REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se Plaintiff Ricky Ryder filed his complaint against various defendants alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, (Doc. 10), by which Plaintiff is requesting that the Defendants be ordered to (1) retrieve Plaintiff's medical records from Barnes Hospital; (2) arrange for an optometrist to evaluate and diagnose Plaintiff's eye-related medical issues; and (3) order that Defendant David treat Plaintiff's ongoing pain from Plaintiff's knee and back injuries. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Defendants have filed responses in opposition to Plaintiff's motion. (Docs. 36, 38). Based on the following, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his complaint relating to his eye, knee, and back issues against the Defendants responsible for Plaintiff's care while Plaintiff was housed at Shawnee Correctional Center ("Shawnee"). (Doc. 9, pp. 2-3). Plaintiff entered IDOC custody on December 27, 2016—at this time, Plaintiff was housed at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), and had a pre-existing eye condition as well as back and knee pain. (Id. at p. 2). Plaintiff alleges that he had been scheduled for surgery at Barnes Jewish Hospital, but was unable to obtain his medical records from Barnes Jewish while housed at Menard. (Id. at pp. 2-3). From December 27, 2016 until March 29, 2017, Plaintiff did not receive treatment for his eye condition. (Id. at p. 3).

Plaintiff was transferred to Shawnee on March 29, 2017, and immediately requested care for his eye condition upon his arrival. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smoot called Plaintiff to Shawnee's Health Care Unit ("HCU"), but only told Plaintiff that Shawnee did not employ an eye doctor and that Plaintiff's eye issues would not be treated while at Shawnee. (Id.). Defendant Smoot gave Plaintiff a single dose of ibuprofen. (Id.).

Beginning on April 11, 2017, Plaintiff began using Shawnee's grievance procedure to request treatment for his eye issues, as well as accommodation for his knee and back pain—Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Smoot and Dennison ignored his requests and took no action to ensure treatment of his eye, knee, and back issues. (Id.). Further, Plaintiff alleges that he sought medical treatment from Defendant David, but Defendant David likewise took no steps to provide Plaintiff care. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from severe pain and discomfort, as well as periodic loss of vision. (Id.).

Defendant David, a medical doctor at Shawnee, evaluated Plaintiff on April 11, 2017. (Doc. 36, p. 5). At this time, Defendant David requested and obtained Plaintiff's medical records from Barnes Jewish, with Plaintiff's authorization. (Id.). These records were also contained in Plaintiff's IDOC medical records that Defendant David obtained during the pendency of the present lawsuit. (Id.). Defendant David reviewed the Barnes Jewish records on May 10, 2017 and referred Plaintiff for an evaluation with an ophthalmologist at that time. (Id. at pp. 5-6). Plaintiff was evaluated by non-party ophthalmologist George Ortiz on August 17, 2017, who diagnosed Plaintiff with glaucoma, age-related macular degeneration, cataracts, and a pinguecula (a benign growth or development on the conjunctiva of the eye) of the left eye. (Id. at p. 6).

Following this evaluation with the ophthalmologist, Plaintiff was prescribed medication and nutritional supplements to treat his glaucoma and macular degeneration, and was recommended continued monitoring for Plaintiff's cataracts and left eye pinguecula. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that as of January 3, 2018, he has repeatedly attempted to obtain medical treatment for his eye, knee, and back pain, but his requests have been repeatedly denied by Defendants. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 4, 2018, and has since been transferred to Robinson Correctional Center ("Robinson"). (Docs. 1, 15). However, Plaintiff was again evaluated by a non-party optometrist at Shawnee and issued continued prescriptions for his glaucoma and macular degeneration medication and supplements before his transfer to Robinson. (Id.). Plaintiff has also been evaluated and treated by another non-party optometrist at Robinson following his transfer in June 2018, who again recommended continued treatment of Plaintiff's eye issues. (Id. at pp. 6-7). As of November 7, 2018, Plaintiff had been evaluated and treated for his eye issues by an ophthalmologist and two separate optometrists, and remains on the treatment regimen first set forth by the ophthalmologist in August 2017. (Id.).

Following his transfer to Robinson, Plaintiff's medical records do not indicate that he has sought evaluation or treatment for his back or knee pain. (Id. at p. 7).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Plaintiff's motion seeks a preliminary injunction. Injunctions are extraordinary equitable remedies that are to be granted in civil cases only when specific criteria are clearly met by the movant. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The plaintiff must show four elements for an injunction: (1) plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) without an injunction irreparable harm against the plaintiff is likely; (3) the harm likely to be suffered by the plaintiff would be greater than the harm the injunction would inflict on defendants; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. Id. The greater the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits of the case, the less significant the likely harm against the plaintiff must be in relation to the harm the defendant will likely suffer due to an injunction. Id. According to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) injunctions in the prison context must be "narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626. Courts may issue preliminary injunctions only on notice to the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).

In the context of prisoner litigation, there are further restrictions on courts' remedial power. The scope of the court's authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunction relief "must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(2). See also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (the PLRA "enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Seventh Circuit has described injunctions like the one sought here, where an injunction would require an affirmative act by the defendant, as a mandatory preliminary injunction. Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997). Mandatory injunctions are "cautiously viewed and sparingly issued," since they require the court to command a defendant to take a particular action. Id. (citing Jordan v. Wolke, 593 F.2d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 1978)). See also W.A. Mack, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 260 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1958) ("A preliminary injunction does not issue which gives to a plaintiff the actual advantage which would be obtained in a final decree.").

ANALYSIS

Here, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time. Plaintiff has not shown that he has a likelihood of success on the merits as to his claim regarding Defendants' alleged deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs relating to his medical records or his eye, knee, and back pain. To the contrary, the record indicates that Plaintiff has (1) already received his requested relief, and/or (2) Plaintiff's requested relief would be impossible to provide given that Plaintiff has been transferred to a facility that the Defendants are not located at.

First, Defendants have already requested, received, and considered Plaintiff's medical records from Barnes Jewish Hospital as far back as May 2017. This request was done with Plaintiff's express authorization. Further, these records are a part of Plaintiff's IDOC medical file. While the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint, taken as true, may state a justiciable claim relating to these medical records, after considering the materials before the Court, the undersigned finds that this requested relief is moot because Defendants have already retrieved these records. At the very least, Defendants have shown that Plaintiff has a very low likelihood of success at the merits stage for the medical records issue, and is not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.

As for Plaintiff's second request that Defendants "[i]mmediately arrange for a[n] optometrist to evaluate and diagnose [Plaintiff]," (Doc. 1, p. 6), the record indicates that, contrary to the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff has in fact been evaluated and diagnosed by an ophthalmologist and two separate optometrists, both before and after Plaintiff filed his Complaint in April 2018. The undersigned need not evaluate the merits of Plaintiff's potential damages claim for his backwards-looking deliberate indifference allegations against the Defendants—instead the undersigned evaluates Plaintiff's forward-looking request for an injunction governing Defendants' future behavior regarding the treatment of Plaintiff's eye issues through the lens of Defendants' treatment of Plaintiff's issues to this point.

The facts in the record indicate that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed in showing that Defendants' present treatment plan for Plaintiff's eye issues demonstrates deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. Plaintiff has been evaluated and treated by multiple eye doctors, both before and after filing his Complaint, and both before and after his transfer from Shawnee to Robinson. As such, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits for this aspect of his preliminary injunction request, and thus he is not entitled to a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to arrange for an optometrist to "evaluate and diagnose" Plaintiff's eye issues when that has already been repeatedly done.1

Finally, Plaintiff's requested relief that Defendant David "properly determine" the reason or Plaintiff's ongoing knee and back pain is moot. Defendant David does not work at the facility that Plaintiff is currently being housed in, making Plaintiff's requested relief impossible. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc., the entity that contracts with IDOC to provide medical care to IDOC's inmates and thus the only Defendant that could ostensibly have any control over Plaintiff's present medical care at Robinson, Plaintiff's request should also be denied. It appears that Plaintiff has yet to request evaluation or treatment for his knee and back pain since his transfer to Robinson. The undersigned can find no indication that Defendant Wexford has shown deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff's knee and back pain, nor that Defendant Wexford is likely to demonstrate such deliberate indifference if Plaintiff does eventually request evaluation or treatment while at Robinson.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 10).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.1(b), the parties may object to any or all of the proposed dispositive findings in this Recommendation. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed on or before January 2, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 73.1(b) of the Local Rules of Practice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, any party may serve and file written OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law within fourteen (14) days of service.

Please note: You are not to file an appeal as to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At this point, it is appropriate to file OBJECTIONS, if any, to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. An appeal is inappropriate until after the District Judge issues an Order either affirming or reversing the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Failure to file such OBJECTIONS shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal, which are addressed in the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Video Views, Inc. v Studio 21, Ltd. and Joseph Sclafani, 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).