JORGE L. ALONSO, District Judge.
Plaintiff sues the Board of Education of Bloom Township High School District #206
Plaintiff is the mother of Z.R., a student in Bloom Township High School District #206 who is eligible to receive special education services under the IDEA. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) On July 31, 2013, plaintiff attempted to enroll Z.R. in the District by providing it with all required documents and a copy of Z.R.'s April 23, 2013 individual education plan ("IEP"). (Id. ¶ 14.) Rose Walls, the District's Special Education Coordinator, made a copy of the IEP and did not tell plaintiff that there was anything else she needed to do to enroll Z.R. (Id. ¶ 15.)
On August 1, 2013, Walls told plaintiff that she had to enroll Z.R. twice more; first, at the District Office, and then in a special needs program called "SPEED." (Id. ¶ 16.)
On August 22, 2013, a week after the school year started, Walls scheduled a tour of the SPEED program for plaintiff on September 6, 2013. (Id. ¶ 18.) After the tour, plaintiff told Walls she did not think the program was sufficient to meet Z.R.'s needs. (Id.)
On September 9, 2013, the District conducted a placement IEP meeting for Z.R., but did not provide the statutorily-required notice of the meeting and did not have all of the required participants in attendance. (Id. ¶ 19.) At the end of the meeting, Walls told plaintiff that the District would contact her about Z.R.'s enrollment and placement. (Id.)
On October 7, 2013, plaintiff told District Superintendent Navarre that Z.R. had an April 13, 2013 IEP placing him at Elim Christian Therapeutic Day School, she had met with District representatives regarding the IEP and Z.R.'s placement, but Z.R. was still not in school and she had had no recent contact from the District. (Id. ¶ 20.) Superintendent Navarre told plaintiff that Dawn Angellini, the District's Director of Student Services, would be in touch with her. (Id.)
On December 5, 2013, the District set an IEP meeting for December 16, 2013. (Id. ¶ 21.) On the day of the meeting, Angellini told plaintiff that she needed to enroll Z.R. at Bloom Trail High School before the IEP meeting could be conducted. (Id. ¶ 22.) On December 17, 2013, plaintiff registered Z.R. again, but the District still refused to implement his IEP. (Id.)
Another IEP meeting, with counsel for both sides present, was scheduled for January 23, 2014. (Id. ¶ 23.) "[H]owever, due to inclement weather, [plaintiff's] attorney was unable to be present." (Id.) "The meeting was not re-scheduled by the District until April 1, 2014 despite numerous attempts by [plaintiff] to have an IEP Meeting sooner." (Id.)
On March 31, 2014, plaintiff filed a due process complaint notice, alleging that the District:
(Id., Ex. 1, Due Process Hr'g Decision, Issues.)
On July 30 and September 4 and 5, 2014, an independent hearing officer held a due process hearing on plaintiff's complaint. (Id., Cover Page.) On September 18, 2014, the hearing officer issued a decision, finding for plaintiff on the first five issues in her complaint, i.e., that the District failed to implement Z.R.'s transfer IEP when he enrolled, failed to adopt Z.R.'s previous IEP when plaintiff said she was satisfied with it, failed to conduct an IEP team meeting to adopt Z.R.'s IEP, failed to give Z.R. specialized educational services after he enrolled, and failed to give him an appropriate IEP. (Id., Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 27-28.) The hearing officer found for the District on the remaining issues, i.e., that the District had predetermined Z.R.'s placement, failed to evaluate him in all areas of his disability, failed to provide him with an appropriate ESY placement during the summer of 2014, and that its psychological evaluation of Z.R. was inappropriate. (Id. ¶ 29.)
On September 23, 2014, both parties requested clarification of the decision, which the hearing officer issued on September 24, 2014. (See 1st Am. Compl., Ex. B, Resp. District & Parent's Req. Clarification.) Neither party appealed. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations" but must contain "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In Count I, plaintiff seeks attorney's fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA, a claim the District contends is untimely.
In Counts II and III, respectively, plaintiff alleges that the District discriminated against Z.R. in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and violated his equal protection rights. The District argues that plaintiff was required to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies for these claims, though they are not brought under that statute, because they seek relief that is available under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . ., title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . ., or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter."); Charlie F. ex rel. Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 991-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying IDEA exhaustion requirement to Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 claims). Plaintiff counters that compensatory damages, which is the relief she seeks in these claims (1st Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief), are not available under the IDEA and therefore exhaustion is not required.
However, as the Seventh Circuit explained in Charlie F, relief may be "available" under the IDEA, even if plaintiff seeks compensatory damages:
98 F.3d at 992. Whether relief is available, the court said, depends on "[t]he nature of the claim and the governing law," not on what "the aggrieved party wants." Id. at 991-92; see McCormick v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 374 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Where a plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to some degree by the IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies, then the courts should require exhaustion of administrative remedies.") (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff seeks damages for the District's "denying [Z.R.] the benefits of his education," "failing to allow [him] to enroll and begin receiving services, and [failing to] implement any services at all between the first date of school of the 2013-2014 School Year until the implementation of the IEP after the Due Process Hearing." (1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 31.) In other words, plaintiff seeks damages to compensate for the year of education that Z.R. missed. Compensatory educational services is relief available under the IDEA. See Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. Michael M., 356 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) ("Compensatory services are well-established as a remedy under the IDEA."). Thus, regardless of how plaintiff characterizes it, at least some of the relief she seeks in Counts II and III is available under the IDEA.
The next question is whether plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies with respect to this relief. Plaintiff made a claim for compensatory education services in her due process complaint. (See District's Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 1st Am. Compl., Ex. A, Due Process Compl. at 2.) However, the hearing officer struck that claim because plaintiff had not complied with his orders to "provide specific information" about and disclose documents and witnesses relative to it. (See District's Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 1st Am. Compl., Ex. D, Ruling Mot. Barring Compensatory Education Relief.)
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part and denies in part the District's motion to dismiss [15] and dismisses Counts II and III without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The motion is denied as to Count I. This case is set for a status hearing on March 9, 2016 at 9:30 a.m.