BARNES, Judge.
St. Joseph Hospital ("St. Joseph") appeals the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss filed by the Fort Wayne Metropolitan Human Rights Commission ("HRC") and the trial court's decision not to rule on St. Joseph's motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand.
St. Joseph raises two issues, which we reorder and restate as:
Richard Cain was employed by St. Joseph as a behavioral health assessment specialist until he was terminated on March 19, 2007. On April 2, 2007, Cain filed a charge with the HRC alleging that St. Joseph had discriminated against him based on his race. On March 25, 2009, the HRC conducted a hearing and, on July 31, 2009, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a proposed order favorable to Cain. On January 25, 2010, the ALJ recommended a damages award in the amount of $31,469.
The HRC consists of seven commissioners. At the time of the February 8, 2010 HRC monthly meeting, however, one of the seven seats was vacant. Also, one of the commissioners was not present. Two of the five commissioners present at the meeting recused themselves based on conflicts of interest and did not vote on the ALJ's proposed order.
On March 10, 2010, St. Joseph filed with the trial court an unverified petition for judicial review of the HRC's final order. On April 5, 2010, St. Joseph filed an amended petition containing a verification. On April 13, 2010, the HRC filed a motion to dismiss arguing that, because St. Joseph failed to timely file a verified petition, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On April 21, 2010, St. Joseph filed a motion to amend its petition. On May 7, 2010, St. Joseph filed a motion to dismiss its petition without prejudice, arguing that the HRC's final order was invalid because
On June 1, 2010, after a hearing, the trial court granted the HRC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court stated:
Appellant's App. p. 186. In the alternative, the trial court concluded that, because at least four of the seven commissioners were present at the February 8, 2010 HRC meeting, the quorum requirements were satisfied. The trial court also noted that the fourth signature on the final order by the commissioner who was not present at the February 8, 2010 meeting did not render the final order invalid. St. Joseph now appeals.
St. Joseph contends that the trial court improperly granted the HRC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The facts related to the jurisdictional question are not disputed. Where the facts before the trial court are not in dispute, then the question of subject matter jurisdiction is purely one of law. GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind.2001). Under those circumstances, we owe no deference to the trial court's conclusion because we independently, and without the slightest deference to trial court determinations, evaluate those issues we deem to be questions of law. Id.
The HRC argues that the trial court properly concluded it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over St. Joseph's petition for judicial review because it was not verified. Pursuant to the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act ("AOPA"), a party who does not file a timely petition waives the right to judicial review. Ind.Code § 4-21.5-5-4. A petition is timely only if it is filed within thirty days after the date that notice of the agency action was served. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-5. Among other requirements, a petition for review must be verified. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-7. It is undisputed that St. Joseph's unverified petition was timely filed and that its amended petition and its motion to amend the petition to include a verification were not filed within thirty days of the service of the HRC's final order.
In support of its argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the HRC relies on a line of cases requiring strict compliance with AOPA for the trial court to obtain jurisdiction. For example, in Hoosier Environmental Council v. Department of Natural Resources, 673 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied, we held that although an unverified petition was timely filed, the motion to amend the petition was filed after the thirty-day period expired and "the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over the case." Although Hoosier clearly required timely compliance with the verification requirement, our supreme court has since discarded the concept of jurisdiction over the case.
The K.S. court went on to explain, "Attorneys and judges alike frequently characterize a claim of procedural error as one of jurisdictional dimension." K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 541. "`The question of subject matter jurisdiction entails a determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which a particular case belongs.'" Id. at 542 (quoting Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind.2000)). "Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without any service of process. Thus, characterizing other sorts of procedural defects as `jurisdictional' misapprehends the concepts." Id.
As this concept relates to the timely filing of a complaint in the Tax Court, our supreme court has held:
Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927, 931-32 (Ind.2006).
There is no dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction over the general class of actions at issue here—petitions for judicial review of agency actions. The HRC argues, however, that K.S. involves a juvenile delinquency matter and not AOPA and that the legislature has not "gotten on board with this new trend" since K.S. was decided in 2006. Appellee's Br. p. 17.
First, the HRC offers no explanation as to why the analysis of jurisdictional concepts in K.S. applies with less force in an AOPA case than it does in a juvenile delinquency adjudication. Either a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction—the power to decide the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs—or it does not. See K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 540. Second, although K.S. clarifies certain jurisdictional concepts, we do not believe it is a "new trend." See, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Noble Circuit Court, 263 Ind. 353, 357-58, 332 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1975) (determining that trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over election recount petition based on the statutory jurisdictional grant, concluding that candidate's improperly captioned petition for recount was not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
Based on K.S., we conclude that the failure to file a verified petition does not deprive a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the failure to file a verified petition is accurately described as a "procedural error." Thus, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over St. Joseph's petition regardless of the fact that it was unverified.
Having reached this conclusion, we must determine whether an unverified petition for judicial review may be amended and whether the amendment relates back to the date of the filing of the original petition pursuant to Trial Rule 15, which provides:
(Emphases added) (brackets in original).
Because of its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court specifically declined to rule on any other outstanding motions, including St. Joseph's motion to amend its petition. Indeed, when there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court is said to be without jurisdiction to do anything in the case except enter an order of dismissal. See Albright v. Pyle, 637 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). This rationale explains our holdings in similar cases decided before K.S. clarified the jurisdictional concepts.
For example, in Hoosier, we addressed, "whether a party is allowed to file an amended petition after the time has elapsed to `relate back' to a petition which did not fully satisfy the statutory requirements but which was timely filed." Hoosier, 673 N.E.2d at 813. We concluded, "the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over the case." Id. at 815. We explained that although the unverified petition was timely filed, at the time Hoosier sought to amend its petition, the thirty day period had expired. Id. As such, Hoosier's amended petition could not "relate back" to the initial petition because without a
As we have already determined, however, K.S. explicitly rejected the concept of "jurisdiction over the case" and explained the difference between jurisdiction and procedural errors. Based on K.S., we conclude that cases like Hoosier are no longer accurate assessments of a trial court's ability to rule on a motion to amend an unverified petition for judicial review.
We also find little guidance in the line of cases involving AOPA and the untimely transmission of an agency record. Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-13, controlling the transmission of an agency record, provides in part:
Recently, our supreme court addressed "whether AOPA requires a court to deny a petition for extension of time to file the record when the petition is filed after the time for filing the extension has expired." Indiana Family and Social Services Admin. v. Meyer, 927 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ind. 2010). Without addressing subject matter jurisdiction, our supreme court held, "the statute acknowledges possible difficulties in preparing and submitting the agency record, but places the burden on the petitioner to file or seek an extension within the statutory period or any extension." Meyer, 927 N.E.2d at 371. The Meyer court concluded that the trial court erred in granting a second extension after the first extension had expired. Id.
Like the timely transmission of an agency record, AOPA clearly requires that a petition for judicial review "must be verified." I.C. § 4-21.5-5-7. Nevertheless, Trial Rule 15 specifically allows for the amendment of a pleading and the relation back to the date of the original pleading. We are unaware of any similar Trial Rule that would permit the untimely transmission of an agency record. In that regard, the line of cases addressing the untimely transmission of an agency record, including Meyer, are distinguishable from the question before us today.
Wayne County Property Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals v. United Ancient Order of Druids-Grove No. 29, 847 N.E.2d 924 (Ind.2006), is similarly distinguishable because it involved the untimely transmission of an agency record. It does, however, provide guidance in determining whether Trial Rule 15 permits the amendment of a petition for judicial review. In that case, our supreme court discussed the interplay between the Indiana Tax Court Rules and AOPA. Druids, 847 N.E.2d at 926. The court determined that, although rules of court may be law for many purposes, they do not fall within AOPA's definition of "law," which includes the federal or state constitution, any federal or state statute, a rule of an agency, or a federal regulation. Id. at 928 (quoting I.C. § 4-21.5-1-7).
Like the Tax Court Rule at issue in Druids, Trial Rule 15 does not actually conflict with the verification requirement in Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-7. We believe that, by the verification requirement, the General Assembly did not intend to preclude a court promulgated rule from allowing a petition to be amended and to relate back to the date of the filing of the original petition in accordance with Trial Rule 15.
This conclusion is consistent with our supreme court's decision in State ex rel. Young v. Noble Circuit Court, 263 Ind. 353, 357-58, 332 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1975), in which the court concluded that a candidate's petition for recount was improperly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the trial court clearly had a jurisdictional grant to entertain such petition. The Young court then addressed whether the improperly captioned petition was subject to dismissal on other grounds. Young, 263 Ind. at 358, 332 N.E.2d at 102. The court acknowledged the familiar principle that one who seeks the benefit of a statutory proceeding, in this case a recount petition, must comply with all procedural terms of the statute. Id. at 358, 332 N.E.2d at 102. "Failure to comply with such niceties will subject the complaint or equivalent pleading such as the petition herein to dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to TR. 12(B)(6)."
We find Young highly instructive and conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over St. Joseph's unverified petition and should consider St. Joseph's motion to amend on the merits. We reverse the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for it to consider St. Joseph's motion to amend.
After the HRC moved to dismiss St. Joseph's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and St. Joseph moved to amend its petition, St. Joseph filed a motion to dismiss its petition without prejudice. St. Joseph claimed that the HRC lacked a quorum at the February 8, 2010 meeting when it approved the ALJ's proposed order.
According to the pleadings and briefs, the following facts are generally agreed on by the parties.
Even if the HRC lacked the necessary quorum to approve the final order and its actions are considered invalid, many procedural obstacles associated with the presentation of this issue in this manner prevent us from resolving the quorum question on the merits. Aside from lack of record, a petition for judicial review must set forth specific facts demonstrating that the petitioner has been prejudiced by one or more of the grounds described in Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-14, including that an agency action is without observance of procedure required by law. See I.C. §§ 4-21.5-5-7(b)(6); 4-21.5-5-14(d)(4). Although the lack of a quorum clearly fits in this category, St. Joseph did not raise the issue in its petition for judicial review. Additionally, St. Joseph has not argued, let alone established, that it was prejudiced by the lack of a quorum. AOPA requires a person to have been prejudiced before a trial court may set aside an agency action. See I.C. § 4-21.5-5-15.
The quorum question comes to us prematurely in the form of St. Joseph's motion to dismiss. This question is not now appropriate for appellate review.
Because the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over St. Joseph's unverified petition for judicial review, it improperly granted the HRC's motion to dismiss and declined to rule on the other outstanding motions, namely St. Joseph's motion to amend. The alleged lack of a quorum, however, was not properly raised in St. Joseph's motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand for consideration of St. Joseph's motion to amend.
Reversed and remanded.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
Wayne County Property Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals v. United Ancient Order of Druids-Grove No. 29, 847 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ind.2006).
