JOHN J. THARP, Jr., District Judge.
NOW COME the Plaintiffs, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CHICAGO PAINTERS AND DECORATORS PENSION FUND, by and through their attorney, STEVEN F. McDOWELL, ARNOLD AND KADJAN, LLP, and pursuant to FRCP 55 move for entry of a final judgment of default against Defendant, Cindy K. Gossett, in this matter. In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs state as follows:
1. Plaintiffs filed an interpleader complaint on April 7, 2017, against Defendants, ROGER GOSSETT and CINDY K. GOSSETT with respect to each Defendant's competing claim for the portion of ROGER GOSSETT'S pension from the Chicago Painters and Decorators Pension Fund that was awarded to CINDY K. GOSSETT in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order entered in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, 246th Judicial District on or about July 3, 2007.
2. Service upon Defendant, CINDY K. GOSSETT was made on May 18, 2017, and a copy of the proof of service was filed with the court on June 22, 2017.
3. Defendant, CINDY K. GOSSETT, was required to answer the interpleader complaint on or before June 8, 2017. Defendant, CINDY K. GOSSETT, has neither answered nor appeared in this proceeding. While Defendant, CINDY K. GOSSETT, sent correspondence to the attention of the Court and a different set of correspondence to the attention of counsel for Plaintiffs, both of which were filed with this Court as Exhibits to the Initial Status Report and Supplement to the Initial Status Report, neither constituted an answer or appearance in this matter.
4. Courts have held that where a named interpleader defendant, such as CINDY K. GOSSETT, fails to answer the interpleader complaint, a default judgment may be entered against her. For example, in
5. If a default judgment is entered against an interpleader defendant, it is also appropriate to enter an order enjoining the defaulting interpleader defendant from bringing further litigation over the benefits which were the subject matter of the interpleader dispute.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that:
1. Defendant, CINDY K. GOSSETT, be found in default in this matter.
2. Judgment be entered against Defendant, CINDY K. GOSSETT, and in favor of Plaintiffs, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CHICAGO PAINTERS AND DECORATORS PENSION FUND, ordering that the entire pension benefit be paid to Defendant, ROGER GOSSETT, and enjoining Defendant, CINDY K. GOSSETT from bringing any action in state or federal court against Plaintiffs, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CHICAGO PAINTERS AND DECORATORS PENSION FUND or the Chicago Painters and Decorators Pension Fund that they administer, with respect to the pension benefits that were the subject of this interpleader action.
Christine S. Hwang, Lindsay Rose Nicholas, Leonard Carder, LLP, San Francisco, CA, D. Ward Kallstrom, Kathleen Cahill Slaught, Michelle Marie Scannell, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Brian Leroy Larsen, Lauren Beth Gelber, Law Office Brian L. Larsen, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.
EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge.
The Trustees are the named fiduciaries and designated administrators of the ILWU-PMA Pension Plan ("the Plan"), an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et. seq. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4. Decedent James A. Taylor was a Plan participant who began receiving monthly benefits from the Plan when he retired on November 1, 2003, until his death on November 15, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 6, 29. The Plan provides that upon the death of a plan participant, the "surviving spouse [as defined by the Plan] will receive a monthly Survivor Pension benefit for the remainder of the surviving spouse's life." Id. ¶ 37. At the time this suit was filed, the amount of plan benefits payable to the surviving spouse equaled $2,299.27 per month. Id. ¶ 39.
Plaintiffs' complaint does not indicate that the pension plan documents record the identity of the decedent's spouse. However, records associated with a separate employee benefit plan sponsored by the ILWU-PMA do. Mr. Taylor was also a participant in the ILWU-PMA Welfare Plan ("Welfare Plan"), "a separate ERISA plan providing hospital, medical, and other benefits to longshore workers and their dependents." Comp. ¶ 14. "Under the Welfare Plan, longshore workers designate their dependants, including dependent spouses, as eligible for Welfare Plan coverage by submitting a `Record Change Form' or a `Dependent Verification Form.'" Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs, through the ILWU-PMA Benefit Plan Office, received a total of 11 such forms from the decedent over the course of his participation in the two plans. See id. ¶¶ 13-30. These forms identify five separate individuals as the decedent's spouse. Plaintiffs have named each of these five individuals as a defendant in this action "on information and belief that [each] may have an interest in the benefits at issue." Id. ¶¶ 9-11.
Defendant Laversa Pier, a resident of San Francisco, California, was married to James Taylor from October 11, 1980, until the dissolution of their marriage on a date before November 12, 1982. Compl. ¶ 9. Defendant Jennifer Taylor, a resident of Brentwood, California, was married to James Taylor on October 10, 1982. Id. ¶ 7. Jennifer Taylor was deleted as a dependent spouse by the decedent on a Record Change Form filed on January 18, 1984. Id. ¶ 21. Defendant Mary Taylor, whose residence is unknown, was married to James Taylor around January 1984 until the dissolution of their marriage around February 1985. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant Sheryl Perdue, a resident of Lithonia, Georgia, was married to James Taylor from November 30, 1985, until the dissolution of their marriage on October 31, 1989. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant Pamela Coates, a resident of San Francisco, California, married James Taylor on August 6, 1999. Id. ¶ 8. At the time of his retirement, James Taylor indicated to the ILWU-PMA Benefit Plan Office that Pamela Coates was his legal spouse. Id. ¶ 29. On February 4, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed a "Dependent Verification Form" deleting Pamela Coates as a dependent spouse, and when he died later that year, Mr. Taylor's death certificate stated that his marital status was "widowed." Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
In an effort to resolve these conflicting claims to the Benefits, the Trustees filed this interpleader
Jennifer Taylor was served on August 29, 2011. See Docket No. 11. The Trustees allege that a person representing herself as Jennifer Taylor had a telephone conversation with Plaintiffs' counsel on September 2, 2011, to inquire about the summons and complaint she received. Declaration of Lindsay Nicholas ("Nicholas Decl.") (Docket No. 39) ¶ 6. Laversa Pier was served on September 19, 2011. See Docket. No. 12. The Trustees allege that Laversa Pier contacted Plaintiffs' counsel on September 20, 2011, to indicate that she had no interest in claiming the Benefits on account of her marriage to James Taylor. Nicholas Decl. ¶ 11. Other than these brief interactions with Plaintiffs' counsel, neither Ms. Pier nor Ms. Taylor filed a response to the complaint or otherwise entered an appearance in this action. The Trustees moved for entry of default against these two defendants, which the Clerk entered on November 17, 2011. See Docket No. 19.
After unsuccessful attempts to locate defendants Mary Taylor and Sheryl Perdue via searches of three electronic databases, Plaintiffs moved for permission to serve Mary Taylor and Sheryl Perdue by publication. See Pl.'s Motion to Serve by Publication (Docket No. 23). The Court granted the motion, and the Plaintiffs published summons for Mary Taylor in the San Franciscobased publications The Recorder and the San Francisco Chronicle. See Docket Nos. 26, 29. The Trustees published summons for Sheryl Perdue in the The Recorder, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Atlanta-based publication the Daily Report. See Docket Nos. 25, 27-28. After Ms. Taylor and Ms. Perdue failed to file a timely answer or otherwise appear, the Clerk entered default against Mary Taylor on June 22, 2012, and against Sheryl Perdue on July 2, 2012. See Docket Nos. 46, 49.
Following the Court's ruling, the Plaintiffs published summons for Mary Taylor in the Washington, D.C.-based publication The Washington Post. See Docket No. 63. After Mary Taylor failed to file a timely answer or otherwise appear, the Clerk entered default against her on December 20, 2012. See Docket No. 66. The Plaintiffs thereafter brought their instant motion for entry of default judgment against Mary Taylor. Docket No. 67. The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion on February 7, 2013, at which Defendant Mary Taylor failed to appear.
In considering whether to enter a default judgment, a district court first must determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to the case. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) ("When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.").
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this ERISA case under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
In this case, the Plaintiffs have brought an ERISA enforcement action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) in an effort to "enforce the terms of the Pension Plan," that is, to determine "to whom the Survivor Pension benefits payable on account of James A. Taylor . . . are to be paid." Compl. at 2. The complaint does not allege Mary Taylor's state of residence, but under ERISA's nationwide service of process provision, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over her even if she does not reside in this judicial district. See Vivien, 2002 WL 31640557 at *2. Mary Taylor presumably falls within ERISA's nationwide service of process provision as long as she is a resident of the United States. See Combs v. Doe, No. 10-cv-01120 HRL, 2011 WL 738052, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Feb.23, 2011) (recommending that default judgment be entered against a defendant whose identity and location are unknown). The Court has been given no reason to believe that she is not. Thus, the Court has a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over Mary Taylor in order to grant default judgment against her.
As a threshold matter in considering a motion for default judgment, the Court must first "assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom default is requested." Board of Trustees of the N. Cal. Sheet Metal Workers v. Peters, No. C-00-0395 VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 2, 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) provides that "an individual . . . may be served in a judicial district of the United States by. . . following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located. . . ." California law allows for service by publication if the party to be served "cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner," and is a "necessary or proper party to the action" or "has or claims an interest in real or personal property in this state that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court or the relief demanded in the action." Cal.Code Civ. Pro. § 415.50(a). In order to effectuate service by publication, a party must publish the summons "in a named newspaper, published in this state, that is most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served." Cal.Code Civ. Pro. § 415.50(b). "If the party to be served resides or is located out of this state, the court may also order the summons to be published in a named newspaper outside this state that is most likely to give actual notice to that party." Id. California law also specifies that service by publication will be satisfied on the twenty-eighth day following the first date of publication, with the summons being published at least once a week for four consecutive weeks, with at least five days intervening between the publication dates. See California Government Code § 6064.
After the entry of default, a court may grant default judgment on the merits of a case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). "The district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one." Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980). Factors that a court may consider in exercising that discretion include:
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986). Because default has already been entered in this case, the Court must construe as true all factual allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint except for those related to the amount of damages. See Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir.1987). See also Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.1977) (holding that at the default judgment stage, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those concerning damages, are deemed admitted by the non-responding parties). Facts not contained in the pleadings and claims which are legally insufficient, however, are not established by default. Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.1978).
The Court finds that all seven Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment against Mary Taylor. First, the Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if the Court does not enter default judgment against this Defendant because they would be denied the finality of judgment sought through their interpleader action. See Trustees of IL WU-PMA Pension Plan v. Peters, 660 F.Supp.2d at 1144 (finding prejudice "if default judgment were not granted because [the ERISA plan fiduciaries] would be denied the certainty and finality that judgment in an interpleader action is intended to provide."); see also W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Canul, No. 11-cv-01751 AWI, 2012 WL 844589, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 12, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-cv-01751 AWI, 2012 WL 1074952 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff "would be prejudiced if a default judgment is not granted" because plaintiff "has no other alternative by which to evaluate [d]efendant's claim to the life insurance policy.") (citation omitted); W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan v. Jennings, No. 10-cv-03629, 2011 WL 2609858, at *3 (N.D.Cal. June, 5, 2011) ("Plaintiff and [answering defendant] would suffer prejudice if the Court does not enter default judgment. The dispute concerns [d]efendants' competing claims to interpleaded funds. Without entry of default judgment, the competing stakeholders' claims cannot be resolved.").
The fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake in the action, weighs neither for nor against an entry of default judgment. In interpleader actions, the sum of money at stake, however significant, is not dispositive as the interpleading party is not asserting an interest in the interpleaded funds, nor are they seeking damages. Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Ward, No. 11-cv-0433 JAM, 2011 WL 5241257, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Oct.31, 2011); see also Jennings, 2011 WL 2609858 at *3 (finding that the fourth Eitel factor is neutral in an interpleader action). The Plaintiffs in this action are not asserting a claim to the funds, but are attempting to distribute the funds to the party entitled to the plan benefits. There is no dispute that the funds to be deposited and distributed are determined by the Plan.
The fifth and sixth Eitel factors recommend that a court consider "the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts" and "whether the default was due to excusable neglect" in assessing whether to grant default judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. The Court finds that both factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment. Mary Taylor has made no effort to challenge the Trustees' interpleader complaint. Therefore, there is nothing on the record before the Court to suggest that a factual dispute exists. See Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 5241257 at *4 (finding that "there is a very low likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists" because "the court [assumes] the truth of well-pleaded facts in the complaint following the clerk's entry of default"); see also Canul, 2012 WL 844589 at *3 ("[T]here is little possibility of dispute concerning material facts because (1) based on the entry of default, the Court accepts all allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true and (2) Defendant has not made any effort to challenge the Complaint or otherwise appear in this case."). Further, considering the merits of this action, it is unlikely that Mary Taylor would assert a competing claim to be designated the decedent's "surviving spouse" under the plan, given that her marriage to Mr. Taylor ended in February 1985, and the decedent twice remarried in the twenty four years before his death. Turning to the sixth factor, the Plaintiffs sought and obtained administrative relief to proceed with substituted service on Mary Taylor. See Docket Nos. 23-24, 61-62. The Plaintiffs then effectuated service by publication. See Docket Nos. 26, 29, 63. "[I]t is unlikely that [the defendant's] failure to answer, and the resulting defaults entered by the [clerk], were the result of excusable neglect" where "[the plaintiff] effectuated service on [the defendant] via substituted service, which is a method permitted by law." Canul, 2012 WL 844589 at *3. Therefore, these two factors also weigh in favor of default judgment.
In sum, the Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment against Defendant Mary Taylor.
The Plaintiffs' interpleader complaint seeks an "Injunctive Order of this Court" to prevent the named Defendants "from commencing or maintaining any action against the Plaintiffs, the Pension Plan,[] ILWU, PMA, or the Plans Office regarding entitlement to the Survivor Pension benefits payable under the Pension Plan on account of James A. Taylor." Compl. at 10. Unlike statutory interpleader, rule interpleader under Fed.R.Civ.P. 22 does not authorize courts to enjoin litigants from pursuing further claims in state or federal court with regard to the res at issue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(e) ("These rules do not modify . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2361, which relates to preliminary injunctions in actions of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader."). However, courts have used the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to enjoin defendants in an interpleader action from bringing future proceedings regarding the same claim in federal court. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 879 (5th Cir.1998) ("Under the All Writs Statute, a federal court has the power to enjoin a party before it from attempting to relitigate the same issues or related issues precluded by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel in another federal court. Accordingly, a federal court in a Rule 22 interpleader proceeding may issue an injunction to restrain the parties from pursuing such issues in another federal court.") (citations omitted). This is because relitigation of these issues "would be judicially wasteful and raise the possibility of inconsistent results. It would also defeat the purpose of the [plaintiffs'] interpleader action." Trustees of IL WUPMA Pension Plan v. Peters, 660 F.Supp.2d at 1145.
Further, courts have held that injunctions issued pursuant to the All Writs Statute may be used to enjoin parties from relitigating the same issues or claims before state courts. Normally, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, "limits the ability of federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings." Peters, 660 F.Supp.2d at 1144. However, an exception has been recognized for injunctions that are "necessary in aid of [the court's] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment." Id. This exception is referred to as the "relitigation exception." Id. (citing Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988)). See also Gen. Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir.1991) ("A federal court presiding over an interpleader action may stay pending state court proceedings involving the same interpled fund under the `necessary in aid of its jurisdiction' exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.").
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
This order disposes of Docket No. 67.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 556800, 55 Employee Benefits Cas. 1009
Ann Todd Taylor, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, AL, Scott Burnett Smith, Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Huntsville, AL, for Plaintiff.
Victor London, Montgomery, AL, pro se.
Dora L. Hill, Montgomery, AL, pro se.
Julian Mason Davis, Marcus M. Maples, Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.
W. KEITH WATKINS, Chief Judge.
MetLife brings an interpleader action naming Dora L. Hill, Victor London, and Signature Group Financial, LLC, as Defendants. Ms. Hill is the named beneficiary of a policy issued under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act ("FEGLIA") payable upon the death of the decedent, Jesse Williams, Sr. MetLife administers FEGLIA policies, which are issued pursuant to federal law. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-16. Ms. Hill assigned $7,483 of the total $8,750 in FEGLIA benefits to the funeral home that handled Mr. Williams's arrangements, and the funeral home, in turn, assigned that sum to Signature Group Financial, LLC. Before MetLife could distribute the benefits, it received an undated letter from Mr. London, a relative of Mr. Williams, stating that Ms. Hill "committed identity theft on several" of Mr. Williams's accounts and that Ms. Hill's claim was fraudulent. (Doc. # 1, Ex. E.) MetLife brought its interpleader complaint to avoid exposure to double liability.
The complaint arises under federal law as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because a FEGLIA policy "is not a private contract between the insured and the insurer, but a federal policy administered under federal law." O'Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir.1988). There is, therefore, a jurisdictional basis for the claim in federal court, and Rule 22 interpleader is available because MetLife has joined three parties who it believes have "claims that may expose [it] to double or multiple liability." Fed.R.Civ.P. 22(a).
Mr. London, one of the three adverse parties who MetLife believes may subject it to multiple liability, has failed to answer. MetLife moves for a default judgment against him. See Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Conroy, 431 F.Supp.2d 220, 226 (D.R.I.2006) ("A named interpleader defendant who fails to answer the interpleader complaint and assert a claim to the res forfeits any claim of entitlement that might have been asserted."). MetLife has complied with the procedural requirements for obtaining a default judgment, as it has secured an entry of default from the clerk based upon Defendants' failure to file an answer or otherwise defend this action. (Doc. # 20); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Accordingly, MetLife's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 17) is due to be granted.
MetLife asserts that the requirements for interpleader have been met, and, therefore, it should be discharged from further liability. (Docs.# 1, 15.) It represents that the Defendants who have appeared, Ms. Hill and Signature Group Financial, consent to MetLife's discharge from the case. MetLife has disavowed all interest in the res and asks the court to enjoin all Defendants from instituting any action or proceeding in any court against MetLife for the recovery of the res. Kurland v. United States, 919 F.Supp. 419, 422 (M.D.Fla.1996) ("Interpleader gives the disinterested party the ability to bow out, leaving the actual parties with real interests at stake to litigate their claims."). Further, MetLife has waived its complaint request for attorneys' fees and costs. In light of the default judgment against Mr. London, the remaining Defendants' consent, and MetLife's imminent satisfaction of the requirements of interpleader, it is entitled to the relief it seeks.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Pay Funds into the Court and for Order of Dismissal (Doc. # 15) is GRANTED in part. No later than
At that time, Ms. Hill and Signature Group Financial will be required to litigate or settle and adjust between them their claims for the FEGLI benefits. If, as it appears, they are in agreement, they should file a notice reflecting such agreement and informing the court how they wish it to direct the res no later than
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 2181295
Avram N. Cohen, Law Office of Avram N. Cohen, Stephen J. Angell, Law Office of Stephen J. Angell, Providence, RI, Edward L. Gerstein, Esq., Little Compton, RI, Edward R. Dipippo, Cranston, RI, for Defendants.
SMITH, District Judge.
The Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge David L. Martin filed on March 16, 2006, in the above-captioned matter is accepted pursuant to Title 28 United States Code § 636(b)(1). Defendant, Carol Kimberly Griggs' Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against Defendants Nadeau, Gonya, Marino, Robbio, Davenport, Von Fredrek and Luiz is GRANTED.
MARTIN, United States Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Carol Kimberly Griggs' Motion for Entry of Default Judgments against Defendants Nadeau, Gonya, Marino, Robbio, Davenport, Von Fredrek
This is an interpleader action. See Complaint for Interpleader (Doc. # 1) ("Complaint") ¶ 1. Plaintiff Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, U.S. ("Plaintiff" or "Sun Life"), is a stock life insurance company with a principal place of business in Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 3. In 1984 and 1985 Sun Life issued a total of seven annuity contracts (the "Contracts") to Frederick A. Gonya ("Frederick"). Id. ¶ 14. The Contracts bear the following numbers: 08-0880-138224 ("Contract 224"), 08-0880-138233 ("Contract 233"), 08-0880-145038 ("Contract 038"), 08-0880-145056 ("Contract 056"), 08-0880-145065 ("Contract 065"), 08-0880-145074 ("Contract 074"), and 71-7100-001929 ("Contract 929"). Id. At various times prior to his death on September 6, 1999, Frederick designated one or more of the named Defendants as beneficiaries of one or more of the Contracts. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
Sun Life filed this action on April 25, 2005, see Docket, alleging that "a dispute exists among the defendants regarding who are the beneficiaries under the Contracts and how the proceeds from the Contracts should be distributed among them," Complaint ¶ 19. The Complaint named ten individuals as Defendants: Ida Conroy ("Conroy"), Paul S. Davenport ("Davenport"), Paul Gonya ("Gonya"), Carol Kimberly Griggs, a.k.a. Carol Kimberly ("Griggs"), Jeffrey Luiz ("Luiz"), H. Locke MacDonald ("MacDonald"), A. Michael Marino ("Marino"), Robert R. Nadeau ("Nadeau"), Anthony J. Robbio, Jr. ("Robbio"), and Frederick Von Fredrek ("Von Fredrek"). Complaint at 1.
According to the Complaint, Frederick allegedly designated Griggs as the beneficiary
Only three Defendants, Conroy, MacDonald, and Griggs, responded to the Complaint by filing timely answers. See Docs. # 3, # 15, # 16; see also Docket. The remaining seven Defendants, Davenport, Gonya, Luiz, Marino, Nadeau, Robbio, and Von Fredrek (the "defaulted Defendants"), who are the subjects of the instant Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, did not file timely answers or responses to the Complaint, see Docket, and they were defaulted on October 24, 2005, see Docs. # 31-37.
Six of the defaulted Defendants (Davenport, Gonya, Marino, Robbio, Nadeau, and Von Fredrek) filed motions on November 16, 2005, to vacate the default and to allow them to answer the Complaint. See Docket; see also Docs. # 41, # 44, # 47, # 50, # 53, # 56. Luiz had advised Sun Life in a letter dated June 28, 2005, that he did "not object to Sun Life's distribution of the assets according to their records as designated by the owner of the policies, Frederick Gonya, at the time of his passing." Memorandum of Defendant Carol Kimberly Griggs[] in Support of Motion for Entry of Default Judgments against Defendants Nadeau, Gonya, Marino, Robbio, Davenport, Von Fredrek and Luiz ("Griggs' Mem."), Exhibit ("Ex.") A (Letter from Luiz to Kirby of 6/28/05).
Following a hearing on January 6, 2006, the Court denied the motions to vacate in a memorandum and order issued on January 12, 2006. See Memorandum and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Deposit Proceeds and Denying Motions to Vacate Default (Doc. # 61) ("Memorandum and order of 1/12/06"). In that same memorandum and order, the Court granted Sun Life's motion to deposit the proceeds of five of the Contracts with the Clerk.
The instant Motion for Entry of Default Judgment was filed by Defendant Griggs on February 14, 2005. See Docket. By the Motion, Griggs seeks to have default judgment enter against the defaulted Defendants and in her favor concerning five annuity Contracts: 224, 233, 038, 074, and
As an initial matter, when judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to assure itself that it has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties. See Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.2001); In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir.1999); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack—Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir.1997); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.1986); see also Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.2002)("To hear a case, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties, `that is, the power to require the parties to obey its decision.' ")(quoting United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir.1999)); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 668 (D.D.C.1980)(holding that issue of subject matter jurisdiction should be fully explored despite previous entry of default); cf. Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 3 n. 3 (1st Cir.1989)("[W]here the court rendering the default judgment is shown to lack personal jurisdiction over the defendant, . . . the judgment may be vacated and set aside by the rendering court on motion, or by another court on collateral attack.")(quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice para. 55.09)(second alteration in original). Accordingly, this Court examines both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
"Under 28 U.S.C. § 1335,
This action was brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 22
Davenport, Gonya, Luiz, Robbio, Marino, and Nadeau each signed a waiver
The instant Motion for Entry of Default Judgment has been filed by Griggs, a Defendant in the action. See Motion. While more frequently it is the plaintiff who moves for entry of default judgment, the right of a defendant in an interpleader action to do so is recognized. See Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Alps Elec. Co., No. 99 C 6990, 2002 WL 484845, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 29, 2002)(finding that defendant was "clearly entitled" to have his motion for default judgment granted against one of two other defendants who had neither answered nor appeared); Gulf Coast Galvanizing, Inc. v. Steel Sales Co., 826 F.Supp. 197, 203-04 (S.D.Miss.1993)("Thus, an interpleader claimant may obtain judgment when the remaining claimants have defaulted, unless, however, the competing claimant is the United States."); European Am. Bank v. Royal Aloha Vacation Club, No. 87 CIV. 2154(RWS), 1988 WL 68194, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1988) (granting moving defendant's motion for default judgment against two other defendants who did not file a timely answer to the complaint).
Griggs has resolved her dispute with Conroy and MacDonald, the other two Defendants who have not been defaulted. See Stipulation Concerning Distribution of Annuity Proceeds (Doc. # 65) ("Stipulation"). Conroy claimed an interest only in Contract 056, see Doc. # 15 (Conroy Answer), and MacDonald claimed an interest only in Contract 065, see Doc. # 3 (MacDonald Answer). They have each executed a stipulation authorizing and directing Sun Life to distribute the proceeds of the annuity contract in which they claimed an interest to Griggs. See Stipulation ¶¶ 4, 5. Conroy and MacDonald have also agreed to execute releases in favor of Sun Life after the proceeds have been distributed to Griggs. Id. ¶ 7. Thus, in light of the Stipulation, for practical purposes, the only remaining defendants in this action are Griggs and the defaulted Defendants.
A named interpleader defendant who fails to answer the interpleader complaint and assert a claim to the res forfeits any claim of entitlement that might have been asserted. See Gulf Coast Galvanizing, Inc. v. Steel Sales Co., 826 F.Supp. 197, 203 (S.D.Miss.1993)(citing Gen. Accident Group v. Gagliardi, 593 F.Supp. 1080, 1089 (D.Conn.1984)); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eason, 736 F.2d 130, 133 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984)("if all but one named interpleader defendant defaulted, the remaining defendant would be entitled to the fund"). Thus, I find that the defaulted Defendants by their failure to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint have forfeited any claim to the proceeds from annuity Contracts 224, 233, 038, 074, and 929.
Default judgments should enter against the defaulted Defendants (Davenport, Gonya, Luiz, Marino, Nadeau, Robbio, and Von Fredrek) and in favor of Griggs concerning the proceeds of Contracts 224, 233, 038, 074, and 929. See Motion at 4. The proceeds of these Contracts which have been deposited into the Registry of the Court should be paid to Griggs, and the defaulted Defendants should be restrained from instituting any action against Sun Life relating to the recovery of the proceeds of those Contracts. See Complaint, Prayer for Relief.
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that the Motion for Entry of Default Judgment be granted (in the form stated above). Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten (10) days of its receipt. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); DRI LR Cv 72(d). Failure to file specific objections in a timely manner constitutes waiver of the right to review by the district court and of the right to appeal the district court's decision. See United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1986); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.1980).
March 16, 2006.
Christine S. Hwang, Lindsay Rose Nicholas, Leonard Carder, LLP, San Francisco, CA, D. Ward Kallstrom, Kathleen Cahill Slaught, Michelle Marie Scannell, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Brian Leroy Larsen, Lauren Beth Gelber, Law Office Brian L. Larsen, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.
EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge.
The Trustees are the named fiduciaries and designated administrators of the ILWU-PMA Pension Plan ("the Plan"), an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et. seq. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4. Decedent James A. Taylor was a Plan participant who began receiving monthly benefits from the Plan when he retired on November 1, 2003, until his death on November 15, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 6, 29. The Plan provides that upon the death of a plan participant, the "surviving spouse [as defined by the Plan] will receive a monthly Survivor Pension benefit for the remainder of the surviving spouse's life." Id. ¶ 37. At the time this suit was filed, the amount of plan benefits payable to the surviving spouse equaled $2,299.27 per month. Id. ¶ 39.
Plaintiffs' complaint does not indicate that the pension plan documents record the identity of the decedent's spouse. However, records associated with a separate employee benefit plan sponsored by the ILWU and PMA do. Mr. Taylor was also a participant in the ILWU-PMA Welfare Plan ("Welfare Plan"), "a separate ERISA plan providing hospital, medical, and other benefits to longshore workers and their dependents." Comp. ¶ 14. "Under the Welfare Plan, longshore workers designate their dependants, including dependent spouses, as eligible for Welfare Plan coverage by submitting a `Record Change Form' or a `Dependent Verification Form.'" Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs, through the ILWU-PMA Benefit Plan Office, received a total of 11 such forms from the decedent over the course of his participation in the two plans. See id. ¶¶ 13-30. These forms identify five separate individuals as the decedent's spouse. Plaintiffs have named each of these five individuals as a defendant in this action "on information and belief that [each] may have an interest in the benefits at issue." Id. ¶¶ 9-11.
Defendant Laversa Pier, a resident of San Francisco, California, was married to James Taylor from October 11, 1980, until the dissolution of their marriage on a date before November 12, 1982. Compl. ¶ 9. Defendant Jennifer Taylor, a resident of Brentwood, California, was married to James Taylor on October 10, 1982. Id. ¶ 7. Jennifer Taylor was deleted as a dependent spouse by the decedent on a Record Change Form filed on January 18, 1984. Id. ¶ 21. Defendant Mary Taylor, whose residence is unknown, was married to James Taylor around January 1984 until the dissolution of their marriage around February 1985. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant Sheryl Perdue, a resident of Lithonia, Georgia, was married to James Taylor from November 30, 1985, until the dissolution of their marriage on October 31, 1989. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant Pamela Coates, a resident of San Francisco, California, married James Taylor on August 6, 1999. Id. ¶ 8. At the time of his retirement, James Taylor indicated to the ILWU-PMA Benefit Plan Office that Pamela Coates was his legal spouse. Id. ¶ 29. On February 4, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed a "Dependent Verification Form" deleting Pamela Coates as a dependent spouse, and when he died later that year, Mr. Taylor's death certificate stated that his marital status was "widowed." Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
In an effort to resolve these conflicting claims to the Benefits, the Trustees filed this interpleader
Jennifer Taylor was served on August 29, 2011. See Docket No. 11. The Trustees allege that a person representing herself as Jennifer Taylor had a telephone conversation with Plaintiffs' counsel on September 2, 2011, to inquire about the summons and complaint she received. Declaration of Lindsay Nicholas ("Nicholas Decl.") (Docket No. 39) ¶ 6. Laversa Pier was served on September 19, 2011. See Docket. No. 12. The Trustees allege that Laversa Pier contacted Plaintiffs' counselon September 20, 2011, to indicate that she had no interest in claiming the Benefits on account of her marriage to James Taylor. Nicholas Decl. ¶ 11. Other than these brief interactions with Plaintiffs' counsel, neither Ms. Pier nor Ms. Taylor filed a response to the complaint or otherwise entered an appearance in this action. The Trustees moved for entry of default against these two defendants, which the Clerk entered on November 17, 2011. See Docket No. 19.
After unsuccessful attempts to locate defendants Mary Taylor and Sheryl Perdue via searches of three electronic databases, Plaintiffs moved for permission to serve Mary Taylor and Sheryl Perdue by publication. See Pl.'s Motion to Serve by Publication (Docket No. 23). The Court granted the motion, and the Plaintiffs published summons for Mary Taylor in the San Franciscobased publications The Recorder and the San Francisco Chronicle. See Docket Nos. 26, 29. The Trustees published summons for Sheryl Perdue in the The Recorder, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Atlanta-based publication the Daily Report. See Docket Nos. 25, 27-28. After Ms. Taylor and Ms. Perdue failed to file a timely answer or otherwise appear, the Clerk entered default against Mary Taylor on June 22, 2012, and against Sheryl Perdue on July 2, 2012. See Docket Nos. 46, 49.
Following the Court's ruling, the Plaintiffs published summons for Mary Taylor in the Washington, D.C.-based publication The Washington Post. See Docket No. 63. After Mary Taylor failed to file a timely answer or otherwise appear, the Clerk entered default against her on December 20, 2012. See Docket No. 66. The Plaintiffs thereafter brought their instant motion for entry of default judgment against Mary Taylor. Docket No. 67. The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion on February 7, 2013, at which Defendant Mary Taylor failed to appear.
In considering whether to enter a default judgment, a district court first must determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to the case. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir.1999) ("When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.").
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this ERISA case under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
In this case, the Plaintiffs have brought an ERISA enforcement action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) in an effort to "enforce the terms of the Pension Plan," that is, to determine "to whom the Survivor Pension benefits payable on account of James A. Taylor . . . are to be paid." Compl. at 2. The complaint does not allege Mary Taylor's state of residence, but under ERISA's nationwide service of process provision, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over her even if she does not reside in this judicial district. See Vivien, 2002 WL 31640557 at *2. Mary Taylor presumably falls within ERISA's nationwide service of process provision as long as she is a resident of the United States. See Combs v. Doe, No. 10-cv-01120 HRL, 2011 WL 738052, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Feb.23, 2011) (recommending that default judgment be entered against a defendant whose identity and location are unknown). The Court has been given no reason to believe that she is not. Thus, the Court has a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over Mary Taylor in order to grant default judgment against her.
As a threshold matter in considering a motion for default judgment, the Court must first "assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom default is requested." Board of Trustees of the N. Cal. Sheet Metal Workers v. Peters, No. C-00-0395 VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 2, 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) provides that "an individual . . . may be served in a judicial district of the United States by. . . following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located. . . ." California law allows for service by publication if the party to be served "cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner," and is a "necessary or proper party to the action" or "has or claims an interest in real or personal property in this state that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court or the relief demanded in the action." Cal.Code Civ. Pro. § 415.50(a). In order to effectuate service by publication, a party must publish the summons "in a named newspaper, published in this state, that is most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served." Cal.Code Civ. Pro. § 415.50(b). "If the party to be served resides or is located out of this state, the court may also order the summons to be published in a named newspaper outside this state that is most likely to give actual notice to that party." Id. California law also specifies that service by publication will be satisfied on the twenty-eighth day following the first date of publication, with the summons being published at least once a week for four consecutive weeks, with at least five days intervening between the publication dates. See California Government Code § 6064.
After the entry of default, a court may grant default judgment on the merits of a case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). "The district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one." Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980). Factors that a court may consider in exercising that discretion include:
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986). Because default has already been entered in this case, the Court must construe as true all factual allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint except for those related to the amount of damages. See Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir.1987). See also Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.1977) (holding that at the default judgment stage, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those concerning damages, are deemed admitted by the non-responding parties). Facts not contained in the pleadings and claims which are legally insufficient, however, are not established by default. Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.1978).
The Court finds that all seven Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment against Mary Taylor. First, the Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if the Court does not enter default judgment against this Defendant because they would be denied the finality of judgment sought through their interpleader action. See Trustees of IL WU-PMA Pension Plan v. Peters, 660 F.Supp.2d at 1144 (finding prejudice "if default judgment were not granted because [the ERISA plan fiduciaries] would be denied the certainty and finality that judgment in an interpleader action is intended to provide."); see also W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Camul, No. 11-cv-01751 AWI, 2012 WL 844589, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Mar.12, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-cv-01751 AWI, 2012 WL 1074952 (E.D.Cal. Mar.29, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff "would be prejudiced if a default judgment is not granted" because plaintiff "has no other alternative by which to evaluate [d]efendant's claim to the life insurance policy.") (citation omitted); W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan v. Jennings, No. 10-cv-03629, 2011 WL 2609858, at *3 (N.D.Cal. June, 5, 2011) ("Plaintiff and [answering defendant] would suffer prejudice if the Court does not enter default judgment. The dispute concerns [d]efendants' competing claims to interpleaded funds. Without entry of default judgment, the competing stakeholders' claims cannot be resolved.").
The fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake in the action, weighs neither for nor against an entry of default judgment. In interpleader actions, the sum of money at stake, however significant, is not dispositive as the interpleading party is not asserting an interest in the interpleaded funds, nor are they seeking damages. Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Ward, No. 11-cv-0433 JAM, 2011 WL 5241257, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Oct.31, 2011); see also Jennings, 2011 WL 2609858 at *3 (finding that the fourth Eitel factor is neutral in an interpleader action). The Plaintiffs in this action are not asserting a claim to the funds, but are attempting to distribute the funds to the party entitled to the plan benefits. There is no dispute that the funds to be deposited and distributed are determined by the Plan.
The fifth and sixth Eitel factors recommend that a court consider "the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts" and "whether the default was due to excusable neglect" in assessing whether to grant default judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. The Court finds that both factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment. Mary Taylor has made no effort to challenge the Trustees' interpleader complaint. Therefore, there is nothing on the record before the Court to suggest that a factual dispute exists. See Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 5241257 at *4 (finding that "there is a very low likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists" because "the court [assumes] the truth of well-pleaded facts in the complaint following the clerk's entry of default"); see also Canul, 2012 WL 844589 at *3 ("[T]here is little possibility of dispute concerning material facts because (1) based on the entry of default, the Court accepts all allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true and (2) Defendant has not made any effort to challenge the Complaint or otherwise appear in this case."). Further, considering the merits of this action, it is unlikely that Mary Taylor would assert a competing claim to be designated the decedent's "surviving spouse" under the plan, given that her marriage to Mr. Taylor ended in February 1985, and the decedent twice remarried in the twenty four years before his death. Turning to the sixth factor, the Plaintiffs sought and obtained administrative relief to proceed with substituted service on Mary Taylor. See Docket Nos. 23-24, 61-62. The Plaintiffs then effectuated service by publication. See Docket Nos. 26, 29, 63. "[I]t is unlikely that [the defendant's] failure to answer, and the resulting defaults entered by the [clerk], were the result of excusable neglect" where "[the plaintiff] effectuated service on [the defendant] via substituted service, which is a method permitted by law." Canul, 2012 WL 844589 at *3. Therefore, these two factors also weigh in favor of default judgment.
In sum, the Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment against Defendant Mary Taylor.
The Plaintiffs' interpleader complaint seeks an "Injunctive Order of this Court" to prevent the named Defendants "from commencing or maintaining any action against the Plaintiffs, the Pension Plan,[] ILWU, PMA, or the Plans Office regarding entitlement to the Survivor Pension benefits payable under the Pension Plan on account of James A. Taylor." Compl. at 10. Unlike statutory interpleader, rule interpleader under Fed.R.Civ.P. 22 does not authorize courts to enjoin litigants from pursuing further claims in state or federal court with regard to the res at issue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(e) ("These rules do not modify . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2361, which relates to preliminary injunctions in actions of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader."). However, courts have used the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to enjoin defendants in an interpleader action from bringing future proceedings regarding the same claim in federal court. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 879 (5th Cir.1998) ("Under the All Writs Statute, a federal court has the power to enjoin a party before it from attempting to relitigate the same issues or related issues precluded by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel in another federal court. Accordingly, a federal court in a Rule 22 interpleader proceeding may issue an injunction to restrain the parties from pursuing such issues in another federal court.") (citations omitted). This is because relitigation of these issues "would be judicially wasteful and raise the possibility of inconsistent results. It would also defeat the purpose of the [plaintiffs'] interpleader action." Trustees of IL WUPMA Pension Plan v. Peters, 660 F.Supp.2d at 1145.
Further, courts have held that injunctions issued pursuant to the All Writs Statute may be used to enjoin parties from relitigating the same issues or claims before state courts. Normally, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, "limits the ability of federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings." Peters, 660 F.Supp.2d at 1144. However, an exception has been recognized for injunctions that are "necessary in aid of [the court's] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment." Id. This exception is referred to as the "relitigation exception." Id. (citing Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988)). See also Gen. Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir.1991) ("A federal court presiding over an interpleader action may stay pending state court proceedings involving the same interpled fund under the `necessary in aid of its jurisdiction' exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.").
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
This order disposes of Docket No. 67.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 556800, 55 Employee Benefits Cas. 1009
28 U.S.C. § 1335.
Fed.R.Civ.P.22.
28 U.S.C. § 2361.
