ORDER

SARA L. ELLIS, District Judge.

The Court reverses the judgment entered against Donaldson. See Statement.

STATEMENT

After receiving a petty offense ticket for chaining his bike to a handicap ramp at the Jesse Brown VA Medical Center (the "Medical Center"), Defendant-Appellant Pedro Donaldson proceeded to a bench trial before Magistrate Judge Susan Cox. Judge Cox found Donaldson guilty of disorderly conduct that obstructs the normal use of entrances in violation of 38 C.F.R. §§ 1.218(a)(5) and (b)(11). She sentenced him to thirty days' unsupervised probation and prohibited him from chaining his bike in any way to the ramps located at the Medical Center. Judge Cox waived the fine and court processing fee. Donaldson now appeals, challenging whether the evidence sufficiently established that Donaldson unreasonably obstructed the normal use of an entrance to the Medical Center as required to establish a violation of § 1.218(a)(5).

"In all cases of conviction by a United States magistrate judge an appeal of right shall lie from the judgment of the magistrate judge to a judge of the district court in which the offense was committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3402. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2) provides that "[t]he defendant is not entitled to a trial de novo by a district judge." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(D). Using the same rules as those that apply to appeals, id., in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and reverses only if the record contains no evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, United States v. Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court "cannot re-weigh evidence or reassess witness credibility." Id.

The facts established at Donaldson's bench trial are as follows: The entrance to the Medical Center has two handicap ramps, each approximately five feet wide, surrounded by grass. On August 25, 2016, while on the north handicap ramp, Donaldson began to lock his bike to the ramp's railing. Observing Donaldson, Sergeant Carlos Echeverry told him to move the bike to the bike rack. Instead of following Echeverry's orders, Donaldson moved his bike to the grassy area and chained the bike to the handicap ramp's railing. Donaldson then pulled out a camcorder to film the remainder of the encounter. Echeverry informed Donaldson that if he did not move his bike from the grassy area to the bike rack, Echeverry would issue Donaldson a ticket. Donaldson did not move his bike, and Echeverry issued him a citation for "disorderly conduct which obstructs the normal use of entrances (handicap ramp blockage)" in violation of 38 C.F.R. 1.218(b)(11). Doc. 1-1. Photographs introduced into evidence show one of the handlebars of Donaldson's bike hovering over the handicap ramp railing.

Section 1.218(a)(5), pertaining to rules and regulations at VA property, reads:

The accompanying penalty provision, § 1.218(b), provides that "[c]onduct in violation of the rules and regulations set forth in paragraph (a) of this section subjects an offender to arrest and removal from the premises." Additionally, being found guilty of § 1.218(a)(5) subjects an offender to a $250 fine, with the regulation there using the language "disorderly conduct . . . which obstructs the normal use of entrances, exits, foyers, offices, corridors, elevators, and stairways or which tends to impede or prevent the normal operation of a service or operation of the facility." 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(b)(11). In finding Donaldson guilty, Judge Cox tracked this language, finding that Donaldson's bike "tend[ed] to impede that handicapped ramp." Doc. 16 at 27-28.

Donaldson argues, however, that based on the facts established at his trial, no reasonable trier of fact could find that his bike "unreasonably obstructed" the usual use of the handicap ramp so as to establish a violation of the regulation. The government does not contest that it needed to prove an unreasonable obstruction of the usual use of the ramp as opposed to merely that the bike "tend[ed] to impede the handicapped ramp," as Judge Cox found. See Doc. 16. at 27. The parties' only disagreement, then, is the level of obstruction that constitutes a violation under the regulation and whether the placement of Donaldson's bike on the grassy area constituted such an unreasonable obstruction.1

Although the Court need not establish a bright line rule for what amounts to an unreasonable obstruction, it agrees with Donaldson that no rational trier of fact could find that his bike, located on the grassy area with only the handlebar protruding over the railing of the handicap ramp, falls into that category so as to constitute a violation of § 1.218(a)(5). Because the regulation uses the term "unreasonable" to modify "obstruction," it allows for some blockage or impediments to normal use before a violation occurs. See Donovan v. Penn. Co., 199 U.S. 279, 303, 26 S.Ct. 91, 50 S.Ct. 192 (1905) (defining "materially obstructive" as "of such exclusive character as, in a substantial sense, to prevent others from also using it upon equal terms, for legitimate purposes"). The permissible obstruction would clearly encompass the situation at hand, where the handlebar of Donaldson's bike, which protruded over the railing, would at most require an individual to adjust his or her grip on the railing for a step or two and does not pose any impediment to use of the south railing of the ramp. By contrast, if Donaldson's bike had been chained to the inside of the handicap ramp, such an obstruction would not qualify as reasonable, where an individual using the handrail for support would have to let go of it for the entire length of the bike. See United States v. Gilbert, 47 F.3d 1116, 1118 (11th Cir. 1995) (defendant unreasonably obstructed the usual use of the entrance of a federal building by lying down in front of a revolving door to the courthouse). Because Donaldson's bike did not unreasonably obstruct the usual use of the handicap ramp, allowing passage and at most requiring an individual to move one's hand for a moment when encountering the handlebars sitting above the railing, the Court concludes that Donaldson's conviction must be reversed.