MICHAEL J. REAGAN, District Judge.
A seven-day criminal jury trial culminated in May 9, 2003 guilty verdicts against Michael Bonty on charges of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, attempting to intimidate a juvenile by leaving a message on her cellular telephone with the intent to hinder the juvenile from communicating to law enforcement information relating to the commission of a federal offense, and being a felon in possession of ammunition.
The undersigned sentenced Bonty to a 660-month prison term, a 3-year term of supervised release, a fine, and a special assessment. Bonty appealed unsuccessfully.
In November 2005, Bonty filed a timely petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The undersigned denied that petition in July 2006. Bonty appealed. The Court of Appeals denied his request for a certificate of appealability on March 16, 2007. Bonty filed additional motions in this Court (and another notice of appeal), without success. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued another mandate in April 2008 (Doc. 48), dismissing Bonty's November 2007 appeal.
Seven years after this Court denied Bonty's § 2255 petition, he filed another motion challenging his sentence on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. After explaining the significance of Bonty's filing and allowing the parties to weigh in, the undersigned (on July 31, 2013) entered an order finding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a second or successive § 2255 petition.
One year later (on August 11, 2014), Bonty filed in this closed § 2255 proceeding a "Petition for Return of Seized Property" (Doc. 64) which asks the Court to order the return of Bonty's cellphone, car keys, jewelry and personal papers seized from him on September 29, 2002, when he was arrested in the 2002 criminal matter. Bonty relies on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for his motion seeking the return of his personal belongings. Rule 41(g) provides:
Rule 41(g) furnishes a mechanism by which criminal defendants can recover their property which was seized by the Government.
Turning to the case at bar, several questions immediately arise as to Bonty's motion, starting with when and where Bonty filed it. Bonty's trial and conviction occurred over 10 years ago. He filed his Rule 41(g) motion for return of property in this closed § 2255 proceeding (which was a collateral attack on his sentence). Caselaw indicates that "once a defendant has been convicted, a motion under Rule 41(g) is deemed to initiate a civil equitable proceeding."
So the motion should not have been filed in the closed criminal case.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether relief under Rule 41(g) is even available at this date. See
Finally, it is unclear whether Bonty's motion is timely. Some cases state that no statute of limitations applies to Rule 41(g) motions. But the Seventh Circuit has clarified that although it makes sense to have no time limit on such motions before criminal charges are brought or administrative proceedings begun, "once the criminal proceedings or the civil forfeiture proceedings have concluded," a six-year statute of limitations applies."
The Court does not answer these questions at this time. The undersigned intends to direct the Clerk's Office to file Bonty's August 11, 2014 motion (Doc. 64) as a
Bonty and the United States shall file their Responses to this Order
IT IS SO ORDERED.