Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change

McDougal v. Larson, 3:17-cv-469-SMY-RJD. (2019)

Court: District Court, S.D. Illinois Number: infdco20190513a02 Visitors: 1
Filed: Apr. 18, 2019
Latest Update: Apr. 18, 2019
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REONA J. DALY , Magistrate Judge . This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge Staci M. Yandle pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's Motion to Deter Harassment (Doc. 47), which the Court construes as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Based on the following, it is RECOMMENDED that the Distri
More

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge Staci M. Yandle pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's Motion to Deter Harassment (Doc. 47), which the Court construes as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Based on the following, it is RECOMMENDED that the District Court ADOPT the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and FIND AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion to Deter Harassment.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff Carlos McDougal, an inmate in Big Muddy River Correctional Center ("Big Muddy"), brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following threshold review, Plaintiff proceeds on the following claim:

Count 1 — Defendants showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical need involving pain in his hand, wrist, and arm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff alleges in his motion that Defendants have continually harassed him while he was trying to seek medical attention and that they denied him "basic medical assistance" on the following dates: 3/8/18, 3/12/18, 5/2/18, 7/2/18, 9/6/18, and 10/16/18. Plaintiff does not provide specifics concerning his medical needs, but seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease the harassment and provide basic medical attention. Defendants responded to Plaintiff's motion asserting that Plaintiff received medical attention on five of the six dates mentioned and that his condition has been adequately monitored. Defendants also explain that Plaintiff has received physical therapy and medication.

A hearing on Plaintiff's motion was held on March 6, 2019. On February 11, 2019, prior to the date of the hearing, Plaintiff filed a notice with the Court indicating he was transferred to Shawnee Correctional Center ("Shawnee") (Doc. 59). At the hearing, Plaintiff was questioned regarding this transfer and how it relates to the medical treatment at issue in this lawsuit. The Court noted that the only defendants named in this action are medical providers at Big Muddy. Plaintiff indicated that he currently had no complaints regarding his medical treatment at Shawnee.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy" for which there must be a "clear showing" that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2948 (5th ed. 1995)). The purpose of such an injunction is "to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit." Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law; and (3) irreparable harm absent the injunction. Planned Parenthood v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012). As to the first hurdle, the Court must determine whether "plaintiff has any likelihood of success — in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning." AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). If Plaintiff meets his burden, the Court must then weigh "the balance of harm to the parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction on the public interest." Id. In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a preliminary injunction must be "narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm . . .," and "be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), a preliminary injunction would bind only the parties, their officers or agents, or persons in active concert with the parties or their agents.

In this instance, the Court's analysis of whether Plaintiff has met his threshold burden of demonstrating a need for a preliminary injunction is curtailed in light of his transfer from Big Muddy to Shawnee. Significantly, Plaintiff's claims arise solely from inadequate medical treatment he was allegedly provided at Big Muddy. Plaintiff submitted a notice of change of address with the Court on February 11, 2019 indicating that he had been transferred to Shawnee. Plaintiff remains incarcerated at Shawnee to date. It is well established that when a prisoner is transferred or released from IDOC custody his claims for injunctive relief are moot. See Easterling v. Pollard, 528 F.App'x 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012); Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996). Said relief is moot unless the prisoner "can demonstrate that he is likely to be retransferred." Higgason, 83 F.3d at 811 (citation omitted); see also Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff is likely to be transferred back to Big Muddy. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief is moot.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion to Deter Harassment (Doc. 47) be FOUND AS MOOT, and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objection thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004).

NOTICE

PURSUANT to Title 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 73.1(b) of the Local Rules of Practice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, any party may serve and file written OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law within fourteen days of service.

Please note: You are not to file an appeal as to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At this point, it is appropriate to file OBJECTIONS, if any, to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. An appeal is inappropriate until after the District Judge issues an Order either affirming or reversing the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Failure to file such OBJECTIONS shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal, which are addressed in the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Video Views, Inc. v Studio 21, Ltd. and Joseph Sclafani, 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).

You should e-file/mail your OBJECTIONS to the Clerk, U.S. District Court at the address indicated below:

301 West Main St. Benton IL 62812
Source:  Leagle

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer