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Allen v. Butler, 17-cv-1004-MJR-SCW. (2018)

Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois Number: infdco20190104954 Visitors: 6
Filed: Dec. 11, 2018
Latest Update: Dec. 11, 2018
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS , Magistrate Judge . INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff, who was proceeding pro se at the time he filed his complaint, filed his complaint for failure to protect, excessive force, deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, and violation of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights (Doc. 1). This matter is now before the Court on a motion for summary judgment (Docs. 64 and 65) filed by Defendant Cortney
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff, who was proceeding pro se at the time he filed his complaint, filed his complaint for failure to protect, excessive force, deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, and violation of Plaintiff's procedural due process rights (Doc. 1).

This matter is now before the Court on a motion for summary judgment (Docs. 64 and 65) filed by Defendant Cortney Meyer. Defendant Meyer argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against her. Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, was given until April 30, 2018 in which to file a response to Defendant's motion. Plaintiff failed to file a response. The Court considers Plaintiff's failure to respond an admission of the facts of Defendants' motions. SDIL Local Rule 7.1(c). See also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995) (a failure to respond constitutes an admission that there are no undisputed material facts).

The matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams by United States District Judge Michael J. Reagan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and Local Rule 72.1(a). Based on the following, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Defendant Meyer's motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 19, 2017 (Doc. 1). As narrowed by the threshold order, the only claim against Defendant Cortney Meyer is Plaintiff's failure to protect claim (Count 1) for placing or allowing Plaintiff to remain in a cell with a prisoner known to have attacked previous cellmates (Doc. 7, p. 7). At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was housed at Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in a cell with an inmate that was known to have attacked prior cellmates and who was mentally ill (Doc. 7, p. 3). Plaintiff alerted several officers of death threats he received from his cellmate including Meyer who was a mental health worker (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Meyer documented his fears and request to move but told Plaintiff that she could not do anything for him (Id.). Plaintiff was ultimately attacked by his cellmate on November 4, 2015. Plaintiff's cellmate punched him in the face, stabbed him with an ink pen, kicked and choked him (Id. at p. 4). According to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center on December 30, 2015 (Doc 65, p. 4).

In response to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant Meyer filed the pending motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against her (Docs. 64 and 65).

Plaintiff filed several grievances related to the November 4, 2015 attack by his cellmate. Plaintiff first submitted a grievance dated November 21, 2015, while he was still housed at Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 65-1, p. 13-14). The grievance indicates that he was attacked and then issued a disciplinary ticket (Id. at p. 13). Plaintiff asked for medical attention and that the ticket be expunged. Plaintiff does not indicate that he informed any officers, including Defendant Meyer, of his concerns. The grievance was fully exhausted.

Plaintiff next submitted a grievance on January 3, 2016, directly to the ARB as he was then housed at Pontiac Correctional Center (Doc. 65-1, p. 57). Plaintiff indicated that he had been attacked by his cellmate and that prior to the attack he had warned staff to include Officer Hanks, Sgt. Bebout, Mental Health Professional Coffee, and "a host of other officer[s]" (Id. at p. 57). He later mentions that he spoke to mental health personnel after the injury but that "she" was indifferent to his injuries (Id. at p. 58). The ARB indicated in their response that they spoke to staff and they had no recollection of Plaintiff making complaints (Id. at p. 56). The ARB found claims against staff unsubstantiated (Id.). The grievance was denied on March 31, 2016 (Id. at p. 56).

Plaintiff submitted two copies of a grievance dated January 20, 2016 directly to the ARB. The first copy was received on January 29, 2016 as Plaintiff transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center (Doc. 65-1, p. 73-74). The ARB ruled on the grievance on March 16, 2016 (Id. at p. 71). The grievance indicated that he sent grievances to the ARB on January 2, 3, and 14, 2016 and mailed copies to the State Attorney General's Office (Doc. 65-1, p. 73). Plaintiff indicated that IDOC was trying to keep him from addressing the issue regarding his care (Id.). He also requested responses to his other prior issues including warning officers of the possible attack by his cellmate (Id. at p. 74). Plaintiff noted that he informed Officer Hanks, Sgt. Bebout, Mental Health Professional Meyer, and Mental Professional "Coffee" (Id.). The grievance was returned by the ARB because they had previously addressed the claims in the grievance (Id. at p. 71). The ARB informed Plaintiff that they received a grievance on January 6, 2016 (Plaintiff's January 3, 2016 grievance) that was still pending and that all grievances sent to the ARB had been addressed (Id.). Plaintiff was also directed to contact the healthcare unit regarding his issues with care and personal property regarding his loss of property issue (Id.). The ARB also indicated that they previously addressed some of the issues on February 22, 2016 and March 8, 2016 (Id.). A second copy of the grievance was received by the ARB on April 12, 2016 (Id. at p. 10). The ARB returned the grievance because it was not submitted in the proper time frame and because the grievance had already been answered by the ARB (Id.).

A grievance dated January 27, 2016 was also sent directly to the ARB and received on February 1, 2016 (Doc. 65-1, p. 78). This grievance also indicated that he previously warned officers, to include Officer Hanks, Sgt. Bebout, and Mental Health Professional Coffee (Id. at p. 80). The grievance was rejected for failure to provide a counselor and grievance officer response (Id. at p. 78) and Plaintiff was instructed to take up his issue with missing property, which went missing after the attack, with his current facility (Id.). The ARB also noted that the grievance was not submitted within the proper timeline as the incident occurred over 60 days from the date of the grievance (Id.).

Finally, Plaintiff submitted a grievance on April 1, 2016 related to his November 4, 2015 attack (Doc. 65-1, p. 32-43). This grievance also indicates that he warned several officers about the threats from his cellmate including Hanks, Bebout, and several officers including mental health worker Coffee (Id. at p. 33). The grievance was received on April 12, 2016 and returned on September 14, 2016 with a number of other grievances received by the ARB (Id. at p. 10).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part, that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that `[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion"). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id. Moreover, "[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require." Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison's grievance process, "the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner's claim can be indefinitely unexhausted." Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.

Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that "debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies" are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41(7th Cir. 2008). Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense, the Court set forth the following recommendations:

The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he's not just being given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner's fault, in which event the case is over. (3)If and when the judge determines that the prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies.

Id. at 742.

A. Illinois Exhaustion Requirements

As an inmate confined within the Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiff was required to follow the regulations contained in the Illinois Department of Correction's Grievance Procedures for Offenders ("grievance procedures") to properly exhaust his claims. 20 Ill. Administrative Code §504.800 et seq. The grievance procedures first require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(a). The grievance form must:

contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.

20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.820(a). The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the inmate. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(a). "The Grievance Officer shall consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances." 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(e). "The Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and recommendation and advise the offender of his or her decision in writing. Id.

If the inmate is not satisfied with the Chief Administrative Officer's response, he or she can file an appeal with the Director through the Administrative Review Board ("ARB"). The grievance procedures specifically state, "[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that the problem, complaint or grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date of the decision." 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(a). The inmate shall attach copies of the Grievance Officer's report and the Chief Administrative Officer's decision to his appeal. Id. "The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written report of its findings and recommendations." 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(d). "The Director shall review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final determination of the grievance within 6 months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of the Director's decision." 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(e).

The grievance procedures do allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. In order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to the Chief Administrative Officer ("CAO") who may "[determine] that there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender" and thus the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(a). If the CAO determines the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis, then the CAO "shall expedite processing of the grievance and respond to the offender" indicating to him what action shall be taken. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(b). If the CAO determines the grievances "should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the standard grievance process. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(c). When an inmate appeals a grievance deemed by the CAO to be an emergency, "the Administrative Review Board shall expedite processing of the grievance." 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(f).

ANALYSIS

The Court notes that Plaintiff has not filed a response, and under its Local Rules, the Court will deem the facts as presented by the Defendants to be uncontroverted. See Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995) (a failure to respond constitutes an admission that there are no undisputed material facts). Further, as there are no disputes of fact, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not needed in this case.

Here, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court FIND that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies against Defendant Meyer. The grievance procedures require that an inmate name the individuals involved in the complaint, or, if their names are not known, an inmate must, as the very least, "include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible." 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(a)(b). See also Ambrose v. Godinez, 510 Fed. App. 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2013); but see Jackson v. Shepherd, 552 Fed. Appx. 591, 593 fn.1 (7th Cir. 2014). Further, the Seventh Circuit has held that an inmate is required to provide enough information to serve a grievance's function of giving "prison officials a fair opportunity to address [an inmate's] complaints." Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011). This fits with the purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement which was designed to afford correctional officials a chance to address inmate complaints internally, prior to resorting to federal litigation. See, e.g., Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684, citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). The purpose of a grievance is to provide prison officials a "fair opportunity" to address an inmate's complaint. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir.2011). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has consistently reminded district courts that "all that the PLRA requires" is that a grievance "alert the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought," Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir.2005), citing Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.2002), and afford prison officials an opportunity to respond, see Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d at 905-06.

On January 3, 2016 Plaintiff submitted a grievance directly to the ARB regarding his November 4, 2015 assault (Doc. 65-1, p. 56-58), which he could do as he had transferred from Menard Correctional Center to Pontiac Correctional Center. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504-870(a)(4). Plaintiff's grievance indicated that he informed Hanks, Bebout, mental health professional Coffee "and a host of other officer[s]" (Id. at p. 57). The ARB ruled on the merits of the grievance on March 31, 2016 (Id. at p. 56). Plaintiff did not specifically identify Meyers but indicated that he spoke with numerous officers about the threats from his cellmate. The ARB ruled on the merits of the motion, indicating that they contacted Menard Staff who had no recollection of Plaintiff expressing his concerns with his cellmate. The ARB did not reject the grievance for not identifying additional staff nor did they indicate what staff they contacted at Menard.

Plaintiff later tried to file an additional grievance on January 20, 2016, which did identify Defendant Meyer as one of the officers he contacted (Id. at p. 73-74). Plaintiff indicated in that grievance that he had filed a grievance on January 3, 2016 (Id. at p. 73). The ARB rejected the grievance on March 16, 2016, noting that they had Plaintiff's other grievances in their possession, including the January 3, 2016 grievance, and that they had previously addressed his issues (Id. at p. 71). Thus, it appears to the undersigned that Plaintiff tried to supplement his January 3, 2016 grievance with Defendant Meyer's name prior to the ARB ruling on the grievance and the ARB rejected it. The undersigned finds, therefore, that the ARB had the identity of Defendant Meyer in Plaintiff's January 20, 2016 grievance, which the ARB received prior to ruling on the January 3, 2016 grievance. In fact, the ARB noted that the January 3, 2016 grievance had been received by the ARB and that this new grievance raised no new issues. As such, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court FIND that Plaintiff did all that he could to exhaust his claims against Meyer by identifying her in the January 20, 2016 grievance which the ARB had an opportunity to review. The ARB had an opportunity to address the issues against Defendant Meyer in connection with the January 3, 2016 grievance as Plaintiff identified her prior to their ruling on that grievance. The ARB acknowledged receipt of that grievance in rejecting the January 20, 2016 grievance and found that the January 20 grievance raised no new issues. As such, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court FIND that Plaintiff exhausted his claims against Defendant Meyer.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Defendant Meyer's motion for summary judgment (Docs. 64 and 65).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.1(b), the parties may object to any or all of the proposed dispositive findings in this Recommendation. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed on or before December 28, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 73.1(b) of the Local Rules of Practice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, any party may serve and file written OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law within fourteen (14) days of service.

Please note: You are not to file an appeal as to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At this point, it is appropriate to file OBJECTIONS, if any, to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. An appeal is inappropriate until after the District Judge issues an Order either affirming or reversing the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Failure to file such OBJECTIONS shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal, which are addressed in the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd. and Joseph Sclafani, 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).

You should e-file/mail your OBJECTIONS to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, at the address indicated below: 750 Missouri Ave., East St. Louis, IL 62201
Source:  Leagle

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