NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MAY, Judge.
John Katzioris appeals the denial of his motion for a status conference to determine whether our decision in Martin Oil Mktg. Ltd. v. Katzioris, 908 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh `g denied, resolved all of Katzioris' claims. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, Katzioris sued Martin Oil Marketing Ltd. and Speedway SuperAmerica LLC (collectively, "Martin") for damage associated with the discharge of hazardous pollutants onto his property from Martin's gas station next door. Martin moved for summary judgment on the ground Katzioris' lawsuit was barred by the six-year statute of limitations and designated evidence in support thereof. Katzioris moved to strike Martin's designated affidavit from John Kiest1 on the ground it was not based on personal knowledge. The trial court denied Martin's summary judgment motion and, in the same order, "denied as moot" Katzioris' motion to strike the Kiest affidavit "in light of the ruling on [Martin's] Motion for Summary Judgment." (Appellant's App. at 22.)
We accepted Martin's interlocutory appeal of the denial of its request for summary judgment. In reversing that denial, we explained:
Returning now to the pivotal question, we must determine whether a question of fact remains as to whether, before August 9, 2000, Katzioris knew or in exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of contamination of his property. [Martin] presented evidence that he did. A report sent in 1994 from ESG to Martin Oil indicated that Katzioris had given oral permission to enter onto his property to test for and, if necessary, remediate contamination. Kiest, then president of ESG, submitted an affidavit stating that "ESG sought and received permission to conduct tests, take samples, monitor and conduct remediation efforts on Johnny's Property from the City of Gary andfrom John L. Katzioris in late fall of 1994." Id. at 148 (emphasis supplied). If true, this means that in 1994 Katzioris was apprised by ESG that his property might have been contaminated and that such might require clean-up efforts, or remediation. Of course, the "if true" qualification is the all-important question here.
Did Katzioris present evidence sufficient to call that assertion into question? The Appellants' counsel questioned Katzioris closely on precisely that issue. Katzioris was asked, "Can you dispute that you ever . . . gave permission to enter on Johnnie's [sic] Gyros property in 1994?" Id. at 104. Katzioris answered in the negative. Repeating now the all-important question from the Appellants' counsel, Katzioris was asked (through an interpreter), "I'd like to know if he remembers giving permission or if he remembers not giving permission or he just doesn't remember." Id. at 104-05. Katzioris replied, "I don't remember at all."
Katzioris, 908 N.E.2d at 1187-88. Because Katzioris could not contradict Martin's evidence that Katzioris gave ESG permission in the fall of 1994 to enter his property to test for contamination and to conduct remediation efforts if necessary, we held Martin demonstrated Katzioris had sufficient information, "long before the date before which said information and knowledge defeats Katzioris's claim by application of the six-year statute of limitations," to cause a reasonable person to inquire further in order to determine whether he had suffered a legal wrong. Id. at 1189. We accordingly reversed the denial of summary judgment.
After our reversal, Katzioris sought a status conference in the trial court on the question whether all claims in the case were resolved by our decision. The trial court determined they were, found "no basis for any further proceedings," (Appellant's App. at 17), and denied Katzioris' motion for a status conference.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Katzioris notes this court relied in part on the Kiest affidavit to support our determination Katzioris gave permission for ESG to test his property for contamination and therefore had information that triggered the limitations period. He also notes the trial court, having denied the Martin summary judgment motion, never ruled on his motion to strike that affidavit. Because we reversed the denial of summary judgment, he argues, his motion to strike is no longer moot and the trial court should rule on it.
Our determination in Katzioris that Katzioris did not bring his action within the limitations period is the law of the case, and we decline to reopen that issue. The law of the case doctrine is that facts determined at one stage of a proceeding, which were part of an issue on which judgment was entered and appeal taken, are unalterably and finally established as part of the law of the case and may not be relitigated at a subsequent stage. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers, Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Even if the judgment is erroneous, it nevertheless becomes the law of the case and thereafter binds the parties unless successfully challenged on appeal. Certain Northeast Annexation Area Landowners v. City of Fort Wayne, 622 N.E.2d 548, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
All issues decided directly or by implication in a prior decision are binding in all further portions of the same case. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 800 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ("American Family IT') (emphasis added). The doctrine does not foreclose legitimate appeals of issues not previously decided, but it is invoked in the interests of judicial economy and prompt dispensation of justice to preclude the promotion of potentially endless litigation and appeals. Id. at 1019-20. The admissibility of the Kiest affidavit was an issue "decided by implication" in our decision and, thus, in subsequent proceedings, the admissibility of the affidavit and the summary judgment for Martin are the law of the case.
In Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 775 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (("'American Family I"), we determined Federated's attempt to exclude persons from uninsured motorist coverage because they are not directors, officers, partners, and owners of the named insured was void under Indiana statute and that Federated did not show the named insured waived that statutory requirement. Id. at 1206. We also stated failure to obtain written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage required an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage equal to bodily injury liability limits, and there had been no written rejection of full-liability limits of uninsured motorist coverage by the named insured. Id. We unequivocally ordered Federated to provide uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 1207.
On remand, Federated filed an amended exhibit list with a document indicating there had been a waiver. The document had not been included in the material on which Federated relied for summary judgment in the first appeal, but American Family had raised the lack of a written waiver as an issue in its cross-motion for summary judgment before the first appeal. The trial court denied American Family's motion to strike the exhibit and granted Federated's motion for summary judgment.
In American Family II, the appeal after that remand, we reversed. Federated argued, as does Katzioris in the case before us, the law of the case doctrine would not prevent it from presenting new or additional evidence on a second summary judgment after an appeal. We distinguished decisions where we declined to invoke the law of the case doctrine when additional or new evidence was presented after remand "where the evidence after remand was in accordance with our instructions or did not alter a matter that had already been finally determined." 800 N.E.2d at 1021 (emphasis added).
In American Family I, by contrast, "[o]ur multifaceted approach-on statutory, public policy, contract, and evidentiary grounds — to the broad issue whether Federated was required to provide uninsured motorist coverage for the Browns, left no gap to be filled by the presentation of additional evidence on remand." Id. Even if one aspect "was arguably wrongly decided due to Federated's failure to present all the evidence on the issue, that issue was nonetheless finally determined on the merits." Id. We further noted Federated did not avail itself of procedures for suspending an appeal and presenting new evidence to the trial court: "Based upon the information presented to this court, we stated that no written rejection existed and that Federated was required to provide uninsured motorist coverage. Federated did not request rehearing. Federated did not petition for transfer. As such, the opinion was certified to the trial court." Id. at 1021-22.
The case before us is similar. In Katzioris, Katzioris argued that this court should not consider the Kiest affidavit. In the brief he submitted in Katzioris, Katzioris explicitly argued the Kiest affidavit did not amount to evidence Katzioris gave permission: "It is . . . only a statement of his beliefs that [Katzioris'] verbal permission was obtained in November 1994 based on what others said and the same `verbal permission' verbiage in the ESG December 2, 1004 report." (Appellees' App. at 85.) Katzioris sought rehearing, where he again argued this court should not have relied on the Kiest affidavit. We denied rehearing and Katzioris did not seek transfer.
The better practice might have been for the Katzioris panel to remand so the trial court could rule on the motion to strike.2 But it is evident that even though the trial court never ruled on the motion, the question of the admissibility of the affidavit was an issue "decided . .. by implication" in Katzioris, and it is therefore "binding in all further portions of the same case." American Family II, 800 N.E.2d at 1019. It was not error for the trial court to deny
Katzioris' request for a status conference, and we accordingly affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
