STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge.
This § 1983 case, in which pro se Plaintiff Pierre James has alleged excessive force, is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30). The matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams by United States District Judge Michael J. Reagan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and Local Rule 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on whether James exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit. For the following reasons, it is
On December 12, 2011, Pierre James, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois, brought the instant suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's sole remaining allegation after threshold review stated a claim against the Tactical Team at Stateville for beating him during an August 10, 2010 cell extraction. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff was able to identify one member of the tactical team, Sgt. Cartwright, and Defendant has been ordered to produce the names of the other tactical team members. (Doc. 40).
In the meantime, Defendant filed the instant motion on January 22, 2013. (Doc. 30). Defendant argued that Plaintiff never adequately described the August 10, 2010 incident in any grievance, and alternatively, that Plaintiff did not complete the grievance process. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion admitting that he never completed the grievance process, but arguing that the grievance process was unavailable to him because he never received any responses to his grievances, thus making any appeal impossible. (Doc. 32). The Court held a hearing in which Jeannette Cowan, former grievance officer at Stateville, and Plaintiff offered their testimony. Having thoroughly reviewed the entire record, the undersigned
In support of his Complaint, Plaintiff submitted a grievance dated September 4, 2010, which challenged both staff conduct and the disciplinary report that was generated against Plaintiff as a result of the incident. (Doc. 1, p. 32). Although most of the grievance addresses the disciplinary hearing, the grievance also cites to the 8th Amendment and alleges that the grievant was pepper-sprayed and beaten while handcuffed by the Tactical Unit. (Doc. 1, p. 32). The grievance also alleges that Plaintiff filed two other grievances that had been ignored. (Doc. 1, p. 32). The grievance does not contain a response from Plaintiff's counselor, the grievance officer, or the CAO. Plaintiff also submitted a grievance dated September 7, 2010 where he contested his cell placement after the August 10, 2010 incident. (Doc. 1, p. 34). This grievance also lacked an institutional response. (Doc. 1, p. 34). Plaintiff testified that he wrote these grievances himself, and they bear his signature at the bottom. (Doc. 1, p. 32-35).
In his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff clarified that the September 4, 2010 grievance and the September 7, 2010 grievances were actually faxed to the ARB and the CAO by Plaintiff's mother, Ms. James. (Doc. 32, p. 3, p. 20). Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he felt forced to take this step because he had attempted to grieve the August 10, 2010 previously and received no response. No record of these earlier grievances has been found. Ms. Cowan testified that she never received any grievances. Plaintiff testified that he put them in the slot of his suicide cell within three to four days after the incident, and assumed that they had been picked up by the staff. Ultimately, the faxed grievances were returned to Ms. James on September 15, 2010 by the CAO with the explanation that she could not file grievances on Plaintiff's behalf. (Doc. 32, p. 26). Still, it was undisputed that the COA and Ms. Cowan were aware of the faxed grievances. The correspondence also indicated Plaintiff would be given a housing change, which is part of the relief he requested in the September 7, 2010 grievance. (Doc. 32, p. 26). Plaintiff testified he believed this statement indicated that his earlier lost grievances had actually been received. He also testified that he received the housing re-assignment.
Finally, Plaintiff submitted a third grievance dated November 19, 2010 along with his Complaint, which mentioned that Plaintiff could no longer grieve the discipline as a result of the August 8, 2010 incident and requested relief related to the segregation time he was awarded as a result. (Doc. 1, p. 36). The document submitted by Plaintiff contained no response, however, at the May 20, 2013 hearing, Defendants submitted a copy of the same grievance with the grievance officer's response (Exhibit C). Plaintiff testified the hearing was the first occasion that he had seen any response from the November 19th grievance. The grievance had been considered on the merits, but addressed the adjustment committee's decision, rather than the cell extraction itself. Plaintiff also generally testified the Menard has a history of losing his grievances.
Summary judgment—which is governed by FEDERAL RULE OF PROCEDURE 56— is proper only if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Finally, the Court's role on summary judgment is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge witness credibility, or to determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists.
Lawsuits filed by prisoners are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The PLRA states, in pertinent part, that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
Where the defense has been raised, the Seventh Circuit has set forth the following recommendations:
Though the Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement,
The contours of the exhaustion requirement are set by each state's prison grievance system, so the Court looks to Illinois law for the procedures relevant to the instant motion.
As an inmate confined within the Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiff was required to follow the regulations contained in the Illinois Department of Corrections' Grievance Procedures for Offenders ("grievance procedures") to properly exhaust his claims.
"The Grievance Officer shall [then] consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer," who "shall advise the offender of the decision in writing within 2 months after receipt of the written grievance, where reasonably feasible under the circumstances."
Alternatively, a prisoner "may request a grievance by handled on an emergency basis by forwarding the grievance directly to the Chief Administrative Officer."
The Motion for Summary Judgment raises the issue of whether the grievance process was available to Plaintiff after the August 8, 2010 incident. The Court found both witnesses credible at the hearing but recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment be denied because Plaintiff has submitted evidence to suggest that the grievance process was unavailable to him.
As an initial matter, the undersigned rejects Defendants' arguments that Plaintiff never grieved the August 10, 2010 cell extraction incident in any form. The September 4, 2010 grievance clearly states that the grievance is based in part on the 8th Amendment, which bars cruel and unusual punishment, and describes the cell extraction incident.
The undersigned also finds Plaintiff's testimony that he submitted a grievance from segregation within three to four days after the incident credible. Plaintiff testified that he had previously sued staff on the segregation block and that they would have been responsible for sending his grievance to his counselor. He also testified that although his counseling summary indicates that he reported no issues to his grievance counselor one week after the incident, the summary is not always accurate because counselors may decide that safety concerns prohibit them from carrying out their rounds. While the undersigned also finds Ms. Cowan's testimony credible, there are many ways that Plaintiff's initial grievance could have gone astray before reaching her. Ms. Cowan's testimony that she never received a grievance does not speak to the issue of whether Plaintiff ever submitted one. Therefore, the undersigned finds that he did.
Plaintiff also testified that he took the unusual step of sending two fully completed grievance forms bearing his signature to his mother so she could fax them to the CAO. Plaintiff took this step within sixty days after the incident, or within his time to file a grievance. The parties agree that the CAO received these grievances. Ms. Cowan testified that they were returned to Ms. James because no one can file grievances on behalf of an inmate. The Defendants argue that this conclusion is implied by the Illinois Administrative Code. However, the Code contains no explicit command on this point. In fact, the Code states that staff should assist inmates in filing grievances if they are unable to do so themselves. When this was pointed out to Defendants, they argued that as long as the assistance came from inside the prison, it was acceptable. No explicit provision of the Code that commands that result either. While the undersigned agrees with the Defendants that the Code does not contemplate third-parties writing grievances on behalf of other inmates, the undersigned rejects the conclusion that the inmate must file the grievances personally. There is testimony in the record that grievances may be submitted to any staff member, that that the staff will then tender the grievance to the appropriate office. Staff are also permitted by the Code to assist inmates with writing grievances. Finally, Defendant's position would imply that a grievance that passed through the hands of the United States Postal Service would also be rejected. Prisoners are permitted to file their emergency grievances directly with the CAO. Plaintiff testified that his mother's fax was an attempt to do just that. Though his method was unusual, the undersigned finds nothing in the Illinois Code that would explicitly prohibit it.
Additionally, the case law is very clear that the purpose of the administrative exhaustion requirement is to give prison officials an informal chance to resolve issues raised by inmates.
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.1(b), the parties may object to any or all of the proposed dispositive findings in this Recommendation. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals.
