REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DONALD G. WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge.

This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson by United States District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause for Entry of a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 26) and Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 32). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motions be DENIED, and that the Court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff Fredrick Goings, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard CC"). Through various Orders, Plaintiff is proceeding on the following claims:

The Warden of Menard was added as a defendant only in his or her official capacity for the sole purpose of assisting in the identification of the unknown defendants (see Doc. 9). On December 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for order to show cause for entry of a preliminary injunction, which the Court construes as a motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 26). In his motion, Plaintiff claims that since his transfer to Pontiac Correctional Center ("Pontiac CC") on June 1, 2016, correctional officers and medical personnel have subjected him to a litany of abuses, including: subjecting Plaintiff to excessive exposure of chemical agents, denying him hygiene products and cleaning supplies, intercepting his legal mail and tampering with his legal files, and denying him access to a medical specialist to treat his deep sleep disorder. These actions, Plaintiff claims, "resembles a mafia plot to seriously injure or kill plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff exercising his rights to seek redress from the courts" and, as such, Plaintiff asks for injunctive relief "to prevent the continuing campaign of harassment, retaliation and wrongful acts of the defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concert and participation with them" (Doc. 26). Soon after the filing of his motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 32), reciting many of the allegations set forth in his motion for preliminary injunction; however, Plaintiff complains about an incident in November, 2016 wherein someone was allowed into his cell while he was sleeping and made marks on Plaintiff's biceps in "a dotted line fashion." Defendants timely responded to Plaintiff's motion asserting that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden for either a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order and, moreover, that Plaintiff has not directed his relief against Defendants. Defendants also indicate that Plaintiff merely makes conclusory assertions that staff at Pontiac are somehow acting on behalf of Defendants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Temporary Restraining Order

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides specific procedures for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). A TRO can be issued without notice and, by its term, is temporary in nature. If a TRO is issued without notice, the matter must be set for a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction. Rule 65(a) states that no preliminary injunction shall be issued unless notice is given to the adverse party. In addition, Plaintiff must show that he is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits, that no adequate remedy at law exists, and that he will suffer irreparable harm which, absent injunctive relief, outweighs the irreparable harm the respondent will suffer if the injunction is granted. Finally, Plaintiff must show that the injunction will not harm the public interest. Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, Illinois, 378 F.3d 613, 619 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technologies, Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005). If Plaintiff meets this initial burden, "then the inquiry becomes a `sliding scale' analysis where these factors are weighed against one another." Joelner, 378 F.3d at 619.

In this case, Plaintiff is not entitled to a TRO. Plaintiff's request for a TRO has been de facto converted into a motion for preliminary injunction as the respondent is on notice of the request and has been given an opportunity to respond. See Doe v. Village of Crestwood, Illinois, 917 F.2d 1476, 1477 (7th Cir. 1990). Therefore, because the Court will rule on the merits of Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 32) be DENIED.

Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy" for which there must be a "clear showing" that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2948 (5th ed. 1995)). The purpose of such an injunction is "to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit." Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating:

2. no adequate remedy at law; and

3. irreparable harm absent the injunction.

Planned Parenthood v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012). As to the first hurdle, the Court must determine whether "plaintiff has any likelihood of success — in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning." AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). Once Plaintiff has met his burden, the Court must weigh "the balance of harm to the parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction on the public interest." Id.; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). "This equitable balancing proceeds on a sliding-scale analysis; the greater the likelihood of success of the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party's favor." Korte, 735 F.3d at 665. In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a preliminary injunction must be "narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm . . .," and "be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), a preliminary injunction would bind only the parties, their officers or agents, or persons in active concert with the parties or their agents.

The main purpose of a preliminary injunction is "to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held." University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Accordingly, the preliminary injunctive relief sought must relate to the claims pending in the underlying lawsuit. See Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that "a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint"). A motion for preliminary injunction is not a proper avenue to pursue additional claims or name additional defendants. The Court notes the Plaintiff is seeking preliminary injunctive relief from staff at Pontiac Correctional Center ("Pontiac CC"), none of which are named in Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff makes conclusory statements that staff at Pontiac have engaged in the behavior he now complains of "on behalf of defendants." However, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any particularities with regard to this alleged connection between Defendants and Pontiac CC staff. Further, none of the named Defendants are in a position to give Plaintiff relief from the conditions he complains of. And, even if Plaintiff's current custodian were substituted for the Warden of Menard, it is unlikely Plaintiff would receive any injunctive relief in light of his transfer to Stateville Correctional Center. See Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) ("A preliminary injunction is appropriate when it grants relief of the same nature as that to be finally granted."). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue claims against staff at Pontiac CC for the incidents described in his motions, he is not without recourse, as he may file a new lawsuit, if appropriate, seeking relief from these individuals therein.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause for Entry of a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 26) and Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 32) be DENIED, and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objection thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2003).