BARNES, Judge.
The Hunt Construction Group, Inc., and Mezzetta Construction, Inc., (collectively, "Hunt Construction")
Hunt Construction raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
The Indiana Stadium and Convention Building Authority ("Owner") hired Hunt Construction to act as the construction manager for the construction of Lucas Oil Stadium. The construction contract between Owner and Hunt Construction consisted of documents entitled "Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager" and "Indiana Stadium Project Safety Program."
On October 16, 2006, Garrett, an employee of Baker Concrete, was injured at the jobsite when another employee of Baker Concrete was removing a piece of forming material above her and the forming material fell, striking Garrett. Garrett sustained injuries to her head and left hand.
Garrett filed a complaint for negligence against Hunt Construction. Garrett then filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding Hunt Construction's duty to her. Garrett argued that Hunt Construction had assumed a nondelegable duty to her through its contract and that it had assumed a duty to her through its conduct. In response, Hunt Construction filed a cross motion for summary judgment. Hunt Construction responded that it was entitled to summary judgment because it did not have a duty to Garrett. Hunt Construction argued that vicarious liability through a nondelegable duty was improper because a principal/contractor relationship did not exist between Hunt Construction and Baker Concrete. Additionally, Hunt Construction argued that it did not assume a duty to Garrett through its contracts or through its conduct.
After a hearing, the trial court granted Garrett's motion for partial summary judgment and denied Hunt Construction's motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that Hunt Construction had "assumed, by both contract and conduct, a nondelegable duty of safety to all employees at the construction project, including employees of contractors and subcontractors" and that "in addition to liability for their own negligence, [Hunt Construction was] vicariously liable for the negligence of [Garrett's] employer, Baker Concrete Construction." App. pp. 697-98. Hunt Construction now appeals.
Hunt Construction appeals the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to Garrett regarding duty and the trial court's denial of Hunt Construction's motion
Garrett brought this negligence action against Hunt Construction. To prevail on a claim of negligence the plaintiff must show: (1) duty owed to the plaintiff by defendant; (2) breach of duty because of conduct falling below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty. Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind.2010). The summary judgment motions here concern whether Hunt Construction had a duty to Garrett. Absent a duty there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach. Id. Generally, whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Rhodes v. Wright 805 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind.2004).
The trial court found that Hunt Construction was vicariously liable for the negligence of Baker Concrete. This finding was based on Garrett's argument that Hunt Construction owed her a nondelegable duty. In general, vicarious liability is "indirect legal responsibility." Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind.1999) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1404 (5th ed.1979)). This doctrine applies where a party is legally responsible for the negligence of another, not because the party did anything wrong but rather because of the party's relationship to the wrongdoer. Id. Courts employ various legal doctrines to hold people vicariously liable, including respondeat superior, apparent or ostensible agency, agency by estoppel, and the non delegable duty doctrine. Id. Some doctrines are based in tort law, and some are based in agency law. Id. at 147-48.
In the construction context, "the long-standing general rule has been that a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor." Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ind. 1999). However, "[w]hile a master is generally not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor, the master may be liable if the independent contractor was performing a non-delegable duty." Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 147 n. 4 (citing Bagley v. Insight Communications Co., 658 N.E.2d 584, 586, 588 (Ind.1995)). "A non-delegable duty is one that public policy holds to be so important that one party should not be permitted to transfer the duty (and its resultant liability) to another party." Id. Nondelegable duties encourage the employer of the contractor to participate in the control of work covered by the exceptions in order to minimize the risk of resulting injuries. Carie, 715 N.E.2d at 855.
Indiana courts have recognized five nondelegable duties: (1) where the contract requires the performance of intrinsically dangerous work; (2) where the principal is by law or contract charged with performing the specific duty; (3) where the act will create a nuisance; (4) where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken; and (5) where the act to be performed is illegal.
On appeal, Hunt Construction argues that vicarious liability is inappropriate in this situation because there was no principal/contractor relationship between Hunt Construction and Baker Concrete. In response, Garrett argues that contractual privity is not required to find Hunt Construction vicariously liable.
In construction litigation cases, vicarious liability has generally been applied in the general contractor/subcontractor relationship. See Stumpf v. Hagerman Construction Corp., 863 N.E.2d 871, 876-80 (Ind.Ct. App.2007) (holding that a general contractor assumed a nondelegable duty of care for the safety of all employees, including the subcontractor's employees), trans. denied. Here, however, Hunt Construction was the construction manager, not the general contractor.
Although we have concluded that Hunt Construction did not have a duty to Garrett by virtue of vicarious liability, we must also address the parties' argument that Hunt Construction independently had a duty to Garrett by virtue of its contracts or its conduct. We begin by addressing
"A duty of care, the breach of which will support a negligence action, may arise contractually." Plan-Tec, Inc. v. Wiggins, 443 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind.Ct. App.1983). The extent of the duty owed, if any, is a matter of contractual interpretation. Id. In determining whether a duty exists, this court will give effect to the intent of the parties as reflected by the language of the document. Id. Where the contract affirmatively evinces an intent on the part of the parties to charge one party with a duty of care, actionable negligence may be predicated upon the contractual duty. Id.
Several Indiana cases deal with negligence of a construction manager where the duty is based on the contract. In Plan-Tec, we found no contractual duty where the general conditions of the contract stated that the contractors were to have safety responsibility and that the construction manager had no "direct or indirect responsibility for matters relative to Project safety." Id. at 1219 n. 3. On the other hand, in Perryman v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., 628 N.E.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), trans. denied, we found a duty based on the contract where the contract provided that the construction manager would comply with all applicable state and federal statutes and regulations and would require compliance from the contractors. The contract also provided that the construction manager was responsible for reviewing contractors' safety programs and making recommendations. We held that the construction manager accepted a contractual duty to require the contractor to install safety nets or install the nets itself.
Here, Hunt Construction entered into several contracts, and many provisions of the contracts addressed safety concerns. The three contracts at issue here are the "Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager," the "Indiana Stadium Project Safety Program," and the "Partnership Agreement" with the Indiana Department of Labor and IOSHA. Hunt Construction focuses on provisions of the agreements that limit the responsibilities of the construction manager and detail the safety obligations of the individual contractors and subcontractors. However, our focus must be on the intent of the agreements regarding the construction manager's responsibilities, not the contractor and subcontractor responsibilities. The fact that the contractors also accepted a duty regarding safety does not in any way alter Hunt Construction's duties or liabilities under the contracts. See Perryman, 628 N.E.2d at 1244-45.
In particular, Hunt Construction relies upon the following provisions in the Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager:
App. p. 92.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 143.
The Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager also provides:
Id. at 102-03.
The Indiana Stadium Project Safety Program also addresses Hunt Construction's responsibilities regarding safety and provides:
Id. at 165.
Id. The CMSR is the Construction Manager's designated full time on-site safety professional. Contractors were required to submit a "site specific safety program" to the CMSR. Id. at 170. If the Construction Manager was "aware of any noncompliance with safety requirements, or is advised of such noncompliance," the Construction Manager had the following options: (1) deny any claim or request for additional time or money for suspension of work for the unsafe circumstances; and (2) remove any employee or piece of equipment deemed to be unsafe. Id. at 181. Hunt Construction's CMSR had several responsibilities, including, for example: (1) reviewing and approving each
Finally, the Partnership Agreement with the Indiana Department of Labor and IOSHA also addressed safety responsibilities of Hunt Construction. The goal of the Partnership Agreement was to provide a safe work environment for all employees and established a "cooperative effort in ensuring safety and maintaining an open line of communication between IOSHA, Hunt Construction ... and contractors and their subcontractors" on the project. Id. at 225. The Partnership Agreement also provided that "[s]pecifications and assignments within this partnership document do not relieve the contractors from or lessen their safety & health responsibilities nor change any contractual obligations between Hunt Construction Group, Inc. in association with Smoot Construction/Mezzetta Construction and the project Owner...." Id. at 225. Under the Partnership Agreement, Hunt Construction was required to provide all employees with a site-specific safety orientation and require all contractors and subcontractors to submit their written safety and health programs. Additionally, the Partnership Agreement required Hunt Construction to:
Id. at 227-28. Companies participating in the Partnership Agreement received IOSHA incentives. Under the heading "Advantages," the Partnership Agreement provided: "This Partnership requires frequent inspections of the worksite by Hunt Construction ..., Contractors and their subcontractors and other members of the Partnership to identify and correct known hazards." Id. at 230-31.
According to Hunt Construction, those provisions indicate that its duty was to Owner only and that the individual contractors retained a duty regarding safety. Although the contracts at issue here contain some provisions purporting to limit Hunt Construction's duties regarding safety, other provisions give Hunt Construction significant duties regarding safety on the jobsite. Hunt Construction was responsible for approving contractors' safety programs, monitoring compliance with safety regulations, performing inspections, and addressing safety violations. Hunt Construction had the ability to remove any employee or piece of equipment deemed unsafe. As a result of these contractual provisions, we conclude that Hunt Construction assumed a duty to workers on the jobsite, including Garrett.
Hunt Construction was not vicariously liable to Garrett, and the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Garrett on this issue. However, Hunt Construction owed a duty to Garrett through its contracts, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Garrett on that issue and properly denied Hunt Construction's motion for summary judgment on that issue. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
CRONE, J., concurs.
FRIEDLANDER, concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
FRIEDLANDER, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the Majority that Hunt Construction, by virtue of its relationship to Baker Concrete, did not owe a nondelegable duty to Garrett so as to support a finding of vicarious liability. I respectfully dissent, however, from the Majority's conclusion that Hunt Construction independently owed a duty to Garrett based on contract. I would further conclude that Hunt Construction did not assume a duty to Garrett based on conduct.
A considered reading of the contract language as a whole makes clear that Hunt Construction did not assume a duty to Garrett by contract. The various contract documents expressly state that Hunt Construction's duties were undertaken "[w]ithout assuming the safety obligations and responsibilities of the individual Contractors," one of whom was Baker Concrete. Appendix at 92. Again, in paragraph 2.4.14, Owner and Hunt Construction made clear that Hunt Construction "shall not have control over or charge of or be responsible for ... safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work of each of the Contractors, since these are the Contractor's responsibilities." Id. at 104-05. The Agreement between the Owner and Hunt Construction further provided that Baker Concrete would "remain the controlling employer responsible for the safety programs and precautions" applicable to its work and that Hunt Construction's contractual responsibilities would "not extend to direct control over or charge of the acts or omissions of [Baker Concrete]." Appendix at 102-03.
These limiting provisions are an unequivocal statement that Hunt Construction was not responsible for project safety and the safety of Baker Concrete's employees and that such responsibility remained with Baker Concrete. In drafting the documents, Hunt Construction and the Owner clearly expressed their intent in this regard. Where the contract indicates that the parties did not intend to charge one party with a duty of care, the contract will not support a claim of negligence. See Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Plan-Tec., Inc. v. Wiggins, 443 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind.Ct. App.1983). The language employed by the Owner and Hunt Construction clearly demonstrates that the parties did not intend to charge Hunt Construction with a duty of care to onsite employees.
Further evidencing the intent of Hunt Construction and the Owner is the inclusion of language in the contract that Hunt Construction's services were for the sole benefit of the Owner and not the employees of a separate contractor on the project. While this duty may have coincidentally benefited the workers onsite, it does not alter the fact that Hunt Construction's obligations under its contract with the Owner
Although the Majority quotes large portions of the various contract documents dealing with safety on the jobsite, the Majority pays short shrift to the language limiting Hunt Construction's liability, noting only that the contract contains provisions that "purport [ ] to limit Hunt Construction's duties regarding safety...." Op. at 804. The Majority wholly ignores the clear import of these provisions and fails to give them effect, essentially rendering them ineffective and meaningless. The Majority's holding will fundamentally alter contracts of this nature and make it virtually impossible for a contractor taking on the role of construction manager to limit its liability so as not to become an insurer of safety for workers of other contractors.
Indeed, the manner in which the contracts at issue here were drafted seems to me to be a well-settled practice in the industry. To impose a duty of care on Hunt Construction for the safety of the employees of each contractor here is tantamount to making Hunt Construction an insurer of safety. The parties clearly sought to avoid such an interpretation by including clear language limiting Hunt Construction's liability. Moreover, the Majority's construction of the contractual provisions at issue undermines the framework often employed in projects of this nature. To carry out the intent of the parties, we must give effect to the clear and unequivocal language in the contract documents that Hunt Construction owed a duty only to the Owner and not to the workers onsite.
Because the Majority found that Hunt Construction owed a duty of care pursuant to its contracts, the Majority did not address Garrett's argument that Hunt Construction also assumed a duty of care by its conduct. I reject Garrett's contention in this regard as well. Hunt undertook a duty to the Owner to insure there was a safety program in place for the project. Hunt Construction's conduct was in accordance with its contractual obligations to the Owner. In performing its duties to the Owner, Hunt Construction did not assume a duty of care to Garrett.
Absent a duty, a party may not be held liable for negligence. See Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, trans. denied. Finding no duty on behalf of Hunt Construction, Hunt Construction is entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Garrett and order entry of summary judgment in favor of Hunt Construction.
