RILEY, Judge.
Appellant-Respondent, A.K., Sr. (Father), appeals the trial court's involuntary termination of his parental rights to his minor child, A.K., Jr.
We affirm.
Father raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as the following two issues:
(1) Whether the trial court properly determined that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal or the reasons for placement outside the home would not be remedied; and
(2) Whether the termination was in A.K., Jr.'s best interests.
A.K., Jr., born on September 29, 2008, is the biological child of Father and T.K. (Mother).
According to A.K., Jr.'s parents, Mother had bathed the child in lukewarm water and he appeared fine after his bath. Later, the parents told IDCS that the bath was initially hot, but they then pulled the plug and ran cold water into the sink for the bath. A.K., Jr.'s treating physician disputed the parents' version of what had happened and opined that the child's burns were consistent with him being placed in scalding hot water. It is undisputed that Mother bathed the child while Father was running an errand. When Father returned home, A.K., Jr. was still in the sink and unclothed; Father did not observe any injuries. Father did not realize that A.K., Jr. was injured until approximately one and one-half hours after the bath, when the child's skin was peeling off. At that point, Mother and Father took A.K., Jr. to the emergency room.
On April 23, 2010, the trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition and found A.K., Jr. to be a CHINS. The trial court authorized the placement of the child with maternal relatives. On May 28, 2009, the trial court issued its dispositional order in the CHINS proceeding, recommending the continued placement of A.K., Jr. outside the care of his parents and ordering the parents to participate in court-ordered services.
Throughout the proceedings following the trial court's dispositional order, Father participated in many of the services ordered and appeared and participated in review and permanency hearings. At all times however, A.K., Jr. remained placed with his maternal relatives. On February 17, 2010, IDCS filed its petition for involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship. On June 17, June 25, and June 29, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on IDCS's petition. At the time of the termination hearing, Father continued to reside with Mother despite his knowledge of her conviction for neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury, a Class C felony, and the condition of her probation that she was prohibited from unsupervised visitation with A.K., Jr. On August 10, 2010 the trial court entered its Order, terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child. The trial court concluded that
(Appellant's App. pp. 420-22) (internal citations omitted).
Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Father contends that the IDCS did not present sufficient evidence to support the involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship with A.K., Jr. In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law in its termination of parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the conclusions of law. Id.
In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the trial court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the conclusions of law drawn by the trial court are not supported by its findings of fact or the conclusions of law do not support the judgment. Id.
It is axiomatic that the traditional right of parents "to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination of the parent-child relationship. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Parental rights may therefore be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.
To effect the involuntary termination of a parent-child relationship, the IDCS must present clear and convincing evidence establishing that:
I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
In the instant case, Father asserts that the trial court erred in terminating the parental relationship with his son. Father disputes the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal or the reasons for placement outside the home would not be remedied and that the termination was in the child's best interests. Specifically, he contends that "no direct evidence was provided by [IDCS] to prove that the specific conditions that justified removal continued to exist." (Appellant's Br. p. 20). Rather, he maintains that the evidence presented merely consisted of a litany of concerns by IDCS and service providers about speculative future problems and speculation that Father would fail to implement safety tools within his home.
First, we address Father's claim that the IDCS failed to present direct evidence establishing that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal or the reasons for placement outside the home would not be remedied.
In determining whether the conditions that led to a child's removal will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his child at the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. However, the trial court must also evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. Moreover, IDCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change, but only needs to establish that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Moore v. Jasper County Dep't. of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
In order to reach a conclusion, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through the IDCS. Lang v. Starke Co. Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). "A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change." In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1161 (2002).
The record is clear that Father attended and participated in some of the services ordered by the trial court and was faithful in his visitation with A.K., Jr. However, merely going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change but only suggest a temporary improvement and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress. See In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, all of the case workers involved with Father expressed their concern about the lack of progress in Father's skills to adequately care for his young child.
Family behavior specialist, Stephanie Morris (Morris), commenced working with Mother in February of 2009 twice each week on parenting skills, child development, and related matters. Although Father was present in the home while Morris was working with Mother, Father would often sleep or play videogames, saying that "this is more [Mother's] thing." (Transcript p. 61). It was not until September of 2009 that Father enrolled for services with Morris. Additionally, Morris was present during some of Father's supervised visitations with A.K., Jr. She observed that Father needed continual prompting to do activities that would nurture the bond with his son. In this light, she testified that
(Tr. pp. 63-64). She noticed that often times, the house was not ready for the visit: items that presented a safety concern were not placed out of reach of the child or picked up.
Rebecca Ball (Ball), a case manager, provided supervision during some of Father's visits with A.K., Jr. During these visits, Ball heard Father call his son "stinky, greedy, fat head, little rat." (Tr. p. 89) She testified that Father was not able to use the parenting skills that were being taught. She was concerned that Father was not able to pick up the child's cues during mealtimes and either overfed or underfed him. Father was not interested in making his home a safe environment for the child: there were times when A.k., Jr. was out of sight "or he would reach for objects like scissors or a trash can, [or] electrical cords[.]" (Tr. p. 86).
Likewise, Early Head Start Home Visitor, Stephanie Ellet (Ellet), expressed her concern about Father's apparent unwillingness to learn how to care for A.K., Jr. During her time of working with Father, she never noticed any progress in Father's skills. Deana Wright, a clinical supervisor for foster care, summed up Father's abilities as follows:
(Tr. pp. 118-19).
Father's main family case manager, Joseph Tinsley (Tinsley), testified that Father explained to him that during the hour time lapse between the time that A.K., Jr. incurred the burns and actually going to the emergency room, Father failed to recognize the severity of his son's injuries. Tinsley explained that A.K., Jr.'s skin was totally gone on his buttocks and there were patches on his leg where the skin was gone and the light pink second layer underneath was visible. During the proceedings, Father has continued to reside with Mother even though they are divorced now. Father has indicated that he did not consider A.K., Jr. to be at risk in Mother's care as long as Mother did not bathe him.
With respect to Father's progress with services, Tinsley acknowledged that progress has been very minimal throughout the whole case. He clarified that
(Tr. p. 136). As an example, Tinsley stated
(Tr. p. 139). At no point did Father graduate from supervised to unsupervised visits. At no point did any service provider recommend reunification of A.K., Jr. with Father.
As stated before, Father continues to reside with Mother and is financially dependent upon Mother's social security income as he is unemployed. Father testified, and other witnesses confirmed, that Father's plan in parenting his son was to return to California where all his relatives are residing and live with his aunt who would help him in caring for A.K., Jr. Despite Tinsley's request to have the aunt contact him in order to be screened, Tinsley never talked to Father's aunt.
Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that resulted in the removal will not be remedied.
(Tr. p. 159). Although Father was enrolled in services, no progress was made. He appears unwilling to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services as he continues to rely on them to repeatedly give him the same detailed instructions on how to parent his child. As such, we agree with the trial court's conclusion.
Next, we address whether termination of the relationship with Father is in the best interests of A.K., Jr. We are mindful that, in determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the IDCS and to consider the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe County Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 182, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
To support his argument that termination is not in A.K., Jr.'s best interests, Father relies predominately on the testimony of Ed Pereira (Pereira), the director of clinical services at the Family Service Society in Marion, indicating that Father does not present a threat to his child. Specifically, Pereira testified that based on the tests he had administered to Father, Father was capable of learning the necessary parenting skills to get reunited with his child and would not intentionally harm his son. He advocated giving Father more time to prove himself.
"It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty." Baker v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Ind. 2004). Requiring A.K., Jr. to wait indefinitely until Father can master the needed parenting skills and is able to adequately provide—financially and emotionally—for him would be harmful to A.K. Jr.'s emotional and physical growth. A.K., Jr. is ready to move on and start a new phase in his life. Therefore, based on the evidence before us, we find termination to be in A.K. Jr.'s best interests. As such, we refuse to disturb the trial court's decision.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated Father's parental rights to A.K., Jr.
Affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur.
