JORGE L. ALONSO, District Judge.
Plaintiff Joseph Ware filed a four-count complaint against Harvey Auto Credit, LLC ("Harvey Auto") alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") (Count I), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") (Count II), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA") (Count III), and the Illinois Commercial Code (Count IV). Defendant moves to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
On November 5, 2015, plaintiff entered into an unconditional retail installment sale contract ("RISC") with defendant to buy a car, but claims he never received a copy of the contract. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff made a $2,000 down payment for the car, which turned out to be a lemon. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Defendant promised to exchange the car for one that was not defective, but when plaintiff arrived at Harvey Auto to make the exchange, defendant blocked plaintiff's car and took the keys. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) After his car was seized, plaintiff demanded that he be reimbursed for the $2,000 down payment, but defendant refused. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff filed suit seeking actual, statutory, and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (ellipsis omitted). Under federal notice-pleading standards, a plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. Stated differently, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts must] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but [they] `need [ ] not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.'" Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Defendant moves to dismiss all claims on the ground that plaintiff is judicially estopped from suing because he failed to disclose the claims in a prior bankruptcy case.
"Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that `prevents a party from prevailing on an argument in an earlier matter and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in a subsequent matter.'" Thompson v. Vill. of Monee, No. 12 CV 5020, 2014 WL 4175915, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2014) (quoting Wells v. Coker, 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2013)). "In the bankruptcy context, judicial estoppel bars a debtor `who denies owning an asset, including a chose in action or other legal claim, from realizing on that concealed asset after the bankruptcy ends.'" Id. (quoting Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006)). Courts in this circuit have held that "dismissing a case on judicial estoppel grounds for failing to disclose a preexisting legal claim during a bankruptcy case is appropriate only where the plaintiff intended to deceive the bankruptcy court." David v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 11 C 8833, 2014 WL 5510986, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2014) (citing Spaine v. Cmty. Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also Van v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 14 CV 8708, 2016 WL 1182001, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2016) ("Courts make an exception [to judicial estoppel] where an omission of a claim from the bankruptcy schedule is innocent, meaning based on poor communication with counsel or on the good faith belief that the claim has no value.") (citing Metrou v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 781 F.3d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Plaintiff contends that the failure to disclose his legal claim was an oversight and he subsequently amended the bankruptcy schedule to reflect the claim. Unlike the plaintiff in Cannon-Stokes
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to dismiss [11] is denied. Defendant is directed to answer the complaint by June 23, 2017. A status hearing is set for July 25, 2017.