REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Keith Walker, acting pro se, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights while a detainee at the Madison County Jail ("the Jail"). Plaintiff's lawsuit stems from an alleged sewage back-up at the Jail. At the outset, Plaintiff named several defendants in his suit; however, now, only Defendant Sgt. Dover remains. This matter is before the undersigned on Defendant Dover's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the district judge GRANT Defendant's Motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Walker's suit consists of a single count alleging deliberate indifference to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 10, p. 3). Sgt. Dover is the only remaining defendant. (See Doc. 30). The claims against Defendant Dover are that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a lack of water while Plaintiff was confined in the Jail on December 27, 2014 and that he was also deliberately indifferent to a sewage back-up on the same date, to which Plaintiff was exposed. (See Doc. 10, p. 5; Doc. 30, p. 8).

Defendant Dover provides an affidavit wherein he indicates that he was a Jail Deputy at the time Plaintiff was detained at the Jail. (Doc. 36-2, p. 1). Defendant Dover states that on December 27, 2014, water was shut off in Plaintiff's cellblock in order to allow the maintenance department to repair clogged toilets. (Id.). According to Dover, the water was shut off for two hours. (Id.). Defendant Dover states that he was not responsible for turning-off the water, as that task was performed by the maintenance department. (Id.). He also indicates that during the time period the water was off, clean drinking water was available to inmates in the Jail's dayroom. (Id. at 2). Detainees were allowed to access the dayroom to retrieve water from the dayroom faucet. (Id.). Moreover, according to Dover, pretrial detainees at the Jail are provided with fluids three times a day with each meal they are served. (Id.). Detainees receive one pint of milk with breakfast and lunch each and one juice packet with dinner. (Id.). Defendant Dover states that the detainees at the Jail were provided with these fluids during their meals on December 27, 2014. (Id.). Also, according to Dover, plugged toilets and sewer back-ups at the Jail are caused by detainees flushing trash, blankets, and/or t-shirts down the toilet. (Id.).

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed a document substantively consisting of a single paragraph, which reads as follows:

(Doc. 38). Plaintiff attached no exhibits to his response.

In the partial deposition testimony provided by Defendant, Plaintiff disputes both the length of time the water was shut-off and whether he had access to other water while it was off. According to Plaintiff, the water was off for roughly a day, (Doc. 25; Doc. 36-1, p. 6), and the detainees were on lockdown while the water was off (Doc. 36-1, p. 6). Plaintiff denies he had access to water in the breakroom. (Id.). Plaintiff, however, testified that he drank milk after breakfast on December 27. (Id. at 5).

In response to a prior Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff provided an affidavit wherein he states that on December 27, 2014, sewage backed up and flooded the cells in the unit he was housed in, and that "they had to shut off our water supply." (Doc. 25). Plaintiff was locked in his cell with the raw sewage and did not have water to drink for 24 hours. (Id.). At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was never provided with cleaning supplies for his cell on December 27, even after asking an officer for some. (Doc. 36-1, p. 13, 14). Plaintiff does not recall the name of the officer from whom he requested supplies, but acknowledged that he received cleaning supplies the following day. (Id. at 14).

LEGAL STANDARD

1. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment motions. The rule states that summary judgment is appropriate only if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating — based on the pleadings, affidavits and/or information obtained via discovery — the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact remains "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr. Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012); Righi v. SMC Corp., 632 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2011); Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), "we set forth the facts by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor." Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014).

2. Conditions of Confinement

As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001). Where a jail official's state of mind is at issue1, such as here, however, courts apply the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard. Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 475 (7th Cir. 1998). To prove a conditions of confinement claim brought under the Eighth Amendment's standard requires a two-part showing. First, the inmate must demonstrate he was subject to a deprivation that was objectively, sufficiently serious so that an official's act or omission resulted in the denial of the minimal civilized nature of life's necessities. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008). Second, the prison official must be "deliberately indifferent" to a serious risk of harm to the inmate. Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2009).

"Deliberate indifference" constitutes a state of mind more blameworthy than mere negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The test for deliberate indifference is a subjective one, where, to be held liable, a prison official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Id. at 837. In other words, to be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must have actual knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm. It is not enough that the official should have drawn the inference of the risk but failed to do so. Id. at 838.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is the "put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." Johnson v. Cambridge Industries, Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Schacht v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has failed to "put up." Plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment by merely pointing the Court to his Complaint. A civil Complaint is merely a series of allegations made to state a civil claim. Ultimately, a plaintiff must demonstrate actual facts to recover on that claim. The undersigned cannot consider the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint in issuing a recommendation on Defendant's summary judgment motion. Only the facts set forth in the record may be considered. The undersigned, therefore, considers the facts in the record provided by Defendant in support of his motion, as well as, an affidavit provided by Plaintiff in opposition to a prior dispositive motion. Any facts set forth in the record provided by Defendant not contradicted by Plaintiff are considered undisputed. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); SDIL-LR 7.1(c). See also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995) (a failure to respond constitutes an admission that there are no undisputed material facts).

From the record before the Court, the undersigned cannot find that a reasonable juror could find for Plaintiff on his conditions of confinement claim. First, the claim for lack of water does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Tesch v. County of Green Lake is instructive. There, Ronald Tesch brought a lawsuit alleging, inter alia, certain unconstitutional conditions of confinement stemming from his stay in a county jail. Tesch, 157 F.3d at 469 — 70. Among the evidence set forth by Mr. Tesch was that he was unable to drink from the sink in his cell due to his confinement to a wheelchair. Id. at 469. Therefore, for 44 hours, Mr. Tesch was unable to drink anything other than the beverage provided with each of his three meals a day. Id. at 469, 476. The Seventh Circuit, however, found that such a situation did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 476. Mr. Tesch failed to demonstrate that he was denied any of his basic human necessities; rather, he merely demonstrated that he did not receive the level of comfort he desired. Id. The court noted that there is no requirement that jails be comfortable, however. Id.

Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate he was denied any basic human necessities due to the lack of water on December 27. For purposes of the motion at-bar, the undersigned takes as true that Plaintiff was locked in his cell without access to drinking water, including any drinking water in the day room, for roughly a day. Defendant Dover, however, provided evidence that the detainees received beverages with their meals on December 27. That evidence has not been disputed by Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiff's testimony that he drank milk after breakfast on the morning of December 27 appears to corroborate Defendant Dover. If, as in Tesch, 44 hours without water, but with beverages provided with meals three times a day is not a constitutional deprivation, then the undersigned cannot say that 24 hours of the same conditions is unconstitutional. The record fails to demonstrate that Plaintiff has suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in his claim for lack of water.

Even assuming arguendo that a sufficiently serious deprivation existed, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that Defendant Dover was personally responsible for Plaintiff's lack of water. Personal responsibility on the part of the defendant is a requisite element for recovery on a § 1983 claim. See Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002) ("It is well-established that a plaintiff may only bring a § 1983 claim against those individuals personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation."). Defendant Dover has indicated, and Plaintiff has not disputed, that Dover did not turn off the water. Further, Defendant Dover stated that the water was shut off in order to facilitate repairs relating to the sewer back-up, and in his sole affidavit, Plaintiff acknowledges that after the back-up "they had to shut off our water supply." Therefore, the undersigned finds no dispute as to the notion that regardless of who shut off the water, it had to be turned off in order to repair the source of the sewage problem. Turning off the water itself, therefore, cannot be a constitutional violation. Though Plaintiff claims that he did not have access to water, whether in the day room or otherwise, after it was turned off, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Defendant Dover was responsible for Plaintiff's lack of water. There is no evidence indicating that Dover locked Plaintiff in his cell or otherwise refused to provide him water.2 Even if the lack of water available to Plaintiff was a sufficiently serious deprivation, there is no evidence that Defendant Dover was personally responsible for that deprivation.

For similar reasons, the record fails to demonstrate that Defendant Dover was personally responsible for the sewage backup and/or Plaintiff's exposure to it. According to Defendant Dover, the sewage back-ups at the Jail were caused by inmates flushing various items down the toilets. Plaintiff has not provided disputing evidence, and there is no indication in the record, including in Plaintiff's deposition, that Dover may have been responsible for the back-up. Additionally, the record is devoid of evidence indicating that the defendant caused or prolonged Plaintiff's exposure to the sewage. Though Plaintiff testified that he asked a guard for cleaning supplies, he did not recall who that guard was. The record is otherwise free of evidence to suggest that Defendant Dover was in any way responsible for preventing Plaintiff from receiving cleaning supplies until the day after the back-up. From the record at hand, a reasonable juror simply could not find that Defendant was responsible for the sewage back-up and/or Plaintiff's exposure to it.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Dover is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's lack of access to clean drinking water for a day, when he was provided other beverages three times a day, does not constitute a deprivation resulting in the denial of the minimal civilized nature of life's necessities. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record at hand to suggest that Defendant Dover was personally responsible for Plaintiff's lack of access to water. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record sufficient to suggest that Dover was responsible for the sewage back-up and/or Plaintiff's prolonged exposure to it. Therefore, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the district judge GRANT Defendant Dover's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.1(b), the parties may object to any or all of the proposed dispositive findings in this Recommendation. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed on or before August 7, 2017.

IT IS SO ORDERED.