OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

John R. Berry IV, told a man that he was going to kill him and assaulted the man with a hammer. The State charged Berry with class A felony attempted murder.1 At trial, Berry argued that he was not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the crime pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-6. The trial court rejected Berry's insanity defense, finding that Berry's psychotic symptoms at the time of the crime were caused by his voluntary use of alcohol and that Berry was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. The trial court found Berry guilty as charged.

On appeal, Berry argues that there is no evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of the crime and that it is improper, as a matter of law, to conclude that his psychotic symptoms were voluntarily induced. He also argues that his conduct before, during, and after the offense does not support a reasonable inference of sanity.

We conclude that there is no evidence that Berry was intoxicated when he committed the offense. We adhere to the longstanding principle that a defendant suffering from a mental disease or defect caused by severe, prolonged, and chronic alcohol abuse that renders that person unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct is not responsible for prohibited conduct committed while in that condition. We conclude that the evidence is undisputed that at the time of the offense Berry suffered from psychotic symptoms caused by his prolonged and severe alcohol abuse and that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in rejecting his insanity defense. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to find Berry not guilty by reason of insanity and for further proceedings as required by the Indiana Code.

Facts and Procedural History

Berry is an alcoholic. Born in May 1971, he began drinking when he was nine years old and was drinking to intoxication on a daily basis by the time he was a high school sophomore. When he was fifteen, his mother sent him to Koala Hospital for substance abuse treatment, but he resumed drinking shortly thereafter. Berry also used marijuana and cocaine on a daily basis and took LSD, ecstasy, and methamphetamine. When he was thirty years old, he went to Fairbanks Hospital for alcoholism. After age thirty, he continued to drink large amounts of alcohol, but he stopped using the other drugs.

In 1999, following two arrests for driving under the influence, Berry was hospitalized at Community North Hospital and diagnosed with bipolar disorder.2 He was treated with Depakote, a mood-stabilizing medication. At that time, he was twenty-seven or twenty-eight years old. Since 1999, Berry has been hospitalized multiple times at Community North and Wishard Hospitals, usually for a combination of symptoms of bipolar disorder, methamphetamine abuse, and alcohol dependence with withdrawal seizures, including at least one instance of delirium tremens. Delirium tremens, also referred to as DTs, is a severe form of alcohol withdrawal in which a person may experience seizures and hallucinations and become psychotic.3 Tr. at 275. Berry has been treated with a variety of medications including lithium, a mood-stabilizing medication; Seroquel, Risperdal, and Zyprexa, antipsychotic medications; Klonopin, an antianxiety medication; and Paxil, an antidepressant.

In 2009, Berry lived with his father, John Berry III ("Father"). On Tuesday, February 3, 2009, Berry left Father's house to go to a "Plainfield party house." Id. at 310. Berry drank heavily on Saturday and had a couple drinks on Sunday. On Sunday, he returned to Father's house. Berry had last been treated with psychiatric medications fourteen months earlier.

Early Monday morning, February 9, 2009, Father went to the basement to work out and found Berry sitting on the couch reading the Bible. For about an hour, Berry continued to read the Bible while Father worked out. Afterward, Father and Berry got ready to go to Gary Monday's house, which they were helping to repair. On the way there, they stopped to buy plumbing supplies. When they got to Gary's house, Father parked his truck on the street in front of the house, and they went inside.

Gary's brother, Tony Monday, was also doing work on the house. Tony had tiled the bathroom the previous day and was in the bathroom cleaning it up when Father and Berry arrived. Father and Tony greeted each other, and Tony told Father that he had borrowed his cordless drill and hammer and the tools were in the bathroom. Father told him that was fine. Berry and Tony did not know each other. Father took Berry into a bedroom to install drywall. Father explained the job to Berry and told him that he needed the drill and hammer in the bathroom. Father then went to the living room to make a pot of coffee.

Tony was still in the bathroom cleaning up. Berry entered and told Tony that he was going to kill him. Id. at 84. Tony asked him why. Berry told him to "shut up" and repeated that he was going to kill him. Id. Berry hit Tony multiple times in the head with a hammer and also struck Tony's hand when he attempted to protect himself.

Father was in the living room making coffee when he heard somebody say "damn." Id. at 123. He thought that maybe Tony had broken a tile. Father heard another sound that made him turn around, and he saw Tony in the hall bleeding profusely from the head. Father sat Tony down and asked him what happened. Tony told him that Berry had hit him with a hammer. Father realized that the injuries were serious and called 911. Father tried to stop the bleeding by putting direct pressure on Tony's injuries with a roll of paper towels.

As Father was tending to Tony's injuries, he saw Berry walking back and forth in the kitchen, wiping the hammer with a white towel. Father asked Berry, "Did you hit him with the f* * *ing hammer?" Id. at 131. Berry was staring off into space. He turned and said, "I guess so," in a questioning manner. Id. Father noticed that "[Berry] wasn't mad. He wasn't excited. He just wasn't there." Id. Father told Berry to put the hammer away and go to the garage. Id. at 165. Berry went out the back door and walked around to the front of the house. He put the hammer and towel in a chest of drawers that was lying in the bed of Father's truck. Berry came back into the kitchen and told Father that he could not find the garage. Father explained where the garage was (about ten to twelve feet behind the house) and told Berry to go there. Berry complied.

Police and medics arrived at the house. Father told the police that Berry was in the garage. The police went to the garage and found the door locked. They knocked and asked if Berry was inside, and he answered yes. The police asked Berry to open the door, but he did not respond. When the medics arrived to care for Tony, Father came out to the garage and told Berry to open the door and come out. Berry obeyed, and police handcuffed him. Police described Berry as "calm, cool" and said that he provided "no resistance." Id. at 213. Police asked Berry where the hammer was, and he told them it was in a drawer in the truck. Police described Berry's speech as clear and understandable. When the police went to a truck parked in back of the house, Berry told the police that the hammer was in the truck parked in front of the house. Police found the hammer wrapped in a towel where Berry told them it would be.

The police questioned Berry about what happened, and he was cooperative. Berry admitted that he hit Tony with a hammer and that he knew he was hitting Tony. When asked why he wrapped the hammer in a towel and put it in the drawer in the truck, Berry stated that Father had told him to. Id. at 238-39. However, some of Berry's answers were "nonsensical." Id. at 232. He told one officer that he had been reading the Bible, and that when he arrived at the house, God told him that it was time to go. He stated that he hit Tony because Tony was caught playing with the eagle, and God told him to hit Tony. He told a different officer that Tony was attacked by an eagle.

Berry was taken to Wishard Hospital and was admitted to Midtown Community Mental Health Center for stabilization of psychosis. The treating physician, Dr. Kimberly Mayrose, noted, "Thought processes were disorganized, possible flight of ideas. Can at times give short logical answers. Thought content delusional, grandiose, religious." Appellant's Addendum to Br. at 4. Dr. Mayrose's admission summary indicates that "[Berry] reported a history of Bipolar Disorder and alcohol dependence, including DT's and seizures. He reported drinking a 5th of alcohol daily, although he drank a few sips Sunday night, February 8, 2009." Id. Dr. Mayrose's Axis I diagnosis of Berry was "Bipolar Disorder, type I, mixed and Alcohol dependence, possible withdrawal (not DT's)."4 Id. Berry was treated with lithium and Seroquel and was discharged on February 16, 2009. His discharge diagnosis was "Bipolar I Disorder, Mania Stabilizing[]; and Alcohol Dependence." Ex. at 81.

As a result of Berry's attack, Tony suffered eight lacerations to his head and one on his right hand. Tony underwent surgery to repair his nose, sinuses, eye sockets, and broken jaw. Titanium plates were implanted into his skull to repair his head and facial injuries. Tony has lost vision in one eye and suffers diminished vision in the other. In addition, he can no longer use his dentures due to the injury to his jaw.

On February 20, 2009, the State charged Berry with class A felony attempted murder. He was placed in the jail mental health unit, and his treatment with lithium and Seroquel was continued. Berry filed a notice of intent to raise the insanity defense. The trial court appointed Dr. Don A. Olive, clinical neuropsychologist, and Dr. Ned P. Masbaum, forensic psychiatrist, to examine Berry to determine whether he was competent to stand trial and whether he was legally insane at the time of the offense. Berry also sought his own evaluation from Dr. George F. Parker, an associate professor of clinical psychiatry at Indiana University School of Medicine. Dr. Masbaum met with Berry on April 9, 2009, for approximately one hour. Dr. Olive met with Berry on May 9, 2009, for an unknown length of time. Dr. Parker met with Berry on September 15, 2009, for approximately two and one-half hours. Berry was being treated with lithium and Seroquel throughout this period.

All the doctors found that Berry was competent to stand trial.5 As to Berry's mental state at the time of the offense, Dr. Masbaum concluded in his report that Berry's psychotic symptoms "were a result of voluntary alcohol & substance use/intoxication/withdrawal or a combination of all. Based on my experience and training, violent behavior is more likely with the combination of alcohol & substances and a severe mental disorder rather than the disorder alone." Id. at 89. Dr. Masbaum was unable to form an opinion regarding Berry's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense.

In their reports, Dr. Olive and Dr. Parker both concluded that Berry's psychotic symptoms were the result of his bipolar disorder and that Berry was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense. Dr. Olive concluded that

Id. at 85.

Dr. Parker found that

Id. at 68-69.

Berry waived trial by jury, and a bench trial was held on April 19, 2010, and concluded on April 21, 2010. At trial, Dr. Masbaum's testimony differed from his written evaluation. He expressed doubt regarding Berry's bipolar diagnosis and modified his conclusion that Berry's psychotic symptoms were caused by a combination of his alcohol use and a mental disorder. Specifically, Dr. Masbaum testified,

Tr. at 397.

Dr. Masbaum further testified that there were four conditions associated with alcohol use that could explain Berry's symptoms and behavior at the time of the offense: alcohol intoxication, pathological intoxication, alcohol induced psychotic disorder, and delirium tremens. As to alcohol intoxication, Dr. Masbaum acknowledged that no one stated that Berry appeared intoxicated, but he testified that "a person with chronic alcoholism can be drinking and not show any signs of intoxication outwardly whatsoever." Id. at 398. Dr. Masbaum testified that pathological intoxication "is a state where a person becomes very violent and agitated behaviorally on relatively small amounts of alcohol at the time." Id. Dr. Masbaum explained that alcohol induced psychotic disorder is caused by excessive drinking and "can be looked at as a withdrawal syndrome," but it is "relatively rare." Id. Dr. Masbaum had "only seen a couple cases of it" during his career. Id. Dr. Masbaum noted that these three conditions are "connected with voluntary alcohol use." Id. at 399. The last, delirium tremens, is, according to Dr. Masbaum, "the only one to fall in the category of being a severe mental disorder at the time." Id.

The trial court asked Dr. Masbaum which of the four possibilities was most likely in Berry's case. Dr. Masbaum answered,

Id. at 401. However, when later questioned by the prosecutor, Dr. Masbaum agreed that his diagnosis was that Berry "placed himself in the alcohol induced psychosis by voluntarily abusing alcohol." Id. at 412.

On July 19, 2010, the trial court issued its findings and judgment, in which it concluded as follows:

Appellant's Addendum to Br. at 14-15. The trial court found Berry guilty as charged.

Discussion and Decision

A. Insanity Defense

Berry challenges his conviction for attempted murder. On appeal, he does not contend that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense. See Ind.Code § 35-41-4-1 ("A person may be convicted of an offense only if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). Rather, Berry argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his insanity defense. When a defendant raises the insanity defense, the trier of fact has the additional options of returning a verdict of either "not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the crime" ("NRI") or "guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime" ("GBMI"). Ind.Code § 35-36-2-3.6 Berry contends that he is NRI.

The insanity defense is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-6, which provides,

The insanity defense is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.Code § 35-41-4-1. The defendant must establish both that (1) he or she suffers from a mental disease or defect and (2) the mental disease or defect rendered him or her unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the offense. Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ind.2010). "Although insanity and GBMI both require proof of some form of mental disorder or impairment, a finding of insanity also requires a showing of the defendant's inability to understand the wrongfulness of the criminal conduct; mental illness alone is not a defense to a crime." Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Ind.1998). "A defendant who is mentally ill but fails to establish that he or she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct may be found [GBMI]." Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 708.

The trier of fact's finding regarding a defendant's sanity at the time of the offense warrants substantial deference from reviewing courts. Id. at 709. "A convicted defendant who claims that his [or her] insanity defense should have prevailed at trial is in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and we will reverse only when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed." Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). "As such, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom." Jones v. State, 825 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.

As to expert testimony, we observe that

Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709 (footnote and citations omitted). "[T]estimony regarding behavior before, during, and after a crime may be more indicative of actual mental health at the time of the crime than mental exams conducted weeks or months later." Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149.

B. Mental Disease or Defect

We first address whether the evidence that Berry suffered a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that Berry was insane when the crime was committed. Here, the trial court found, and the experts agreed, that Berry displayed psychotic symptoms on the morning of February 9. Psychosis is defined as "fundamental derangement of the mind (as in schizophrenia) characterized by defective or lost contact with reality especially as evidenced by delusion, hallucination, and disorganized speech and behavior." MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/psychosis (last visited July 6, 2011). The Indiana Code defines mental disease or defect as "a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception." Ind.Code § 35-41-3-6(b). We conclude that psychosis fits the statutory definition of mental disease or defect. Accordingly, the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that Berry was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense.

However, the experts did not agree on the cause of Berry's psychotic symptoms. In their reports and at trial, Drs. Olive and Parker attributed Berry's psychotic symptoms to his Bipolar Disorder. In his report, Dr. Masbaum concluded that Berry's psychotic symptoms were the result of alcohol intoxication and/or withdrawal and a mental disorder. At trial, Dr. Masbaum testified that Berry's psychotic symptoms could be explained solely by his voluntary alcohol use.8

The trial court concluded that, based on Berry's longstanding alcohol abuse and his heavy drinking the weekend before, his psychotic symptoms on the morning of February 9, 2009, were caused by voluntary abuse of alcohol. We observe that Section 35-41-3-6 requires only that a defendant suffer a mental disease or defect; it does not set forth any constraints regarding the source or cause of such disease or defect. However, the trial court found Berry guilty based, in part, on its conclusion that Berry's behavior was caused by voluntary abuse of alcohol. To hold Berry responsible for his crime, the trial court relied on Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-5, which states, "Intoxication is not a defense in a prosecution for an offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of the offense unless the defendant meets the requirements of I.C. 35-41-3-5."9 In other words, the legislature has decreed that intoxication will not excuse a person from responsibility for his or her conduct.10

Berry argues that there was no evidence that he was intoxicated, and therefore the trial court's conclusion that his psychotic symptoms were brought on by the voluntary use of alcohol is based on speculation, not evidence. Alternatively, Berry argues that even if "long-term alcohol dependence explains his conduct, it is contrary to law to conclude that the resulting psychotic state and inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was voluntarily induced." Appellant's Br. at 18. We address each argument in turn.

Berry asserts that there was no testimony or evidence that he appeared or acted in an intoxicated manner either before or after the assault. Although Dr. Masbaum testified that a person with chronic alcoholism may not exhibit any outward signs of intoxication, there must be some evidence in the record to support an inference of intoxication. See Pelak v. Ind. Indus. Serv., Inc., 831 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) ("An inference is not reasonable when it rests on no more than speculation or conjecture."). Our review of the record before us shows that Berry drank heavily on Saturday, and on Sunday he had a couple drinks. Dr. Parker testified that the time span between Berry's last drinks and the assault made it likely that Berry was sober at the time of the assault. Dr. Olive testified that he did not think that Berry was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offense. Father was with Berry a couple hours before the assault on the morning of February 9. Father provided no testimony that Berry appeared to be intoxicated. Significantly, neither the police officers who spoke with Berry nor the medical personal who treated Berry after the assault reported signs of intoxication. At the hospital, Berry was observed for signs of alcohol withdrawal, not intoxication. Indeed, Dr. Masbaum himself testified that "there's nothing from the emergency records that indicates that Mr. Berry was under the influence at the time of the offense." Tr. at 426.

Implicitly, the State concedes that there was no evidence of intoxication in that it does not contest this assertion. Instead, the State invites us to draw an inference of intoxication based on evidence of prior incidents in which Berry acted violently when he was intoxicated. The record shows that Berry has acted violently in the past when he was visibly intoxicated. However, there is no evidence that Berry displayed psychotic symptoms during any of those instances, as he did when he committed the current offense. Given that the prior instances of violence involved outward signs of intoxication but no signs of psychosis, the prior incidents do not support a reasonable inference that Berry was intoxicated on the morning of February 9. Accordingly, our review of the record before us reveals no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Berry was intoxicated at the time of the crime. It follows that Section 35-41-2-5 is inapplicable.

We must now answer the second question posed by Berry: whether, as a matter of law, Berry's psychotic state, having been caused by prolonged and chronic alcohol abuse, was voluntarily induced such that the insanity defense is inapplicable. Although the State does not address this contention, longstanding Indiana case law supports Berry's argument that his psychotic state was not voluntarily induced.

As early as 1878, Indiana has adhered to the principle that a defendant who manifests a mental disease or defect, as opposed to intoxication, caused by prolonged and chronic alcohol abuse that renders him or her unable to distinguish right from wrong is not responsible for a crime committed while in that condition. That principle is now commonly referred to as "fixed" or "settled" insanity. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 147 (2006) (explaining that the fixed or settled insanity defense exists "where the initial choice to abuse alcohol or drugs has become so attenuated over time that it serves little to no purpose to hold the defendant accountable for that choice once a permanent mental illness has taken hold through years of chronic substance abuse."). The Indiana Supreme Court explained this doctrine as follows:

Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435, 440 (1878) (citations omitted). To illustrate the application of the doctrine, the Fisher court quoted with approval the following passage from United States v. Drew, 25 F.Cas. 913, 913-14 (C.C.D.Mass.1828):

64 Ind. at 441-42 (quotation marks omitted).

The principle that a defendant is not responsible for a crime committed while suffering from a mental disease or defect that, though caused by prolonged and chronic alcohol abuse, renders him or her unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the prohibited conduct has been acknowledged with approval as recently as 1980. See Jackson v. State, 273 Ind. 49, 52, 402 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1980) ("Where the ingestion of intoxicants, though voluntary, has been abused to the point that it has produced mental disease such that the accused is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct ... the law does not hold him responsible for his acts."); Jackson v. Duckworth, 549 F.Supp. 1280, 1285 (N.D.Ind.1982) (concluding that instruction that stated that voluntary intoxication is not a defense was counterbalanced with statement explaining that "a finding of insanity may be based upon extreme or long-term abuse of narcotics or alcohol, irrespective of whether voluntarily or involuntarily ingested" and therefore properly stated Indiana law).11 Although Indiana Courts have recognized this principle, we have found that it did not apply in cases where (1) there was sufficient evidence that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the offense, see Fisher, 64 Ind. at 442; Jackson, 273 Ind. at 52, 402 N.E.2d at 949, or (2) there was insufficient evidence of chronic alcoholism and sufficient evidence that the defendant understood the wrongfulness of his actions. See Anderson v. State, 177 Ind.App. 603, 606-07, 380 N.E.2d 606, 609 (1978); Feller v. State, 264 Ind. 541, 543-44, 348 N.E.2d 8, 12 (1976). Those cases are distinguishable because in the instant case there is no evidence that Berry was intoxicated at the time he committed the offense, and it is undisputed that Berry has a lifelong history of habitual and severe alcohol and drug abuse.

For further guidance, we have reviewed decisions from our sister states.12 Our research has not revealed any recent cases involving severe and prolonged alcohol abuse in which the settled insanity defense was found applicable. A generally informative discussion of the settled insanity doctrine is provided in State v. Sexton, 180 Vt. 34, 904 A.2d 1092, 1101-04 (2006):

(Footnotes omitted.) The Sexton court found it unnecessary to decide whether to adopt settled insanity as a defense to murder, because, even if it were accepted law, the defendant's drug usage for only two weeks prior to the murder would be insufficient to establish the defense. Id. at 1103-05.

We believe that the circumstances of Berry's case fall squarely within the doctrine of settled insanity. As previously discussed, there is no evidence that Berry was intoxicated at the time of the offense. Further, the evidence that Berry experienced psychotic symptoms at the time of the offense is without conflict, as is the evidence that Berry's alcohol abuse was prolonged, habitual, and severe. Berry's mental disease was not temporary as evidenced by the fact that prison doctors have continued to prescribe psychiatric medicines such as lithium and Seroquel. As the doctrine of settled insanity is well established, having been set forth by our supreme court more than 125 years ago, our duty is to apply it where appropriate. See Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) ("We are bound by the decisions of our supreme court."), trans. denied 783 N.E.2d 687 (Ind.2003). Fisher represents longstanding precedent that is both unequivocal and thorough in its presentation, and any decision to overturn or modify such a precedent must originate from our supreme court or our legislature. See id. ("Supreme court precedent is binding upon us until it is changed either by that court or by legislative enactment."). As such, we conclude that Berry's psychosis resulting from prolonged, habitual, and severe alcohol abuse is a mental disease or defect within the meaning of Section 35-41-3-6(b).

However, a successful insanity defense must also satisfy the requirement of Section 35-41-3-6(a) that, as a result of the mental disease or defect, the person is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense. We turn now to this issue.

C. Ability to Appreciate Wrongfulness of Conduct

Even though the trial court concluded that Berry was suffering psychotic symptoms on the morning of February 9, it found that Berry was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct based on his behavior before, during, and after the assault.13 Appellant's Addendum to Br. at 15.

Specifically, the trial court found as follows:

Id. at 13.

We observe that

Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 714.

In Galloway, the court found that "there was not sufficient evidence of probative value from which an inference of sanity could be drawn sufficient to create a conflict with the (nonconflicting) expert testimony that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense." Id. The Galloway court reasoned that

Id. at 715.

Here, the conduct described by the trial court supports a reasonable inference that Berry knew what he was doing when he struck Tony with the hammer, but acting knowingly and intentionally is not synonymous with appreciating the wrongfulness of one's conduct. We observe that Berry and Tony did not know each other, and there is no explanation as to Berry's motive. On the other hand, Berry had a long history of hospitalization for bipolar disorder. Berry had begun the day reading the Bible, and he told the police that God told him to kill Tony. The police testified that Berry's answers to their questions were "nonsensical." Tr. at 232. Father testified that just after the attack, Berry was in a daze, pacing about. Berry wiped the hammer with a towel, but if he was trying to hide the blood, then why did he wrap the towel around the hammer rather than hide or discard it? The trial court emphasizes that Berry did not go immediately to the garage but first put the hammer in Father's truck. Given that Father told Berry to put the hammer away, the fact that Berry put the hammer in a drawer in the truck does not support a reasonable inference that Berry was trying to hide the hammer. Id. at 165, 238-39. Although Berry did not go immediately to the garage, after he put the hammer away as directed, he came back into the house to ask Father where the garage was, and once he received the information, he obeyed. In addition, Berry did not hide the location of the hammer from the police but told them exactly where it was.

Considered as a whole, the demeanor evidence does not support a reasonable inference of sanity sufficient to create a conflict with the nonconflicting expert testimony that Berry did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.14 We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Berry's conduct and statements before, during, and after the attack point to his knowledge of the wrongful nature of his actions. The evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that Berry was suffering from a mental disease or defect that rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time he attempted to kill Tony. Accordingly, the trial court erred in not finding Berry NRI. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand with instructions to enter a finding of NRI and for further proceedings as required by the Indiana Code, such as the civil commitment proceedings discussed in footnote 6, supra. Reversed and remanded.

ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.