BROWN, Judge.
Donald K. Haire and Julie A. Haire appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Andrew Parker. The Haires raise three issues, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in granting Parker's motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.
The relevant facts as designated by the parties follow.
To some extent all motor vehicles are potentially dangerous. The participants should take part in motor vehicle events based on their own abilities. Regardless of state law, Haspin Acres strongly urges the participant to wear a helmet and other appropriate safety apparel. Haspin also urges participants to receive professional instruction before operating any motor vehicle.
Any participant who: prior to starting an event doubts their ability to participate in an event, feels they have not adequately prepared themselves and their equipment, questions the safety
In consideration of permission to enter for any purpose the NON-PUBLIC AREA (defined as any area to which admission is not open to the general public, including but not limited to pit areas, judging areas, special promotion areas, racing surfaces, walkways, official's and participants' areas, etc.) of the above location, and/or in further consideration of permission to observe and/or participate in the above described meet in any capacity whatsoever, I hereby understand and agree as follows:
1. I RELEASE, DISCHARGE AND AGREE NOT TO SUE THE HASPIN ACRES MOTORPARK, its officers, trustees, employees and agents, meet officials, promoters, sponsors, motorcycle owners, riders, mechanics and pit crew and owners and lessees of premises used in connection with the meet, and each of their respective employees and agents, from all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, liability loss or injury (including death) of whatsoever kind, nature or description that may arise to my person and property, in any way resulting from or arising in connection with the above-described meet while I am in the NON-PUBLIC AREA.
2. I ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND THE RISK OF loss, damage or injury (including death) of whatsoever kind, nature or description that may arise to my person and property notwithstanding any negligence of the HASPIN ACRES REC PARK, its officers, trustees, employees and agents, meet officials, promoters, sponsors, motorcycle owners, riders, mechanics and pit crew, and owners and lessees of premises used in connection with the meet, and each of their respective employees and agents, while I am for any reason in the NON-PUBLIC AREA voluntarily and upon reliance of my own judgment and ability and knowledge of the risks and hazards to myself and property while entering, upon departing such area.
3. I INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS the HASPIN ACRES REC PARK, its officers, trustees, employees, and agents, meet officials, promoters, sponsors, motorcycle owners, riders mechanics and pit crew, and owners and lessees of premises used in connection with the damage, or cost each of them may incur due to my presence in the above-described NON-PUBLIC AREA.
4. THIS RELEASE, ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT SHALL BE BINDING UPON my heirs, administrators, executors and assigns.
If any portion of this RELEASE ASSUMPTION of RISK AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT is held invalid, the balance shall notwithstanding continue in full legal force and effect.
I HAVE READ AND VOLUNTARILY SIGN THIS RELEASE, ASSUMPTION OR RISK AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, AND I certify that no oral representation statements or inducements apart from the foregoing written agreement have been made.
Appellants' Appendix at 47.
At some point, Parker's ATV "rolled down" a hill and "tipped over." Id. at 143. Parker turned his ATV back over and started it as he stood beside it. "The throttle cable was stretched so [the ATV] took off." Id. at 65. Donald described the incident as follows:
Id. at 84. Parker later described the incident as follows:
Id. at 143. Donald sustained physical injuries.
On October 26, 2009, the Haires filed a complaint against Parker alleging that Parker was negligent which resulted in physical injuries and expenses to the Haires and that Julie lost the services and consortium of Donald. On December 18, 2009, Parker filed an answer setting out nine defenses. The Haires filed an amended complaint alleging that Donald was injured by Parker's actions and that Julie lost the services and consortium of Donald.
On June 2, 2010, Parker filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the Haires' claims against Parker were explicitly barred as a result of Donald's execution of the Release. On October 6, 2010, the Haires filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment/Response to Defendant, Andrew Parker's, Motion for Summary Judgment and Designation of Evidence in Support Thereof. Parker filed a response and argued that he was entitled to summary judgment based upon the Release and based upon the idea that "participants in sporting events will not be permitted to recover against their co-participants for injuries sustained as the result of the inherent or foreseeable dangers of the sport." Id. at 117. The trial court granted Parker's motion for summary judgment and denied the Haires' motion for partial summary judgment.
The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Parker's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(c); Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmovant. Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 973. Our review of a summary
"In order to prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach." Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind.2004). In negligence cases, summary judgment is "rarely appropriate." Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004). "This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Id. Nevertheless, a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 385.
The parties disagree as to whether the Release signed by Donald applies to Parker. Generally, only parties to a contract or those in privity with the parties have rights under the contract.
OEC-Diasonics, Inc. v. Major, 674 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315 (Ind.1996). However,
Id. at 1315 (internal citation omitted). The intent of the contracting parties to bestow rights upon a third party must affirmatively appear from the language of the instrument when properly interpreted and construed. Id. However, it is not necessary that the intent to benefit a third party be demonstrated any more clearly than the parties' intent regarding any other terms of the contract. Id.
"A release, as with any contract, should be interpreted according to the standard rules of contract law." Huffman v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 588 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind.1992). "[R]elease documents shall be interpreted in the same manner as any other contract document, with the intention of the parties regarding the purpose of the document governing." OEC-Diasonics, Inc., 674 N.E.2d at 1314 (quoting Huffman, 588 N.E.2d at 1267). Generally, "[i]nterpretation of a contract is a pure question of law and is reviewed de novo." Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 249, 252 (Ind.2005). If its terms are clear and unambiguous,
The Release provided that Donald released, discharged, and agreed not to sue:
Appellants' Appendix at 47. The Release also listed the entities in the following paragraphs:
Id.
The Haires argue that because "the plain language of the Release does not identify Parker by name or category, there is no affirmative intent to benefit Parker" and that Parker "does not have standing to enforce the Release." Appellants' Brief at 15. The Haires argue that "[t]he Release does not say it releases anybody who is on the property, nor does it say it releases the general public." Id. at 14. The Haires argue that "[t]he effect of the possessive `its' controls the entire list, including `riders,'" and that "[t]he express provision states `its . . . riders,' not all riders." Id.
Parker argues that he was a rider and that "the Release . . . clearly states (without qualification) that Haire agreed to release, discharge and not sue, among other individuals and entities, all `riders' at Haspin Acres, which clearly includes Parker who was likewise operating an ATV." Appellee's Brief at 9. Parker argues that:
Id. at 10.
In their reply brief, the Haires argue:
Appellants' Reply Brief at 7.
To the extent that the Haires argue that "the entire list of categories is controlled by the possessive `its,'" we observe that the list includes "riders," "motorcycle owners," "mechanics and pit crew, and owners and lessees of premises," Appellants' Appendix at 47, and the plain language of the Release does not reveal whether these entities are or are not owned by or separate from Haspin Acres and such a conclusion is dependent upon certain extrinsic facts. Further, even assuming that "its" applied to the entire list of categories as the Haires contend, we cannot say based upon the language of the Release whether, on the one hand, being a Haspin Acres' rider requires a certain type of relationship between the rider and Haspin Acres or, on the other hand, one of Haspin Acres' riders is merely a person in Parker's position, i.e., someone who went to Haspin Acres, stopped at the gate, went inside, showed them identification, signed a waiver, gave Haspin Acres money, and rode his ATV around Haspin Acres. We conclude that there is a question of fact as to whether Parker was a rider for purposes of the Release.
The Haires also argue that Donald was not in a non-public area. The
In his motion for summary judgment, Parker cited Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 9 and alleged that the Release Agreement was applicable because Donald "admits that he was injured in an area that was not open to the general public, as it is undisputed that he was required to sign the Release Agreement and pay a fee before being allowed into the park." Appellants' Appendix at 34-35. On appeal, Parker again cites to Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 9 and argues that "Haire admits that he was injured in an area that was not open to the general public, as it is undisputed that he was required to sign the Release Agreement and pay a fee before being allowed into the park." Appellee's Brief at 12. Without citation to the record, Parker also argues that "the Release's `non-public area' definition includes `participants' areas,' which definition clearly applies to Haire and his location at the time of the occurrence." Id.
Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 9 states:
Appellants' Appendix at 52-53. We cannot say that Donald's response to Request No. 9 reveals that he admits that he was injured in an area that was not open to the general public. Further, Request No. 8 and Donald's response to Request No. 8 state:
Id. at 51-52. We cannot say based upon the designated evidence and as a matter of law that the incident occurred in a Non-Public Area.
Lastly, the Haires argue that Donald "must be a participant" and "participate in a `scheduled event'" for the Release to apply. Appellants' Brief at 15. The Haires argue that "both `event' and `meet' should be interpreted harmoniously to mean an organized sporting competition, which is very different from the informal, recreational weekend of ATV trail-riding Haire and Parker anticipated." Id. at 17. The Haires point to the fact that the Release contains a blank area provided for the "Description and Location of Scheduled Event(s)." Appellants' Brief at 15 (quoting Appellants' Appendix at 26). The Haires also point to the following statement in the Release: "Any participant who: prior to starting an event doubts their ability to participate in an event. . . ." Id. (quoting Appellants' Appendix at 26). Parker argues that "an examination of the actual language of the contract reveals plain, unambiguous language that clearly states the intention of the parties, and which does not require any of the creative interpretation that the Appellants provide." Appellee's Brief at 11. Based upon the language in the Release, we cannot say that the Release requires that Donald be a participant in a scheduled event or meet.
In summary, we conclude that issues of fact exist as to whether Parker was a rider within the terms of the Release and whether Donald was in a non-public area at the time of the incident. Accordingly, the court erred in granting Parker's motion for summary judgment.
The Haires argue that "[t]he doctrine of inherent risk does not apply to this case because non-competitive, recreational ATV usage is not an organized sport." Appellants' Brief at 20. Parker cites Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. 2011), and argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because "there has been absolutely no facts alleged that would suggest that Parker acted outside of the scope of ordinary behavior for a person participating in an ATV activity." Appellee's Brief at 15. In their reply brief, the Haires argue that Pfenning "does not change the conclusion that casual, recreational ATV usage still is not an organized sport" and that "common-law negligence principles apply here." Appellants' Reply Brief at 13. The Haires also argue that "[u]nder the Pfenning analysis, there must still be an organized sport, not merely a recreational activity." Id. Lastly, the Haires contend that "[b]ecause recreational ATV usage is not an organized sport, and because there is no way to ascertain reasonableness as a matter of law, the inherent risk doctrine does not apply." Id. at 14.
In Pfenning, Cassie Pfenning was injured by a golf ball at a golf outing when
Pfenning brought an action against Joseph E. Lineman, the golfer who hit the ball that struck her. Id. at 396. Lineman sought summary judgment on grounds that he could not be held liable under a negligence theory because the plaintiff was a co-participant in the sporting event, and her injuries resulted from an inherent risk of the sport. Id. at 398. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 396. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court "reject[ed] the concept that a participant in a sporting event owes no duty of care to protect others from inherent risks of the sport," but adopted "instead the view that summary judgment is proper when the conduct of a sports participant is within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport and therefore is reasonable as a matter of law." Id. at 396.
The Court held:
Id. at 403-404. The Court held that "in negligence claims against a participant in a sports activity, if the conduct of such participant is within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport, the conduct is reasonable as a matter of law and does not constitute a breach of duty."
Here, even assuming that this case is one "involving sports injuries," we cannot say that the "general nature of the conduct reasonable and appropriate for a participant" in ATV riding "is usually commonly understood and subject to ascertainment as a matter of law." Id. at 403-404. Specifically, we cannot say as a matter of law and Parker does not direct our attention to any designated evidence suggesting that his conduct of starting his ATV while standing beside it after the ATV had "tipped over" was conduct within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport and reasonable as a matter of law. Appellants' Appendix at 143. Accordingly, we conclude that an issue of fact exists as to whether Parker's actions constituted a breach of duty and that the trial court erred in granting Parker's motion for summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's grant of Parker's motion for summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.