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Buck v. Young, 3:17-cv-270-DRH-RJD. (2018)

Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois Number: infdco20180319680 Visitors: 4
Filed: Feb. 26, 2018
Latest Update: Feb. 26, 2018
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REONA J. DALY , Magistrate Judge . This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge David R. Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the question of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Fo
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge David R. Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the question of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Courtney Meyer, Brandy Tripp, Melissa Pappas, and Jacob Weatherford (Doc. 71) be DENIED, and that the Court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff William Buck, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"). Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was on suicide watch from October 27, 2016 to December 7, 2016. Following a threshold review of Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff is proceeding in this action on the following claims:

Count One: Defendants Withoff, Pappas, Meyers, and Weatherford subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was on suicide watch between October 27, 2016 and December 12, 2016, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Count Two: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Clavens and Callais for using excessive force against Plaintiff on or about November 20, 2016. Count Three: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Young for using excessive force against Plaintiff on or about November 21, 2016. Count Four: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim to serious medical needs against Defendants Young, Slavens, Callais, Pam, Tripp, Jill, and Meyers for refusing to treat and/or inadequately treating Plaintiff's injuries related to the excessive force incidents. Count Five: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Walls for instituting policies that led to inadequate and delayed medical care.

Defendants Meyer, Tripp, Pappas, and Weatherford filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies on August 31, 2017 (Doc. 71). Plaintiff filed his timely response on October 2, 2017 (Doc. 78). Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit against them1. In particular, Defendants contend that the only relevant grievances in the record, dated December 9, 2016 and December 11, 2016, were not exhausted as they were never submitted to the Administrative Review Board ("ARB") for review. In response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff asserts that his December 2016 grievances were fully exhausted as he received the relief he was requesting at the institutional level and, therefore, he was not required to appeal the decision to the ARB.

RELEVANT GRIEVANCES

The parties indicate, and the Court agrees, that the following grievances are relevant to the issue of exhaustion as it relates to Defendants Meyer, Tripp, Pappas, and Weatherford:

1. December 9, 2016 Emergency Grievance (Doc. 72-2)

In this grievance, Plaintiff explains that he was assaulted by officers on November 20, 2016, while on suicide watch. Plaintiff indicates that he was not provided adequate medical treatment and, on November 22, 2016, he was taken to nurse sick call where he saw Nurse Tripp who refused to help him. Plaintiff requested that the incidents described in his grievance be investigated and that he be given treatment and "whatever else is necessary" (Doc. 72-2 at 1). The warden responded to this grievance as an emergency on December 15, 2016, and it was expedited for review. The grievance officer responded to this grievance on December 19, 2016, recommending that it be found moot as an investigation was conducted and staff conduct allegations were unfounded, and Plaintiff was currently under the care of the healthcare unit (Id. at 6). The warden concurred with the grievance officer's response on January 3, 2017 (Id.).

2. December 11, 2016 Emergency Grievance (Doc. 72-2)

In this grievance, Plaintiff explains that he was placed on suicide watch on October 27, 2016, and was not provided certain personal hygiene items. Plaintiff also complains he was placed in cells that were filthy, with blood and feces around the cell, and that he complained to Weatherford, Meyer, and Pappas, but to no avail. Plaintiff requested that his complaints be investigated, that he get better mental health treatment, and "whatever else is necessary" (Doc. 72-2 at 3). The warden responded to this grievance as an emergency on December 15, 2016, and it was expedited for review. The grievance officer responded on December 15, 2016, recommending that it be found moot (Id. at 5). In particular, the grievance officer explained that cells are cleaned prior to crisis watch placement and that Plaintiff was monitored by mental health during his crisis watch placement and is currently being seen by mental health (Id.). The warden concurred with the grievance officer's response on January 3, 2017 (Id.).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party "must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. "[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies." Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). "[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment." Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). "[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice." Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).

An inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections must first submit a written grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence or problem, to his or her institutional counselor, unless certain discrete issues are being grieved. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the grievance is considered by a Grievance Officer who must render a written recommendation to the Chief Administrative Officer — usually the Warden — within 2 months of receipt, "when reasonably feasible under the circumstances." Id. §504.830(e). The CAO then advises the inmate of a decision on the grievance. Id.

An inmate may appeal the decision of the Chief Administrative Officer in writing within 30 days to the Administrative Review Board for a final decision. Id. § 504.850(a); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2006). The ARB will submit a written report of its findings and recommendations to the Director who shall review the same and make a final determination within 6 months of receipt of the appeal. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d) and (e).

An inmate may request that a grievance be handled as an emergency by forwarding it directly to the Chief Administrative Officer. Id. § 504.840. If it is determined that there exists a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm, the grievance is handled on an emergency basis, which allows for expedited processing of the grievance by responding directly to the offender. Id. Inmates may further submit certain types of grievances directly to the Administrative Review Board, including grievances related to protective custody, psychotropic medication, and certain issues relating to facilities other than the inmate's currently assigned facility. Id. at § 504.870.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In determining whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court first considers whether Plaintiff's December 9 or December 11, 2016 grievances exhausted all available remedies2. Plaintiff admits that these grievances were not submitted to the ARB for review; however, Plaintiff relies on Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005), and argues that because he received the relief he was seeking, there was no issue left to appeal to the ARB. The Court agrees. Plaintiff's December 9, 2016 grievance complained about an incident involving alleged excessive force and medical personnel's failure to adequately respond. Plaintiff requested that his complaints be investigated and that he be given treatment. Plaintiff remarks that the grievance officer conducted an investigation and also noted that Plaintiff was currently under the care of the healthcare unit. Based on the grievance officer's response, it is clear Plaintiff received the articulable relief he requested. As noted by the Seventh Circuit in Thornton, not only is it counter-intuitive to require Plaintiff to appeal to higher channels after receiving the relief he requested, but it is not required by the PLRA. 428 F.3d at 697. Because there was no further relief available with regard to Plaintiff's December 9, 2016 grievance, the Court finds it was sufficiently exhausted.

The Court comes to the same conclusion with respect to Plaintiff's December 11, 2016 grievance. Again, Plaintiff requested an investigation and mental health treatment. The grievance officer conducted an investigation and found the grievance moot as Plaintiff was currently being seen by mental health. Thus, there was no further relief available to warrant an appeal to the ARB.

The Court, having found Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as to his December 9 and December 11, 2016 grievances, must consider whether he adequately complained about the actions of Defendants Meyer, Tripp, Pappas, and Weatherford in said grievances. The answer is clear — Plaintiff clearly identified (by name) each of these Defendants in his grievances and complained about their actions at issue in this lawsuit. Accordingly, it appears Plaintiff exhausted his claims against Defendants Meyer, Tripp, Pappas, and Weatherford prior to filing this lawsuit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Courtney Meyer, Brandy Tripp, Melissa Pappas, and Jacob Weatherford (Doc. 71) be DENIED, and that the Court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objection thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004).

FootNotes


1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support also reference Dr. Vipin Shah and Wexford. As Plaintiff explains, neither Dr. Shah nor Wexford are defendants in this lawsuit. The Court finds that although any reference to Dr. Shah or Wexford is confusing (and may evidence some haste in the filing of the motion), it does not bear on the issue before the Court — whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as to his claim against Defendants Tripp, Pappas, Meyer, and Weatherford.
2. An evidentiary hearing was not held in this matter on the issue of exhaustion as there are no material facts in dispute that necessitate a hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). Specifically, the record includes the grievances Plaintiff relies on to establish exhaustion and there is no dispute as to the contents of said grievances.
Source:  Leagle

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