JOHN J. THARP, Jr., District Judge.
The plaintiff, David M. Johnson, has filed suit against his former employer, Melton Truck Lines, Inc. ("Melton"), a number of individuals associated with Melton—Robert Peterson, Michael Dargel, Ramona Williams, and Robert Ragan,
Johnson's Second Amended Complaint is no less prolix than his original complaint; in fact, Johnson has expanded his allegations in the SAC, which runs to 48 pages and 265 paragraphs. As in his original complaint, the SAC is replete with misused legal jargon and omits many facts necessary to the formation of a coherent narrative. The Opinion granting Great West's motion to dismiss the original Complaint explains some of the background between the parties. See Johnson v. Great W. Cas. Co., No. 14 C 7858, 2015 WL 4751128, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2015).
The Opinion dismissing the original Complaint advised Johnson that claims premised upon the defendants' opposition to his workers' compensation claim "are the province of the [Illinois Workers Compensation Commission], not a federal court." Johnson, 2015 WL 4751128, at *2 ("the exclusive remedy for `unreasonable or vexatious' efforts to avoid and delay payment of workers' compensation benefits is an award of additional compensation under the [Illinois Workers' Compensation Act]."). Nonetheless, a number of Johnson's new allegations continue to assert liability based on the defendants' opposition to his workers compensation claims. See SAC (Counts V-VI, IX-XI, XIV). To these claims against the Great Western defendants, Johnson now asserts claims against the Melton defendants based on his recruitment to, employment with, and termination from, Melton. The defendants have filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Johnson has not stated a claim entitling him to any relief from this Court.
The individual Melton defendants move to dismiss the SAC under Rule 12(b)(2), arguing that Johnson has failed to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over them. Melton Mem. in Supp. 2; Melton Reply 2-5, ECF No. 179. A federal court in Illinois may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the Illinois long-arm statute would allow it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Illinois' statute contains a catch-all provision that permits personal jurisdiction if it would be authorized by either the Illinois Constitution or the United States Constitution, the state statutory and federal constitutional requirements merge. Id.; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209(c).
Personal jurisdiction may be "general" or "specific." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754 (2014); Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). General personal jurisdiction exists where the defendant's continuous operations within the forum state are "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318). "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff's claims against the defendant arise out of the defendant's constitutionally sufficient contacts with the forum state. uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 425; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). "The key question is therefore whether the defendant [has] sufficient `minimum contacts' with Illinois such that the maintenance of the suit `does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700-701 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Specific jurisdiction requires that (1) the defendant has purposely directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities. Id. at 702, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
Given that the defendants have moved to dismiss the SAC for a lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to Johnson to show that such jurisdiction exists. Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). Johnson alleges that because defendants Peterson, Williams, and Dargel interacted with him by both phone and email on matters related to Johnson's employment with Melton, both specific and general personal jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 27, 33, 55, 112-13, 248, 250, 256, 262. As to defendant Ragan, Johnson alleges no facts indicating that Ragan had any contacts with Illinois; instead, the complaint merely describes Ragan as the administrator of Melton's Injury Benefit Plan. See SAC ¶¶ 141, 152, 156.
Here, it is apparent that Johnson's allegations have failed to demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over any of the individual Melton defendants. In order for a court to exercise general jurisdiction over an individual defendant, that defendant must be a citizen of the forum state or have contacts that are so "continuous and systematic" with the forum state that, for all intents and purposes, they are at home in that state. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). For the purposes of general jurisdiction, individual defendants are considered citizens of the state in which they reside with the intent to remain indefinitely. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (noting that "[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile."). The complaint makes plain that none of the individual Melton defendants are domiciled in Illinois; all three of these defendants reside in Tulsa, Oklahoma and, although residence does not necessarily equate to domicile, no facts are alleged to suggest that with respect to these defendants their residence and domicile are not one and the same. See SAC ¶¶ 8-10, 12. Nor does the complaint does not allege any facts indicating that the defendants have "systematic and continuous" contacts with Illinois to the extent required for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a non-citizen defendant. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930. Here, the individual Melton defendants' alleged contacts with Illinois are limited to a few phone calls and emails. See SAC ¶¶ 18, 33, 112-13. Such limited, infrequent conduct does not warrant a finding of general personal jurisdiction over any of the individual Melton defendants.
Nor do the few phone calls or business solicitation emails establish specific jurisdiction. To establish specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state; (2) the alleged injury must have arisen from the defendant's activities within the forum; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, it is apparent the individual defendants did not purposely avail themselves to the benefits of Illinois; their alleged contacts with Illinois are limited to Peterson's emails to Johnson advertising Melton, Williams' phone calls to Johnson regarding his scheduling, and Dargel's email regarding Johnson's termination. SAC ¶¶ 18, 33, 112-13. These allegations only connect Peterson, Williams, and Dargel to Johnson, who happens to live in Illinois.
Even if the few interactions Peterson, Williams, and Dargel had were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Illinois, the individual defendants argue that because their alleged interactions with Johnson were on behalf of their employer, they are protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine. Illinois recognizes the fiduciary shield doctrine, which "denies personal jurisdiction over an individual whose presence and activity in the state in which the suit is brought were solely on behalf of his employer or other principal." Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F.Supp.3d 697, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also ISI Int'l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Illinois employs the fiduciary-shield doctrine . . . under which a person who enters the state solely as fiduciary for another may not be sued in Illinois." (citing Rollins v. Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1314 (Ill. 1990)). Here, the individual defendants contacted Johnson on behalf of Melton—thus, because the individual defendants' contacts with an Illinois resident were solely in the interests of their employer and not to serve their personal interests, the defendants are protected by the fiduciary shield doctrine.
Accordingly, the individual Melton defendants' Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss is granted.
Johnson alleges that Melton did not compensate him for the hours he spent doing tasks other than driving for Melton—such as responding to emails and checking and cleaning his truck—which he asserts is a violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206. He alleges that he worked 70 hours per week, including driving and non-drive time, but was only compensated for the hours he spent driving (although Johnson acknowledges that Melton paid drivers for a number of non-driving activities, including layovers, stop-offs, tarping, and crossing into Canada). See SAC ¶¶ 31, 116; Ex. A. Melton argues that the non-drive time portion of Johnson's claim is a request for gap-time payment, which is not recognized under the FLSA. Melton Mem. in Supp. 4 (citing Brown v. Lululemon Athletica, Inc., No. 10 C 05672, 2011 WL 741254, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2011) (collecting cases which hold that "the FLSA does not provide a remedy for workers who have received at least the minimum wage for a pay period in which they have not worked overtime").
As to his minimum wage claim, Johnson specifies four weeks where his total compensation divided by the 70 hours he claims to have worked in those weeks fell below the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, in violation of the FLSA. SAC ¶ 118. Johnson lists his compensation for six specific weeks in the SAC; in two of those six examples, however, his total compensation divided by the 70 hours he claims to have worked is above the federal minimum wage: "the net earnings of $569.87 for the payroll ending January 21, 2013 equaling $8 per hour [and] . . . the net earnings of $512.73 for the payroll ending March 27, 2013 equaling $[7.32] per hour."
Johnson also invokes the Lanham Act to attack Melton's compensation; Johnson asserts that Melton's email advertisements that it offered "high pay" to its drivers were false in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). SAC ¶ 123; see also Obj. Melton Mot. Dismiss Ex. ECF No. 163. To invoke the Lanham Act's protections, however, a "plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014). "A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke the protection of the Lanham Act." Id. Because Johnson has not alleged an injury to his commercial interest, his Lanham Act claim must be dismissed.
Johnson has alleged that Melton and Great West committed a number of violations of the ERISA, including failure to provide benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty by plan administrators. It is clear from the SAC, however, that Johnson has mistakenly equated Melton's workers' compensation plan with an ERISA plan, but ERISA does not apply to any employee benefit plan "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws." 29 U.S.C. § 1003. Johnson quotes at length from Melton's Injury Benefit Plan (none of the parties have attached any benefit plan documents), which provides various accident compensation rates for injured employees. See SAC ¶ 131. Johnson identifies the plan as policy number WC21114I, which is an insurance policy under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.
Johnson's ADA claims can be grouped into two theories: discrimination in benefits and failure to accommodate. To bring an ADA claim, a plaintiff must timely file a charge with the EEOC, receive a right-to-sue letter, and assert claims within the scope of the charge filed with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; see also Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist. 203, 392 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 2004) ("the ADA's enforcement provision expressly incorporates § 2000e-5 of Title VII"). Johnson asserts that he filed a charge with the EEOC against Melton and received a notice of right-to-sue on October 28, 2015. SAC ¶ 6. The Melton defendants argue that, because Johnson has not attached the notice of right-to-sue, he cannot establish that he has exhausted his administrative remedies and, therefore, his ADA claims must be dismissed. Not necessarily; failure to attach the notice of right-to-sue is not fatal to an ADA claim. See, e.g., Krause v. Turnberry Country Club, 571 F.Supp.2d 851, 859 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("`Although Title VII requires that a claimant be notified of her right-to-sue before filing a complaint, it does not state any requirement that a plaintiff attach the right-to-sue letter to her complaint.'" (quoting Raymond v. City of Chicago, 183 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1066 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2002)). Johnson filed the SAC (in which he first alleged the ADA claims) on November 5, 2015, well within the 90-day window after he alleges that he received the notice of right-to-sue, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
In any event, even assuming Johnson's claims to be within the scope of his EEOC charge, his ADA claims must be dismissed.
Johnson's failure to accommodate claim also suffers from a number of fatal flaws. To state a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show: 1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; 2) that the defendant was aware of his disability; and 3) that the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 2016). Johnson asserts that, since his fall, his fingers on his left hand "remain[ ] completely frozen" and, as a result, he "is unable to work as the operator of a commercial motor vehicle."
Johnson asserts that he took a leave of absence on June 12, 2013 to visit the doctor for his hand injury and that he was terminated that day "pursuant to [Melton's] new and unannounced leave policy." SAC ¶ 186. There is no allegation that the defendants were aware of Johnson's allegedly disabling condition at the time of his termination (other than his message to Melton on May 5, 2013 that he injured his hand and would be seeking medical treatment at some point, SAC ¶ 51). Although Johnson states that the defendants "have received medical records indicating his inability to carry and lift heavy items," SAC ¶ 187, he had not yet seen a doctor as of June 12, 2013, so Melton could not have received any medical records regarding Johnson's alleged impairment at the time of his termination. Johnson's assertion that the defendants "regarded" him as having a substantially limiting impairment—"his present inability to carry and lift a heavy tarp, attach the bungee cords to the tarp, and similar activities with his left hand . . . on June 12, 2013," SAC ¶ 188—is illogical for the same reason; Johnson had not yet seen a doctor, so unless he told Melton of these limitations (which he does not claim to have done, and how could he if he had not yet received a diagnosis?), there is no explanation of how Melton would have known about or considered his alleged disability at the time it terminated his employment.
Nor has Johnson pleaded that he requested any accommodation prior to his termination. Instead, he argues that Melton has failed to provide an accommodation that would permit him to return to work, "including, but not limited to, reassignment to an open position" of driver manager. SAC ¶¶ 191-92. As already established, Johnson has not pleaded facts plausibly establishing that Melton terminated him because of his alleged disability but rather for one of a number of other possible reasons; the ADA does not entitle Johnson to be rehired with an accommodation. Cf. Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[A]n employee is not entitled to return to her former position if she would have been fired regardless of [her disability]."); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 1998) (employer has a duty to consider reassigning its disabled employees—not former employees—to other positions for which they are qualified).
Johnson invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in alleging that the denial of his claims under the workers' compensation plan violates his due process rights. Section 1983 provides:
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is a remedy for constitutional violations committed by state actors. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2009). Johnson claims that the state actor here is "Illinois Arbitrator Williams," who presided over his Illinois workers' compensation claim and that the defendants acted at the direction of Arbitrator Williams to deny Johnson benefits under the workers' compensation plan.
Johnson asserts that the defendants have used his nonpublic personal information "to facilitate the commercial advantage to Defendants . . . from denying the `existence' of coverage," in violation of the ADA, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"), and Illinois law. SAC ¶ 236. Like the majority of his claims, this, too, is rooted in the defendants' participation in the workers' compensation proceedings: Johnson asserts that Melton shared his personal information, such as his address, date of birth, and information about his medical condition, with its insurer, Great West, in relation to his coverage under the workers' compensation policy. See SAC ¶ 234.
The ADA protects the privacy of employees with disabilities via prohibitions on the use of medical information as a condition of employment, including "a prohibition against using pre-employment medical tests; a prohibition against the use of medical tests that lack job-relatedness and business necessity; and a prohibition against the use of tests which screen out (or tend to screen out) people with disabilities." Karraker v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)). The GLBA requires that financial institutions "respect and protect the security and confidentiality of [ ] customers' nonpublic personal information." 15 U.S.C. § 6801. Neither statute, however, bars an employer from providing information necessary to defend against a worker's compensation claim initiated by the employee. Cf. E.E.O.C. v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2011) (disclosure of information supplied voluntarily by an employee does not violate the ADA). That Johnson's former employer shared information with its insurer necessary to evaluate Johnson's workers' compensation claim under its insurance policy, however, is not an invasion of his privacy under the ADA or the GLBA.
Illinois law prohibits the public disclosure of private facts: to prevail, a plaintiff "must show that private facts were made public and that the matter made public would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Karraker, 411 F.3d at 838 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Wynne v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 741 N.E.2d 669, 676-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)). "Disclosure to persons with a `natural and proper interest' in the information is not actionable." Karraker, 411 F.3d at 838 (quoting Roehrborn v. Lambert, 660 N.E.2d 180, 182-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)). As the insurer providing Melton's workers' compensation coverage, Great West had a "natural and proper interest" in Johnson's basic identifying information and medical condition. See, e.g., Roehrborn, 660 N.E.2d at 182-83 (no privacy violation in disclosing probationary officer's psychological and polygraph test results to administrator of police training institute because administrator had "a natural and proper interest in knowing the performance of potential applicants").
Accordingly, the motions to dismiss Johnson's invasion of privacy claim are granted.
Johnson's breach of contract claim stems from an incident on June 12, 2013: although the facts alleged are not entirely clear, it seems that while Johnson was off-duty driving his tractor and trailer to his home in Gary, Indiana, defendant Williams called and "demanded" that he continue working or otherwise relinquish his vehicle. SAC ¶¶ 244, 248-250. Johnson apparently refused either option, and Williams called the Gary police to report that Johnson had stolen Melton's tractor. See SAC ¶¶ 249-50.
Johnson asserts that he had various agreements "in writing" with Melton, including that he would park his tractor and trailer at his home in Gary when he was off on "home-time" and that he would notify Melton of his home-time by electronically recording the dates in advance in Melton's computer system. SAC ¶¶ 241-42. He claims that by terminating him because he drove the tractor to his home when he was off-duty, Melton breached these written agreements. Melton's sole argument for dismissal of the breach of contract claim is that Johnson cannot state a claim "because [he] has not alleged the existence of a contract that was breached." Mem. in Supp. 11. Not so; Johnson states that he and Melton had an agreement that he could park the tractor at his home when he was off-duty and that Melton terminated him when he tried to do so. Taking all facts as true as the Court must on a motion to dismiss, Johnson has sufficiently alleged that the parties mutually assented to specific conditions as part of his employment and that Melton breached those agreements. The motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim is therefore denied.
The same cannot be said of the conversion claim; a claim for conversion requires "(1) an unauthorized and wrongful assumption of control, dominion, or ownership by defendant over plaintiff's personalty; (2) plaintiff's right in the property; (3) plaintiff's right to the immediate possession of the property, absolutely and unconditionally; and (4) a demand for possession of the property." Cohen v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 601, 614 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Douglass, 565 N.E.2d 93, 96-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The property Johnson identifies as having been converted are his wages, see SAC ¶ 253; Illinois law, however, limits conversion actions for money to instances where the money is "capable of being described as a specific chattel . . . [A]n action for the conversion of funds may not be maintained to satisfy a mere obligation to pay money." Eggert v. Weisz, 839 F.2d 1261, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Thebus, 483 N.E.2d 1258, 1260 (Ill. 1985)). Johnson's claim is for an alleged obligation to pay wages he lost as a result of Melton's breach of contract and, as such, fails to state a claim for conversion. See, e.g., Horbach v. Kaczmarek, 288 F.3d 969, 978 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he plaintiff's right to the money must be absolute[:] `It must be shown that the money claimed, or its equivalent, at all times belonged to the plaintiff and that the defendant converted it to his own use.'" (emphasis added; citations omitted)).
Because a plaintiff may seek to recover lost wages based on an unjust enrichment theory, see, e.g., Dempsey v. Nathan, No. 14 CV 812, 2014 WL 4914466, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014), the motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim is denied.
In his penultimate claim, Johnson invokes the Surface Transportation Assistance Act ("STAA"), which protects employees who report or are about to report violations of commercial motor vehicle safety and security standards from discharge, discipline, or discrimination. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a). An employee who has suffered discharge, discipline, or discrimination in violation of § 31105(a) may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 180 days of the alleged violation. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b). If the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 210 days of the filing of the complaint, the employee may bring an original action in a district court. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(c).
Johnson states that he "brought the conduct of Defendant Melton to the attention of the U.S. Department of Labor" on July 14, 2014. SAC ¶ 255. By "conduct," Johnson explains that to mean that he was going to report to the Department of Labor that drivers were working off the clock, which put their health and safety at risk. SAC ¶ 256. Even assuming that bringing this conduct to the attention of the Department of Labor is the equivalent of filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor (which is a necessary prerequisite to exhaust his administrative remedies), Johnson did so well past the 180-day period after the alleged violation; he was terminated on June 12, 2013 but did not report the incident to the Department of Labor until July 14, 2014, more than a year (397 days, to be specific) later. Accordingly, Johnson's STAA claim must be dismissed as untimely.
Johnson titles his final claim, "Retaliation in Violation of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act." SAC Count XIV. He makes two contrasting arguments, that the defendants accused him of filing his workers compensation claim in retaliation for his termination, and that the Melton defendants retaliated against him by informing the Ohio arbitrator of Johnson's complaints about safety conditions. See SAC ¶¶ 262-63. Putting aside the nonsensical argument that accusing Johnson of filing a retaliatory workers' compensation claim is somehow itself retaliatory, Johnson fails to state a claim for retaliatory discharge; he was terminated prior to the filing of any of his workers' compensation claims, so he could not have been terminated in retaliation for filing those claims. Nor does he allege that he planned to file a claim at the time he was terminated (he had not even seen a doctor at the time of his termination), so it is not plausible that Melton discharged him in anticipation of his filing of a workers' compensation claim. See Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ill. 1998) (Illinois law permits retaliatory discharge claims "when an employee is discharged for filing, or in anticipation of the filing of, a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act"). Johnson's claim for retaliation in violation of the IWCA is, therefore, dismissed.
The Great West defendants have moved for sanctions against the plaintiff. They ask for reasonable attorney's fees and costs defending this action and for an injunction preventing Johnson from filing any additional civil actions against them without pre-certification that the claims are not frivolous. Johnson has filed four lawsuits in this district asserting claims against Great West and Melton,
Mr. Johnson's motion for sanctions, however, is plainly frivolous and procedurally improper. The filings by the Great West defendants have been anything but sanctionable. What Johnson characterizes as "bad faith litigation conduct" on the part of the Great West defendants is simply the presentation of meritorious legal positions. Accordingly, Johnson's motion for sanctions is denied and Mr. Johnson is advised that the filing of a baseless motions for sanctions is itself sanctionable conduct.
For the foregoing reasons, the Great West defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint [117] is granted; the claims against the Great West defendants are dismissed with prejudice. The Melton defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended complaint [156] is granted in part and denied in part. The claims against defendants Peterson, Dargel, Williams, and Ragan are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction; that dismissal is final as to this case but without prejudice to the filing of claims in any other forum. The claims against Melton and the Plan are denied with prejudice, with the exception of the plaintiff's FLSA, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment claims against Melton, as to which the motion to dismiss is denied. The respective sanctions motions of the plaintiff [137] and the Great West defendants [132] are denied.
The Court notes as well that, despite prior admonishment (see ECF 22), Mr. Johnson continues to make inaccurate statements, such as "the Ohio Arbitrator has rejected all of the assertions made by Defendants at Arbitration," SAC ¶ 136, when in fact, the Ohio Administrator rejected Johnson's claim.
