Filed: Jul. 10, 2018
Latest Update: Jul. 10, 2018
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REONA J. DALY , District Judge . This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge David R. Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the District Court ADOPT the following findings of fact and conclus
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REONA J. DALY , District Judge . This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge David R. Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the District Court ADOPT the following findings of fact and conclusi..
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
REONA J. DALY, District Judge.
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge David R. Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the District Court ADOPT the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and GRANT Defendants' Motion.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was attacked by another inmate on March 28, 2017 and sustained an injury to his eyes due to the failure of correctional officers to carry out their duties. Plaintiff alleges he was denied medical treatment for his injuries and was placed in segregation to prevent him from filing grievances concerning the attack and his inadequate medical care. Plaintiff's complaint was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and he is proceeding on the following claims (as delineated in the Court's screening order):
Count Three: Lashbrook failed to intervene when Plaintiff was subjected to retaliation, cruel and unusual punishment, unlawful detention, harassment, and deliberate indifference to his medical needs by individual defendants;
Count Six: Lashbrook and Graves showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical need involving the injury he sustained to his eyes on March 28, 2017, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
Count Seven: Masterson, Snell, Ellis, and Zang retaliated against Plaintiff for and/or exercised prior restraint on Plaintiff to prevent Plaintiff from filing grievances and otherwise complaining about his treatment, in violation of the First Amendment;
Count Nine: Illinois state law claim against Masterson, Snell, Graves, Ellis, Zang, and Lashbrook for intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon Plaintiff; and
Count Twelve: Illinois state law claim against the Illinois Department of Corrections for indemnification.
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Count 12 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that the Illinois State Employee Indemnification Act, 5 ILCS 350/0.01, et seq. ("the Act") does not provide for a private cause of action allowing Plaintiff to sue under the Act. Plaintiff indicates he does not understand Defendants' motion, but asserts that the claim should not be dismissed because he was allowed to proceed on such claim after the Court's threshold order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal if a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and draws all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted).
Here, Defendants seek dismissal of Count 12 of Plaintiff's complaint, the Illinois state law claim against the IDOC for indemnification. Under the State Employee Indemnification Act, 5 ILCS 350/1, et seq., the State is obligated to indemnify "any State employee" in civil actions against the employee for "act[s] or omission[s] occurring within the scope of the employee's State employment" and the Attorney General is to appear on the employee's behalf. 5 ILCS 350/2(a) and (e)(ii). As correctly argued by Defendants, the Illinois State Employee Indemnification Act does not expressly create a private cause of action, and there has been no showing that Plaintiff meets the criteria for an implied cause of action. See 5 ILCS 350/2; see also Emerald Pork, II, Ltd. v. Purina Mills, Inc., 17 F.Supp.2d 816, 817 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1998) ("A private cause of action will be implied in Illinois only if: (1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted; (2) it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act; (3) plaintiff's injury is one the Act was designed to prevent; and (4) it is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the Act.").
Further, it is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over "actions against a state brought by her own citizens," unless the state consents to suit. Scott v. O'Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The fact that a state chooses to indemnify its employees for damages does not constitute consent. Ollison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 16-C-00662, 2016 WL 6962841, *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2016) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Count 12 against the IDOC must be dismissed as it is premised on a "mere legal conclusion" that "does not . . . purport to make a substantive claim," and a federal court cannot enter a money judgment requiring the State of Illinois to indemnify its employees. Id.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) be GRANTED, that Count 12 be DISMISSED, along with the IDOC, and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objection thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004).
