Plaintiff's] subjective description of his limitations but on Dr. Sokolowski's expertise as an orthopedic surgeon." (Reply 2). But this is mere specu-lation by Plaintiff—and nothing in the record supports such a conclusion. (See gen-erally R. at 297-308). Moreover, Dr. Sokolowski's examination of Plaintiff was un-remarkable. A straight leg test was negative bilaterally; strength was symmetrical-ly intact with respect to quadriceps, dorsiflexors, plantar flexors, and EHL bilateral-ly; sensation was intact to light touch in all dermatomal distributions;
Plaintiff contends that the "ALJ did not identify the clinical manifestations that should have been present to support the restrictions proposed by the doctor." (Mot. 8). But a claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868. In any event, the ME reviewed the record and found no evidence of positive straight leg raise, antalgic gait, use of an assistive device, muscle atrophy, claudica-tion, foot drop, or focal neurological deficits. (R. at 27). The ME's conclusions were adopted by the ALJ (id. at 54) and rebut Plaintiff's contention.
The ALJ found inconsistency between Dr. Sokolowski's opinions with regard to Plaintiff's ability to return to work a year after the surgery and later-imposed func-tional limitations. (R. at 55); see Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007) (an ALJ may discount a treating physician's opinion as being internally in-consistent). On October 27, 2011, a few days after Plaintiff's surgery, Dr. Sokolowski opined that Plaintiff would not be able "to return to his prior occupation for at least 12 months." (R. at 306). This conclusion was contradicted by Dr. Sokolowski's January 2012 opinion that Plaintiff is limited indefinitely to lifting 10 to 15 pounds.
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Sokolowski's January 2012 opinion is consistent with his pre-surgery advice that while the surgery would potentially ameliorate Plain-tiff's radicular pain, it would have no effect on his back pain. (Mot. 9; see R. at 302). But Dr. Sokolowski's pre-surgery advice does not explain the apparent inconsisten-cy between his two post-surgery opinions. Plaintiff also argues that just because "the outcome of the surgery did not match the optimistic outcome that Dr. Sokolowski proposed immediately subsequent to the surgery did not render the lat-er opinion of [Plaintiff's] functional capacity any less valid." (Reply 3). Nevertheless, as discussed below, Dr. Sokolowski's opinion is not supported by objective medical evidence.
Dr. Sokolowski's opinion was contradicted by his own examinations. On Novem-ber 10, 2011, Plaintiff's straight leg test was negative bilaterally; his strength was symmetrically intact with respect to quadriceps, dorsiflexors, plantar flexors, and EHL bilaterally; sensation was intact to light touch in all dermatomal distributions; and Plaintiff's surgical incision was clean, dry and intact. (R. at 307). Dr. Sokolowski's examination yielded similar unremarkable results on January 11, 2012, when he opined that Plaintiff was functionally limited to sitting and standing for no more than 15 minutes and pushing, pulling, or lifting no more than 10 to 15 pounds. (Id. at 308). Moreover, Dr. Sokolowski noted that Plaintiff's functional limi-tations could be due to deconditioning. (Id.). Thus, the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Sokolowski's "own reports fail to reveal the type of significant clinical and laborato-ry abnormalities one would expect if [Plaintiff] were in fact disabled" (id. at 55) is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Sokolowski "had the benefit of reviewing an MRI of [Plaintiff's] lumber spine before issuing his [January 2012] opinion." (Mot. 8). But the MRI predated Plaintiff's back surgery (see R. at 290-91), and thus has no bear-ing on Dr. Sokolowski's post-surgery opinion. Moreover, Plaintiff reported to both Dr. Sokolowski and Dr. Indyk that his pain had significantly improved post-surgery. (Id. at 307, 319). On March 3, 2012, Dr. Indyk reduced Plaintiff's pain medication after he reported that his pain had subsided. (Id. at 319; accord id. at 52). Similarly, at the hearing, Plaintiff admitted that his pain had lessened since his surgery. (Id. at 33). And the ME testified that Plaintiff's post-surgery physical examinations did not show evidence of positive straight leg raise, antalgic gait, use of an assistive de-vice, muscle atrophy, claudication, foot drop, or focal neurological deficits and that no more EMGs or surgeries had been planned. (Id. at 27).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate Dr. Sokolowski's opinion using the required list of factors (Mot. 7-8), including "the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the physician's specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician's opinion." Moss, 555 F.3d at 561; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). After carefully review-ing the record, the Court concludes otherwise. As discussed above, the ALJ consid-ered the consistency and supportability of Dr. Sokolowski's opinions. The ALJ dis-cussed the medical evidence provided by Dr. Sokolowski in detail, and in so doing recounted the length, nature and extent of that doctor's relationship with Plaintiff, and the frequency of examination thereof. (See R. at 54-55). The ALJ mentioned each interaction of Plaintiff with Dr. Sokolowski, noted the result of each visit, and recounted Dr. Sokolowski's medical opinions. (Id.). The ALJ acknowledged the Dr. Sokolowski was a treating source and an orthopedic surgeon. (Id. at 54). And the ALJ observed that Dr. Sokolowski's post-surgery examinations were essentially un-remarkable. (Id. at 53-54).
The ALJ properly weighed the various physicians' opinions, and his decision to give the greatest weight to the ME's opinion was supported by substantial evidence. See Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006) (ALJ determines how much weight to give various medical opinions, which the Court will uphold if sup-ported by substantial evidence.). In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ provided substantial evidence to support his ruling, and the reasons presented were specific enough for the Court to follow. See Moss, 555 F.3d at 561.
On May 11, 2012, approximately six months after his lumber spine surgery, Plaintiff testified that he could only walk 30 to 40 feet due to left leg pain and numbness in the toes. (R. at 25). Plaintiff further alleged that his condition led him to lie down to rest for one to two hours, generally with a frequency of once every three to four hours. (Id. at 33-34). He said the pain prevented him from sitting com-fortably for more than an hour (id. at 34), or from lifting more than five to eight pounds (id. at 34-35), and woke him up "at least two times" during the night. (Id. at 34). Plaintiff testified that he felt "a little, slightly better" following his surgery. (Id. at 33).
In his decision, the ALJ made the following credibility determination:
(R. at 52-54) (citations omitted).
An ALJ's credibility determination may be overturned only if it is "patently wrong." Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008). In determining credibility, "an ALJ must consider several factors, including the claimant's daily activities, [his] level of pain or symptoms, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and limita-tions, and justify the finding with specific reasons." Villano, 556 F.3d at 562 (cita-tions omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Social Security Ruling (SSR)
The Court will uphold an ALJ's credibility finding if the ALJ gives specific reasons for that finding, supported by substantial evidence. Moss, 555 F.3d at 561. The ALJ's decision "must contain specific reasons for a credibility finding; the ALJ may not simply recite the factors that are described in the regulations." Steele, 290 F.3d at 942 (citation omitted); see SSR 96-7p. "Without an adequate explanation, neither the applicant nor subsequent reviewers will have a fair sense of how the applicant's testimony is weighed." Steele, 290 F.3d at 942.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff's testimony about the nature and extent of his ailments, and claims legal error in the ALJ's development of the record. (Mot. 12-16).
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ relied on boilerplate language and backward rea-soning. (Id. at 16). The ALJ wrote:
(R. at 54). This is the same language that the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly de-scribed as "meaningless boilerplate" because it "yields no clue to what weight the [ALJ] gave the testimony." Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012). "However, the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination." Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, the ALJ pointed to substantial evidence to sup-port his conclusion that Plaintiff's testimony concerning his physical limitations was not reliable.
In finding that the objective evidence did not support the extent of Plaintiff's claimed limitations, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's self-reported ability to care for himself (R. at 52), the success of his surgery (id. at 52, 54), the positive effect of medical management of Plaintiff's pain (id. at 52), and the results of physical exam-inations (id. at 54). The ALJ weighed this evidence against Plaintiff's testimony. (See id. at 52 ("Despite these allegations [of reduced capacity], the [Plaintiff] stated that his condition has no effect on his ability to care for his personal needs, which is not what one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limita-tions."), 54 ("Despite the [Plaintiff's] subjective reports and allegations that he could only sit and stand for fifteen minutes at a time, physical examinations from that time are essentially normal.")). These findings provide ample support for the ALJ's determination. See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 367-68.
After carefully and thoroughly reviewing the record, the ALJ found that Plain-tiff's October 2011 surgery was successful in controlling the worst of Plaintiff's symptoms (R. at 52), and "the objective findings in this case fail to provide strong support for the [Plaintiff's] allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations" (id. at 53). Before being operated on, Plaintiff exhibited a "markedly antalgic" gait, a positive straight leg raise on both sides, weakness in left ankle dorsiflexion and plantar flexion, along with radiating back pain. (Id. at 301). Plaintiff's surgery was routine and performed without any complications, as summarized by Dr. Sokolowski. (Id. at 303-05). Two weeks later, a physical examination found nega-tive straight leg raise and intact strength and sensation bilaterally. (Id. at 307). Plaintiff's surgical incision was clean, dry, and intact. (Id.). A physical examination in January 2012 revealed similar, unremarkable results. (Id. at 308). And the ME testified that Plaintiff's post-surgery physical examinations did not show evidence of positive straight leg raise, antalgic gait, use of an assistive device, muscle atrophy, claudication, foot drop, or focal neurological deficits and that no more EMGs or sur-geries were planned. (Id. at 27).
Plaintiff's testimony contradicted his own statements. While Plaintiff reported following surgery that the tingling and numbness had ceased and his leg pain "had likely resolved" (R. at 307), at the hearing he alleged that he could only walk 30 to 40 feet due to left leg pain and numbness in the toes (id. at 25). As the Seventh Cir-cuit has noted, Social Security claimants have an incentive to exaggerate their symptoms. Johnson, 449 F.3d at 805. Here, Plaintiff's hearing testimony reflected more severe impairments than those he reported to his doctors. Following surgery, Plaintiff reported lessening lumbar pain, absence of leg pain, and lack of numbness or tingling in the extremities to Dr. Sokolowski (id.), and that his pain had lessened, to Dr. Indyk. (Id. at 319). On March 3, 2012, Dr. Indyk reduced Plaintiff's pain medication after he reported that his pain had subsided. (Id. at 319; accord id. at 52). Plaintiff has not reported any side effects from his medications and testified that his pain had lessened since his surgery. (Id. at 33; accord id. at 52).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly assessed his credibility by failing to consider activities of daily living. (Mot. 12-13; Reply 7-8). On the contrary, the ALJ explicitly cited Plaintiff's statements that his condition had no effect on his ability to care for his personal needs. (R. at 52). Indeed, on March 30, 2011, seven months before his successful back surgery, Plaintiff stated that his impairments had "no ef-fect" on his ability to care for his personal needs. (Id. at 118). Similarly on June 15, 2011, Plaintiff again reported that his impairments had "no effect" on his ability to care for his personal needs.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ was required to consider Plaintiff's long work history in making a credibility determination, citing a few cases in which work his-tory was weighed. (Mot. 14-15; Reply 9-10). However, while an irregular or lacka-daisical work history might weigh against a Plaintiff's credibility, Plaintiff has not identified and the Court has not found any case or regulation requiring a strong work history to weigh in favor of a claimant's credibility. In any event, "the stand-ard of review for credibility determinations is extremely deferential, and the ALJ did provide some evidence supporting [his] determination." Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013). As discussed above, the Plaintiff's hearing testimo-ny was contradicted by the medical evidence and Plaintiff's previous statements.
In sum, while Plaintiff has demonstrated severe impairments, the ALJ properly concluded that "the objective findings in this case fail to provide strong support for [Plaintiff's] allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations." (R. at 53). The Court concludes that the ALJ's credibility determination was not "patently wrong." See Craft, 539 F.3d at 678. The ALJ's credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence and was specific enough for the Court to understand the ALJ's reasoning. See Moss, 555 F.3d at 561; Skinner, 478 F.3d at 845.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was able to perform the full range of light work. Although the Plaintiff is impaired by an L4-L5 disc herniation with central canal stenosis (R. at 50), the ALJ concluded that the objective medical evidence did not support limitations more restrictive than those permitting the full range of light work. (Id. at 51-56).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not explain how this improvement led to the conclusion that Plaintiff was able to perform light work. (Mot. 14). Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ did not determine if the evidence supported Plaintiff's alleged need to lie down throughout the day (id. 11), and that the ALJ ignored the range of motion limitations recommended by Dr. Patel in a consultative examination (id. 14).
"The RFC is an assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can per-form despite her limitations." Young, 362 F.3d at 1000; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) ("Your residual functional capacity is the most you can still do de-spite your limitations."); SSR 96-8p, at *2 ("RFC is an administrative assessment of the extent to which an individual's medically determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do work-related physical and men-tal activities."). The RFC is based upon medical evidence as well as other evidence, such as testimony by the claimant or his friends and family. Craft, 539 F.3d at 676. In assessing a claimant's RFC, "the ALJ must evaluate all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe," and may not dismiss evidence contrary to the ALJ's determination. Villano, 556 F.3d at 563; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) ("We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all relevant evidence in your case record."); SSR 96-8p, at *7 ("The RFC assessment must include a discussion of why reported symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence.").
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have included Plaintiff's need to lie down during the day in the RFC. (Mot. 10). However, as discussed above, the ALJ proper-ly discredited Plaintiff's testimony with respect to his claimed functional limitations. Even so, the ALJ did not entirely discount the Plaintiff's testimony. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff "does experience some level of pain and limitations, but only to the extent described in the residual functional capacity above." (R. at 56). The ALJ did not clear Plaintiff to return to his previous work as a bricklayer (id. at 55), even though such work was performed by Plaintiff at a medium rather than a heavy lev-el, according to Plaintiff's self-report and the VE's testimony (id. at 30-31).
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to account for the postural limita-tions recommended by Dr. Patel in a consultative examination. (Mot. 14; see R. at 186-91). The Court finds sufficient evidence that the ALJ incorporated these limita-tions, and that, alternatively, any error was harmless. First, Dr. Jiminez explicitly took Dr. Patel's postural limitations into account and concluded that they did not restrict Plaintiff's ability to perform a full range of light work, which includes occa-sional stooping. (R. at 196-203); see SSR 83-14; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The ALJ adopted Dr. Jiminez's opinion regarding light work. (R. at 54).
Second, the Court finds no evidence of postural limitations for any 12-month pe-riod. And the record does not support postural limitations following Plaintiff's sec-ond surgery. The ME opined, after reviewing Plaintiff's medical record, that Plain-tiff would have been limited to sedentary work before his surgery in October 2011, but post-surgery, Plaintiff is capable of work at the light level. (R. at 28). Neither the ME nor Dr. Sokolowski made mention of postural limitations. (See id. at 26-28).
Even assuming the ALJ should have explicitly included Dr. Patel's findings in the RFC, the Court finds such error harmless. Sedentary work does not require any significant bending or stooping. See SSR 83-10. But even if plaintiff were limited to sedentary work prior to surgery, as the ME opined, the ALJ noted that the Grids would still mandate a finding of not disabled. (R. at 57). Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC, and that, alternatively, any such error was harmless.
For the reasons stated above Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Final Decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security [17] is
