BARTEAU, Senior Judge.
Petitioner-Appellant Deanna Thompson Stull ("Deanna") appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Respondents-Appellees Larry L. Thompson Revocable Trust ("the Trust"), Derek Thompson ("Derek"), and Vicki Thompson Craver ("Vicki"). We affirm.
Deanna raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court's judgment in favor of the Trust, Derek, and Vicki is erroneous.
In addition, the Trust, Derek, and Vicki contend that Deanna's appeal is frivolous and request appellate attorney's fees.
This is the third appeal in this case. The facts set forth in the first appeal are as follows:
In re Thompson Revocable Trust, 856 N.E.2d 1252, 1253-54 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) ("Thompson I") (footnote omitted), trans. denied. The Trust, Derek, and Vicki pursued an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling. This Court determined that the defect in Deanna's first execution of the form, and the circumstances under which Deanna executed the second form, did not invalidate her consent to Larry Thompson's ("Larry") beneficiary designation. Therefore, this Court concluded that "summary judgment in favor of the Trust is appropriate," and reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id. at 1259.
Next, we turn to the facts relevant to the second appeal in this case, as follows:
Id. at 10.
On remand, the trial court held a pretrial hearing on August 14, 2009 regarding the issues to be tried. On the same day, the trial court issued a docket entry, as follows:
Appellant's App. p. 23. The case was tried to the bench. After the trial, the court issued a final judgment. The judgment states:
Id. at 29. Subsequently, Deanna filed a Motion to Correct Errors and a Motion to Amend Petition in Equity to Conform to Evidence. The trial court denied both motions. This appeal followed.
At the beginning of the bench trial, the court granted an oral request to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the trial court's final judgment, as quoted above, consists of partial findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Deanna argues that the trial court improperly barred her from raising certain claims at the bench trial in support of her request for a constructive trust. Specifically, Deanna contends that she should have been allowed to argue: (1) a confidential relationship existed between her and Derek, and his misrepresentations in connection with Deanna's execution of the beneficiary designation form after Larry's death improperly deprived her of a share of Larry's retirement benefits and the Trust's property; and (2) a constructive trust is necessary to remedy Deanna's mistake of fact, specifically that she thought that if she agreed to Larry's designation of the Trust as the recipient of his retirement benefits, she would become a beneficiary of the trust equal to Derek and Vicki.
Before turning to the merits of Deanna's argument, the Trust, Derek, and Vicki assert that Deanna has waived both of her additional claims in support of her request for an equitable trust. Specifically, the Trust, Derek, and Vicki assert that Deanna failed to object to or otherwise challenge the trial court's August 14, 2009 docket entry identifying the issues to be tried. They further assert that in the absence of an objection, Deanna waived any other claims she may have intended to present at trial.
A party must show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits of a claim before seeking an opinion on appeal. Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526, 533 (Ind.2006). In this case, in February 2009, the trial court held a pretrial conference. The court subsequently issued a docket entry stating, "There is some difference in opinion among counsel as to issues to be tried. The Court sets a deadline of June 1, 2009, for counsel to file statements of contentions on pretrial matters." Appellant's App. p. 22. In June 2009, the Trust, Derek, and Vicki filed a motion to clarify the scope of proceedings, and Deanna filed a "Statement of Contentions." Id. at 23. In her Statement, Deanna argued that Derek owed her a duty to carry out Larry's instructions as she described them. Deanna further stated, "[N]one of her previously pleaded equitable claims have been precluded by the Court of Appeals' opinion. . . ." Id. at 78. On August 14, 2009, the trial court held a hearing,
Based upon these materials, we conclude that Deanna has not waived her claim that
We now turn to Deanna's argument that the trial court should have allowed her to argue at trial that a constructive trust is necessary because she had a confidential relationship with Derek, whom she alleges misled her. The Trust, Derek, and Vicki respond that the Court's opinion in Thompson II fully addressed and resolved all of Deanna's equitable claims for a constructive trust, and the trial court properly barred her from presenting her additional equitable claim.
Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts. Pinnacle Media, LLC v. Metro. Dev. Comm'n of Marion Cnty., 868 N.E.2d 894, 901 (Ind. Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. All issues decided directly or by implication in a prior decision are binding in all further portions of the same case. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 800 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). In addition, facts established at one stage of a proceeding, which were part of an issue on which judgment was entered and appeal taken, are unalterably and finally established as part of the law of the case and may not be relitigated at a subsequent stage. Id. The law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice. Id. A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Id.
In Thompson II, Deanna appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on "the issue of whether a constructive trust should be imposed." Thompson II, Cause No. 54A01-0802-CV-52, at 4. A panel of this Court stated, "The issue before us is whether the Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on [Deanna's] claim of constructive fraud upon which she seeks to impose a constructive trust." Id. at 6. This Court further noted, "The parties' arguments are directed at whether Derek had a confidential or fiduciary duty to [Deanna]. . . ." Id. at 7. This Court concluded, as is noted above, "[T]he determination of the existence of a confidential relationship between Derek and Larry should be left to the fact finder," and "the fact finder will be faced with the factual issue of determining the true content of Larry's directions to Derek and whether Derek agreed to carry them out." Id. at 9. The Court did not identify any other issues of material fact to be addressed on remand.
We conclude from the foregoing that the Thompson II Court considered and decided all aspects of Deanna's claim in equity for a constructive trust. In fact, the Thompson II Court specifically noted that the parties were asking for a determination as to whether Derek had a confidential relationship to Deanna, which is the issue that Deanna now seeks to raise. Deanna
This Court may, in its discretion, assess damages, including attorney's fees, against an appellant if an appeal is frivolous or in bad faith. Ind. Appellate Rule 66(E). We will assess appellate damages only against an appellant who in bad faith maintains a wholly frivolous appeal. Harness v. Schmitt, 924 N.E.2d 162, 168 (Ind. Ct.App.2010). A strong showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more egregious. Id.
Here, we have found that Deanna's appeal is without merit and have affirmed the Montgomery Superior Court's judgment. Nevertheless, although Deanna did not prevail, we cannot conclude that this appeal is frivolous or that Deanna has maintained this appeal in bad faith. Consequently, we deny the Trust, Derek, and Vicki's request for appellate attorney's fees. See id. at 169 (declining to award appellate attorney's fees to an appellee because the appellant's claims were not "utterly devoid of plausibility").
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and deny the Trust, Derek, and Vicki's request for appellate attorney's fees.
Affirmed.
DARDEN, J., concurs.
BROWN, J., concurs in result.