BAILEY, Judge.
Pursuant to a policy or practice of Tippecanoe Superior Court 4, Darlene Baca ("Baca"), a disabled and indigent small claims litigant, was ordered to perform four hours of community service in order to have her claim set for a hearing. The trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and this Court accepted jurisdiction. Baca presents the sole issue of whether the informal local rule requiring community service is enforceable.
Acting pro se, Baca attempted to file a claim for the return of her security deposit from a former landlord. Unemployed, disabled, and indigent, Baca lacked the $76 filing fee but was informed by court personnel that she could perform sixteen hours of community service in order to have her complaint filed. Baca contacted Indiana Legal Services.
On April 14, 2010, at a hearing before a judge pro tempore in Superior Court 4, Baca appeared with counsel from Indiana Legal Services. Counsel argued that the community service "policy" was of "questionable soundness" and that, nonetheless, Baca was unable to perform community service. (Tr. 2.) Baca testified that she was residing in public housing and receives Social Security disability and supplemental security income payments. She further testified that she suffers from scoliosis and has a plate in her leg and foot.
After suggesting that Meals on Wheels might be an appropriate venue for community service, the judge pro tempore advised Baca's counsel that counsel would be responsible for "helping her find four hours of community service that she can do." (Tr. 5.) Counsel informed the judge that Baca was facing imminent eviction from public housing unless she could prove that she was contesting a demand for damages from her former landlord. In an apparent deviation from the requirement that community service be performed before an indigent's claim could be filed, the court ordered Baca's claim to be filed. However, the setting of a hearing date was held in abeyance pending Baca's performance of four hours of community service.
Notwithstanding Indiana Code Section 33-37-3-2, providing that a person entitled to bring a civil action may do so without paying the required fees after filing a sworn statement of his or her indigency,
Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 81 provides that "[c]ourts may regulate local court and administrative district practice by adopting and amending in accordance with this Rule local and administrative district rules not inconsistent with—and not duplicative of—these Rules of Trial Procedure or other Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court." Recently, in Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 328 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), we reviewed the function and scope of local rules. Local rules are generally procedural, intended to standardize the practice within that court, to facilitate the effective flow of information, and to enable the court to rule on the merits. Id. at 331. After a local rule is promulgated, all litigants and the court are bound by the rules of the court. Id. at 331-32.
"A rule of court is a law of practice, extended alike to all litigants who come within its purview, and who, in conducting their causes, have the right to assume that it will be uniformly enforced by the court, in conservation of their
Id. at 331 (quoting Magnuson v. Billings, 152 Ind. 177, 180, 52 N.E. 803 (1899)). Accordingly, Trial Rule 81(B) sets forth the procedure for local rule adoption:
Subsection (F) requires that adopted rules be placed in the Record of Judgments and Orders, and that the county clerk post them in the clerk's office and on the county clerk's website, if any, for public inspection. A copy is to be transmitted to the Division of State Court Administration for posting on the Indiana Judicial Website. T.R. 81(F).
Subsection (A) includes a specific prohibition of standing orders: "Courts shall not use standing orders (that is, generic orders not entered in the individual case) to regulate local court or administrative district practice." We agree with Baca that the practice of Tippecanoe Superior Court 4 is essentially a standing order, in circumvention of the requirements of Trial Rule 81(B) for the proper promulgation of local court rules. It is, accordingly, unenforceable.
Reversed.
NAJAM, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.