MICHAEL J. REAGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Nedrick Hardy is an inmate in the custody of Defendant Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (Menard). Plaintiff brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint (Doc. 79). The Court
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), if the non-moving party does not consent, "[a] party may amend its pleadings . . . only with the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires."
The grant of the motion does not end the matter, however. When an amended complaint is filed, the prior pleading is withdrawn, and the amended pleading is operative.
To start its merits review, the Court summarizes the new complaint. The Court accepts the factual allegations made in the complaint as true,
Plaintiff first alleges that certain staff and officials at Menard failed to provide him with certain prescribed medications. According to Plaintiff, prior to October 31, 2014, he was prescribed medications for ailments including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, attention deficit disorder, high blood pressure, acid reflux, and a deviated septum. On October 31, 2014, Menard's tactical team conducted a search of his cell. After the search, a clear plastic cup that Plaintiff used to take his medication was gone. Subsequently, nurses Amy Lang, Christi Rayburn, Lori Cady, and Gail Walls all refused to administer Plaintiff's prescribed medication to him since he did not have a cup of water with which to take the medicine. Kim Butler, the then warden of Menard, was notified that Plaintiff was not receiving his medication via two grievances, dated September 4 and September 11, 2014. Warden Butler denied these grievances.
Plaintiff also alleges he was subjected to extreme heat during a period of time in Spring to Fall 2014. These allegations are as follows. From May 21, 2014 to October 20, 2014, Plaintiff was in disciplinary segregation and exposed to extreme heat, including a period of over seven days of temperatures in excess of 100 degrees. He also was suffering from heat sensitivity during this time due to the medications he was taking. Prior to July 15, 2014, Plaintiff notified nurse Amy Lane that his medications, combined with the heat, were causing him to suffer from, among other things, dizziness, light-headedness, and urinary incontinence. He requested medical care and evaluation from Ms. Lane; however, she ignored his requests. At some point during Plaintiff's time in disciplinary segregation, the director of the IDOC, Salvador Godinez, was on a tour of Menard, and Plaintiff personally informed Director Godinez of the effects from which Plaintiff was suffering due to his medication and the heat. Plaintiff requested medical care, but his requests were ignored by Director Godinez.
Plaintiff filed a grievance on July 15, 2014 regarding the heat and its effects. This grievance was reviewed by Nurse Crane, who responded via letter over a month later, and instructed Plaintiff to "`follow sick call procedures for further medical/mental health concerns'" and took no other action. Plaintiff then filed an emergency grievance on August 25, 2014 raising the same issues. That grievance was reviewed by Warden Butler, and she deemed the grievance an emergency. Plaintiff attached the emergency grievance to the Fourth Amended Complaint. The grievance was reviewed by a grievance officer who inquired with medical staff at Menard. The medical staff indicated that there was no indication of heat sensitivity in Plaintiff's records, and there was no indication that Plaintiff was decompensating while housed in segregation. A major in charge of the cell house also informed the grievance officer that heat prevention protocols were being adhered to. Based on his review of the information provided, the grievance indicates that the grievance officer recommended that the grievance be denied as moot, and Warden Butler concurred. Plaintiff, therefore, remained in segregation.
Plaintiff also claims that he suffers from several physical ailments, such as back, knee, and joint pain, and degenerative disk disease. He alleges he requires a waste chain, low bunk, and low gallery to accommodate these disabilities. Plaintiff has not received a waist chain, and nor has he been placed on low bunk/low gallery, which has caused further deterioration of Plaintiff's physical condition and unnecessary pain and suffering, as well as, limitations in major life activities, including walking, standing, bending, and caring for himself.
In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Lane refused to treat Plaintiff for his chronic medical conditions on several occasions, including June 4, 2014, June 11, 2014, and June 18, 2014. According to Plaintiff, on these and other occasions, he requested treatment from Lane for his various medical conditions, and Lane refused to treat Plaintiff because he could not pay a co-pay due to inadequate funds. Nurse Lane's refusal to treat Plaintiff caused him pain and emotional distress.
Finally, Plaintiff presents allegations against counselors Regina Price and Betsy Spiller. Plaintiff alleges that he requested to complete paperwork to allow him furlough to attend his daughter's funeral. Counselor Price, in violation of IDOC policy, refused to complete the furlough paper work due to the amount of work it would take, and because she believed it would be denied. Ms. Price spoke with Counselor Spiller regarding the matter, and Ms. Spiller also refused to complete the paper work. As a result, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.
When conducting a merits review pursuant to the PLRA, the Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss any portions of the complaint that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant with immunity.
Plaintiff attempts to raise a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment against the defendants in Count I. Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments" if they display deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs.
To prevail, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge of constitutionally-deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test.
Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate health.
The Court has no doubt that many of Plaintiff's ailments, including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and high blood pressure, constitute objectively serious medical conditions. The question as to Count I is whether Defendants knew of Plaintiff's serious medical condition and consciously disregarded it. Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against the nurse defendants—Lang, Rayburn, Cady, and Walls. From the allegations, it could easily be inferred that these Defendants knew what medications they were administering to Plaintiff, and for what purpose. Their refusal to administer the medication to Plaintiff simply because Plaintiff did not possess a cup would constitute deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff has also successfully stated a claim against Warden Butler by alleging that Warden Butler was aware of the fact that Plaintiff was not receiving his medication via two grievances and then denied those grievances. Though Plaintiff did not allege that Warden Butler undertook to treat him, per the Seventh Circuit, Plaintiff's grievances addressed to her may show that she knew of Plaintiff's serious medical need and refused to intervene.
Plaintiff also uses the factual allegations in Count I to raise a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in Count II. To prevail on an IIED claim under Illinois state law, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) that the defendants knew that there was a high probability that their conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and (3) that the defendants' conduct in fact caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress.
For purposes of threshold review, Plaintiff has stated a claim for IIED against the Defendants in Count I. It is plausible that a medical care provider would know that depriving an inmate of prescribed medication could cause emotional distress, particularly when some of the medication was for the treatment of mental health conditions, and depending on the circumstances, such acts or omissions could "go beyond all possible bounds of decency."
Plaintiff has stated a claim for deliberate indifference and IIED relating to his heat-related medical issues against Nurse Lane and Nurse Crane. The allegations against Nurse Lane demonstrate clear deliberate indifference by her alleged action of ignoring Plaintiff's request for medical care. And deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Crane can plausibly be inferred even though she sent a letter in response to Plaintiff's grievances. If proven at trial, a jury could find that by merely instructing Plaintiff to follow sick call procedures and taking no other action, Nurse Crane consciously disregarded Plaintiff's serious medical needs associated with the extreme heat and his sensitivity to it. Furthermore, depending on the specific facts, a medical professional disregarding Plaintiff's requests for medical care relating to severe heat could amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's IIED claims against Nurse Lane and Nurse Crane shall go forward.
The Fourth Amended Complaint fails to state claims against Director Godinez and Warden Butler under Counts III and IV, however. To be liable on a § 1983 claim, a defendant must have "caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation."
On the face of the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's only non-conclusory allegations against Warden Butler in Count III are that he sent a grievance indicating his concerns that his medications were causing him to feel extreme effects of the heat in segregation; that Warden Butler deemed the grievance an emergency and expedited it; and that she ultimately denied the grievance, thus allowing Plaintiff to remain in segregation. Plaintiff's allegations along with the August 25, 2014 grievance attached to the Fourth Amended Complaint, however, plead Plaintiff's heat-related claims against Warden Butler out of court. Along with demonstrating that, as Plaintiff alleges, Warden Butler deemed Plaintiff's grievance an emergency, the grievance also shows that she denied the grievance after the grievance officer recommended the grievance be deemed moot per discussions with medical and mental health staff, as well as, the cell house major. The grievance itself, therefore, demonstrates that Warden Butler denied the grievance in relying upon the judgment of medical personnel and her subordinates, as she is entitled to do. While Warden Butler could be liable if she had actual knowledge, or a reason to believe, that medical personnel were mistreating or not treating Plaintiff,
Nor do Counts III and IV state claims for relief against Director Godinez. While the allegations that Plaintiff personally informed Director Godinez of his heat-related issues, and that the director did nothing, would likely state a claim against Mr. Godinez if he were the warden of Menard, they are not sufficient to state a claim against a director of the IDOC. Guidance from the Seventh Circuit in Burks v. Raemisch is instructive. There, the court made note of the division of labor within bureaucratic organizations and cautioned against imputing liability to any public official with knowledge of an inmate's problem:
Director Godinez cannot be liable for deliberate indifference based on a single complaint made by an inmate during a prison tour. Analogous to the Seventh Circuit's example, to hold the director liable under such allegations would be to open up the IDOC Director to deliberate indifference lawsuits based on inmates shouting complaints to the Director during facility tours. Such a situation could have a chilling effect on facility tours, and the IDOC Director should be encouraged, rather than deterred, to tour and examine prison facilities. Further, while the alleged interaction between Plaintiff and Director Godinez was an in-person complaint, the Court finds the interaction to be closely akin to a complaint made in a letter.
The important distinction, of course, is that with an in-person interaction, the director could see for himself Plaintiff's condition. For instance, if during a tour, Director Godinez saw an inmate severely bleeding and lying on the ground and ignored the inmate, the inmate may have a claim. There are no allegations regarding Plaintiff's condition at the time of his complaint to Director Godinez, however. Menard is a big facility, and the Fourth Amended Complaint does not allege where in Menard the interaction took place, and nor does it make allegations as to Plaintiff's physical condition or even the temperature in the location at the time. To hold the Director of the IDOC liable on a mere complaint by an inmate, even a verbal one, would raise the same problems stemming from liability from letters highlighted by the Seventh Circuit in Burks. For these reasons, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief for either deliberate indifference or IIED against Director Godinez on the allegations raised. Counts III and IV are
Plaintiff also includes a count under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) against IDOC in relation to a failure to provide him with a waist chain, low bunk, low gallery permit. The RA provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Thus, to state a claim under the RA, the Plaintiff must establish that: "(1) he is qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the Department of Corrections denied him access to a program or activity because of his disability."
Although the RA does not expressly require accommodation, the Supreme Court has located a duty to accommodate in the statute generally. Thus, a refusal to make reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff's disability caused by his various physical ailments, resulting in Plaintiff being limited in major life activities is tantamount to denying access under the RA.
Very recently, the Seventh Circuit again "urge[d] the district courts to be alert to this problem."
Plaintiff's claims against Nurse Lane relating to her refusal to treat his chronic medical conditions shall go forward. Nurse Lane's refusal to treat Plaintiff for his chronic medical conditions for a mere inability to pay a co-pay, if true, would constitute deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. In addition, the same rationale provided in regards to the IIED claims against the medical providers in Counts II, and IV applies as to Count VII and Plaintiff's IIED claim against Nurse Lane in that count shall go forward.
For purposes of threshold review, Plaintiff has stated a claim for IIED under Count VIII.
Like Count V, however, the allegations raised in Count VIII do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as any of the other allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint, and neither of the Count VIII defendants is a defendants in any other count. Severance is appropriate. While Defendant Price was already a defendant in this matter, Plaintiff's proposed Fourth Amended Complaint adds Defendant Spiller. In the severed suit, however, Defendant Spiller will not be added as a defendant until Plaintiff pays the requisite filing fee.
Plaintiff alleges two Monell claims — one based on failure to provide medical treatment and a second premised on IIED. In his non-conclusory allegations in Count XI, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Godinez, Baldwin, Butler, Lashbrook, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford) "maintained policies, procedures, customs or practices" in which the defendants' "employees" essentially failed to provide medical care as demonstrated by the aforementioned allegations relating to medical care, and that these policies, etc. were so prevalent as to put the defendants on actual notice of the policies' existence. While Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for unconstitutional policies or customs against Wexford in Count IX, the individual defendants—who are directors and wardens—shall be dismissed.
In
As for the individual defendants, however, they cannot be held liable in their policymaking capacity. Section 1983 does not provide for recovery under a theory of vicarious liability.
In Count X, Plaintiff brought another Monell claim against the same defendants listed in Count IX. The Count X claim, however, is premised upon IIED. Count X shall be dismissed. Monell is an extension of liability specifically stemming from § 1983,
Finally, Plaintiff also brings an Eighth Amendment claim in Count XI based on the totality of the living conditions at Menard. Plaintiff brings this count against IDOC, Director Godinez, and Wardens Butler and Lashbrook. The Court will not recite the entirety of the allegations raised in Count XIII. It suffices to say that Plaintiff raises a plethora of complaints relating to the general conditions at Menard, including claims relating to the medical care provided, as well as the infrastructure and the staffing. In its Order addressing Plaintiff's previous complaint, this Court dismissed a similar count against individual defendants due to Plaintiff's failure to plead "sufficiently particularized allegations as to how [those] Defendants personally acted to create unconstitutional conditions of confinement or to provide insufficient medical care." (Doc. 47, p. 22 — 23). Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint does not cure this defect.
As already discussed, to hold the individual defendants liable, Plaintiff must allege personal involvement in the deprivation of his rights. Plaintiff has failed to allege what the individual defendants did to personally cause the conditions he alleges.
Though Plaintiff may have a stronger argument for Count XI proceeding against IDOC under a claim of unconstitutional policies/practices, Count XI must ultimately be dismissed against IDOC as well. In its previous threshold review Order, the Court found that Plaintiff's fatal flaw in his totality of conditions claim as against IDOC was that he failed to identify a particular harm that had befallen him. (Doc. 47, p. 23). Plaintiff now has specifically listed a multitude of alleged unconstitutional conditions, but he has made allegations of harm only as to some of conditions, not all. Further, in some instances, Plaintiff makes vague assertions of harm, such an allegation that double-celling "upon information and belief, is a detriment to Mr. Hardy's psychological and physical state."
Given the Seventh Circuit's recent urging to the district courts to be alert to inmates attempting to "flout the rules for joining claims and defendants,"
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint (Doc. 79) is
For any new lawsuit created as part of a count being severed, Plaintiff shall be required to pay the filing fee in the separate suit or apply for IFP status in that new case. The Clerk of Court is
IT IS SO ORDERED.