BARNES, Judge.
Robert Hollis on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated appeals the
Robert raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly dismissed his claims against Defender Security Company d/b/a Defender Direct ("Defender").
Keisha Hollis began working for Defender in October 2005, selling ADT Security systems. In March 2007, Defender hired Robert. During his employment, Robert sold Dish TV systems and ADT Security systems and was paid a commission based on his sales. Robert was "involuntarily separated" from Defender on April 21, 2009. Appellants' App. p. 97. Keisha was "voluntarily separated" from Defender on September 10, 2009. Id.
On September 21, 2009, Robert and Keisha, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, filed a complaint alleging that Defender had violated the Wage Payment Statute by failing to pay agreed wages in a timely fashion. On November 23, 2009, Defender filed a motion to dismiss Robert's claims.
Robert argues that the trial court improperly granted Defender's motion to dismiss because his claims were brought under the Wage Payment Statute and, as such, he was not required to submit them to the Department of Labor ("DOL"). Our review of a trial court's ruling on an Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss where the facts before the trial court are undisputed, as here, is de novo. See Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 714, 717-18 (Ind.Ct. App.2009), trans. denied.
Indiana Code Chapter 22-2-5 is commonly referred to as the Wage Payment Statute. Indiana Code Section 22-2-5-1 provides:
Indiana Code Section 22-2-5-2 provides for the recovery of liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees where an employer fails to make payments as required by Indiana Code Section 22-2-5-1. In interpreting this statute, our supreme court has concluded, "the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the phrases `all wages' and `amount due' unambiguously establishes that the legislature intended the Wage Payment Statute to govern not only the frequency but also the amount an employer must pay its employee." St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind.2002).
Indiana Code Chapter 22-2-9, commonly referred to as the Wage Claims Statute, also concerns disputes over the amount of wages due and provides for the recovery of liquidated damages and attorney fees. See id. at 704-05. According to Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-2(a), "Whenever any employer separates any employee from the pay-roll, the unpaid wages or compensation of such employee shall become due and payable at regular pay day for pay period in which separation occurred. ..." Regarding the Wage Claims Statute, the Steele court explained, "Claimants who proceed under this statute may not file a complaint with the trial court. Rather, the wage claim is submitted to the Indiana Department of Labor." Id. at 705.
Id.
Steele was a doctor who, at all times, was employed by St. Vincent. A dispute arose regarding St. Vincent's obligation to reimburse Steele for certain treatments he provided to patients. Steele filed a complaint against St. Vincent alleging breach of contract for failure to pay the full amount of compensation due under the terms of their agreement and for violation of the Wage Payment Statute.
In determining whether the Wage Payment Statute or the Wage Claims Statute applied to Steele's claim, the Steele court explained, "Although both the Wage Claims Statute and the Wage Payment Statute set forth two different procedural
Id. (emphasis added). The Steele court concluded, "Because Dr. Steele was a current employee of St. Vincent at the time of the wage dispute, he proceeded correctly under the Wage Payment Statute." Id.
Based on the Steele court's reference to "wage disputes," Robert argues that whether to proceed under the Wage Payment Statute or the Wage Claims Statute depends on an employee's status when the claim accrues as opposed to the employee's status when he or she files the claim. Specifically, Robert contends that the Wage Payment Statute applies because he is seeking payment only for alleged violations that occurred while he was an employee of Defender. According to Robert's argument, the fact that he was involuntarily separated from Defender before he filed his complaint is irrelevant because he is not alleging a violation of the Wage Claims Statute.
Based on Robert's proposed application of the statutory framework, an involuntarily separated employee would have to file a complaint based on the Wage Payment Statute for alleged violations that occurred prior to the separation and then submit a separate claim with the DOL under the Wage Claims Statute for alleged violations that occurred during the final pay period. It also seems that Robert's interpretation would remove all but the last of an involuntarily separated employee's claims from the purview of the Department of Labor.
Robert's argument is based on a footnote in McCausland v. Walter USA, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 420, 424 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied, in which a panel of this court stated:
The parties dispute whether this statement is dicta and debate the precedential value
We conclude that an employee's status at the time he or she files the claim is the relevant inquiry in determining whether to proceed under the Wage Payment Statute or the Wage Claims Statute. Robert was involuntarily separated from Defender when he filed his claims and, as such, his claims fell under the Wage Claims Statute.
The trial court properly granted Defender's motion to dismiss Robert's claims because he did not submit them to the DOL as required by the Wage Claims Statute. We affirm.
BAKER, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.