DONALD G. WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge.
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson by United States District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) and Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 83). For the reasons set forth below, it is
Plaintiff Durwyn Talley is a prisoner previously housed at Menard Correctional Center. Talley brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, among other things, that Defendants interfered with his access to the courts. Currently pending before this Court is one Count of denial of access to the Courts against Defendants Fitzgerald, Lashbrook and Minor; and one Count for injunctive relief against Warden Hutchinson for inhumane conditions of confinement.
On November 25, 2013 the Central District of Illinois entered an order granting summary judgment against Talley and dismissing his claim in Talley v. Friel, et al. (Central District of Illinois 11-cv-1368 Doc. 79; Doc. 60-1, p. 12).
On April 7, 2014 the Central District issued another order finding that Talley's motion to proceed in forma pauperis did not identify the issues on appeal, as previously ordered, and granted Talley fourteen days to clarify his basis for appeal in writing (Doc. 60-1, p. 13). Talley alleges he was transferred to Menard Correctional Center two days later, on April 9, 2014 (Doc. 71-2, p. 5). Talley filed a change of address on May 2, 2014.
Plaintiff admits he is no longer housed at Menard Correctional Center and that the claim against Defendant Hutchinson for injunctive relief is therefore moot (Doc. 65, p. 11). It is therefore
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).
A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The Seventh Circuit has stated summary judgment is "the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events." Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005).
When bringing a claim based on the denial of access to the Courts, an inmate must prevail on a two-part test. Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1992). First, the inmate must show prison officials failed "to assist in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. Second, the prisoner must generally show "some quantum of detriment caused by the challenged conduct of state officials resulting in the interruption and/or delay of the plaintiff's pending or contemplated litigation." Id. Regardless of the length of an alleged delay, a prisoner must show actual substantial prejudice to specific litigation. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 1995). Prejudice occurs when the prison official's action causes the doors of the court to "be actually shut" to a plaintiff. Id.
Talley alleges Defendants at Menard failed to provide him with a copy of the orders from the Central District of Illinois, resulting in dismissal of his appeal (Doc. 2, p. 6). In support, he has filed almost five hundred pages of documents (See Docs. 65, 71). The vast majority of those documents, however, relate to incidents other than the ones at issue in this case. The only claims pending before the Court relate to the actions of Defendants Fitzgerald, Lashbrook and Miner at Menard Correctional Center.
The record is clear a change of address to Menard Correctional Center was not entered in the Court record until May 5, 2014 (Doc. 60-1, p. 13).
Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Talley, the only evidence before the Court is that the April 7, 2014 Order was sent to Danville. Talley has provided no evidence that the Menard Defendants were ever made aware of the April 7, 2014 Order, let alone that they did anything to interfere with or delay his receiving that order.
Talley argues, however, that his claim is also based on subsequent Court orders entered after he was transferred to Menard. Specifically, the May 12, 2014 Order informing Talley that he had 30 days to respond to the Court's finding that his original appeal was not in good faith (Doc. 65, p. 8).
Finally, the second prong of an access to court claim requires a plaintiff show the alleged behavior interfered with their efforts to pursue a legal claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Defendants argue Talley cannot meet this requirement because the Central District found his appeal was not made in good faith, and therefore he could not have been successful (Doc. 60, p. 5). What Defendants ignore, however, is that the sole basis for the Court's finding of bad faith was Talley's failure to respond to its earlier orders. Had Talley received the May 12, 2014 order informing him of his 30 days to appeal that finding of bad faith, he may have been successful in averting the dismissal of his appeal. Thus, there is evidence in the record upon which a jury could find the behavior alleged by Talley interfered with his ability to appeal his claim.
It is therefore
A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy" for which there must be a clear showing that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALANWRIGHT, ARTHUR RMILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (5th ed. 1995)). The purpose of such an injunction is "to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit." Faheem-Elv. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). The movant has the burden of demonstrating: (1) A reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) No adequate remedy at law; and (3) Irreparable harm absent the injunction. Planned Parenthood v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012).
The Court previously denied Talley's motion for a preliminary injunction on this same issue, finding he was unlikely to succeed on the merits (Doc. 4, p. 8). Nothing in this new motion for preliminary injunction leads the Court to a different conclusion. Although it is recommended Talley be allowed to proceed on a limited claim of denial of access to the courts, there is little evidence to support that claim. Further, while Talley alleges ongoing interference with receiving and filing documents, there is no evidence that Talley has not received or been unable to file documents in this action. In fact, a review of the docket sheet indicates he has filed over twenty-five documents and has not missed any court ordered deadlines. Thus, there is no evidence Talley's access to the court is currently being impinged or that he will suffer any harm, let alone irreparable harm, absent a preliminary injunction. Thus, the Court
For the foregoing reasons, it is
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objection thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2003).
