J. PHIL GILBERT, District Judge.
This is an appeal of the Social Security Administration's decision denying Plaintiff Nancy Schulte's applications for disability insurance and Social Security Income benefits. Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 5, 2019. (ECF No. 16). The Commissioner of Social Security filed a response on November 7. (ECF No. 20). For the reasons that follow, the Court
Plaintiff worked part-time as an assistant manager at a convenience store from 2008-2011. (Hr'g Tr. 10, ECF No. 13-2). Her duties included cashiering, unloading of goods, scheduling, and receiving orders. (
In April 2015, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance and Social Security Income benefits with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). (SSA Decision 1, ECF No. 13-1). She complained of arthritis in her lower back and neuropathy.
The ALJ applied the five-step analysis used to determine whether an applicant is disabled,
In evaluating Plaintiff's residual functional capacity at Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work seated for six hours and standing for two hours. (
Finally, the ALJ concluded at Step 5 that although Plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work due to exertion demands, she is still capable of performing semi-skilled work. (
In February 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff motioned for summary judgment, (ECF No. 16), and the Commissioner responded, (ECF No. 20).
In reviewing the SSA's benefits decisions, the Court treats its findings as conclusive "so long as they are supported by `substantial evidence.'"
The ALJ's decision denying Plaintiff's applications for benefits was based on substantial evidence. In giving little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, the ALJ suitably discussed the conflicts between the physician's testimony and the objective medical evidence on the record. Moreover, the discrepancy between the vocational expert's SVP determination and the ALJ's decision was harmless error: The alternative jobs offered in the decision apply to Plaintiff regardless of whether her work as an assistant manager carried a SVP of 4 or 7.
In reviewing an application for Social Security benefits, the ALJ must give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight where the following two conditions are met: (1) the opinion is supported by "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques"; and (2) it is "not inconsistent" with substantial evidence on the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). "If the opinion is unsupported or inconsistent with the record, the ALJ may still choose to accept it, but if the ALJ rejects the opinion, he must give a good reason."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly affirmed ALJ decisions to discount the opinions of treating physicians where the ALJ "minimally articulate[d] his reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence of disability."
Here, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Alao's opinion after determining that it was based primarily on Plaintiff's subjective evaluation of her own condition. According to the ALJ, that evaluation conflicted with medical evidence on the record. Plaintiff argues, however, that the ALJ's reasoning was a mere "general rejection" that ignored Plaintiff's consistent reports of lower extremity numbness and "objective evidence noting limited sensation on examination." (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 16). The Court disagrees.
The ALJ's decision to give little weight to Dr. Alao's opinion was not a general rejection, but rather it was supported by both objective evidence and the ALJ's findings on examination. Importantly, the ALJ did not dispute that Plaintiff experienced numbness—he took issue with Dr. Alao's opinion that Plaintiff was limited in her ability to stand and sit throughout the workday and could only stand for 30 minutes at a time. (SSA Decision 9) ("The evidence of neuropathy supports limitation to sedentary exertional work, but does not support [Plaintiff's] subjective reports that she must alternate position every 30 minutes and she could only sit for 4 hours in an 8-hour day."). The ALJ's decision to give little weight to Dr. Alao's determination was based on objective medical findings of mild degenerative disc disease, a normal electromyogram, and mild findings on examination. Specifically, the results of Plaintiff's electromyogram did not support Plaintiff's subjective complaints of upper extremity neuropathy; Plaintiff's reports of falls contradicted her ability to walk without need for an assistive device; and the fact that Plaintiff drove, traveled, and performed sedentary activities in her home for extended periods disproved her claim that she needs to alternate positions every half hour. While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ's conclusion, it was not a blanket denial: It was supported by substantial evidence on the record, and this Court is required to show deference to that reasoned decision.
In assessing Plaintiff's vocational background at Step 5, the ALJ considered the physical and mental demands of past relevant work "done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [Plaintiff] to learn to do it." 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1). This assessment was primarily based on the
In order to assess the SVP of Plaintiff's work experience as an assistant manager, the ALJ sought the views of a "vocational expert"—a "professional[ ] under contract with SSA to provide impartial testimony in agency proceedings."
Plaintiff worked as an assistant manager of a convenience store—a position that does not fit precisely into a category in the DOT. Plaintiff testified during the hearing that the first assistant-manager role consisted of cashiering, unloading, preparing work schedules, and making and receiving orders. (Hr'g Tr. 12-13). The vocational expert acknowledged that the DOT does not contain an entry for assistant managers, but it does have one for retail store managers. (
The SVP was then used to determine which work, if any, Plaintiff is still fit to perform in the national economy. Relying on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could still work as a payroll clerk, personnel scheduler, or data-entry clerk. (SSA Decision 10-11).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously classified her first assistant-manager position as a SVP of 4, rather than a SVP of 7—contrary to the vocational expert's testimony. The DOT describes a store manager with a SVP of 7 as an employee that prepares work schedules, sets prices, takes inventory, maintains store records, orders merchandise, and supervises other employees.
Although the ALJ incorrectly cited the vocational expert's testimony to be that Plaintiff's assistant-manager position was a SVP of 7, the ALJ nonetheless properly found the position to carry a SVP of 4. As Plaintiff notes, positions carrying a SVP of 7 require two-to-four years' training, yet Plaintiff worked as a cashier for only eight months prior to her promotion to assistant manager. The discrepancy between the vocational expert's testimony and the ALJ's decision, however, was harmless error. As discussed, the ALJ ultimately determined that Plaintiff's assistant-manager position carried a SVP of 4; and the positions that the ALJ suggested that Plaintiff is fit to work carry the same. Regardless of whether Plaintiff's assistant-manager position was a SVP of 4 or 7, the jobs that the ALJ suggested that Plaintiff could still take on—payroll clerk, personnel scheduler, and data-entry clerk—are semi-skilled with SVPs of 4. Even if the ALJ intended to classify the position at the higher SVP, Plaintiff was not prejudiced by his misstatement of the vocational expert's testimony. The Court will not remand where the ALJ, upon addressing the purported error, would reach the same result.
Plaintiff also argues that her first assistant-manager position should not have been used to calculate her SVP because she only held the position part-time from 2003-2006. This argument fails, however, because substantial gainful activity includes work "done on a part-time basis." 20 C.F.R. § 416.972.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record regarding her transferrable skills. Specifically, she contends that the record is devoid of any mention of her experience with computers. Since the DOT descriptions for payroll clerk, personnel scheduler, and data-entry clerk include computer-related tasks, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by not inquiring further into the minutia of her work experience. Importantly, however, the DOT list the maximum requirements for a given job. Further, the DOT definition for "payroll clerk" states that workers may "[c]ompile payroll data . . . using computer or calculator."
The Court