REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Acting pro se, Plaintiff Michael Smith, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit alleging violations of his civil rights. Among the allegations raised by Plaintiff, he alleges violations of his rights relating to the care and treatment of a hand injury he suffered in May 2016. This matter is before the Court on two motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants (Docs. 39 and 48). Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). After reviewing the briefs, the undersigned held an evidentiary hearing, and this matter is now ripe for disposition. Since the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's administrative remedies were not available to him, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the district judge DENY the motions for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit. (Doc. 1). In a merits review order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A, Chief Judge Reagan found that Plaintiff had successfully pleaded the following counts:

(Doc. 7, p. 6).

On June 17, 2016, Plaintiff prepared a grievance regarding lack of medical treatment. (Doc. 49-1, p. 9). In that grievance, Plaintiff wrote that he suffered an injury to his hand on May 30, 2016, and that he notified staff of the injury. (Id.). He wrote that the staff, however, delayed notifying or escorting him to the healthcare unit. (Id.). Plaintiff also complained of Dr. Trost's failure to adequately examine his injury. (Id. at 10).

This grievance was sent by Plaintiff as an emergency, but was deemed to not be an emergency by Warden Butler on June 26, 2016. (Id. at 9). After receiving the grievance back from the warden, Plaintiff submitted it to his counselor, who responded on July 8, 2016. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he then submitted the grievance, along with a follow-up grievance dated July 22nd, to the grievance office. (Doc. 60, p. 31). Plaintiff did not get either of those grievances back. (Id. at 38). According to Plaintiff's testimony, at the same time he initially prepared the June 17th grievance, he also prepared an identical duplicate grievance, which he sent directly to the ARB. (Id. at 24-25). He did this in order to attempt to make a record of his grievance submissions. (Id. at 25).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in July 2016, Dr. Trost sought an orthopedic consult for Plaintiff, but that the consult request was denied by Dr. Ritz. (Doc. 7, p. 3-4). After Plaintiff submitted a sick call request at the end of July 2016 regarding pain and swelling in his hand, he submitted another grievance on September 30, 2016, "which incorporated the issues from the 7/22/16 grievance and the and the 6/17/2016 grievance." (Doc. 60, p. 27). Plaintiff did not receive the September grievance back. (Id. at 35). In a request letter sent to his counselor, dated October 14, 2016, Plaintiff referenced the June 17th and September 30th grievances. (Doc. 51-1, p. 16).

On December 23, 2016, Plaintiff prepared a grievance wherein he stated that prison staff did not loosen handcuffs he had been wearing. (Doc. 49-1, p. 2). According to the grievance, Plaintiff told prison staff that his fingers and shoulders were hurting due to the pre-existing hand injury, but that he nonetheless remained in the handcuffs for at least four hours. (Id.). Plaintiff also grieved that he had requested a front cuff permit on multiple occasions. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff sent this grievance as an emergency, but was deemed a non-emergency by the warden on January 6, 2017. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff then sent the grievance to his counselor, who responded on January 17, 2017. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he then sent the grievance to the grievance office. (Doc. 60, p. 22). Plaintiff did not receive this grievance back. (Doc. 44, p. 3). As with previous grievances, Plaintiff sent a duplicate copy of the December 23rd grievance to the ARB at the same time he initially submitted the grievance to the warden. (Id. at 25). The ARB did not rule on the merits of any of these grievances. (Doc. 49-1, p. 1, 5, & 8).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating — based on the pleadings, affidavits and/or information obtained via discovery — the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact remains "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr. Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012); Righi v. SMC Corp., 632 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2011); Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), "we set forth the facts by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor." Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014).

A Motion for Summary Judgment based upon failure to exhaust administrative remedies, however, typically requires a hearing to determine any contested issues regarding exhaustion, and a judge may make limited findings of fact at that time. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). The case may proceed on the merits only after any contested issue of exhaustion is resolved. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742. While generally, the Court's role on summary judgment is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge witness credibility, or determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether a general issue of triable fact exists, a different standard applies to summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. Nat'l Athletic Sportwear Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). In Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that "debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies" are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740-41. Here, due to the existence of factual issues, an evidentiary hearing was held.

b. PLRA's Exhaustion Requirement

The affirmative defense of failure to exhaust depends on whether a plaintiff has fulfilled the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, which in turn depends on the prison grievance procedures set forth by the Illinois Department of Corrections. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

The PLRA provides that "no action shall be brought [under federal law] with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under the PLRA, exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, and unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The case may proceed on the merits only after any contested issue of exhaustion is resolved by the court. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742.

The Seventh Circuit takes a strict compliance approach to exhaustion; requiring inmates follow all grievance rules established by the correctional authority. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner must therefore "file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison's rules require." Pozo v. McCaughtry, 268 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). But the PLRA's plain language makes clear that an inmate is required to exhaust only those administrative remedies that are available to him. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If the prisoner fails to follow the proper procedure, however, the grievance will not be considered exhausted. Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). The purpose of exhaustion is to give prison officials an opportunity to address the inmate's claims internally, prior to federal litigation. Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006).

Additionally, exhaustion is a precondition to filing suit; a prisoner may not file suit in anticipation that his administrative remedies will soon become exhausted. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). Rather, a prisoner must wait to bring a suit until after he completes the exhaustion process. Perez v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). A suit that is filed prior to the exhaustion of remedies must be dismissed, even if a plaintiff's administrative remedies become exhausted during the pendency of the suit. Id.

c. Exhaustion Requirement under Illinois Law

IDOC's process for exhausting administrative remedies is laid out in the Illinois Department of Corrections Grievance Procedures for Offenders. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.810. If unable to resolve dispute with the counselor, the prisoner may file a written grievance with the Grievance Officer within sixty (60) days of discovery of the dispute. Id. The grievance should include "factual details regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint . . . [or] as much descriptive information about the individual as possible." Id. The grievance officer shall review the grievance and report findings and recommendations to the Chief Administrative Officer. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.810(c). The prisoner will then have the opportunity to review the CAO's response. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.830(e). If the prisoner is unsatisfied with the institution's resolution of the grievance, he may file an appeal to the Director through the Administrative Review Board within 30 days of the CAO's decision. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.850. The ARB is required to make a final determination of the grievance within six months after reciving it. Id. Completion of this process exhausts a prisoner's administrative remedies.

In emergencies, the Illinois Administrative Code also provides that a prisoner may request his grievance handled on an emergency basis by forwarding the grievance directly to the CAO. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.840. The grievance may be handled on an emergency basis if the CAO determines that there exists a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender. Id. The request to have a grievance handled on an emergency basis may also be appealed to the ARB. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.850(a).

IV. ANALYSIS

Since Plaintiff's administrative remedies were unavailable to him, Plaintiff is deemed to have exhausted them. If an inmate properly submits a grievance, but does not receive a response, then his attempts to exhaust that grievance are thwarted, his administrative remedies are no longer available to him, and he may proceed with a lawsuit. See Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 979 (7th Cir. 2000) (an inmate is not required to appeal his grievance if he submits the grievance to the proper authorities but never receives a response); Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (a remedy can be unavailable to a prisoner if the prison does not respond to the grievance or uses misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting his resources).

Here, the undersigned finds credible Plaintiff's testimony that he submitted the June 17th and December 23rd grievances to the grievance office after receiving them from the counselor. The undersigned does not find it likely that Plaintiff would go to the trouble of attempting to make a record of his grievance submissions by sending duplicates to the ARB, and then simply fail to complete the grievance process. The undersigned also finds credible Plaintiff's testimony that he submitted a grievance on September 30th. This grievance was referenced in correspondence written by Plaintiff in October 2016. Since the undersigned finds that Plaintiff submitted these three grievances, and since they were not responded to, Plaintiff is deemed to have exhausted them.

The content of these grievances covers all of Plaintiff's claims. The June 17th grievance, which was incorporated by the September 30 grievance, discusses the delay in care caused by prison staff on May 30, 2016, as well as, inadequate care by Dr. Trost. The fact that Plaintiff does not reference by name any of the individuals involved in the May 30th delay in care does not preclude Plaintiff from exhausting. "Grievances are intended to give prison administrators an opportunity to address a shortcoming, not to put individual defendants on notice of a lawsuit." Glick v. Walker, 385 Fed.Appx. 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 218). See also, Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We are mindful that the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued; the grievance is not a summons and complaint that initiates adversarial litigation."). The June 17th grievance sufficiently put prison officials on notice of the alleged May 30th delay in care, as well as, Dr. Trost's alleged inadequate treatment.

Likewise, even though the December 23rd grievance does not mention by name the individuals who were responsible for refusing to loosen Plaintiff's handcuffs, the grievance fairly placed the prison on notice of Plaintiff's handcuff incident. That grievance, which mentions Plaintiff's requests for a front cuff permit, also exhausts Plaintiff's claims against Dr. Trost for failing to provide such a permit.

Though neither the June 17th nor the December 23rd grievances reference Dr. Ritz, the undersigned finds that the June grievance exhausted Plaintiff's claims as to Ritz. Though the grievance was written prior to Ritz's involvement, Plaintiff's claims against Ritz are part of a continuing violation in the form of inadequate treatment from medical officials that began prior to Ritz's denial of the specialist referral. Therefore, Plaintiff need not re-grieve as to Dr. Ritz's denial. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) ("In order to exhaust their remedies, prisoners need not file multiple, successive grievances raising the same issue . . . if the objectionable condition is continuing."). Finally, regarding the claims against Warden Butler, as she reviewed these grievances, his claims as to her are exhausted since the underlying issues for which he claims she did nothing about have themselves been exhausted.

V. CONCLUSION

As the undersigned finds credible Plaintiff's contentions that grievances he submitted went unanswered, Plaintiff was thwarted in his attempts to exhaust, and the administrative remedies process was unavailable to him. As such, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the district judge DENY Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 39 and 48).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.1(b), the parties may object to any or all of the proposed dispositive findings in this Recommendation. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed on or before February 22, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.