MEMORANDUM ORDER

DAVID R. HERNDON, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are the government's motions in limine. [Docs. 22, 23]. In their motions, the government seeks to bar any evidence regarding potential penalties faced by defendant Strowder if she is convicted, ("MIL No. 1") and to bar defendant from defining reasonable doubt to the jury ("MIL No. 2"). For the reasons stated below, both motions are granted.

A. MIL No. 1

The government cites to clear Seventh Circuit precedent that a jury should not be advised of any potential penalty to be imposed on a defendant if convicted of the crime charged. See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 502 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Lewis, 110 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 1997) ("the practice of informing juries about the sentencing consequences of their verdicts is strongly disfavored."). The Court agrees. The jury's role is deciding the guilt or innocence of a defendant and as such, should not be given information that "might confuse of mislead the juries in their true task[.]" United States v. Trent, 863 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2017). Therefore, MIL No. 1 (doc. 22) is GRANTED.

B. MIL No. 2

In its motion in limine to prevent either party from defining reasonable doubt, the government again, cites to well-established Seventh Circuit law. See e.g. United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1988). The Court agrees that it is inappropriate for the term "reasonable doubt" to be defined to the jury. Furthermore, defendant has filed no response to either MIL No.1 or MIL No. 2, and thus seemingly does not object to the pending motions. The Court interprets the lack of response as a concession on the merits of the motion. Therefore, MIL No. 2 (doc. 23) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.