MANISH S. SHAH, District Judge.
Dr. Reuben Barrett, a biology professor at Prairie State College, brings Title VII, 42 U.S.C § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the college, its Board of Trustees, and five employees, alleging race and gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. Defendants move for summary judgment on Dr. Barrett's claims. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). I construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Simpkins v. DuPage Housing Auth., 893 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2018).
Defendant Prairie State College is governed by defendant Board of Trustees for Prairie State. [104] ¶ 5.
The biology program at Prairie State fell within the natural sciences department. Id. ¶ 16. There were around 30-40 full-time faculty in the natural sciences department and four biology labs. Id. The Dean of Academic Affairs (first Solberg and then Prendergast) supervised the biology program and reported to the vice president. Id. ¶ 17. Each academic program, including biology, had a coordinator. Id. ¶ 18. Coordinator positions were in part administrative and included duties like interviewing adjunct faculty and helping process lab supply orders. Id. There were no requirements or qualifications to be a coordinator. [104] ¶ 18. In exchange for taking on additional administrative duties, the coordinator received release time, meaning she could teach fewer credit hours without taking a pay cut. Id.
Both Dr. Nicholas Halm-Lutterhodt, an African-American professor in the biology program, and Craig Nelson, another male biology professor, served as coordinators. [104] ¶ 40.
While each program (such as biology) had a coordinator, each department (e.g. natural sciences) had a chair. [113] ¶ 3; [86-12] at 262:6-11.
Many biology courses at Prairie State had lab components. Id. ¶ 22. To get lab materials and to have the lab set up for class, professors used a request process that changed over the years. Id. Most recently, professors used Microsoft Outlook to send meeting requests to the lab manager with the date of the lab, the materials needed, and instructions. Id. Knowing the exact lab date was especially important when a professor requested live specimens. Id. The biology program ran about 160 labs per week. Id. The dean received the supply request list for the entire department and the list did not indicate which professor made which requests. Id. ¶ 23. If the price of the requested materials exceeded a certain threshold, the university required a bidding process, which could create approval problems. Id. Technology requests were handled differently because they were funded through a different budget. Id.
Dr. Barrett often did not receive requested lab supplies and equipment for his classes. Id. ¶¶ 24, 35. For example, he received elodea (a plant) only one or two times in recent years, and when he did not get live specimens it interfered with his teaching. Id. ¶ 24; [113] ¶ 9. Some of Dr. Barrett's specimens and models were not replaced, and on certain occasions, someone threw out student experiments and other materials left in the lab. [104] ¶¶ 24, 35. When Dr. Barrett's supplies were unavailable, he improvised by giving students worksheets or making up different lessons. Id. ¶ 25. Other biology professors took similar approaches when they did not receive materials or when the lab was not set up properly. Id. Though other professors occasionally dealt with these problems, Dr. Barrett consistently complained about not receiving supplies. [113] ¶ 10. Based on his observations and statements from lab managers, Dr. Barrett believed that white, female professors got the supplies they requested. [104] ¶ 39. Despite these mishaps, Dr. Barrett received positive evaluations from his deans and positive feedback from students. Id. ¶ 25.
Ladaris Martin set up Dr. Barrett's biology labs, and Dr. Barrett told her that he did the same labs every semester and to keep things in stock. [113] ¶¶ 7-8. One day, Dr. Barrett spoke with Martin in the cafeteria about his elodea not being alive. Id. ¶ 25. Martin responded that they were doing their best to ensure it was, to which Dr. Barrett told her not to worry because if it was not, he would file again (which Martin took to mean that he would file another EEOC complaint).
When Dr. Barrett complained about not receiving his lab supplies, Solberg asked staff to evaluate the lab manager John Schmidt's performance. [104] ¶ 26. Prairie State addressed different issues with its lab managers (including Schmidt and Martin) over time, including problems related to live specimens, setting up labs, and appearing for work. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27. Dr. Barrett was never denied lab supplies because of budgetary problems. [113] ¶¶ 21-23.
In 2014, a cabinet where Dr. Barrett and other professors stored some of their lab materials was locked, and Dr. Barrett did not have access to a key. [104] ¶ 29. Once notified of the situation, Prendergast contacted the appropriate department and provided Dr. Barrett with a key within a few weeks (the parties dispute precisely how long it took). Id. Prairie State claimed that it was always reluctant to give out additional keys. Id. Dr. Barrett asserts that Adam and Prendergast had keys and he did not. Id. Dr. Barrett filed his first EEOC complaint about this incident. Id. Prairie State determined there was insufficient evidence to conclude that discriminatory animus was involved. [113] ¶ 36.
Prairie State refused to reimburse Dr. Barrett for professional development expenses. [104] ¶ 37. Prairie State reimbursed Dr. Halm-Lutterodt for a trip to Canada and sent other black male faculty to a training in Florida, though it did not send Dr. Barrett to that training. Id.
Dr. Barrett and another professor developed the curriculum, outline, materials, and lab schedule for Biology 100, all of which corresponded with a certain textbook. [104] ¶ 30. Prairie State submitted courses to the Illinois Articulation Initiative for approval so that students could transfer the credits they earned at Prairie State to other schools. [113] ¶ 24; [86-9] at 39:14-40:18. Some biology professors wanted to standardize the labs to obviate the need for lab requests and make things easier on the lab managers. [104] ¶ 31. When Dr. Barrett objected, the department decided not to go through with the standardization. Id. ¶ 33. Biology faculty also considered using different books for Biology 100; it was typical for professors to evaluate course textbooks regularly to make sure they were using the best book available for their courses. Id. ¶ 32. When the biology program switched to a different textbook, Dr. Barrett's students complained that the chapters listed with his online notes no longer corresponded to the chapters in the textbook. Id. ¶ 33. The parties dispute whether Dr. Barrett could have kept using his preferred course materials. Dr. Barrett says his book was pulled from the bookstore, and so was no longer available to his students. See [86-12] at 19:13-16.
In addition, Dr. Barrett had to defend his work to his colleagues, meaning he had to explain what he was doing in his courses and why he needed certain supplies. [104] ¶ 36.
In 2016, another professor, Lee Anne Burrough, called Dr. Barrett a troublemaker on two separate occasions. [104] ¶ 49; [113] ¶ 42. Dr. Barrett reported this to Human Resources, which opened an investigation. [104] ¶¶ 12, 49. When investigating a complaint, Cronan usually spoke with complaining witnesses first, but he spoke with Burrough before Dr. Barrett because of scheduling issues, and he did not think this impacted his investigation. [113] ¶ 44. Cronan issued a report, crediting Burrough's account of the events and concluding there was no evidence of gender-motivated harassment. [104] ¶ 49. Cronan noted in his report that Burrough had vehemently denied calling Dr. Barrett a troublemaker and looking at him with a menacing look. [113] ¶ 45. Cronan was struck by the manner in which Burrough responded to his inquiry. Id. During the investigation, Cronan viewed a security videotape of the incident, but the camera was positioned far away from where the incident had taken place. Id. Though the footage showed both Burrough and Dr. Barrett near Dr. Barrett's classroom at the relevant time, Cronan was unable to tell whose precise version of the events was accurate. Id. Cronan acknowledged that the video corroborated some of the facts Dr. Barrett asserted, but he concluded it was more likely that the incident was a light-hearted greeting of a colleague than intentional harassment and that the incident did not violate Prairie State's policy that employees treat coworkers and students with respect, courtesy, and professionalism. [113] ¶¶ 43-44, 47. Cronan also believed Burrough when she said she had not heard of Dr. Barrett's lawsuits or EEOC charges, and he did not inquire further. Id. ¶ 46. Cronan admitted his conclusions were based on speculation. Id. ¶ 47. He offered Dr. Barrett a meeting with college officials and participation in employee assistance program and counseled him to avoid any retaliation against Burrough. [104] ¶ 49.
Whenever a Prairie State employee filed a written complaint alleging harassment, Lynita Gephardt, the Executive Director of H.R. at Prairie State before Cronan took over in 2012, expected to be aware of it so she could investigate. [113] ¶¶ 27-29, 31. When investigating a complaint, Gephardt asked for the complete story and interviewed the accused as well as any witnesses. Id. ¶ 31. According to Gephardt, it would not be an appropriate response, in a he-said she-said situation, to recommend counseling to the accused and instruct the complainant not to take any other conduct or make any further accusations. Id. ¶ 33.
Cronan reviewed all three of Dr. Barrett's EEOC charges, and Prendergast, Hansel, and the president of the college were all aware of them. Id. ¶ 34. Cronan began reviewing the materials Dr. Barrett had submitted to the EEOC but stopped because "they were so dense and so filled with biologic arcane—arcanity, that I—I had to go to the individuals, the dean and VP to even understand what [Dr. Barrett] was trying to say in those documents." Id. Cronan had a master's degree and a law degree. Id.
Dr. Barrett marshaled evidence of different incidents, occurring at discrete moments over a long period of time and involving different people, that touch on racial animus.
Several people at Prairie State used the N word. [104] ¶ 50. Around the time President Obama was elected in 2008, Martin discovered an email on Schmidt's computer with a picture of a black man being lynched. Id. ¶ 53. Another professor, Mike Maddox, came into Dr. Barrett's office around the same time and said, "nobody wants an N for president." Id. ¶ 55. Dr. Barrett reported Maddox's statement, and the president of Prairie State met with him to discuss it. Id. Maddox also hit Dr. Barrett in the head with a water bottle in mid-2009. Id. The college investigated and issued a memo indicating that Maddox had violated college policies and that that would be reflected in his personnel records. Id. Maddox frequently caused trouble at Prairie State. [113] ¶ 15.
In 1995, Dr. Barrett overheard Kelly in the cafeteria saying she liked her men like she liked her coffee, black. [104] ¶ 54. Kelly sometimes ate Martin's food, took her office supplies, and was generally disrespectful. [113] ¶¶ 19-20. At the time, Martin thought it could have been because of her race (Martin is African American). See [86-15] at 234:15-18, 269:1-12. But Martin also noted that Kelly did this to everyone, and that as time went on, Martin realized that was just how Kelly was. Id. Kelly taught in her class (at an unspecified time) that black people were inferior white people because their brains were smaller. [104] ¶ 50.
Solberg responded to another professor's mention of racism, saying "racism is alive and well at Prairie State College." Id. ¶ 43. Don Kouba, a former instructor and coordinator of the photographic studies program, thought that Solberg displayed favoritism, particularly when scheduling courses. [113] ¶ 11. As an example, when Kouba had an issue with another teacher, Solberg was not open to hearing both sides of the story, noting she "had it on reliable source" what happened. Id. ¶¶ 2, 11-12.
Dr. Barrett brings sex and race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims against Prairie State, its board, and the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983. Section § 1981 gives "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States" the same right "to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Dr. Barrett also brings Title VII claims against Prairie State and the board. "[T]he same standards for proving intentional discrimination apply to Title VII and § 1983 equal protection claims." Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 788 n. 13 (7th Cir. 2003).
Dr. Barrett does not address defendants' argument that some of the conduct at issue is untimely, noting only that time-barred allegations may still serve as background evidence to support his claims. See [103] at 19 n. 2. The statute of limitations for Dr. Barrett's constitutional claim is four years. See Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 2004). When a state actor violates § 1981, the sole remedy for that violation is under § 1983. See Campbell v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty., Ill., 752 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2014). And although the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Illinois is two years, when such a claim is brought pursuant to the substantive rights created by § 1981, the § 1981 four-year statute of limitations applies. See Sams v. City of Chi., 13-cv-7625, 2014 WL 6685809, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2014). Dr. Barrett filed this lawsuit on March 18, 2015, meaning only events occurring after that date in 2011 are within the statute of limitations for Dr. Barrett's constitutional claims. For the Title VII claims, a plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the complained of conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Dr. Barrett filed his first EEOC complaint on April 4, 2014, meaning only conduct occurring after June 8, 2013 potentially falls within the statute of limitations for Dr. Barrett's Title VII claims. That said, for a hostile-work-environment claim, if the alleged conduct forms a single unlawful employment practice, part of which falls within the statutory period, a court may consider conduct outside of the statute of limitations. Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 2017).
To prevail on a discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was subject to an adverse employment action or a hostile work environment, and (3) the employer took that action because of plaintiff's protected characteristic. Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 916 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2019). Not everything that makes an employee unhappy gives rise to a discrimination claim. Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007). "A materially adverse employment action is something `more destructive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.'" Rhodes v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). Materially adverse employment actions generally fall into one of three categories: (1) those affecting an employee's finances (including a demotion or termination), (2) actions involving a change in an employee's career prospects by preventing him from using his skills, and (3) those where the conditions of employment change to subject the employee to humiliating, degrading, or unsafe conditions. Nichols, 510 F.3d at 780. Denial of a promotion constitutes a materially adverse action if "the position for which a plaintiff was rejected offered markedly greater compensation, responsibilities, or title." Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs., 829 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2016).
Dr. Barrett argues that both the coordinator and chair positions are promotions, and that the biology program's failures to appoint and elect him to those positions were materially adverse actions. Neither position came with additional compensation. Instead, coordinators and chairs taught fewer classes in exchange for taking on additional administrative duties. Defendants argue that faculty members generally do not want to serve as coordinator because it requires additional work without any added benefits. Though the coordinator does not have any formal authority over his colleagues, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dr. Barrett, the coordinator position comes with additional authority. Other professors first go to the coordinator when they have a problem, and the coordinator signs off on purchase requests before passing them up the ladder. Because the coordinator position comes with greater responsibilities, the refusal to appoint Dr. Barrett could have impacted his career prospects, and therefore constitutes a materially adverse employment action. The same is true for the chair position. The chair position comes with additional administrative duties and direct interaction with other administrators, including the dean. While neither position is a clear-cut promotion, a reasonable jury could conclude that the college's refusals to appoint or elect Dr. Barrett to these positions were materially adverse employment actions.
When evaluating a discrimination claim, the relevant question is whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's protected characteristic motivated the adverse employment action. Ortiz v. Werner Ents., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). No reasonable juror could conclude that these promotion decisions were motivated by plaintiff's race or sex. As for the coordinator position, Dr. Barrett does not assert that he ever told either Solberg or Prendergast—who according to him were the sole decisionmakers—that he wanted to be coordinator. See Riley, 829 F.3d at 892 (Noting that to state a prima-facie failure-to-promote claim a plaintiff must show that he applied for and was rejected from the position). Dr. Barrett asserts that doing so would have been futile because the dean alone decided who to appoint, without input from professors. But he also does not point to any specific promotions he missed out on, instead objecting to the fact he was never chosen. He does not address whether or when the biology program was looking for a new coordinator. Without any of these details, a reasonable juror could not pinpoint anything about the Solberg's or Prendergast's motivations not to appoint Dr. Barrett, let alone conclude that they were motivated by his race or sex. Moreover, aside from Solberg's comment that racism was alive and well at Prairie State, there is no evidence linking these decisions to Dr. Barrett's protected characteristics. And Solberg's observation that racism existed does not support an inference that she acted with racial animus when deciding not to appoint Dr. Barrett coordinator. There is nothing linking this decision to Dr. Barrett's sex. Given the lack of evidence of race or sex-based motivations, no reasonable juror could conclude Dr. Barrett was not appointed to the coordinator position because of either protected characteristic. At summary judgment, a plaintiff must make a "showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Dr. Barrett has failed to do so.
The same is true for the chair position. Dr. Barrett does not provide any details about the election process, does not assert when the elections took place, or what their outcomes were. He also does not claim that he nominated himself for the position or that he was ever in the running for an election. Instead, he merely asserts that because he was never elected, it must be because of his protected characteristics. This is not enough. The natural sciences department is made up of 30-40 faculty members, all of whom, presumably, vote to elect the department chair. Assuming that Maddox is part of the natural sciences department, there is evidence that two of those voting— Maddox and Kelly—had racial animus.
None of the other acts Dr. Barrett points to, on their own, rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action. Failing to provide Dr. Barrett with lab supplies and a key to the cabinet where some supplies were stored, changing the course textbook, requiring him to defend his work, and refusing to call him doctor all changed the conditions of employment, but none of this conduct on its own is sufficiently humiliating, degrading, or unsafe to give rise to a discrimination claim. Though it may have been inconvenient to Dr. Barrett to have to update his materials to correspond to the new course textbook and to adapt his labs when he did not receive adequate supplies, inconvenience is not enough to give rise to a claim. See Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 504; see also O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the loss of perks such as a cell phone, pager, vehicle, parking space, and weekends off was not materially adverse). Similarly, Dr. Barrett having to defend his work and other professors refusing to call him doctor are potentially degrading actions, but not so severe as to give rise to a claim. See Longstreet v. Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 276 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cri. 2002) (concluding that requiring an employee to substantiate that her absences were illness related was not an adverse action); see also Nichols, 510 F.3d at 780 (holding that reassignment to a boring and more repetitive job was not materially adverse). There is also insufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude these actions were motivated by his race or sex. Dr. Barrett claims that white female employees did not have to similarly defend their work, but this is speculation; he provides no evidence to support it. He does not assert that white female professors were addressed as doctor; and people referred to Halm-Lutterhodt as Dr. Nick, undercutting an inference that any refusal to address Dr. Barrett with his title was linked to his race or sex.
Denying Dr. Barrett's reimbursement requests had financial consequences, but Dr. Barrett acknowledges he did not submit reimbursement requests for most of the supplies he purchased, so there is no way his loss was caused by defendants' discrimination. There is not enough detail about what training opportunities Dr. Barrett claims to have missed out on to conclude that this conduct was materially adverse. And Dr. Barrett has the burden to put forth enough facts to support all elements of his claims. Even assuming the lack of training affected Dr. Barrett's career prospects, there is no indication that these refusals were linked to his protected characteristics. In fact, the only training opportunity Dr. Barrett missed out on that is described with any detail was meant for black men, which undermines any potential link to his race or sex. The post-it note attached to Dr. Barrett's reimbursement request does not demonstrate any animus, let alone animus based on race or sex. Even if Dr. Barrett turned his requests in on time, a note asking that he be timely is not evidence of hostility or linked to his protected characteristics. No reasonable jury could conclude that Prairie State or its board discriminated against Dr. Barrett because of his race or sex.
In addition to alleging discrimination based on a single materially adverse action, a plaintiff can also bring a hostile-work-environment claim, alleging that different incidents together give rise to a claim. Dr. Barrett does not articulate what conduct gives rise to his hostile-work-environment claim, noting only that his "complaints and EEOC Charge documents demonstrate the daily and continuous harassment he has dealt with for years." [103] at 9. Though some of the incidents discussed above were not materially adverse on their own, considered cumulatively they could constitute a hostile work environment. To prevail on a hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff must establish that he was subject to unwelcome harassment, that the harassment was based on his protected characteristic, that it was severe or pervasive to a degree that it altered the conditions of his employment, and that there is a basis for employer liability. Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2018).
A work environment need not be hellish to be actionable. Gates, 916 F.3d at 633. Whether certain conduct rises to the level of a hostile work environment depends on the circumstances at play, including: "the severity of the alleged conduct, its frequency, whether it [wa]s physically threatening or humiliating (or merely offensive), and whether it unreasonably interfere[d] with the employee's work performance." Robinson, 894 F.3d at 828. Whether conduct is severe or pervasive enough to give rise to a claim depends, in part, on who the harasser is. Id. at 828-29. A supervisor's use of the N word or similar epithets, for example, may give rise to a claim even if the comments were infrequent, but the same comments from a co-worker may not be materially adverse. See id. Also relevant is whether the comments were made directly to the plaintiff or if the plaintiff heard them secondhand. Id.
"Whether harassment was so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work environment is generally a question of fact for the jury." Id. Considering all the conduct Dr. Barrett complains of, from not receiving lab supplies to having to defend his work, a reasonable jury could conclude that the harassment altered the conditions of his work environment and was severe or pervasive. Though for the same reasons discussed above there is no evidence from which it could conclude that this harassment stemmed from his race or gender, some "forms of harassment that might seem neutral in terms of race (or sex or other protected status) can contribute to a hostile work environment claim if other evidence supports a reasonable inference tying the harassment to the plaintiff's protected status." Cole v. Bd. of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). "Evidence that a workplace is tainted by overt racial hostility can support an inference that other harassment that at first seems race-neutral also has an undercurrent of racial animus." Id. Viewing the facts in Dr. Barrett's favor, there is evidence of explicit racial animus at Prairie State— some individuals used the N word, Kelly and Maddox made racial comments, Kelly taught her students black people were inferior and made racial comments, and Schmidt had an email with a lynching photo.
Even if this conduct were timely, it would not support an inference that the other harassment was also racial. In other words, there is no evidence that the facially neutral conduct Dr. Barrett points to is "sufficiently intertwined" with the discriminatory remarks to conclude animus motivated that conduct as well. See Cole, 838 F.3d at 896 (quoting Shanoff v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 258 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2001)). Aside from vague allegations that he was the only one who experienced this type of harassment, Dr. Barrett points to nothing else to show that it was motivated by his race or sex. Without some evidence of a link, no reasonable juror could conclude Dr. Barrett was subjected to harassment based on a protected characteristic.
The same elements apply to retaliation claims under § 1981 and Title VII. Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (2009). To prevail, a plaintiff must prove that he engaged in statutorily protected activity and suffered an adverse action because of that activity. Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir. 2017). To satisfy the causation requirement, a plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a "substantial or motivating factor" in the decision to take the adverse action. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 900 (7th Cir. 2012) (overruled on the other grounds in Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764-65). For a retaliation claim, an action is materially adverse if it would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in the protected activity. Burton v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017). Though the standard is different, for the same reasons discussed above, the only conduct to rise to the level of materially adverse actions are the failures to promote Dr. Barrett to coordinator or chair. The other conduct Dr. Barrett complains of would not dissuade a reasonable employee from undertaking protected activity.
In addition to Dr. Barrett's EEOC complaints, his internal complaints about unlawful employment practices qualify as protected activities. See Northington v. H&M Int'l, 712 F.3d 1062, 1065 (7th Cir. 2013); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). But there is no evidence of a link between that protected conduct and the refusals to promote Dr. Barrett. As evidence of a link, Dr. Barrett points to the incidents with Martin and Burrough and the way Prairie State responded to those conflicts. The incident with Burrough involved protected activity because Dr. Barrett reported what he believed was unlawful conduct. But there is no link between that occurrence and any subsequent decisions not the promote Dr. Barrett. Burrough may have been referencing Dr. Barrett's EEOC complaints when she called him a troublemaker, but her name-calling is not an adverse action giving rise to a claim. Nor was Cronan's warning to Dr. Barrett not to retaliate against Burrough or his offer that Dr. Barrett participate in counseling. Being placed on a formal performance improvement plan is not a materially adverse action. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 918 (7th Cir. 2016). Nothing about the context of this situation shows that the offhand comments from Cronan advising Dr. Barrett to avoid any further conflicts should warrant a different outcome. And nothing about this incident with Burrough or Prairie State's response to it makes it any more likely that the promotion decisionmakers acted in retaliation for Dr. Barrett's protected activities. Prairie State undertook a thorough investigation before concluding that the incident did not warrant discipline. Dr. Barrett does not assert that Burrough had anything to do with appointing or electing him to coordinator or chair or that she was even affiliated with the biology program or natural sciences department.
Nor does Dr. Barrett's encounter with Martin demonstrate a connection between Dr. Barrett's complaints and the failure to promote him. This incident did not involve Dr. Barrett's protected activity—Martin reported his conduct, not vice-versa. Martin referenced Dr. Barrett's EEOC complaint (by noting that he had threatened to file another complaint against her), but nothing about Prendergast's response, or the fact that she reassured Martin, shows that she acted out of retaliation when deciding the unrelated issue of whether to appoint Dr. Barrett coordinator. Given the ongoing nature of the promotion decisions, there is no evidence of suspicious timing to support an inference that Dr. Barrett was not promoted because of his protected activity. Without some evidence of a link between the two, no reasonable juror could conclude Prairie State retaliated against Dr. Barrett.
Dr. Barrett also brings § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the individual defendants—Hansel, Solberg, Prendergast, Kelly, and Adam. Individual liability is appropriate only when the "individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation." Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir.1996). A subordinate employee with discriminatory or retaliatory motive can be individually liable under § 1981 for causing an employer's actions. Smith, 681 F.3d at 899 (overruled on the other grounds in Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764-65). But Dr. Barrett's claims against the individual defendants fail for the same reasons as those against Prairie State. There is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that any of the individuals participated in a materially adverse action against Dr. Barrett that was motivated by his race or gender, or in retaliation for his protected activity.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, [85], is granted. The clerk shall enter judgment and terminate the case.
