OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

In January 2005, Benjamin H. Steinberg purchased an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle equipped with a laser sight, a flash suppressor, and high-velocity ammunition. Steinberg showed the firearm to his roommates and told one of them that "if anything ever happened he could melt his gun to nothing" with welding tanks that he had in the back of his SUV. In the predawn hours of February 8, 2005, Steinberg drove alongside a Monroe County correctional officer who was on his way home from work and shot him in the head, killing him instantly. Later that morning, a dirty and frantic Steinberg arrived at his apartment with blackened hands and told his roommate, "Somebody was coming and I f* * *ed up." The next day, Steinberg told his roommate not to get a newspaper. Steinberg's roommate got a newspaper, read about the shooting, and relayed his suspicions about Steinberg's involvement to the police. Ultimately, Steinberg was charged with and convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty-five years in prison.

On appeal, Steinberg raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court violated the Federal and Indiana Wiretap Acts by admitting recordings of phone calls that Steinberg made to his parents while in jail; (2) if not, whether the trial court erred in not further redacting those recordings; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting a 2003 email in which Steinberg asked whether there were any "extenuating circumstances relating to murder that negate personal liability"; (4) whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument when he stated that the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter did not apply in this case; (5) whether the trial court committed fundamental error in admitting evidence of Steinberg's pretrial references to legal counsel; (6) whether the trial court erred in not finding Steinberg's mental health to be a mitigating factor at sentencing; and (7) whether Steinberg's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Finding no reversible error and that Steinberg has failed to establish that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

Facts and Procedural History1

The facts most favorable to the jury's verdict indicate that in 2005, Steinberg shared an apartment with Kenith Craft and Ian Coleman in Bloomington. In January 2005, Steinberg purchased an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle from a man in Martinsville for $800 in cash. The AR-15 was equipped with a bipod, laser sight, flash suppressor, and copper-jacketed ammunition capable of piercing the side of a motor vehicle.2 Steinberg showed Craft and Coleman the AR-15, which he referred to as his "new toy." Tr. at 138.

Between approximately 7:00 and 8:30 p.m. on February 7, 2005, Steinberg received email confirmations from a gambling website regarding his requested withdrawals, which totaled $18,200. Later that evening, Steinberg, Craft, and Coleman met at a bar near their apartment. Eventually, Coleman left the bar and went to his girlfriend's apartment. Steinberg and Craft went outside the bar for a smoke, and Steinberg showed Craft two oxyacetylene welding tanks in the back of his Oldsmobile Bravada SUV. Steinberg told Craft that "if anything ever happened he could melt his gun to nothing." Id. at 137. Steinberg also told Craft that he had to be somewhere at 1:15 a.m. After midnight, Steinberg drove Craft back to their apartment and told him that he could play online poker on Steinberg's account and keep any money that he won. Steinberg left the apartment. Craft played poker on Steinberg's computer for approximately an hour and went to bed.

Early on the morning of February 8, Michael Helton was driving his semi truck northbound on State Road 37 south of Bloomington when he saw the headlights of two approaching vehicles traveling southbound.3 One of the vehicles, a pickup truck, suddenly veered off the road and crashed into a limestone embankment. The second vehicle continued traveling southbound. Helton stopped and flagged down another trucker, who called 911.

Police determined that the driver of the pickup was William Brand, a correctional officer from the Monroe County Jail. Brand had been shot through the head and killed by a high-velocity copper-jacketed bullet. The bullet had been fired from a weapon positioned directly to Brand's left. The driver's side window of Brand's pickup was shattered, and a bullet had penetrated the driver's side door frame, on which police found gunshot residue. The forensic pathologist recovered from Brand's skull a copper-jacketed bullet fragment that was consistent with ammunition that can be fired by an AR-15. Police could not conclusively determine whether one or two shots had been fired and whether Brand's skull had been penetrated by a bullet or by a bullet fragment that had ricocheted off the door frame.

Later on the morning of February 8, as Craft was getting ready for work, a pale and frantic Steinberg entered the apartment. He was dirty and appeared to have been crying, and his hands were black. Steinberg told Craft, "I f* * *ed up man I f* * *ed up, oh my God. The car slide [sic] down the road. Somebody was coming and I f* * *ed up, I f* * *ed up." Id. at 149. Steinberg told Craft that he had come home to get a checkbook and quickly left the apartment.

The next day, February 9, Steinberg and Craft had a brief conversation in their apartment. Steinberg told Craft, "If anyone comes around asking any questions or looking for me tell them the last time I talked to you I was going to Las Vegas. If you do anything, don't go get a newspaper today. If you get a newspaper don't bring it into this apartment, destroy it." Id. at 152. After the conversation, Steinberg left the apartment. Craft got a newspaper and read the account of Brand's shooting. Craft recalled Steinberg's recent behavior and comments and said, "Oh f* * *k." Id. at 154. When Craft was at lunch, Steinberg called him and asked if "anyone [had] been around." Id. at 160. Craft told Steinberg that no one had been around and that the newspaper article had indicated that the vehicle suspected of being involved in the shooting was a "late model sedan." Id.4 Steinberg replied, "Okay, so I'm cool." Id. Steinberg told Craft to tell Coleman that he "[n]ever saw that thing," which Craft took to mean the AR-15. Id.

Later that day, Craft discussed the matter with Coleman and called the Indiana State Police number listed in the newspaper article. Police interviewed Craft and Coleman and arrested Steinberg at a New Albany hotel on a probation violation based on his alleged possession of a firearm. Police also seized Steinberg's computer and SUV, in which they found molten metal fragments and recently purchased tools, including a shovel.5 Police did not find the welding tanks that Steinberg had shown to Craft, nor did they find Steinberg's AR-15.6

Later that month, while Steinberg was incarcerated, he wrote a letter to Craft instructing him to "Talk to Noone [sic] unless my lawyer is with you" and "don't say sh*t w/out my lawyer — No matter what they say." State's Ex. 27. Steinberg also wrote letters to two friends, asking them to impersonate a police detective to determine whether police had obtained a surveillance videotape from a gas station near the intersection of State Road 37 and Highway 50 in Bedford. In one of the letters, Steinberg specified that the videotape was "from about 2-3 am on the early morning of Tues, February the 8th." State's Ex. 48.

On October 17, 2007, the State charged Steinberg with murder. On October 23, 2009, a jury found Steinberg guilty as charged. On December 16, 2009, the trial court sentenced Steinberg to sixty-five years in prison. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Recordings

At trial, the State offered into evidence recordings of three collect phone calls that Steinberg made to his parents while he was incarcerated in the Floyd County Jail following his arrest in New Albany. During those conversations, Steinberg stated, among other things, that he had given his vehicle and cell phone and a gun he had purchased in Martinsville to masked men who killed a jailer in a drive-by shooting in Bloomington; that he had read about the shooting in the paper; and that he was being framed for the homicide because of his extensive knowledge of and involvement in nanotechnology. He also stated that he had planned on having his SUV repainted and reupholstered because he had been framed but that he had decided not to do so. The trial court admitted the recordings over Steinberg's objection that they had been obtained in violation of the Federal and Indiana Wiretap Acts.

Steinberg contends that the trial court erred in admitting the recordings. Our standard of review is well settled:

Lovitt v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 (Ind. Ct.App.2009) (citation omitted). We may affirm a trial court's admissibility ruling on any theory supported by the record. Leitch v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

A. Federal Wiretap Act

"The Federal Wiretap Act authorizes federal and state law enforcement officers to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications in criminal investigations pursuant to a properly issued court order administered in compliance with specific guidelines." Packer v. State, 800 N.E.2d 574, 578-79 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 and 2518), trans. denied (2004).

Id. at 579 (footnote omitted).

"The ordinary course of business exception to the Federal Wiretap Act's court order requirement applies to taped telephone conversations from a jail." Id. Steinberg asserts that the State failed to establish that the conversations in this case "were taped in the ordinary course of business," claiming that it "never presented any evidence of Floyd County Jail's policy on recording phone conversations." Appellant's Br. at 12. The State points out that at the beginning of each phone call, the operator announced, "This call may be recorded." Appellant's App. at 431a, 431o, 431ee. We agree with the State that "[t]his is evidence that the jail routinely monitors and records phone calls made by inmates" and that, contrary to Steinberg's assertion, "it was unnecessary for the State to also introduce into evidence [a] jail handbook providing the same information already provided in the calls themselves." Appellee's Br. at 11.7 Cf. Baer v. State, 866 N.E.2d 752, 762 (Ind. 2007) (rejecting appellant's argument that State must show that he "received and understood the jail handbook" as a "foundational requirement[] for establishing consent" to his phone calls being recorded for purposes of Indiana Wiretap Act). In other words, we conclude that the recordings were made in the ordinary course of business for purposes of the Federal Wiretap Act and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. Because we affirm the trial court's ruling on this basis, we need not address the applicability of the Act's consent exception.

B. Indiana Wiretap Act

Steinberg's argument that the recording and admission of his phone conversations violated the Indiana Wiretap Act is based solely on his unsuccessful argument regarding the Federal Wiretap Act. See Appellant's Br. at 14 ("[B]ecause there is a violation of the Federal Wiretap Act, it follows the Indiana Wiretap Act was also violated."). Steinberg's argument rests on a faulty premise, and he has failed to develop any other argument on this point. Thus, he has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. In any event, as the State correctly observes, Steinberg's "parents consented to the recording when they accepted the collect calls after being warned that the calls could be recorded, and this alone is sufficient to render the recordings proper under the Indiana Wiretap Act." Appellee's Br. at 16 (citing Edwards v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1254, 1261-62 (Ind.Ct. App.2007), trans. denied).

II. Redaction of Recordings

Prior to trial, the State informed Steinberg that it intended to introduce the recordings of his conversations with his parents "in their entirety." Appellant's App. at 425 (memorandum in support of Steinberg's motion in limine). As stated above, Steinberg unsuccessfully sought to exclude the recordings based on alleged violations of the Federal and Indiana Wiretap Acts. In the alternative, Steinberg requested the redaction of his mother's and father's statements on several grounds, including hearsay and relevancy.

The trial court held a hearing on the matter during trial. The court denied Steinberg's request to redact all of his parents' statements on the basis that "conversations need to be taken in ... context" and that "[i]f you take one side out and leave one side there is no clarity and it becomes nonsensical and difficult for the jury." Tr. at 278. The court and the parties reviewed the transcripts of the recordings line by line, and the court redacted certain statements uttered by Steinberg and his parents. For example, the court redacted Steinberg's statement that he had been arrested for a probation violation, Appellant's App. at 431x, his father's question regarding whether police had conducted a ballistics test, id., and his mother's statements explicitly expressing doubt about his mental health, credibility, and innocence. See, e.g., id. at 431kk ("Your story Ben is part and partial [sic] of your illness."), 431nn ("I don't think you know what really happened Ben."), 431ss ("It makes no sense."), 431yy ("Oh my God. Oh my God you shot some one [sic]."), and 431zz ("[Y]ou are suffering from an illness that you will not address."). The recorded conversations were redacted accordingly and played to the jury. There is no indication that the jury viewed the unredacted transcripts.

On appeal, Steinberg renews his assertion that the trial court erred in failing to redact all of his parents' utterances, contending that "[t]he State's desire to present [his] statements in the context of a flowing conversation does not trump [his] right to a fair trial within the confines of the Rules of Evidence." Appellant's Br. at 9.8 Steinberg's overarching argument appears to be that his parents' statements are inadmissible because they are irrelevant. See Ind. Evidence Rule 401 (defining "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Ind. Evidence Rule 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the United States or Indiana constitutions, by statute not in conflict with these rules, by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this State. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").

"In order to be admissible, the evidence need only have some tendency, however slight, to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable, or tend to shed any light upon the guilt or innocence of the accused." Simmons v. State, 717 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). The statements of Steinberg's parents provide a critical context for Steinberg's own statements, the relevancy of which Steinberg does not (and cannot) dispute. We agree with the trial court that removing his parents' statements from the conversations would have rendered the recordings "nonsensical and difficult for the jury." Tr. at 278. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the statements of Steinberg's parents are at least minimally probative, and we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Steinberg's request to redact all of his parents' statements on relevancy grounds.9 We now address Steinberg's more specific arguments regarding their admissibility.

A. Mother's Statements

Steinberg's arguments regarding the admissibility of his mother's statements focus primarily on Indiana Evidence Rules 704(b) and 403, as well as an order in limine regarding evidence that he suffered from mental illness.10 Evidence Rule 704(b) states, "Witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions." Steinberg contends that his mother's tone of voice and repetitive questioning expressed disbelief and that her responses to his references to masked men and nanotechnology "directly attacked [his] truthfulness, sanity and innocence." Appellant's Br. at 17.11

Steinberg's contention is unpersuasive. The State correctly observes that "[t]here is no rule of evidence that excludes statements because of the `tone of voice' in which they are made" and that none of the objectionable statements cited by Steinberg "express[es] a direct opinion as to [his] guilt, the truth of [his] statements, or [his] sanity." Appellee's Br. at 16-17.12 As Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr., has explained, "Rule 704(b) does not prohibit presentation of evidence that leads to an inference, even if no witness could state [an] opinion with respect to that inference." 13 ROBERT LOWELL MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE § 704.201 at 589 (3d ed.2007). Thus, Steinberg's mother's statements do not run afoul of Evidence Rule 704(b).

Evidence Rule 403 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." (Emphasis added.) Steinberg asserts that

Appellant's Br. at 19.

The State responds that some of Steinberg's mother's statements

Appellee's Br. at 18. We agree with this assessment and conclude that Steinberg has failed to establish that the probative value of his mother's statements is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Evidence Rule 403.

B. Father's Statements

Steinberg says that "[a] large portion of [his] calls with his father dealt with his father's problem relating to selling his condo, and his father objecting to [his] cussing." Appellant's Br. at 20. He further states that "it is clear from the audiotape that [his] father was intoxicated during the first call" and asserts that "[t]he risk that the jury would infer Steinberg's character from his relationship with his father or his father's alcohol problem substantially outweighs the need for the jury to hear about Steinberg's father's problems selling his condo." Id. at 21.13

Appellee's Br. at 19. Once again, we agree with the State's assessment. Absent any demonstration of prejudice, much less any demonstration that the probative value of Steinberg's father's statements was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Evidence Rule 403, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Steinberg's request to further redact his father's statements.

III. Admission of Email

At trial, the State offered into evidence an email that Steinberg sent to what appears to be a United Kingdom governmental law commission on October 20, 2003. The subject line reads, "Acceptions [sic] to Murder," and the text of the message reads, "Are there any extenuating circumstances relating to murder that negate personal liability. I am referring to circumstances such as fear of personal harm. Thank you for any info." State's Ex. 30. Steinberg objected to the email based on its temporal remoteness to Brand's killing and on relevancy and Evidence Rule 403 grounds. The prosecutor responded that the email's "remoteness makes it relevant. The defense has been attempting to suggest that [Kenith] Craft is responsible for this crime. This email predates their living together and ... it has to do with the very crime that we're here on trial for." Tr. at 252. The trial court ruled as follows:

Id. at 254.

On appeal, Steinberg contends that "the nexus between [his] two-line email and the shooting of Brand approximately sixteen months later is far too attenuated to be probative of any plan to kill Brand." Appellant's Br. at 22. We agree. Absent any evidence linking the email to the apparently random and motiveless killing of Brand, we fail to see how it was probative of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action, including the identity of Brand's killer.14 Quite simply, the email does not tend to prove that Steinberg killed Brand, or that he was more likely than Craft to have killed Brand, and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it.

That said, we conclude that the error was harmless. "The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction." Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 569 (Ind. 2000). It is well settled that "[a] murder conviction may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence." Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). The State presented plenty of circumstantial evidence linking Steinberg to Brand's murder, including his purchase of a laser-sighted rifle and ammunition that was consistent with that used to kill Brand; his conversations with Craft before and after the killing; his appearance, behavior, and comments after the killing, as described by Craft; the disappearance of his rifle and welding tanks after the shooting; his jailhouse phone conversations with his parents; and his attempts to track down a gas station surveillance video from the day of the killing. Steinberg had no alibi, and his attempt to cast suspicion on Craft at trial was undercut by his pretrial statements to his parents that he did not know the names of Brand's supposed killers and that Craft had heard Steinberg talking to them. Appellant's App. at 431t, 431kk. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is no substantial likelihood that the admission of Steinberg's email contributed to his conviction.

IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct

The identity of Brand's killer was the primary issue contested at Steinberg's trial for murder, which is the knowing or intentional killing of another human being. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1. During closing argument, however, Steinberg's counsel raised the issue of intent:

Tr. at 433, 452-53.

On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded as follows:

Id. at 454-55.

At that point, Steinberg's counsel requested a sidebar. According to counsel's verified statement of evidence submitted to and certified by the trial court pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A),15 the sidebar was not transcribed by the court reporter because it was inaudible. Steinberg's trial counsel "recollects that during the inaudible sidebar he objected on the grounds that the prosecutor misstated the law" but "does not remember whether he requested an admonishment and mistrial." Appellant's App. at 598f. The trial court apparently overruled counsel's objection and neither admonished the jury nor declared a mistrial.

Later, the court instructed the jury regarding involuntary manslaughter as follows:

Id. at 519-22.

On appeal, Steinberg contends that "[t]he prosecutor's argument was a purposeful misstatement of the law" that requires reversal. Appellant's Br. at 25. Specifically, Steinberg asserts that

Id. at 25-27 (citation omitted).

Initially, we note that

Watkins v. State, 766 N.E.2d 18, 25 (Ind. Ct.App.2002) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

The State contends that "[b]ecause the record does not show that [Steinberg] either requested an admonishment or moved for a mistrial, his claim is unpreserved." Appellee's Br. at 26. In his reply brief, Steinberg contends that his trial counsel's certified statement that he did not remember whether he had either requested an admonishment or moved for a mistrial "is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." Appellant's Reply Br. at 13. Because the record is silent on this point through no fault of Steinberg, and given our oft-stated preference for deciding issues on their merits, we will assume for purposes of this appeal that the issue has been preserved and address Steinberg's argument.

"If an appellant properly preserves the issue of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal the reviewing court first determines whether misconduct occurred, and if so whether it had a probable persuasive effect on the jury." Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind.2004). "Although often phrased in terms of `grave peril,' a claim of improper argument to the jury is measured by the probable persuasive effect of any misconduct on the jury's decision and whether there were repeated instances of misconduct which would evidence a deliberate attempt to improperly prejudice the defendant." Id. at 269 (citation and some quotation marks omitted).

"It is proper for a prosecutor to argue both law and fact during final argument and propound conclusions based upon his analysis of the evidence." Hand v. State, 863 N.E.2d 386, 394 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007). That said, "[a] prosecutor's comments can be prejudicial if they have an impact on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly." McCoy v. State, 574 N.E.2d 304, 308 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As indicated by the trial court's instructions — the correctness of which Steinberg does not dispute — involuntary manslaughter does in fact "address[] situations where the firing of the weapon is random" and "[t]here is no specific target," as the prosecutor told the jury. Tr. at 454. See Appellant's App. at 521 ("A person who knowingly, or intentionally performs an act that create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person commits criminal recklessness; A Class D felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon, or a Class C felony if it is committed by shooting a firearm from a vehicle into a place where people are likely to gather."). At worst, the prosecutor gave the jury an incomplete picture of the law and did not purposefully misstate the law, as Steinberg contends.18

Moreover, final instructions are presumed to correct any misstatements of law made during final argument. McCoy, 574 N.E.2d at 308. Here, the trial court correctly instructed the jury regarding the elements of involuntary manslaughter and further explained that the jury was the judge of both the law and the facts and that the court's instructions were its best source for determining what the law is. Appellant's App. at 523. Also, in its preliminary instructions, the trial court informed the jurors that during closing arguments the attorneys would be "permitted to argue, to characterize the evidence, and to attempt to persuade you to a particular verdict. You are to accept or reject those arguments as you see fit." Id. at 513. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor's remarks prejudiced Steinberg.

V. Admission of References to Legal Counsel

In the recorded jailhouse phone conversations with his parents, Steinberg blamed others for Brand's murder but expressed his desire to retain legal counsel. See, e.g., Appellant's App. at 4311 ("I got some stuff to talk to a lawyer about."); id. at 431u ("I need to talk to a serious f* * *ing lawyer I think."). Also, as mentioned above, Steinberg wrote a letter to Craft instructing him not to talk to anyone without Steinberg's lawyer present. Steinberg now contends that the trial court erred in admitting these references to legal counsel.19 Steinberg failed to object to these references at trial, however, and he concedes that he must demonstrate fundamental error to obtain a reversal.

Our supreme court has explained that the fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is

Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in admitting the references to legal counsel, we cannot conclude that the admission of these statements constituted fundamental error. As indicated above, the State presented abundant circumstantial evidence that Steinberg murdered Brand, and Steinberg's attempt to blame Craft was undermined by his own statements that other persons were responsible for the killing. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the admission of the references to legal counsel was sufficiently egregious to warrant reversal of Steinberg's murder conviction.

VI. Sentencing — Mental Health Considerations

As previously mentioned, Steinberg requested and received an order in limine regarding evidence that he suffered from mental illness. At the sentencing hearing, however, Steinberg's counsel referenced the mental health section of Steinberg's presentence investigation report and asked that Steinberg's mental health be considered a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes. The trial court responded to this request and sentenced Steinberg as follows:

Tr. at 527-32.

Steinberg now contends that the trial court erred in not finding his mental health to be a mitigating factor. "We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion." Hoeppner v. State, 918 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ind.Ct.App.2009).21 "A trial court may abuse its discretion by entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons for imposing a sentence not supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by the record, or includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law." Id.

Determining mitigating circumstances is within the trial court's discretion. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied (2008).

Id. at 272-73 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

"[I]n order for a [defendant's] mental history to provide a basis for establishing a mitigating factor, there must be a nexus between the defendant's mental health and the crime in question." Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ind.Ct. App.2004). We agree with the State that Steinberg has failed to demonstrate such a nexus. Steinberg did not present independent evidence regarding his mental health at the sentencing hearing, and he asserted only that his mental health history provided an "explanation" for Brand's murder. Tr. at 524. The evidence presented at trial indicates that Steinberg carefully plotted to kill someone without being detected and, failing that, to destroy any traces of his involvement in the crime. There is no indication that Brand's murder was motivated by any paranoia or delusion. Although it does appear that Steinberg is obsessed with nanotechnology, we agree with the State that Steinberg's attempt to pin Brand's murder on masked men involved in nanotechnology is "simply a garden-variety attempt to shift the blame by creating a story about a fictitious third party." Appellee's Br. at 35. Finally, we are unpersuaded by Steinberg's argument that the senselessness of the murder is proof positive of a link to his mental illness. As the State correctly observes, "[t]his is hardly the first case ever in which a crime was committed with no understandable motive." Id. In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rejection of Steinberg's mental health as a mitigating factor.

VII. Sentencing — Appropriateness

The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with the advisory (formerly presumptive) sentence being fifty-five years. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-3(a). Steinberg asks that we reduce his sixty-five-year sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides, "The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." "The question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate." Fonner v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct.App.2007). The defendant has the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id.22

Steinberg properly concedes that the nature of this offense is "tragic." Appellant's Br. at 35. Brand's murder was not a crime of passion or revenge but merely the culmination of Steinberg's elaborate plan to kill someone without being detected. Steinberg purchased a semiautomatic rifle with a laser sight, a flash suppressor, and high-velocity ammunition and equipped his vehicle with oxyacetylene welding tanks that he could use to destroy the weapon "if anything ever happened." Tr. at 137. He drove alongside his apparently random victim on a nearly deserted highway in the middle of the night and shot him in the head at close range. Police never recovered Steinberg's rifle and welding tanks but did find molten metal fragments in Steinberg's SUV. Steinberg's premeditated and utterly senseless murder of Brand deserves a lengthy sentence.

With respect to his character, Steinberg again focuses on his mental health history. He received a preliminary diagnosis of schizophrenia in late 2003, but a psychiatrist who evaluated him in August 2004 "found little evidence of psychosis or delusional disorder." Appellant's App. at 623. Steinberg "was ultimately diagnosed as having `other (or unknown) substance-related disorder and alcohol abuse.'" Id. He was referred to group therapy, was removed for "`poor attendance and disruptive attitude,'" and then failed to complete individual therapy. Id. When interviewed for the presentence investigation report, Steinberg "classified himself as being between a moderate and heavy drinker who plans to make no changes in regard to his alcohol consumption." Id. at 624. In sum, the evidence regarding the nature and severity of Steinberg's mental illness is conflicting, and his refusal to deal with his substance abuse issues reflects unfavorably on his character.

Also, at the time of sentencing, the thirty-year-old Steinberg had numerous arrests and several misdemeanor convictions for substance- and driving-related offenses (including marijuana possession and operating while intoxicated), misdemeanor convictions for disorderly conduct and resisting law enforcement, as well as a class D felony conviction for pointing a firearm. Steinberg was on probation for the firearm offense when he purchased the AR-15 and murdered Brand. While incarcerated pending trial, Steinberg was found to have committed four conduct violations, including filing down and sharpening a stool seat, trafficking, and destroying property. Steinberg's numerous and increasingly serious encounters with the law, as well as his failure to comply with the conditions of his probation and incarceration, paint an unflattering portrait of his character. All in all, Steinberg has failed to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.