ORDER

PHILIP G. REINHARD, District Judge.

For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion [368] to file a supplemental exhibit is denied. Attorney Shalaby's motion [365] to file a surreply is granted and the surreply [365-1] is deemed filed. Attorney Shalaby's motion [387] requesting confirmation that the requirement for local counsel for plaintiff to sign all filings made on behalf of plaintiff does not apply to documents filed concerning Attorney Shalaby's PHV admission is granted. Attorney Shalaby's motion [401] for leave to file supplemental documents and a related request to take judicial notice is denied. Attorney Shalaby's pro hac vice admission in this case is revoked. Defendants' objection [343] to Magistrate Judge Johnston's order [333] is denied as moot. The court requests Magistrate Judge Johnston schedule a status conference with attorneys Chen and Nelson and defense counsel as soon as possible.

STATEMENT-OPINION

In its order [382] of September 4, 2018 ("2018 Show Cause Order"), the court ordered Attorney Shalaby to show cause why he should not have his pro hac vice ("PHV") admission revoked or be otherwise sanctioned for certain conduct which arose after Magistrate Judge Johnston's entry of an order [333] on defendants' motion to revoke Attorney Shalaby's pro hac vice admission and the filing of objections thereto. Mr. Shalaby filed a response [384] to the 2018 Show Cause Order on September 12, 2018. He also filed his declaration requesting judicial notice of appellate brief [385] on September 14, 2018. Thereafter, he filed: a supplemental response "further addressing matter of Magistrate Judge Johnston" [386] on September 15, 2018, a second supplemental response re "Judge Efremsky's order of September 17, 2018 [389] on September 17, 2018, his declaration requesting judicial notice of BAP appellate brief [390] on September 18, 2018, a declaration requesting judicial notice of variance in electronic signature procedures of the federal courts' civil and bankruptcy divisions [391] on October 12, 2018, an image from Bloomberg.com of Magistrate Judge Johnston's profile [398] on November 5, 2018, and a motion for leave to file supplemental documents which included a request for judicial notice [401] on December 28, 2018.1

The 2018 Show Cause Order specifically ordered Attorney Shalaby to address the following:

As discussed in the 2018 Show Cause Order, United States Bankruptcy Judge Efremsky had imposed sanctions on Attorney Shalaby in In re Nakhuda, No. 14-41156-RLE, 2015 WL 1943450 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2015). These sanctions included (1) a monetary penalty imposed pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 of $8,000; (2) a suspension imposed pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 from the practice of law in the bankruptcy courts of the Northern District of California until he completed 24 hours of continuing legal education in bankruptcy law plus 3 hours of continuing legal education in ethics ("CLE Provision"); and (3) a suspension pursuant to local rule of his e-filing privileges until he completed ECF retraining ("ECF Provision"). Judge Efremsky also ordered disgorgement of attorney's fees based on 11 U.S.C. § 329. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP"), the fee disgorgement and the suspension imposed by the ECF Provision were affirmed, the monetary penalty imposed pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 was explicitly reversed and the CLE Provision (also imposed pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011), though not directly addressed, appears to have been implicitly reversed. In re Nakhuda, 544 B.R. 886 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016). The BAP decision subsequently was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In re Nakhuda, 703 Fed. Appx. 621 (9th Cir. 2017). In affirming the BAP's decision concerning the suspension imposed by the ECF Provision the Ninth Circuit stated:

In re Nakhuda, 703 Fed. Appx. 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2017).

Attorney Shalaby filed a petition for rehearing with the Ninth Circuit (Dkt. No. 27-1 in Case No. 16-60017) in which he asserted the Ninth Circuit erred when it stated in its decision that Attorney Shalaby's "failure to obtain the debtor's original ink signature on documents electronically filed" "was brought to Shalaby's attention, yet he continued to violate the rules." He argued "[t]here was no allegation anywhere in the record stating or suggesting that the error was brought to Shalaby's attention, yet he continued to violate the rules." His petition for rehearing was denied by the Ninth Circuit on November 30, 2017 and the mandate issued on December 14, 2017. Dkt. Nos. 28, 29 in Case No. 16-60017.

On April 14, 2018, Attorney Shalaby filed a "Motion to Amend Pre-Appeal Sanction and Suspension Order with Judge Efremsky. Judge Efremsky's May 8thOrder is the ruling on that motion.

In the 2018 Show Cause Order, this court noted Attorney Shalaby had requested [346] that this court take judicial notice of the May 8th Order entered by Judge Efremsky. In this request Attorney Shalaby stated: "In this brief I am requesting only that the Court take judicial notice of the relevant Judge's statement based on his personal knowledge, the Ninth Circuit declined to reverse the `moot' suspension portion of the subject order by way of a `clear error' in the record, which is presented below." He further stated: "On that order he [Judge Efremsky] confirms the error of the Ninth Circuit, based on his `personal knowledge,' which I have already disclosed to the Court." Attorney Shalaby quoted paragraph 16 of the May 8th Order as making clear Judge Efremsky's "`personal knowledge' of this error" made by the Ninth Circuit.2

In the 2018 Show Cause Order, this court found that these statements by Attorney Shalaby were a gross misstatement of Judge Efremsky's May 8th Order because "[p]aragraph number 16 of the [May 8th Order] quoted above by Attorney Shalaby is not a finding by Judge Efremsky that his personal knowledge confirms the alleged error. Rather, it is merely a recitation of Attorney Shalaby's argument on the point. Instead, what Judge Efremsky found was: `the Ninth Circuit found that the record supported this court's [Judge Efremsky's] finding that there had been repeated violations of the Local Rules regarding obtaining and keeping ink signatures.'"

In his response [384] to the 2018 Show Cause Order, Attorney Shalaby argues he did not misrepresent the content of Judge Efremsky's May 8th Order. He states: "In my view, any interpretation contrary to footnote 2 of Judge Efremsky's order would be incorrect, because his words `implicitly reversed' express his understanding that the Ninth Circuit's repeat violation allegation is factually incorrect.3 It is therefore my belief that there can be no other interpretation." (emphasis in original). Attorney Shalaby contends: "This `implicitly reversed' observation by Judge Efremsky is the statement of his `personal knowledge' that the Ninth Circuit's repeat violation allegation is factually incorrect and unsupported by the record. Any other interpretation would be impossible because the BAP's decision clearly discloses that Judge Efremsky did not find that I acted `knowingly or intentionally.'" (emphasis in original) Attorney Shalaby then quotes the BAP opinion which notes the "bankruptcy court did not find Shalaby acted knowingly or intentionally" and states "[i]n sum, the bankruptcy court erred in sanctioning Shalaby for his conduct under Rule 9011 because it applied the wrong legal standard for sua sponte sanctions and its factual findings do not support — and in fact foreclose — the heightened standard of `akin to contempt'. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in issuing sanctions under Rule 9011. In re Nakhuda, 544 B.R. 886, 901-902 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016), aff'd, 703 Fed. Appx. 621 (9th Cir. 2017)."

Attorney Shalaby continues: "Furthermore, as the BAP explains in its decision, the imposition of sanctions requires the elements of knowledge and intent. Therefore, the only way the Ninth Circuit could `affirm' would be upon a finding of knowing and intentional misconduct. The Ninth Circuit makes this finding, in direct contradiction with the BAP decision it was reviewing: `The error was brought to Shalaby's attention, yet he continued to violate the rules.' In re Nakhuda, 703 Fed. Appx. 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2017). It is therefore beyond dispute that the Ninth Circuit's repeat violation allegation was factually incorrect, and also formed the very basis for its incorrect decision." (emphasis in original)

Attorney Shalaby then cites to the portion of the hearing before Judge Efremsky held November 20, 2014 in which Attorney Shalaby stated that the failure to obtain and keep an original ("wet") signature was "an innocent mistake as to one procedure that has since been corrected that will never happen again." He then states "[t]hese are the facts which are within Judge Efremsky's `personal knowledge,' which he was trying to advise this Court about on his order. With this information, Judge Efremsky's order should be easier to understand. On paragraph 16, Judge Efremsky identifies his `personal knowledge' following insertion of the comma: `16. Like the petition for rehearing before the Ninth Circuit, the Motion to Amend repeats the contention that this statement in the Ninth Circuit Memorandum is factually erroneous as Mr. Shalaby shows, and as this court's `personal knowledge' confirms.'"

Attorney Shalaby concludes this portion of his response as follows: "The Court should not impose sanctions for the same reason sanctions were reversed by the BAP, namely there was no knowing and intentional misconduct on my part. Whether I am correct in my interpretation of Judge Efremsky's order or not, the record and appellate record themselves prove substantively that I am correct in representing to this Court that the Ninth Circuit's repeat violation allegation is factually incorrect, and that Judge Efremsky himself recognizes that the CLE provision based on the Ninth Circuit's erroneous repeat violation allegation was `at least implicitly reversed.'"

On September 17, 2018, in response to a motion by Attorney Shalaby to amend sanctions order directed to Judge Efremsky in the Nakhuda bankruptcy case, Judge Efremsky entered an order ("September 17th Order") denying the requested relief.4 In the September 17th Order, Judge Efremsky states:

A footnote (n. 3), in the September 17th Order, states:

Along with filing the September 17th Order here, Attorney Shalaby filed a second supplemental response [389] addressing the September 17th Order. In it he states: "Judge Efremsky has erred, because Mr. Shalaby did not misinterpret or misstate the May 8 order with respect to what the Ninth Circuit `stated.' This Court never alleged that Mr. Shalaby was making any misstatement with regard to what the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals `stated.' Mr. Shalaby also never alleged that the Ninth Circuit did not make the repeat violation allegation. The issue is whether Judge Efremsky's May 8, 2018 order expressed his personal knowledge that the Ninth Circuit's repeat violation allegation was factually incorrect. Judge Efremsky's 9/17/18 order is unresponsive to this issue because it states only that other individuals (the Ninth Circuit judges and perhaps the trustee) were the ones that made the allegations." (emphasis in original).

The second supplemental response further states:

Attorney Shalaby then asserts in his second supplemental response that Judge Efremsky's statement in footnote 2 of his May 8, 2018 order5 "unequivocally evidences his `personal knowledge' that the repeat violation allegation did not occur." Attorney Shalaby states:

As the foregoing amply demonstrates, Attorney Shalaby disputes that he misstated the content of Judge Efremsky's May 8th Order. He also disputes Judge Efremsky's September 17th Order in which Judge Efremsky finds Attorney Shalaby misstated the May 8th Order.

Attorney Shalaby persists in claiming that paragraph 16 of the May 8th Order included a finding by Judge Efremsky, based on Judge Efremsky's personal knowledge, that the Ninth Circuit made a factually incorrect statement in its order when it stated (concerning Attorney Shalaby's failure to obtain original ink signatures as required by local rule) that "[t]he error was brought to Shalaby's attention, yet he continued to violate the rules." However, it is obvious that paragraph 16 of the May 8th Order6 is simply a statement of Attorney Shalaby's argument in his Motion to Amend. Not only is paragraph 16 not a finding by Judge Efremsky that the Ninth Circuit committed this asserted error, but footnote 3 of the May 8th Order is an express statement by Judge Efremsky that the record disproved Attorney Shalaby's contention of error. Paragraph 13 of the May 8th Order states:

A footnote (footnote 3) was inserted by Judge Efremsky after the word "corrected" in the last sentence of paragraph 13. That footnote reads as follows: "The record in this court and the appellate record disprove this." Judge Efremsky's May 8th Order's footnote 3 makes clear he did not agree with Attorney Shalaby that the Ninth Circuit had erred.

Attorney Shalaby contends the May 8th Order's

But, there is no possible varying interpretation. The "this" which Judge Efremsky says the record disproves is clearly Attorney Shalaby's Motion to Amend's statement that "the Ninth Circuit's factual finding of repeat violations is erroneous because there was no `continued failure' to obtain signatures in that this failure had occurred only once — in this Nakhuda chapter 7 — and it had been promptly corrected." Nothing in footnote 2 of the May 8th Order leads to a different conclusion. Footnote 2 deals with the BAP's ruling concerning sanctions imposed by Judge Efremsky under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011. The ECF Provision was not imposed pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011. It was imposed under a local bankruptcy rule. As Judge Efremsky notes in the May 8th Order's footnote 2: "The Rule 9011 sanction included the $8,000 payment to the court and the CLE Provision." The CLE Provision and the ECF Provision were distinct provisions and imposed under the authority of separate rules. The CLE Provision (which Judge Efremsky believed was at least implicitly reversed) was imposed under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011. The ECF Provision (which was specifically upheld by the BAP) was imposed under the bankruptcy court's local rules. It was in its consideration of the sanctions entered under Rule 9011 that the BAP noted that Judge Efremsky "did not find Shalaby acted knowingly or intentionally, but that at a minimum, his conduct was negligent," In re Nakhuda, 544 B.R. at 901-02, and that Judge Efremsky's findings did not demonstrate Attorney Shalaby's conduct was "akin to contempt." Id. The reversal of the sanctions imposed under Rule 9011 (monetary penalty and CLE Provision) and the factual standard applied by the BAP in analyzing and reversing the imposition of sanctions under Rule 9011 simply has nothing to do with the ECF Provision. Accordingly, Judge Efremsky's footnote 2 in the May 8th Order, has nothing to do with his view of the correctness of the Ninth Circuit's statement concerning the ECF Provision that "[t]he error was brought to Shalaby's attention, yet he continued to violate the rules."

Also, as detailed by this court in the 2018 Show Cause Order, the May 8th Order found, in its law of the case analysis, that the Ninth Circuit's statement was not clearly erroneous. Judge Efremsky stated: "The Ninth Circuit found that the record supported this court's finding that there had been repeated violations of the Local Rules regarding obtaining and keeping ink signatures. This is the law of the case." Judge Efremsky went on to state: "The court has discretion to depart from the law of the case if (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an intervening change in the law has occurred; (3) the evidence on remand is substantially different; (4) other changed circumstances exist; or a manifest injustice would otherwise result." He then stated "the first three exceptions are absent." Since "the first decision was clearly erroneous" is one of the first three exceptions listed, Judge Efremsky found clear error was absent. Judge Efremsky's finding is the exact opposite of what Attorney Shalaby represented it to be.

The 2018 Show Cause Order also raised Attorney Shalaby's repeated false statements that Magistrate Judge Johnston was employed by Holland & Knight at the time Holland & Knight attorneys were representing the defendants in Attorney Shalaby's personal litigation against them and that Magistrate Judge Johnston refused to disqualify himself in the current case though such disqualification was mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) due to that employment. These false statements concerning Magistrate Judge Johnston were made by Attorney Shalaby in documents filed March 6, 2018 and April 14, 2018 in Shalaby v. Bernzomatic, et al., No. 11 cv 68 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, on June 12, 2018 and in Peralta v. Bernzomatic, 17 cv 3195-JJT in the United States District Court for Arizona and are set forth in the 2018 Show Cause Order on pages 13-15.

Magistrate Judge Johnston had conducted a hearing on November 14, 2017 on Attorney Shalaby's motions [208] [213] to disqualify Magistrate Judge Johnston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2). Magistrate Judge Johnston denied the motions because his employment with Holland & Knight had ended prior to a Holland & Knight attorney entering her appearance in Shalaby v. Bernzomatic.

In his response [384] to the 2018 Show Cause Order, Attorney Shalaby acknowledges that his statements that Magistrate Judge Johnston was employed by Holland & Knight at the time Holland & Knight attorneys were representing the defendants in Attorney Shalaby's personal litigation against them and that Magistrate Judge Johnston refused to disqualify himself in the current case though such disqualification was mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) due to that employment were false. His response states:

He acknowledges he never reviewed the transcript of the hearing on the disqualification motion until well after making these statements. The statements made in April and June 2018 were made after the doctor's note had been filed in this case (footnote 7 above) stating that any medications Attorney Shalaby was prescribed would not impair his professional judgment and the statement made in the March 6, 2018 filing with Judge Battaglia was made the same day the doctor's note was filed.

Local Rule 83.50 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois adopts the American Bar Associations Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). Rule 8.2(a) of the Model Rules provides: "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge." Attorney Shalaby's statements clearly were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. A simple review of the transcript of the hearing would have revealed that Magistrate Judge Johnston had left Holland & Knight prior to its attorney's entry of appearance in Attorney Shalaby's personal action against defendants. The transcript would also have revealed that Magistrate Judge Johnston told Attorney Shalaby how Magistrate Judge Johnston's April 1, 2008 change of law firm could be confirmed by searching his name in the Northern District of Illinois' CM/ECF system and even identified one such case for Attorney Shalaby.

Taking Attorney Shalaby at his word that at the time of the hearing he "was not able to take in and understand Judge Johnston's employment date disclosure, and had no memory of the disclosure" until he downloaded and reviewed the transcript after receiving the 2018 Show Cause Order, this does not excuse his failure to obtain and review the transcript before making the statements several months after the hearing. The facts were clearly presented by Magistrate Johnston on the record at the hearing and easily available to Attorney Shalaby had he bothered to check them. For Attorney Shalaby to say, as he did in 1) docket number 82 in Peralta v. Bernzomatic, 17 cv 3195-JJT in the United States District Court for Arizona that:

and in 2) docket number 95 in Shalaby v. Bernzomatic, et al., No. 11 cv 68 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California that:

and in 3) docket number 97 in the same case that:

impugned the integrity of Magistrate Judge Johnston with false statements in reckless disregard for the easily discoverable falsity of those statements.

Attorney Shalaby's response argues that Magistrate Judge Johnston still violated 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) by failing to recuse himself because, after he left Holland and Knight, Magistrate Judge Johnston had appeared as co-counsel in some cases with a Holland & Knight attorney, Jack Siegel. Attorney Shalaby argues serving as co-counsel with a Holland & Knight attorney falls within the ambit of the language of 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) which requires disqualification by a judge "[w]here in private practice he served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it."9 Attorney Shalaby states: "The Court should not revoke my PHV admission for expressing my concerns and my belief that Hon. Magistrate Johnston was and still is required to recuse himself as a matter of law due to his co-counsel relationship with Holland & Knight. Sanctions should not be imposed for my expression of my belief and opinion."

The first problem with this argument is that he did not, in the California and Arizona court filings express his concerns and belief that Magistrate Judge Johnston was "required to recuse himself as a matter of law due to his co-counsel relationship with Holland & Knight." What he said in those filings was that Magistrate Judge Johnston was a supervising attorney at Holland & Knight at the same time Holland & Knight was representing defendants in Attorney Shalaby's personal action. His actual statements were false.

Further, Attorney Shalaby is incorrect that serving as co-counsel in unrelated matters with an attorney from Holland & Knight required Magistrate Judge Johnston's disqualification. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) "mandates recusal only where a member of the judge's former law firm worked on the matter while the judge was with the firm." Hoang v. Ummel, 24 Fed. Appx. 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2001); see also, Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2002) ("no partner of Mayer Brown served `during such association' (that is, while Jacks also was a partner) as a lawyer in this dispute"); Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2002) ("the firm did not represent the union while the judge was a member of the firm"); Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Warner, No. 12 CV 91, 2013 WL 2403597, *3 (N.D. W. Va. May 31, 2013) ("Section 455(b)(2), in other words, mandates recusal . . . (2) where the judge's former law partner, during the judge's tenure with the firm, served as a lawyer concerning the matter in controversy."); Faulkner v. National Geographic Soc'y, 296 F.Supp.2d 488, 490-91 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (Section 455(b)(2) requires recusal "if and only if, (1) the judge, while in private practice, or another attorney in the same firm, (2) during the judge's tenure with the firm, (3) served as a lawyer concerning the matter.") In its research, the court found no case in which the language of Section 455(b)(2) was construed to apply to a judge who was a former member of a law firm and, who, after withdrawing from that firm, had appeared as co-counsel with a member of that firm in an unrelated matter at the same time that a different member of that firm was serving as a lawyer in the matter in controversy. Attorney Shalaby did not cite any cases in support of his position on this matter.

Attorney Shalaby's response then raises an additional reason, beyond the mandatory 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) disqualification arguments, why he believes Magistrate Judge Johnston should have disqualified himself. Attorney Shalaby raises:

The case history dealing with the question of plaintiff deposing Dr. Eagar is as follows: On August 17, 2017, Magistrate Judge Johnston conducted a hearing [130] on plaintiff's motion [91] to compel the deposition of Dr. Eagar, the motion [115] of Dr. Eagar to quash the subpoena for his deposition, and defendants' motion [103] for a protective order. Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Johnston entered an order [122] granting Dr. Eagar's motion to quash, denying plaintiff's motion to compel, and denying as moot defendants' motion for a protective order. Magistrate Judge Johnston stated on the record during the hearing:

At the conclusion of the hearing, Magistrate Judge Johnston stated:

After the order [122] was entered, Attorney Shalaby filed a document [126] entitled "Notice of Defense Misinformation" in which he noted Dr. Eagar had been listed on plaintiff's initial Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure as an individual with discoverable information and that, in conversations Attorney Shalaby had with Dr. Eagar, Dr. Eagar had told Attorney Shalaby that Dr. Eagar deemed it his civic duty to appear and testify at his deposition and that Dr. Eagar reported having told defense counsel he would not be charging for his testimony. Magistrate Judge Johnston treated this document as a motion to reconsider the prior order [122] and, on August 28, 2017, entered an order [129] denying the motion to reconsider. No objection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) was filed either to the initial order [122] or to the order [129] denying reconsideration.

The issue of deposing Dr. Eagar was again raised at a hearing [246] before Magistrate Judge Johnston on January 4, 2018. During that hearing, the defendants stipulated they would not call Dr. Eagar as a witness in this case. [246, p. 32].

During the hearing Magistrate Judge Johnston stated:

At the conclusion of the hearing Magistrate Judge Johnston stated on the record:

The following exchange then occurred:

Magistrate Judge Johnston then entered a written order [245] on January 4, 2018. In the order he stated:

No objection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) was filed to this order [245]. Attorney Shalaby chose not to submit proposed questions for a possible Rule 31 written deposition.

During a hearing [323] on March 29, 2018 the following exchange occurred:

On behalf of plaintiff, Attorney Shalaby filed an objection [324] [325] pursuant to Fed. R. 72(a) to Magistrate Judge Johnston's ruling during the course of this hearing that plaintiff would not be allowed to depose Dr. Eagar. On August 23, 2018, plaintiff, through Attorney Shalaby, withdrew [380] this objection.

It is apparent from the foregoing that Magistrate Judge Johnston did not deny plaintiff's request to depose Dr. Eagar "without providing any reason." At the March 29, 2018 hearing, he stated: "I already said you can't do that, so why am I revisiting it for the third time." Previously, at the August 17, 2017 hearing, he stated he would not allow the deposition because Dr. Eagar had not been identified as a witness. At the January 4, 2018 hearing, after defendants stipulated they were not going to call Dr. Eagar as a witness, Magistrate Judge Johnston again declined to allow Dr. Eagar to be deposed because defendants were not calling him as a witness. He also, said he was considering allowing a deposition by written questions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 31 on the limited issue of whether Dr. Eagar had notified defendants of his opinion that the product at issue in this case was defective. He then gave plaintiff time to submit ten proposed deposition questions to the court. Attorney Shalaby chose not to submit any proposed deposition questions.

As this review of the record demonstrates, Attorney Shalaby's assertion in his response [384] to the 2018 Show Cause Order that Magistrate Judge Johnston did not provide any reason for precluding plaintiff from taking Dr. Eagar's deposition is false. The reason (that defendants had not identified Dr. Eagar as a defense witness and stipulated that they would not call him as a defense witness) was clearly stated on the record in the August 17, 2017 hearing [130] and the January 4, 2018 hearing [246]. At the March 29, 2018 hearing, the stated reason was "I already said you can't do that, so why am I revisiting it for the third time."

If Attorney Shalaby believed the rulings were wrong, he had the opportunity to file an objection to each ruling pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). He did not avail himself of this opportunity. He did not file Rule 72(a) objections to the August 17, 2017 or January 4, 2018 rulings. While he did file an objection to the March 29, 2018 ruling [323], he subsequently withdrew [380] that objection. Attorney Shalaby's statement in his response [384] that Magistrate Judge Johnston precluded him from taking Dr. Eagar's deposition "without providing any reason" is false.

Attorney Shalaby also filed a supplemental response [386] setting forth additional reasons he believes Magistrate Judge Johnston should have disqualified himself. The supplemental response states:

The supplemental response goes on to note that three of these cases were criminal cases, one was a bankruptcy case, and one was the case at bar. The supplemental response distinguishes the other two cases because in one "the parties jointly selected an expert and had the expert designated as the court expert to advise the court on disputed patent claim terms." Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 630 F.Supp.2d 645 (E.D. Va. 2008). And, in the other, because "the Court retained various experts for advisement regarding several legal issues and to assist in data collecting, data collation, and administration of the numerous communications from and to class members." Grantham v. J.J. Mason Grp., 811 F.Supp. 1386 (E.D. Mo. 1993).

The supplemental response then states:

The record reflects Magistrate Judge Johnston raised the possibility of appointing a court-appointed expert under Fed. R. Evid. 706 at the August 17, 2017 hearing. [130, pp. 8-10, 17] He asked each side to provide a list of five names of proposed experts. [122] At a hearing [157] on September 26, 2017, he stated "[n]one of you folks were able to match up on proposed experts, so I'm going to find my own. He is clearing conflicts now. . . . . . . If he clears conflicts then we are going with Mr. Adil, A-d-i-l, Khan, K-h-a-n." [157, p. 2] In an order [152] entered by Magistrate Judge Johnston on September 26, 2017, Adil Khan was appointed as a court-appointed expert under Rule 706. The order states: "Mr. Khan has confirmed that he has no conflict with the parties or their counsel. The clerk is directed to file a copy of the court's Rule 706 letter to Mr. Khan as well as his resume to the docket." The letter12 [153] and resume [153-1] were so filed. No Rule 72(a) objection was filed to this order or the letter referenced therein and filed with it. Rule 706 clearly allows the court to appoint an expert on its own initiative. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 706 when proposed provide: "The inherent power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing is virtually unquestioned." The note cites Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1962) which upheld the court's appointment of a medical expert in a tort case. Nothing in the rule suggests its use is to be limited to certain types of cases. The Advisory Committee Note states: "in the federal practice, a comprehensive scheme for court appointed experts was initiated with the adoption of Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946." It further states, in reference to Rule 706, that "[t]he present rule expands the practice to include civil cases." Magistrate Judge Johnston acted within his authority to appoint an expert and Attorney Shalaby did not file a Rule 72(a) objection to that appointment.

Other matters raised by the supplemental response include the assertion that Magistrate Judge Johnston failed to file all of the correspondences he had with the court-appointed expert. Attorney Shalaby states in the supplemental response:

As the portion of the order [362] underlined in the above footnote highlights, Attorney Shalaby's supplemental response [386] omits the portion of the order which states: "The clerk is directed to forward a copy of this order to Mr. Khan." The docket contains an entry dated May 16. 2018, which states "MAILED Minute entry order #362 to Adil Khan via email." Attorney Shalaby's statement in his supplemental response that "[t]he Court did not post any letter or notice to Mr. Khan to produce the photographs and materials which cost the parties $15,909.01" and his statement that there was no "order directed to Mr. Khan and directing him to turn over the materials specified by the Court's minute entry" are false. The order [362] clearly directed the clerk to "forward a copy of this order to Mr. Khan" and the docket entry on May 16, 2018 shows the clerk did so.

The supplemental response also references the absence of any letter terminating Mr. Khan but the record shows Mr. Khan's retention was terminated by order [262] dated February 5, 2018. On that same date a docket entry by the clerk was made stating: "Mailed Copy of Order #262 to Adil Khan by electronic mail."

The supplemental response also raises an appearance of impropriety in Magistrate Judge Johnston ordering plaintiff to pay 50% of Mr. Khan's fee even though there are two defendants and only one plaintiff. It states: "The fact that Magistrate Judge Johnston ordered the bill split 50-50, instead of 1/3 each, further creates the `appearance' of `impropriety,' particularly when viewed with the totality of circumstances described above, would likely lead the average person to believe that Magistrate Judge Johnston may be prejudiced by favoring the defendants and perhaps creating obstacles for the plaintiff."

As noted above, no Rule 72(a) objection was filed to the order [152] appointing Mr. Khan or the letter [153] referenced therein and filed with it which clearly set out the 50% plaintiff-50% defendants split for Mr. Khan's fees. Rule 706 makes a court-appointed experts compensation in a civil case payable "by the parties in the proportion and at the time that the court directs — and the compensation is then charged like other costs.15" Fed. R. Evid. 706(c)(2).

Attorney Shalaby also states in the supplemental response that "effectively Magistrate Judge Johnston has already `sanctioned' both the plaintiff as well as his counsel by forcing them to pay $7,954.05 of the $15,909.01 bill referenced above. Magistrate Judge Johnston did not refer to his order directing payment as a `sanction' but in effect the order operated as a sanction, because the Court imposed this involuntary payment of $7,954.05 for an expert the Court hired, then fired, without benefit to any party. Plaintiff and Mr. Shalaby are sharing costs in this action, and thus far Mr. Shalaby has paid far more than 50% of all costs associated with this case. This includes the $15,909.01 bill of Mr. Khan." Attorney Shalaby offers this previously imposed "sanction" as a reason he should not be otherwise sanctioned by the court. The concluding paragraph of the supplemental response states:

As noted above, the 50/50 split was amply set out at the outset of Mr. Khan's retention and no Rule 72(a) objection was made to the order setting up that arrangement. Plaintiff also did not file Rule 72(a) objection to the order directing the payment of 50% of Mr. Khan's invoice nor to the order Magistrate Judge Johnston entered denying reconsideration of that order.16 The order requiring payment of 50% of Mr. Khan's invoice was simply the execution of the original arrangement to pay those fees set out by Magistrate Judge Johnston at the outset and as allowed by Rule 706(c)(2). It cannot be construed as a sanction on plaintiff or Attorney Shalaby.

The supplemental response also addresses several other actions taken by Magistrate Judge Johnston which it asserts raise the appearance of impropriety. These actions include issuing a rule to show cause to Attorney Shalaby on October 18, 2017 concerning information turned over to the court-appointed expert and refusing to allow the turnover to the court-appointed expert of the defendant's own description of the torch's fracture groove and its intended purpose. The supplemental response states concerning this information:

While Attorney Shalaby states he "can only conclude that Magistrate Judge Johnston filtered this information for no reason other than the fact that the defendants asked him to prevent Mr. Shalaby from giving it to the expert, knowing that the fracture groove description alone would go very far towards determination that the fuel cylinders suffer design defects," the record shows the court-appointed expert stated at the hearing on October 17, 2017, that he did not need the information "at this time". The following discussion occurred at the October 17. 2017 hearing:

It is evident from this exchanges at the October 17, 2017 hearing that if, Mr. Khan, the court-appointed expert determined he needed the "the manufacturing specifications for the amount of force the cylinders are designed to withstand as compared to and differentiated from the manufacturing specification for the measure of force required to break the fracture groove on the torch handle," that Magistrate Judge Johnston was going to require defendants to provide that information to Mr. Khan. It is also evident that Mr. Khan stated he did not "need it now" but would "most likely need it once I look at all the components that are involved in this investigation." Magistrate Judge Johnston made clear Mr. Khan would get the information if he requested it.

After this hearing, Magistrate Judge Johnston entered an order [160] which provided in part that "[c]ounsel shall provide the photographs and any manufacturing drawings for the cylinder and torch materials as discussed in open court."

At the conclusion of the hearing the following discussion occurred:

On October 18, 2017, Magistrate Judge Johnston entered an order [161] in which he issued a rule to show cause why Attorney Shalaby should not be held in contempt for violating Magistrate Judge Johnston's order [160] of October 17, 2017, "to provide only photographs of the cylinder and torch at issue in this case" to Mr. Khan.

As just noted, at the October 17, 2017 hearing, Attorney Shalaby acknowledged and Magistrate Judge Johnston confirmed Attorney Shalaby was to send only photographs to Mr. Khan. However, in addition to photographs, he attached to his email to Mr. Khan "Defendant's document describing the torch handle safety fracture groove features at issue." [159 p.5] This attachment included the following text: "Fracture Groove > A designed in failure point in the torch, so that when the torch & cylinder are dropped, the fracture groove will fail prior to the cylinder center bushing failing. If the center bushing fails, then an extremely large 8 to 10 foot flame will erupt from the cylinder." [159 p. 11]

In his supplemental response [192] to Magistrate Judge Johnston's rule to show cause order [161], Attorney Shalaby stated the transcript of the October 17, 2017 hearing showed Magistrate Judge Johnston had erred. He cites the portion of the transcript (quoted above) which states:

Attorney Shalaby's supplemental response [192] to Magistrate Judge Johnston's order [161] then states: "Mr. Khan needs the documents which this counsel has sent. In particular he needs the document that describes the fracture groove feature, a document prepared by the defendants and/or their affiliates, and which explains what a fracture groove feature is." [192, p.3]

Again, as discussed above, a review of the record shows Magistrate Judge Johnston made clear that Mr. Khan would get the fracture groove information if he requested it and that Mr. Khan had stated: "I don't need it now, but I will most likely need it once I take a look at all the components that are involved in this investigation." It was in this context that Magistrate Judge Johnston limited the information to be provided by Attorney Shalaby to photographs of the cylinder and torch at that time in his October 17, 2017 order [160]. From the transcript, it is clear Mr. Khan was planning to inspect the product plaintiff had been using when he was injured and determine after that what his next step would be.

Attorney Shalaby took it upon himself to send the information before Mr. Khan determined if he wanted it and sent the information to Mr. Khan despite the fact the order limited Attorney Shalaby to sending only photos and despite the fact Attorney Shalaby had acknowledged at the October 17, 2017 hearing, and Magistrate Judge Johnston had confirmed at that hearing, that only photographs were to be sent by Attorney Shalaby to Mr. Khan. It was this clear violation of the October 17, 2017 order that elicited the rule to show cause.17

Another action raised by the supplemental response to the 2018 Show Cause Order as creating an appearance of impropriety is set forth as follows:

No Rule 72(a) objection was filed to the order [201], entered November 2, 2017, entering and continuing plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

To summarize, in the 2018 Show Cause Order the court ordered Attorney Shalaby to address: "[h]is repeated false statements that Magistrate Judge Johnston was employed by Holland & Knight at the time Holland & Knight attorneys were representing the defendants in Attorney Shalaby's personal litigation against them and that Magistrate Judge Johnston refused to disqualify himself in the current case though such disqualification was mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) due to that employment." Attorney Shalaby responded by:

1) Acknowledging that he made the statements without reviewing the transcript of the hearing held on the matter and stating that had he "known that Judge Johnston left the HK firm two months before it substituted into my San Diego action, I would not have stated otherwise on the pleadings referenced by this Court";

2) Arguing that notwithstanding Magistrate Judge Johnston's employment with Holland & Knight having ended prior to one of its attorneys entering an appearance in Attorney Shalaby's personal suit, he was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) because, after leaving Holland & Knight, he served as co-counsel with a Holland & Knight attorney in unrelated cases. Attorney Shalaby cited no cases to support this position and the court found none. Rather, the court's research found that Section 455(b)(2) only requires recusal when a member of the judge's former law firm worked on the matter while the judge was still a member of the firm;

3) Arguing that Magistrate Judge Johnston was required to recuse himself for actual prejudice because he refused to allow plaintiff to depose Dr. Eagar and failed to give a reason for this ruling. However, the record in this case shows Attorney Shalaby's claim that Magistrate Judge Johnston did not give a reason for denying plaintiff Dr. Eagar's deposition is false. The record clearly shows Magistrate Judge Johnston stated his reason (Dr. Eagar had not been identified by defendants as an expert and defendants stated they would not call him) in open court;

4) Misrepresenting the content of an order [362] entered by Magistrate Judge Johnston on May 15, 2018, by omitting the portion of the order directing the clerk "to forward a copy of this order to Mr. Khan" and then stating that the "Court did not post any letter or notice to Mr. Khan to produce the photographs and materials" though the docket reflects that the clerk sent Mr. Khan the order directing Mr. Khan to turnover these materials;

5) Arguing Magistrate Judge Johnston improperly refused to allow the turnover of the fracture groove information and stating that "Mr. Shalaby can only conclude that Magistrate Judge Johnston filtered this information for no reason other than the fact that the defendants asked him to prevent Mr. Shalaby from giving it to the expert" when the record shows the expert stated that he did not "need it now" and that Magistrate Judge Johnston would order defendants to provide that information to Mr. Khan if Mr. Khan determined that he needed it;

6) Arguing Magistrate Judge Johnston showed partiality to defendants when he named a court-appointed expert, ordered that expert's fees to be split 50/50 between plaintiff and defendants, and suggesting to defendants that they file a Rule 56(d) declaration in response to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment so he could take the motion off the calendar and then taking the motion off the calendar after defendants filed the declaration;

7) Arguing that the order directing plaintiff to pay 50% of Mr. Khan's submitted bill was in effect a "sanction" and requesting relief from that "sanction".

As the foregoing makes clear, the bulk of Attorney Shalaby's responses to the 2018 Show Cause Order's provision requiring him to address his false statements about Magistrate Judge Johnston's refusal to disqualify himself because of his employment at Holland & Knight have nothing to do with those false statements, but, instead, argue that Magistrate Judge Johnston should have disqualified himself for different reasons. In the course of making these additional arguments, Attorney Shalaby made several additional misrepresentations about Magistrate Judge Johnston's actions in this case as summarized in the foregoing paragraphs numbered 3), 4), and 5) and detailed more fully above.

On December 28, 2018, Attorney Shalaby filed a motion [401] (which included as an attachment a request for judicial notice [401-1]) seeking leave to file "supplemental documents in support of response of Andrew W. Shalaby to order to show cause dated 9/4/18" The proposed supplemental documents are included in Exhibit TR-1 (certain documents from a New York State court case, Tran v. Worthington [401-2]) and Exhibit TR-2 (a draft motion, with accompanying memorandum of law, for Rule 11 sanctions [401-3].) Attorney Shalaby states he served the latter [401-3] on defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(2).18 The docket sheet in this case does not show that the Rule 11 motion was ever filed.

In the motion [401] for leave to file supplemental documents, Attorney Shalaby again raises the argument that Magistrate Judge Johnston's order requiring plaintiff to pay one-half of the court-appointed experts fee was, in effect, a sanction. This argument was addressed above. In the motion [401] Attorney Shalaby also states the following under the heading "Conclusion":

The 2018 Show Cause Order directed Attorney Shalaby to show cause why he should not have his PHV admission revoked or be otherwise sanctioned for certain conduct which arose after Magistrate Judge Johnston's entry of an order [333] on defendants' motion to revoke Attorney Shalaby's pro hac vice admission and the filing of objections thereto. The documents Attorney Shalaby seeks to file via this motion [401] do not go to the matters currently before the court. The unfiled Rule 11sanctions motion and the proceedings in the Tran case are not matters that relate to Attorney Shalaby's conduct after the entry of the order [333] on defendants' motion to revoke Attorney Shalaby's PHV admission. Accordingly, the court denies the motion [401] for leave to file these documents.

The motion also argues that defendants' motivation in moving to revoke Attorney Shalaby's PHV admission as well as defense counsels' own misconduct should be considered and balanced against the chain of events arising from Attorney Shalaby's "one-time failure to obtain a `wet signature' of a client back in 2015." Attorney Shalaby asserts defendants sought his PHV revocation because defendants are aware he has "the evidence, knowledge, skill, and unfettered commitment and tenacity required to obtain a judgment establishing the products defects and early knowledge of same by defendants." But, again, the matters before the court are Attorney Shalaby's actions occurring after the order [333] on defendants' motion to revoke his PHV admission. The motion filed by defendants has been decided. That decision was not to revoke his PHV admission. The only sanction in that order was the requirement that the order be attached to any future PHV application in the Northern District of Illinois. Attorney Shalaby withdrew his objection to that order. Also, any asserted misconduct of defendants or defense counsel is not before the court nor would any such misconduct be a basis for excusing Attorney Shalaby's misconduct. Misconduct does not offset.

The 2018 Show Cause Order also ordered Attorney Shalaby to address the statement in his general bar application that he believed the State Bar of California only made an inquiry rather than conducted an investigation of him when previously in this case he referred to the state bar matter as an investigation and his request for judicial notice to the 9th Circuit and the documents attached thereto indicate the matter was an investigation.

The 2018 Show Cause Order set out various documents in which Attorney Shalaby had referred to the matter concerning him before the State Bar of California as an investigation and his statement made at a hearing before Magistrate Judge Johnston on March 29, 2018 in which he referred to the matter as an investigation. The 2018 Show Cause Order also noted an email from California State Bar Investigator Pomrantz in which she referred to the matter as the "ongoing State Bar Investigation No. 15-O-14848." Along with his response [384] to the 2018 Show Cause Order, Attorney Shalaby attached as an exhibit [384-3] a letter from State Bar of California Investigator Christian Chisnall dated August 22, 2018 concerning "Case Number: 15-O-14848 A State Bar Investigation." The letter states in relevant part: "The State Bar has completed the investigation of the allegations of professional misconduct and determined that this matter does not warrant further action. Therefore, the matter is closed." Despite his own statements and the communications from the investigators identifying the matter as an investigation, Attorney Shalaby now maintains the matter was not an investigation but rather an "inquiry", which, as noted in the 2018 Show Cause Order, is a less serious matter than an investigation.

In his response [384], Attorney Shalaby states:

The letter [384-3] from Investigator Chisnall seems to confirm that the matter before the State Bar of California was an investigation not an inquiry. The letter identifies the matter as "A State Bar Investigation" and states that the "State Bar has completed the investigation of the allegations of professional misconduct and determined that this matter does not warrant further action." It seems unlikely State Bar investigators would have consistently referred to the matter in written correspondence as an investigation if the matter was, in fact, an inquiry. However, the court will not consider the issue of Attorney Shalaby's statement on his general bar application characterizing the State Bar of California matter as an inquiry rather than an investigation in the court's determination whether to revoke Attorney Shalaby's PHV admission. The court will leave considerations related to his general bar application to the executive committee's consideration of that application.

A "federal court has the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it. While this power ought to be exercised with great caution, it is nevertheless incidental to all Courts." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The revocation of an attorney's pro hac vice status falls within this inherent authority of the court. Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005); see also, In re Rimsat, Ltd., 229 B.R. 914, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998) ("revocation of an attorney's pro hac vice admission is an available sanction in response to counsel's misconduct"). False statements to the court are a sound basis for revoking an attorney's pro hac vice admission, Ryan v. Astra Tech, Inc., 772 F.3d 50, 63 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[a]nyone who thinks it important that lawyers not lie to judges would be surprised if the court had done otherwise.") The "whole of abusive action is greater than the sum of the parts of which it is made." Fuery v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2018). "[T]hese incremental abuses chip away at the fair administration of justice and frustrate a trial judge's faith that she can rely upon the lawyers before her—officers of the court—to set forth a fair and accurate presentation of the facts and law. And for this reason we leave the evaluation of such abuse to the discretion of district courts which must manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Attorney Shalaby has misrepresented to this court the content of Judge Efremsky's May 8th Order. He made the misrepresentation in a request for judicial notice [346] as discussed in the 2018 Show Cause Order. He also, as discussed above, misrepresented the contents of the May 8th Order in his response [384] to the 2018 Show Cause Order.

Attorney Shalaby misrepresented to this court that Magistrate Judge Johnston had refused to allow the deposition of Dr. Eagar without expressing any basis for the denial even though the record shows the reason was clearly stated more than once. Attorney Shalaby misrepresented the content of Magistrate Judge Johnston's order [362] relating to the turnover by Mr. Khan of photographs and other work product by omitting the portion of the order directing the clerk to forward a copy of the order to Mr. Khan and not disclosing the clerk's docket entry that the order had been sent to Mr. Khan. Attorney Shalaby misrepresented to this court Magistrate Judge Johnston's action concerning the turnover of the fracture groove information where the record showed Mr. Khan stated he did not need the information at that time but probably would need it in the future and that Magistrate Judge Johnston would require the turnover if Mr. Khan determined he needed it. Attorney Shalaby did not file, on behalf of the plaintiff, any Rule 72(a) objections to any of these rulings by Magistrate Judge Johnston except the denial of plaintiff's third request to depose Dr. Eagar and that objection was subsequently withdrawn.

Attorney Shalaby misrepresented to two other district courts that Magistrate Judge Johnston was employed by Holland & Knight at the time Holland & Knight represented defendants in Attorney Shalaby's personal action against defendants even though the record clearly showed Magistrate Judge Johnston advised Attorney Shalaby that he was no longer employed at Holland & Knight when one of its attorneys entered an appearance for defendants in Attorney Shalaby's personal case. Attorney Shalaby concedes he made these false statements without obtaining and reviewing a transcript of the proceedings in which he was advised that Magistrate Judge Johnston's employment had ceased prior to the Holland & Knight attorneys appearance in Attorney Shalaby's personal case.

In ruling [333] on defendants' motion to revoke Attorney Shalaby's PHV admission, Magistrate Judge Johnston found Attorney Shalaby was not truthful in his PHV application because he did not disclose the sanctions imposed by Judge Efremsky and the Prefiling Order imposed by Judge Battaglia.19 Magistrate Judge Johnston concluded, however, that the "misrepresentations alone do not justify revoking his pro hac vice status." Attorney Shalaby initially objected [338] to the portion of the ruling requiring him to attach a copy of the ruling [333] to any future PHV applications in the Northern District of Illinois but later withdrew [379] [380] his objection to this ruling.20 However, because defendants also objected to the ruling, this court, in the 2018 Show Cause Order, reviewed Magistrate Judge Johnston's findings and determined that the Prefiling Order and Judge Efremsky's sanctions (though not the fee disgorgement ordered per section 329(b)(1) of the bankruptcy code) were required to be disclosed by Attorney Shalaby in his PHV application. Thus, he answered falsely when he answered "No" rather than "Yes" to the question "has the applicant ever been: censured, suspended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplined by any court?"

In the order [333], Magistrate Judge Johnston also expressed "some concern with Mr. Shalaby's conduct based on the history of the instant case. The Court has expressed these concerns in numerous minute entries and court hearings throughout this case." The order also noted concerns raised by Judge Battaglia and Judge Tuchi (the judge in Peralta discussed above) concerning Attorney Shalaby's conduct in those cases.

Rather than revoking Attorney Shalaby's PHV admission, Magistrate Judge Johnston imposed a lesser sanction, attachment of the order [333] to any future PHV applications filed in this district. Magistrate Judge Johnston stated "that judges in the Northern District of Illinois presented with a motion by Mr. Shalaby to appear pro hac vice should be forewarned of this history when making their determination. Each judge should be allowed to make his or her own determination on whether to grant or deny pro hac vice status, but should do so after being fully informed of Mr. Shalaby's actions in this case and his history as detailed in this Order."

Since the entry of this order [333], Attorney Shalaby, as discussed above, has made additional false statements to this court and to other courts. The sanction imposed by Magistrate Judge Johnston has been ineffective in inducing Attorney Shalaby to be truthful in his representations to this court and to other courts. As detailed above, Attorney Shalaby has misrepresented the content of court orders and misrepresented facts appearing in the record. Attorney Shalaby cannot be trusted to accurately present the facts and law in this case. Therefore, Attorney Shalaby's pro hac vice admission in this case is revoked.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion [368] to file a supplemental exhibit is denied. Attorney Shalaby's motion [365] to file a surreply is granted and the surreply [365-1] is deemed filed. Attorney Shalaby's motion [387] requesting confirmation that the requirement for local counsel for plaintiff to sign all filings made on behalf of plaintiff does not apply to documents filed concerning Attorney Shalaby's PHV admission is granted. Attorney Shalaby's motion [401] for leave to file supplemental documents and a related request to take judicial notice is denied. Attorney Shalaby's pro hac vice admission in this case is revoked. Defendants' objection [343] to Magistrate Judge Johnston's order [333] is denied as moot.

Dealing with Attorney Shalaby's voluminous filings and his string of misrepresentations in them has consumed an excessive amount of the court's time. Plaintiff continues to be represented by Attorney David Chen and local counsel Attorney John Nelson. The court trusts they will serve the plaintiff's interest and present his case effectively. The court requests Magistrate Judge Johnston schedule a status conference with attorneys Chen and Nelson and defense counsel as soon as possible.