CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, District Judge.
Plaintiff Michael Campos ("Plaintiff") brings the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Cook County, Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board ("Merit Board"), Steptoe and Johnson, LLP ("Steptoe and Johnson"), Sheriff Thomas Dart, Bryon Brazier, James Nally, John Dalicandro, Brian Riordan, Jennifer Bae, Vince Winters, Patrick Brady, Kim Widup, Juan Balitierre, Gray Mateo Harris, Daniel Raymond, Terence Gonzalvez, and William Andrichik. Before the Court are the Merit Board and Sherriff Thomas Dart's motion to dismiss, the Cook County State's Attorney's motion to dismiss, and Cook County's motions to dismiss. For the reason stated, Defendants Cook County Merit Board and Sheriff Thomas Dart's motion to dismiss is granted. The two remaining motions to dismiss are denied as moot.
Plaintiff is a former Cook County Corrections officer who was terminated from his position 2011. The Merit Board is a statutorily constructed entity under 55 ILCS 5/3-7002 et seq., in exclusively authorized to impose discipline in excess of 30 days and provide employees with meaningful and timely post-deprivation hearings. The following defendants were members of the Merit Board at the time Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint and they are being sued in both their official and individual capacities for intentional constitutional torts: Byron Brazier; James Nally; John Dalicandro; Vince Winters; Patrick Brady; Kim Widum; and Juan Balitierre, who is being sued solely in his official capacity. The following former members of the Merit Board are also being sued in their individual and official capacity for intentional constitutional torts: Brian Riordan; Jennifer Bae; and Gray Mateo Harris. Steptoe and Johnson is a law firm and an Illinois Limited Liability partnership located in Chicago, Illinois, whom represented Sheriff Tom Dart and the Merit Board during the underlying circuit court matter. Plaintiff is suing Steptoe and Johnson for indemnification purposes for the alleged unlawful participation of its agents and employees in the conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Daniel Raymond, Terence Gonzalvez, and William Andrichik are attorneys employed by Steptoe and Johnson and are being sued for intentional constitutional torts. Daniel Raymond, Terence Gonzalvez, and William Andrichik were terminated from this matter on May 10, 2018. Dkt. 21.
On or about November 6, 2010, Plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. On November 29, 2011, the Cook County Sheriff Department submitted a complaint to the Merit Board, seeking the termination of Plaintiff in relation to the November 6, 2010 incident. In February 2012, over the Cook County State's Attorney's objection, the Circuit Court of Cook County rescinded the Secretary of State's summary suspension of Plaintiff's driving privileges. The trial court then granted Plaintiff's motion to quash and suppress evidence related to Plaintiff's arrest. The suppression of evidence was affirmed on appeal on May 14, 2014, and the charges were consequently dismissed.
In reviewing the Cook County Sheriff Department's complaint that sought Plaintiff's termination, the Merit Board held an evidentiary hearing on December 10, 2014. The evidentiary hearing concerned whether Plaintiff had driven under the influence of alcohol, struck several unattended motor vehicles, left the scene of an accident, and violated his DUI court supervision. After review of the testimony, the Merit Board found that, by the preponderance of evidence, Plaintiff violated several rules and regulations of the Cook County Department of Corrections. Am. Compl., Ex 1, at 2. On October 15, 2015, the Merit Board ordered that Plaintiff be terminated from his position effective November 29, 2011.
In November 2016, more than a year after the Merit Board's decision, Plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review of the decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The circuit court found that the Merit Board's decision was vague and remanded it for a new decision. On April 20, 2017, the Merit Board again found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff violated the rules and regulations of the Cook County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff again filed a motion for post-judgment relief in the circuit court. Plaintiff argued that the Merit Board was illegally constituted and, thus, the circuit court was required to vacate the Merit Board's decision.
On March 9, 2018, the circuit court agreed with Plaintiff's argument and voided Plaintiff's prior adjudications, citing
After
Rather than wait for the newly reconstituted Merit Board to review the matter, as ordered by the circuit court, Plaintiff filed the instant § 1983 action. The root of Plaintiff's seven count complaint is that the Merit Board was unlawfully comprised at the time it made its decision to terminate him and, as a result, his post termination process was delayed unnecessarily. From this alleged delay, Plaintiff avers that Defendants, including a private law firm and its attorneys, conspired to and did deprive him of his substantive due process rights, property, and liberty. Defendants Merit Board and Sheriff Thomas Dart now move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint under the plausibility standard,
Count I and Count II claim that Plaintiff's substantive due process rights were violated by the deprivation of his property interest in his tenured employment. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff's alleges as a tenured public employee Plaintiff has a state created property interest pursuant to 55 ILCS 5/3-7011-12, and therefore, Defendants owed Plaintiff certain post-deprivation procedures.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's Response is, at times, inapposite to the substantive due process claims set forth in the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint, specifically Count I and Count II, seeks relief under § 1983 for "Substantive Due Process" violations. Am. Compl. at 13 and 16. The word "procedural" does not appear anywhere in the Amended Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff was given leave to amend his Complaint and, in addition to adding a claim for retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights, Plaintiff amended Count I and Count II from "42 U.S.C. § 1983 Due Process" violations to "42 U.S.C. § 1983 Substantive Due Process" violations. Compl. at 13 and 16; Am. Compl., at 13 and 16 (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff amended his complaint to specifically state substantive due process claims.
Despite bringing claims for substantive due process violations, in his Response, Plaintiff cites to case law discussing pleading requirements for procedural due process claims. Pl.'s Resp. at 11 (emphasis added). Also in his Response, Plaintiff refers to "Defendants' challenge to Plaintif's procedural due process claims [. . .]."
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any substantive due process violations. "We are consistently reminded that the scope of substantive due process is very limited"
The Court will first address Plaintiff's alleged separate constitutional violation. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a speech retaliation claim stating he possessed a "First Amendment right to seek redress for the unlawful termination for his employment." Am. Compl. ¶ 231 . To make out a prima facie case of speech retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: "(I) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he has suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions."
Without a separate constitutional violation, Plaintiff must show that there are inadequate state law remedies. Plaintiff fails to do so. In the wake of the appellate court ruling in
As Plaintiff admits in his Amended Complaint, the departmental regulation of post-deprivation hearings is designed to protect Plaintiff's due process rights. While Plaintiff has issue with the delay of the proceedings prior to this point, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate why the newly reconstituted Merit Board and the subsequent available appeals process would not provide an adequate remedy.
Plaintiff relies on Taylor to argue that his entire termination proceeding to date has been a sham and that future proceedings would be futile. While the circuit court relied on
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court expresses no view regarding the impact of
Next Counts III, IV, and VI, allege that the unlawful constitution of the Merit Board amounts to a conspiracy by all Defendants, including the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, Steptoe and Johnson, and its three attorneys, to intentionally deprive Plaintiff of his property and liberty rights. However, "conspiracy is not an independent basis of liability in § 1983 actions."
Plaintiff requests a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from initiating further post-deprivation proceedings relating to incidents predating 2014. This request would require the Court to place a limitation on the state administrative process. Plaintiff does not address his request for preliminary or permanent injunctions in his Response and does not provide any case law to support his assertion that the Court has the authority to direct the Merit Board on how to conduct its proceedings.
The circuit court's latest order regarding Plaintiff's post-deprivation proceedings voided the Merit Board's final administrative decision and remanded the matter for a new decision. Dkt. 43, Ex. 3 at 4. The circuit court did not restrict the Merit Board's proceedings to only incidents occurring after 2014.
Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to reinstate him to paid status, award full back-pay, and reinstate his healthcare benefits. However, when an administrative decision is set aside on the basis that the agency was unlawfully constituted, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the proper course of action is to remand the matter to the agency for reconsideration by a legally constituted board.
Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants deprived him of his substantive due process rights because he has an adequate state law remedy and he fails to allege a separate constitutional deprivation. The formal procedure for Plaintiff's adequate state law remedy is currently pending. Without an underlying deprivation, Plaintiff cannot bring an independent claim of conspiracy to deprive him of property or liberty. Finally, for the Court to enter a preliminary and permanent injunction limiting the scope of the Merit Board's decision would modify the circuit court decision, in contravention of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover, Plaintiff's requests for reinstatement, backpay, and reinstatement of health benefits are not the proper remedy where the Merit Board was unlawfully constituted; rather the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter. Accordingly, Defendants Cook County Merit Board and Sheriff Thomas Dart's motion to dismiss is granted. The two other pending motions to dismiss are denied as moot. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Civil case terminated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.