MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RONALD A. GUZMÁN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Jeanette Jones, filed this action for judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner's decision denying her application for benefits. For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the Commissioner's decision and remands this case for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits in April 2013, alleging a disability onset date of May 23, 2012. Her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, and she requested a hearing. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a hearing on October 29, 2015 and heard the testimony of plaintiff and a vocational expert. (R. 34-79, Tr.) On November 24, 2015, the ALJ denied plaintiff's applications. (R. 17-33.) The Appeals Council denied review on January 23, 2017 (R. 1-3), leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner, reviewable by this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017).

DISCUSSION

The reviewing court may enter a judgment "affirming, modifying, or reversing" the final decision of the Commissioner, "with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence"; it may not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Our review is limited to the reasons articulated by the ALJ in h[is] decision."). Evidence is considered "substantial" if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion. Young, 362 F.3d at 1001. In rendering a decision, the ALJ "must build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence." Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013). Although the Court's standard of review is deferential, it is "not entirely uncritical," and the case must be remanded where the decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

The Social Security regulations prescribe a five-part sequential test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The Commissioner must consider whether: (1) the claimant has performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for which she claims disability; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations; (4) if not, whether she has the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether she can perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.; Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 844 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. 22.) At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the severe impairments of hearing loss and arthritis. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (R. 23.) At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to "perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. [§] 404.1567(c) and [§] 416.967(c) except she should avoid concentrated exposure to excessive noise of more than moderate intensity and is limited to occupations that do not require fine hearing capability." (Id.) At the final step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as a shipping and receiving clerk, housekeeping cleaner, and laundry worker, and thus is not disabled. (R. 28.)

On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because (1) the ALJ improperly evaluated plaintiff's RFC by failing to account for all evidence of limitations resulting from her hearing loss, failing to provide an evidentiary basis for the two specific hearing limitations in the RFC, and failing to provide an evidentiary basis for the conclusion that plaintiff can perform medium work; and (2) the ALJ improperly assessed the credibility of plaintiff's statements regarding the extent of her hearing loss and her inability to pay for hearing aids.

As to plaintiff's hearing, the ALJ's RFC assessment states as follows in relevant part:

(R. 24-25 (citations omitted).) The ALJ went on to state that while he did not find plaintiff's claims or presentation regarding her hearing loss to be credible, for a number of stated reasons, he gave "little weight" to the opinions of the state-agency medical consultants who opined that plaintiff's impairments were nonsevere. (R. 26-27.) The ALJ explained that while the consultants did not credit the findings of the May 2013 and March 2014 examinations, he gave greater weight to those findings when considering them in combination with the results of the August 2013 audiological testing. (R. 27.) The ALJ concluded his assessment as to plaintiff's hearing with the following statement: "[T]he above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the medical findings, nature and frequency of treatment, the claimant's activities, opinion evidence and other factors discussed above. I have accommodated her impairments and associated symptoms by limiting her to work at the medium exertional level with additional limitations as described above. To the extent that [plaintiff] alleges greater limitations, her allegations are not fully credible." (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately account for the October 2013 testing by the ear, nose, and throat specialist, which revealed moderately severe hearing loss in both ears, as well as the June 2015 audiologic evaluation, which the ALJ requested and which revealed severe hearing loss in the right ear and severe to profound hearing loss in the left ear, but which the audiologist concluded was unreliable due to inconsistencies. The Court agrees. Although the ALJ mentioned the October 2013 results when describing the evidence, he did not explain how those testing results factored into his decision or whether they supported some hearing limitations. As for the evaluation that was done at the ALJ's behest, it appears as if the ALJ implicitly rejected its results because they were unreliable, but it was error not to substantively discuss those results, seek additional information, or explain why reliable results were no longer necessary. See Collins v. Colvin, No. 12 C 1880, 2013 WL 5493683, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013) ("Once the ALJ decided to reject the findings of the consultative exam that he had believed was necessary, he had a duty to seek out additional information or explain why he no longer needed the additional opinion."); Clayborne v. Astrue, No. 06 C 6380, 2007 WL 6123191, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2007) (where the claimant was recommended for a consultative examination, the ALJ's finding that its results were inconclusive obligated him to order a second exam or explain why such an exam was no longer necessary).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also erred by failing to explain how the evidence of plaintiff's hearing loss led him to preclude work that requires fine hearing capability and avoids exposure to excessive noise of "more than moderate intensity."1 The Court agrees that the ALJ did not build a logical bridge between the evidence and these limitations. The ALJ found that certain hearing test results (including the March 2014 examination, which revealed plaintiff could not hear at conversation level from ten feet away) supported "some" hearing limitations. But, as plaintiff points out, the ALJ did not identify any opinion or other evidence that corresponds to the specific limitations imposed (and the Court found none) or otherwise explain why they are warranted by the evidence. That was error. See Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005) (an ALJ's failure to explain how he arrived at specific RFC findings is reversible error). The RFC limitations do not appear to be based on any evidence as to what functional limitations plaintiff's hearing loss would be expected to cause. Although administrative error is sometimes harmless, such that a court will not remand a case to the ALJ for further proceedings where it is convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result, see McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011), the Court is unable to conclude that these errors were harmless. It is entirely possible that the results of a second consultative audiological examination, consideration of all the evidence regarding plaintiff's hearing loss, and further development of vocational evidence would result in a more restricted RFC than was formulated.2

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to provide an evidentiary basis for the conclusion that plaintiff can perform medium work. The Court agrees. As to plaintiff's arthritis, the ALJ discussed the evidence and concluded that while plaintiff "has the severe impairment of arthritis, [the medical evidence] does not indicate that this impairment is so severe as to prevent the claimant from performing all basic work activities. The claimant's arthritis has been accommodated by limiting her to work at the medium exertional level. The medical evidence does not support any further limitations to the claimant's work-related abilities due to arthritis." (R. 26.) While the ALJ gave "little weight" to the opinion from plaintiff's examining physician, who opined that plaintiff has twenty percent reduced capacity to walk, bend, stand, stoop, sit, turn, climb, push, and pull and that plaintiff can lift no more than ten pounds at a time, the ALJ did not tie to any specific evidence his conclusion that plaintiff has the ability to perform medium work. That error also warrants reversal and remand. See Taylor, 425 F.3d at 352; Newell v. Astrue, 869 F.Supp.2d 875, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

Accordingly, this case will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiff also contests the ALJ's credibility finding regarding the extent of her hearing loss and her inability to pay for hearing aids, and because that issue is intertwined with the assessment of plaintiff's RFC, it will have to be revisited on remand as well.3

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ improperly evaluated plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Therefore, the Court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, reverses the Commissioner's decision, and remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.