JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL, District Judge.
This case is an in rem civil forfeiture action about cash seized from a safe in a minivan parked in the driveway of a North Chicago residence. Contending that the funds were used in narcotics trafficking, the government seeks forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). The court previously denied the government's motion for summary judgment but issued a rule to show cause why the court should not grant the government's motion that required claimants Pedro Cruz-Hernandez and Abraham Pedro Cruz-Hernandez to identify any additional evidence that supported their claim of ownership.
The latest round of filings does not challenge the court's prior summary of the facts relating to the discovery of the safe containing the money at issue in this case. The court previously summarized those facts as follows:
(Dkt. 51 at 2-3.)
In their supplemental memorandum, the claimants challenge portions of the following additional facts set forth in the court's prior summary judgment opinion:
(Id. at 3).
When the court previously considered the government's motion for summary judgment, the claimants' evidence supporting their claim of ownership consisted of their affidavits asserting ownership and their claim for the seized $271,080 that was filed in this case. The claim states that the claimants "are the lawful, legitimate and rightful owners of all $271,080.00 U.S. Currency seized" and that the "[c]laimants were not involved in any criminal activity whatsoever. If any criminal activity occurred, claimants were innocent owners and did not know of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture." (Claim ¶¶ 1, 3, Dkt. 7.) Both claimants signed the claim "[u]nder oath and being subject to the penalties of perjury." (Id. at 2.)
The claimants' supplemental memorandum attaches two new affidavits from Pedro and Abraham. Pedro's latest affidavit focuses on the deposition testimony that the court previously found contradicted multiple other statements disavowing an interest in the seized funds. He challenges the government's characterization of a portion of his deposition testimony regarding his statement to the police denying that he owned the funds. He also asserts that he gave money to his brother Abraham for safekeeping and that "throughout this litigation" he did not know where Abraham placed the money. (Dkt. 50-2 at 4.) He thus concludes that he did not knowingly disavow an interest in the money on June 9, 2012, when he told the police that the money in the safe was not his.
In Abraham's latest affidavit, he states that he disavowed any interest in the seized funds to immigration officials in 2012 (both before and after the money was seized) because, "as a non-English speaker with a limited education," he did not physically possess funds that had been seized and thus did not know that he needed to disclose his claim of ownership in his immigration documents. (Dkt. 60-3, at 3-4.) Abraham also asserts that his language challenges prevented him from understanding the terms "assets" and "equities" so he did not realize that the funds at issue in this case were "assets" that needed to be disclosed. (Id. at 4.)
The court will, in an exercise of its discretion, evaluate the new submissions de novo using the legal standard applicable to summary judgment motions, rather than the more restrictive standard applicable to motions to reconsider. Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Smith v. Hope Sch., 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] factual dispute is `genuine' only if a reasonable jury could find for either party." SMS Demag Aktiengesellschaft v. Material Scis.Corp., 565 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2009). The court ruling on the motion construes all facts and makes all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is warranted when the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element of its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012).
When claimants file a claim of ownership under Supplemental Rule G(5)(a)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, their claim is evidence; "[i]t must be signed under penalty of perjury and identify the claimant and the nature of his interest." United States v. Funds in the Amount of $574,840, 719 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Supplemental Rule G of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "the government may move to strike a claim . . . because the claimant lacks standing." Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. G(8)(c)(i).
"[W]hen a plaintiff/claimant is confronted with a valid challenge to his standing . . . it is no longer sufficient to simply rest on the facial validity of his standing claim." United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 11 C 4448, 2014 WL 5023453, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2014). Instead, he must point to evidence establishing the validity of his claim using a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. G(8)(c)(ii)(B).
The claimants take issue with the court's finding that they previously disclaimed ownership of the funds, both under oath in their depositions and elsewhere. If so, the claimants' sworn testimony would contradict their affidavits asserting that they own the funds at issue. This would mean that the affidavits are not enough to withstand the government's motion for summary judgment.
In the affidavit submitted with the claimants' response to the rule to show cause, Pedro denies telling police that he did not own the money recovered from the safe or know who owned the money. He also argues that his deposition testimony does not contradict any alleged statement to the police. Instead, he contends that his testimony shows that he was "confused," that the government's questions were open-ended and thus were unanswerable, and that he "never provided sworn testimony that he disclaimed ownership." (Dkt. 60 at 2.)
As noted by the government, the record contains a transcript of Pedro's interview with a North Chicago Police officer on June 9, 2012, shortly after the defendant currency was seized. The transcript contradicts Pedro's current position regarding his statements to law enforcement:
(Doc. 43-5, at pp. 13-16.)
Despite this testimony, Pedro asserts that during his deposition, he did not say that his statements to the police were truthful. In support, he points to the following exchange:
(Dkt. 60-1, Ex. A at 95:5-97:10.)
This portion of Pedro's deposition testimony is, at best, evasive. In any event, in his summary judgment filings, Pedro agreed that this same deposition testimony shows that he "provided the North Chicago Police with truthful and complete answers in response to their questions." (Dkt. 46 at 6, ¶ 21). Moreover, in addition to the deposition excerpt quoted above, during Pedro's deposition, he agreed that "because of [his] phone call with [his] brother [he] learned that [his] money was in the safe" and that on the night of the home invasion, he "knew that at least half of the money in the safe was [his]." (Dkt. 61-6 at 52:15-18, 53:11-20.) He also agreed that he had "answered several times [during the deposition] that [Abraham told him] that night that there was money in the safe." (Id. at 54:6-16.)
In addition, in the claimants' statement of additional facts filed with this court in opposition to the government's motion for summary judgment, Pedro and Abraham stated that they "placed this savings [cash earned from working as disc jockeys] in a black safe, which has been described in Plaintiff's Complaint for Forfeiture, as well as its Motion for Summary Judgment." See Dkt. 46 at 22. This affirmative representation flatly contradicts Pedro's new affidavit stating that he "was unaware where my brother, Abraham, placed my funds while he was safekeeping them for me" and that "throughout this litigation" he has maintained that he "was unaware" where Abraham put the money.
In sum, the court gave Pedro an opportunity to present additional evidence to support his claim. It did not authorize him to jettison all of his prior admissions (including his sworn deposition testimony) and start over again with a different version of the facts. Pedro's sworn deposition testimony speaks for itself (as do his summary judgment filings submitted with the assistance of counsel). A litigant may not "manufacture material fact questions by affidavit testimony that contradicts prior sworn testimony." United States v. Funds in the Amount of $100,120.00, 730 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2013). Pedro's efforts to use his new affidavit to distance himself from his deposition is, therefore, unavailing.
Like Pedro, Abraham has submitted a new affidavit attempting to distance himself from his statements to immigration officials disclaiming any interest in the seized funds. In this affidavit, he states that he did not understand that he needed to disclose the money from the safe to the immigration officials because the money had been taken from him and was not currently in his possession. He also asserts that as a non-English speaker with a limited education, he did not understand that he needed to disclose the money.
A "record of deportable/inadmissible alien" form dated April 30, 2012 (approximately two months before the seizure) memorializes Abraham's statement to immigration officials that he did not have any "Monies Due/Property in U.S. Not in Immediate Possession." (Dkt. 43-6 at 2.) At this time, the safe was in Abraham's basement. Thus, his contention that he did not realize he needed to disclose the money because it had been taken from him fails to match up with the timeline of events.
In addition, on October 5, 2012, Abraham filed the DEA claim at issue in this case that asserts a claim of ownership. Nevertheless, in November 2012, Abraham disavowed ownership to immigration officials when he filed — under penalty of perjury — an application for cancellation of removal status. Abraham cannot have it both ways; he either has an ownership interest in the money (per his DEA claim) or he does not (per his statements to immigration officials). Abraham himself answered this conundrum at his deposition, when he testified that he gave "complete and truthful answers" to the immigration officials, "told the truth," and did not "leave out, omit, information." (Dkt. 43-10 at 68:7-9, 69:1-20.) He cannot retract this testimony via a subsequent affidavit. See Funds in the Amount of $100,120.00, 730 F.3d at 718.
With respect to Abraham's current contention that his language and education limitations mean that he did not understand what information the immigration forms required, the government notes that Abraham competed his application for cancellation of removal status with the assistance of counsel. The form states that the "completed application was read to the applicant in a language the applicant speaks fluently for verification before he . . . signed the application in my [the preparer's] presence." (Dkt. 43-7 at 10.) Abraham's attorney, who helped him fill out the form, also acknowledged that she was "aware that the knowing placement of false information on the Form EOIR-42B may subject [her] to civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. 1324c." (Id.) Abraham's submissions about the alleged language issue are conclusory and do not engage with or acknowledge these statements.
In sum, the court finds that Abraham's affidavit "involve[s] contradictions so clear that the only reasonable inference [is] that [it is] a sham designed to thwart the purposes of summary judgment." Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 13-1934, 2015 WL 2231823, at *10 (7th Cir. May 13, 2015). Abraham, like Pedro, is bound by his prior disavowal of an ownership interest despite his new affidavit.
In the government's motion for summary judgment, it argued that it had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the funds were forfeitable because "there is a substantial connection between the currency and drug trafficking." (Gov't Mem. at 18, Dkt. 43.) The government presented evidence showing that the chain of events culminating with the discovery of the safe containing the money at issue in this case started when the police responded to a 911 call reporting an apparent home invasion. When the officers entered the residence, they did not find an intruder, but say that they saw a 9mm handgun, plastic bags, cannabis, a digital scale with white powder residue, a knife, and zip-tie plastic fasteners in plain view.
The officers observed three vehicles parked in the driveway behind the residence, including a red Chevrolet minivan. A Lake County Deputy Sheriff, who is also a K-9 handler, and a canine owned by the Lake County Sheriff's Department, conducted a narcotic-odor investigation of the vehicles' exteriors. The canine alerted to the presence of narcotics on the van which, according to the officers, contained a safe in plain view. A circuit court judge issued a warrant to search the residence and minivan and seize evidence, including cash and safes. Inside the safe, the officers found $271,080 in cash, bundled together in increments labeled "$5,000." They also found a handwritten ledger that appeared to contain dollar amounts, dates, and names.
In addition, to challenge the claimants' suggestion that the seized currency represented their combined savings from employment, the government submitted the claimants' tax records, bank records, and evidence of their liabilities and expenses, as well as Abraham's immigration documents where he listed his sources of income under penalty of perjury.
The claimants' evidence to the contrary consisted of the verified claims to the money and affidavits stating that they never used or intended to use the funds in drug trafficking and that they earned the funds by working at various jobs over the course of several years. The claimants' affidavits also deny that either had been in the business of selling drugs and that no narcotics had come into contact with the safe, the funds, or the minivan in which police found the safe.
The court previously found that the affidavits were sufficient to create a disputed question of material fact as to whether the claimants legitimately acquired the funds and that this question precluded summary judgment in the government's favor on the issue of forfeitability. Nevertheless, the court observed that it had serious doubts that claimants would be able to demonstrate their ownership interest in the funds at trial or in a summary judgment proceeding on the question of ownership given the claimants' prior disavowals of ownership. Thus, the court ordered the claimants to show cause why it should not grant summary judgment in favor of the government on the merits of their ownership claim.
In response, the claimants submitted the affidavits discussed above. As detailed above, these affidavits (and the claimants' prior affidavits) are conclusory, fail to explain the claimants' prior disavowals of ownership under oath, and are insufficient to negate those prior disavowals. The "general rule" is that "unsubstantiated, self-serving affidavits may be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment" only if they do "not contradict any prior sworn statement." See Funds in the Amount of $100,120.00, 730 F.3d at 718; see also Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252) ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position will be insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party.").
The affidavits submitted by the claimants in this case fail to meet this undemanding standard. The court has given the claimants multiple opportunities to substantiate their claim of ownership via evidence that does not contradict their prior sworn testimony. Nevertheless, the claims of ownership filed in this case, the claimants' sworn denials of an ownership interest, and their contradictory affidavits attempting to retract these denials remain the claimants' sole evidence of ownership.
In contrast, the government has pointed to substantial circumstantial evidence indicating that the claimants' interest in the money is not legitimate and that the money is connected to criminal activity. Given this record, the claimants' problematic affidavits about ownership are simply insufficient. Moreover, the government has set forth a compelling circumstantial case showing that the money at issue is the product of illegal activities. See Funds in the Amount of $239,400, 2014 WL 5023453, at *6 (granting the government's motion for summary judgment where the "totality of the circumstances" — including a positive dog alert, "the sheer amount of cash and its denominational form [and] the unusual way in which it was packaged," the claimant's "suspicious travel arrangements, and the absence of any credible explanation for any [of] it" — established a substantial connection between the cash and illegal narcotics activity). Accordingly, the government's motion for summary judgment is granted.
As detailed above, the court construes the claimants' "memorandum of additional support [60] as a motion to revisit portions of the summary judgment opinion. As such, it is denied. In addition, the claimants' "memorandum of additional support" and supporting materials are insufficient to withstand the government's motion for summary judgment. Thus, the government's motion for summary judgment [43] is granted. The defendant currency in the amount of $271,080 is forfeited to the United States. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
