REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DONALD G. WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge.

This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson by United States District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the question of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED (Doc. 17), and that the Court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff, Juan Maiden, is proceeding on claims that arose when he was injured on September 24, 2016 while working in the kitchen at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated. While cooking, Plaintiff stepped onto a broken grate covering a drain and injured his arm on a hot kettle when his foot fell through the drain. He claims that Defendant William P. Harris, the Dietary Manager, knew about the broken grate, which had been broken for over a year, but refused to fix the dangerous condition. The grate was eventually fixed in May, 2017.

It is undisputed that on October 21, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a grievance about the September 24, 2016 incident. In the grievance, Plaintiff explained that he stepped on the drain grate, that the iron cover on the drain broke, that his foot fell down the 18 inch drain, and that he injured his arm on the hot kettle on the stove (Doc. 18-1, p. 1). He then went on to detail the medical care he received (or didn't receive) and the injury that he suffered. For relief, Plaintiff stated:

A counselor responded by addressing only the medical care that he received. Plaintiff appealed and the Grievance Officer likewise only investigated and addressed the medical care Plaintiff received (18-2). When Plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Review Board (ARB), the institutional decision was affirmed. The ARB also only referenced the medical care Plaintiff received (Doc. 18-3). It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed no other grievances regarding the event.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970). See also Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that summary judgment is "the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events." Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides:

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a precondition to suit. Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Perez v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 534-535 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that §1997e(a) of the PLRA "makes exhaustion a precondition to bringing suit" under § 1983). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense; defendants bear the burden of proving a failure to exhaust. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Dole v. Chandler, 483 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has interpreted the PLRA to require "proper exhaustion" prior to filing suit. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). This means "using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)." Id. at 90, (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). In finding that the PLRA requires proper exhaustion, the Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute as stated in Pozo, which required an inmate to "file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules require." Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025. In Pavey, the Seventh Circuit instructed District Courts to conduct a hearing to determine whether a Plaintiff has exhausted his remedies. Id. 544 F.3d at 742. If a Plaintiff has exhausted his remedies, the case will proceed on the merits. If, however, a Plaintiff has not exhausted, the Court may either allow Plaintiff to exhaust or terminate the matter. No hearing was required in this matter.

Defendant's only argument is that Plaintiff failed to provide enough factual detail in his grievance as to Defendant Harris and that the issues in his grievance should be limited to his request to medical care and an incident report. Under the procedures set forth in the Illinois Administrative Code in effect at the time, a grievance must

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c) (effective May 1, 2003). The grievance form itself likewise directed Plaintiff to provide a description of what happened and the name or identifying information of the persons involved. There is no requirement in the Code that Plaintiff specifically set forth a legal theory about his injuries and who might be responsible. See e.g. Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002). It is enough that he indicated that he stepped on the grate, that it broke, and he was injured thereby. That the prison overlooked this aspect of his grievance and instead only focused on the medical care does not establish that Plaintiff failed to notify them of the hazard in the kitchen. And, by extension, the prison could have not been at a loss to determine who was responsible for inmate safety in the kitchen. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies filed by Defendant on June 15, 2018 (Doc. 17) be DENIED and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), any party may serve and file written OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law within fourteen (14) days after service.

You are not to file an appeal as to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At this point, it is appropriate to file OBJECTIONS, if any, to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. An appeal is inappropriate until after the District Judge issues an Order either affirming or reversing the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Failure to file such OBJECTIONS shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal, which are addressed in the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd. and Joseph Sclafani, 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).