MICHAEL J. REAGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff James Owens is currently incarcerated at the Lawrence Correctional Center in Sumner, Illinois. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he has sued several individuals for violations of his right to access the courts, retaliation and conspiracy. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated his right to court access by giving him limited or no access to his legal boxes, giving him limited access to the law library and legal supplies, and interfering with his legal mail. Plaintiff also alleges that these actions were done in retaliation and as a conspiracy against him. Plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of two parts of the Illinois code, which he says block him from sending certain mail to sheriff's departments without advance funds in his prison account.
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Davis, Dintleman, Dolce, Fritts, Hartman, Heidemann, Hodges, Kittle, Lutz, Musgrave, Paulmeyer, and Robke (Docs. 139 and 140)—Defendant Evans' separate motion for summary judgment will be dealt with in another order. (For ease of reference, the Court will refer to the moving defendants as "Defendants" throughout this order.) Plaintiff has filed a response to the motion (Doc. 144). Based on the following, the Court
Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 21, 2013, alleging that Defendants violated his right to access the courts, as well as retaliated and conspired against him in denying him access to the courts. Plaintiff also challenged the constitutionality of 20 Illinois Administrative Code § 525.110(h) and § 525.130(a)—he claims that these statutes do not allow him to send certain mail on a credit basis to sheriff's departments, thereby violating his due process rights. As narrowed by the Court's threshold order, Plaintiff's complaint alleged that Defendants at Hill, Big Muddy, Pinckneyville, and Lawrence denied him access to the courts by denying him access to his legal boxes, the law library, legal supplies, and by interfering with his legal mail. The complaint also alleged that these actions were taken out of retaliation and in a conspiracy against Plaintiff.
After Plaintiff submitted his complaint, several defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's claims for events which occurred at Hill and Big Muddy Correctional Center were barred by the statute of limitations. After a review of the complaint and the grievances, the Court granted the majority of the motion to dismiss, leaving only one claim against Defendant Wayne Robke for actions at Hill Correctional Center and one claim against Defendant John Evans (who did not join in the motion to dismiss) for actions at Big Muddy Correctional Center. Specifically, the claim from Hill that survived the motion to dismiss was a claim that Plaintiff was not given access to his legal boxes and was forbidden from sending privileged documents without funds (Doc. 108, p. 3 and 5). The claim from Big Muddy which survived involved the denial of Plaintiff being allowed to send out summonses due to a lack of funds (Doc. 108, p. 5).
Plaintiff's claims involving actions at Pinckneyville and Lawrence also survived. The claims at Pinckneyville which are pending relate to Plaintiff's allegation that he was given access to the law library only once in eight months (Doc. 10, p. 5); Plaintiff's allegation that he was given limited access to his excess legal boxes (Id.); and Defendant Dintleman's policy limiting monthly distribution of legal supplies to two envelopes, ten sheets of paper, and one pen (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that these actions led a separate court to reject Plaintiff's brief. At Lawrence, Plaintiff alleged that he was allowed only one library visit in three months and only eight hours total library time in five months (Doc. 10, p. 6). He also alleged that Defendant Musgrave denied Plaintiff access to the library even though he had a pending briefing deadline (Id.). Plaintiff also did not have access to his excess legal boxes from December 2012 to May 2013.
On June 18, 2015, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims (Doc. 139), and the following facts are relevant to that motion.
The allegations which make up Plaintiff's claims took place while Plaintiff was housed at Hill, Big Muddy, Pinckneyville, and Lawrence Correctional Centers. While he was at Hill, Plaintiff indicated that Defendant Robke, who was responsible for distributing payments from inmate trust funds, refused to send payments to the courts for Plaintiff and refused to distribute money so that Plaintiff could send his complaint to the sheriff's department for service on defendants in a state case (Doc. 140-1, p. 2). Those complaints were ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution (Doc. 140-1, p. 4). Plaintiff testified that Hill refused to send Plaintiff's complaint in the state case to the sheriff's office so that the sheriff could serve the defendants in that case (Doc. 140-1, p. 4). Plaintiff was informed by the state court that he would have to serve the summons by sending the summons to the sheriff's office (Id.). Plaintiff filled out the money voucher for the summons and attempted to send them to the sheriff's department but they were sent back to him with a note stating that the items were not legal mail and would not be sent (Id.). Plaintiff had no other way of serving the summons (Id.).
Plaintiff also claims that he was denied access to the courts because Hill would not pay his filing fees. Plaintiff testified that he filed a motion for injunctive relief in Sangamon County on June 10, 2008 and he was denied in forma pauperis status and ordered to pay $193 in filing fees (Doc. 140-1, p. 6, 7; Doc. 144-1, p. 17-26, 33-34). Although Plaintiff sent a money voucher for the filing fee to be taken out of his trust fund account, he was refused because he had no money in his account (Doc. 140-1, p. 6, 7). In fact, Defendants point out that Plaintiff's funds were -$1803.06 as of May 27, 2015 (Doc. 140-1, p. 7; 140-1, p. 15-20). Plaintiff had numerous funds going out of his account for library fees, legal postage, and copies, leaving his account in the negative (Id.). Sangamon County refused to file his case without the filing fee and since Plaintiff was denied the funds from his account, Plaintiff believes he was denied access to the courts (Doc. 140-1, p. 6). IDOC refused to advance Plaintiff any money for the filing fees (Id.).
Plaintiff filed another case in Knox County, this one involving a motion for injunctive relief to force IDOC to submit his summons to the sheriff's office (Doc. 140-1, p. 7; 144-1, p. 39-45).
Plaintiff testified that he contacted Robke about his issues with his mail. He sent him a request as well as copies of the mail and vouchers showing that the mailroom refused to send the summons, but Robke refused to send the mail (Id. at pp. 4-5).
While at Big Muddy, Plaintiff testified that he had the same problem with a case he filed in Jefferson County (Doc. 140-1, p. 8). He was granted in forma pauperis status with Jefferson County but the clerk's office refused to send the summons to the sheriff's department, instead telling Plaintiff that it was his responsibility. Plaintiff informed the clerk's office of the administrative rule which prevented mail to the sheriff's department from being labeled legal mail, but the County never ruled on his motion (Id. at p. 8). Plaintiff tried to appeal but was directed to pay $60.00 in appellate fees; he didn't have the money and Big Muddy wouldn't advance it, so the state appeal went nowhere (Id.). Plaintiff testified that the code which prohibited Plaintiff from sending out mail to the sheriff's department constituted a conspiracy amongst Defendants (Doc. 140-1, p. 9).
Mary Dolce was a grievance officer at Pinckneyville who allegedly refused to remedy Plaintiff's issues when he informed her of them through the grievance process. Similarly, Linda Fritts, Mark Hartman, and Robert Lutz were counselors at Pinckneyville who allegedly failed to remedy Plaintiff's issues when told of them. (Doc. 140-1, p. 3). Likewise, Tony Kittle was a counselor at Lawrence who allegedly refused to remedy Plaintiff's situation (Doc. 140-1, p. 3). Marc Hodges was the warden at Lawrence and Plaintiff alleges that he did not respond to grievances (Doc. 140-1, p. 3). Plaintiff testified that the communications between the ARB and the institutions as to the grievances shows that there was retaliation and a conspiracy because all of the Defendants agreed not to give Plaintiff the relief he sought (Doc. 140-1, p. 9).
Donna Heidemann was a law librarian at Pinckneyville who purportedly denied Plaintiff access to the law library and his excess legal boxes (Doc. 140-1, p. 3). Kathy Musgrave was also a law librarian who worked at Lawrence when Plaintiff's excess legal boxes were lost. As to the law librarians, Plaintiff testified that he would have frequent meetings with them about not receiving enough time in the law library or about his access to his excess legal boxes (Doc. 140-1, p. 5). Plaintiff testified that the librarians refused to do anything about his lack of access (Id.). Plaintiff testified that while at Pinckneyville, Defendant Dintleman, an assistant warden, wrote a memo allowing indigent inmates only two envelopes, ten sheets of paper, and a pen a month, but Plaintiff indicated that two envelopes was not enough for him to file grievances and handle the rest of his legal filings (Doc. 140-1, p. 10). Plaintiff testified that while he did receive materials and copies from the law librarians, it was not enough for all of his filings (Id.). The record indicates that Plaintiff was given indigent supply packages—which included 29x13 legal envelopes, 4 legal envelopes, 25 sheets of paper and 2 ink pens—on 1/22/2013, 3/19/2013, 4/16/2013, 5/14/2013, 6/14/2013, 7/16/2013, 9/20/2013, 10/9/2013, 11/7/2013, 12/12/2013, 1/14/2014, 2/14/2014, 3/12/2014, 4/15/2014, 5/14/2015, 6/17/2014, 7/10/2014, 8/5/2014, 9/2/2014, 11/14/2014, 12/10/2014, 1/28/2015, 3/25/2015, 4/22/2015, and 5/20/2015 (Doc. 140-1, p. 25). Plaintiff was also allowed to request additional supplies from the library (Id.).
Plaintiff also alleged that he told Heidemann that he had a court deadline coming up and needed access to the law library, but he was denied access (Doc. 140-1, p.10.). Plaintiff testified that he had filed a grievance two years before and the statute of limitations for filing suit on that claim was approaching but Heidemann did not consider that to be a court deadline (Id.). The law library also would not check his case law or allow him access to his legal materials at the time because he was in segregation (Id. at p. 11). Plaintiff admitted that while he was in segregation he was allowed one law library session, but said he did not have a pen during the time he was in segregation (Id.).
Summary judgment is proper only "if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating—based on the pleadings, affidavits, and the other information submitted—the lack of any genuine issue of material fact.
On summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and adopts reasonable inferences and resolves doubts in the non-movant's favor.
Prisoners are entitled to "meaningful" access to the courts.
Officials "potentially" violate an inmate's right to access the courts if they open legal mail (marked with an attorney's name and a warning that it is legal mail) outside of the inmate's presence.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wayne Robke and John Evans
The right to access the courts is not unlimited—officials must provide inmates with "meaningful," but not unlimited, court access.
Nor is there any indication in the record that Plaintiff had an order from the state court requiring the prison to pay the fees for Plaintiff. Illinois law allows for a court to order a party to pay a plaintiff's litigation fees, but there is no evidence that such a court order was entered in Plaintiff's cases.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Robke and Evans interfered with his access to the courts by refusing to send his summons to the sheriff's department because he had no funds in his account. The Illinois code defines mail to sheriff's departments as privileged mail.
Although Plaintiff testified that the mail he was trying to send should have been considered legal mail and should have been sent despite his insufficient funds, the Court notes that the evidence Plaintiff himself submitted to the Court does not support Plaintiff's position that he was attempting to send legal mail to the sheriff's department. In fact, in the grievances Plaintiff points to, he alleges that Defendants failed to send out his mail to the defendants in his pending state case (Doc. 144, p. 19; 1-1, p. 13-14). Plaintiff's grievance dated September 4, 2008 indicates that he received summons from the state court to send to the defendants in that case but Defendants in the mailroom returned the grievances as no legal mail (Doc. 144, p. 19). Plaintiff has also included his legal postage vouchers which indicated he was attempting to send the summons to the defendants in the case and not to the sheriff's department (Doc. 144-2, p. 7, 14-15). There is no indication that Plaintiff was trying to send mail to the sheriff's department as Plaintiff's own documents indicate it was being sent to the defendants directly.
Further, there is no indication that Defendants refusal to send the letters for lack of funds interfered with Plaintiff's court access. To succeed on an access-to-courts claim, a prisoner must show actual injury. As the Court already said, relief for the denial of access to the courts "is intended to remedy rights denied in a separate case due to the impediment. . . . [T]he right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court."
Moreover, there is no indication that the courts would not send out summons if Plaintiff could not do so, had he properly asked. Illinois law allows for special service by order of a court and waiver of service,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mary Dolce, Linda Fritts, Mark Hartman, Robert Lutz, Tony Kittle, and Marc Hodge all denied him access to the courts because they were involved in the grievance process and failed to adequately address his grievances when he complained of his lack of access to the law library and his legal supplies. However, the Court notes that simply rejecting a grievance does not create liability for a constitutional violation.
In ruling on the previous motion to dismiss, the Court allowed a claim against Defendant Robke which alleged that he denied Plaintiff access to his legal boxes. However, in Plaintiff's deposition, he testified only that Robke oversaw the inmate trust fund accounts and that he refused to send payments to the courts (Doc. 140-1, p. 2, 3-4). Although Plaintiff alleges elsewhere in his deposition that others denied him access to his legal materials and boxes, he does not testify that Robke was one of those individuals, nor does he indicate in his responsive brief that Robke denied him access to his legal materials. As such, the Court finds no evidence that Robke interfered with Plaintiff's access to the courts by denying Plaintiff access to his legal materials. Accordingly, the Court finds that Robke is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Plaintiff also alleges that law librarians Donna Heidemann and Kathy Musgrave denied him access to the courts because they would not provide him with access to his legal boxes or provide him with adequate access to the law library. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that Musgrave was the law librarian when his excess legal boxes were lost. He alleges that he spoke to both librarians but they did not provide him with any additional time in the law library. However, Plaintiff has not shown that his lack of adequate access or his missing legal boxes affected the outcome of his state cases. As previously stated, his state cases were never filed because Plaintiff did not pay the filing fees. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to indicate that his access to the law library and his legal boxes had anything to do with the dismissal of his cases.
Plaintiff also alleges that Heidemann denied him court access because she would not allow him access to the law library to make copies of grievances to attach to his complaint. Plaintiff testified that the two year deadline for filing a lawsuit was approaching and he wished to attach a copy of his grievance to the complaint, but Heidemann would not allow him to make a copy (Doc. 140-1, p. 10-11). However, there is no indication that this impeded Plaintiff's state claim. Plaintiff does not indicate what case he wished to attach these grievances to, nor does he indicate that he would not be able to proceed with the case without a copy of the grievance. Further, there is no indication that Plaintiff needed a copy of the grievance to file his case. He could have submitted the original grievance or not submitted the grievance at all. There is no indication that the state court required the grievance to be attached as an exhibit or that the lack of grievance would have caused his case to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment as to Donna Heidemann and Kathy Musgrave.
As to Defendant Dintleman, Plaintiff alleges that he did not provide him with enough indigent supplies to prosecute his cases. Plaintiff testified that Dintleman was the assistant warden at Pinckneyville and wrote a memo permitting indigent inmates only two envelopes, ten sheets of paper, and one pen per month (Doc. 140-1, p. 10). Plaintiff testified that this was not enough to file grievances or to support his legal work (Id.). However, Plaintiff has not shown that the amount of legal materials was not enough or that he was prevented from prosecuting any of his cases because of a lack of materials. Plaintiff filed several lawsuits, none of which were dismissed for a lack of filing of any written materials, and the record indicates that Plaintiff filed numerous grievances (Doc. 144, 144-1, and 144-2). There is no indication that the materials he received were inadequate or that it interfered with his access to the courts. Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Dintleman as to this claim.
An official who retaliates against a prisoner because that prisoner filed a grievance violates the prisoner's First Amendment rights.
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that there was a causal connection between Plaintiff's protected activity and the refusal to send his subpoenas to the sheriff's department for service. Plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances and cases in state court, and because of those filings Defendants retaliated against him by failing to send out his subpoenas to the sheriff's office. However, there is no evidence that Defendants refused to send the subpoenas out of retaliation. Instead, the evidence indicates that Defendants refused to send the subpoenas because Plaintiff lacked sufficient funds and his subpoenas directed to the sheriff's office were not considered legal mail to be sent without prepayment of postage.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants conspired to deprive him of his access to the courts. To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show "(1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights and (2) actual deprivations of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement."
Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that 20 Illinois Administrative Code §§ 525.130(a) and 110(h) operate to block his court access rights. Those provisions of the code establish that privileged letters must be sent at an inmate's expense but allow inmates with insufficient funds to purchase postage for reasonable amounts of legal mail by signing over future funds.
Because Plaintiff's theory of unconstitutionality is tied to his access to court rights, his claim must fail. As the Court already indicated, the way these statutes interacted did not block Plaintiff's access to courts—the underlying cases were dismissed because Plaintiff failed to pay the filing fees, and either way there were several avenues through which Plaintiff could have submitted the summons, including asking for court ordered service,
For the reasons stated above, the Court
The only claims which remain in the case are Plaintiff's causes of action against Defendant Evans. Evans has recently moved for summary judgment, and the Court will address that motion in a separate order in due course.