OPINION

DARDEN, Senior Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Guydell Watson appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle with a blood-alcohol content ("BAC") of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent, a class C misdemeanor.1

We affirm.

ISSUES

FACTS

At approximately 4:40 p.m. on September 18, 2010, Officer Eric Holtzleiter of the Anderson Police Department was parked in his marked police vehicle when he observed Watson driving his vehicle west on East 32nd Street, which had a posted speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour. Using his radar gun, Officer Holtzleiter clocked Watson's speed at fifty-one miles per hour. Once Watson passed, Officer Holtzleiter activated his emergency lights and sirens and initiated a traffic stop.

As Officer Holtzleiter approached the driver's side window, he "immediately noticed a clear bottle in between [Watson]'s legs." (Tr. 122). The bottle was "[w]ell less than half" full and labeled "Demitri Premium London Gin." (Tr. 125). Officer Holtzleiter ordered Watson to give him the bottle and the car keys. As Watson did so, Officer Holtzleiter observed that Watson's movements were "a little slow and a little unsteady." (Tr. 127). Officer Holtzleiter also "detected a strong odor of an alcoholic-type beverage coming from his person." (Tr. 127).

Officer Holtzleiter ordered Watson to exit the vehicle. Watson complied but had "difficulty getting the handle [and] opening the door[.]" (Tr. 128). As he exited the vehicle, Watson "was kind of unsteady" and had to lean against the vehicle "for balance." (Tr. 128). Officer Holtzleiter then administered several field sobriety tests, which Watson failed.

Officer Holtzleiter placed Watson under arrest and transported him to the Anderson Police Department, where Officer Holtzleiter administered a breath test with a B.A.C. Datamaster ("Datamaster"). The breath test revealed a blood-alcohol content of .15 percent.

On or about September 20, 2010, the State charged Watson with Count 1, operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent, a class A misdemeanor; and Count 2, operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent with a previous conviction for operating while intoxicated, a class D felony. A jury trial, commenced on March 23, 2011, resulted in a hung jury. Subsequently, the State again charged Watson with Count 1, operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent, a class A misdemeanor; and Count 2, operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent with a previous conviction for operating while intoxicated, a class D felony.

On April 8, 2011, Watson filed a motion for public funds with which to hire an expert witness and requested an ex parte hearing. The trial court held an open hearing on the motion on April 12, 2011. Finding "no factual basis" for, and "no real clarification made as to the request," the trial court denied the motion. (Hr'g Tr. 9).

The trial court commenced a second jury trial on June 8, 2011. During the trial, Robert Nolley, an inspector with the Indiana State Department of Toxicology, testified that one of his duties is to "inspect and repair breath test instrumentation" such as Datamasters. (Tr. 75-76). Nolley testified that Datamasters are inspected and calibrated every three months. He further testified that the Datamasters are calibrated to "read out less" than the actual BAC to "give the benefit of the doubt to [a] defendant." (Tr. 87). Nolley testified that as a result, a test "using a .15 solution," (tr. 87), from a known sample would give a result "somewhere no lower than .14 nor higher than .149" percent BAC. (Tr. 88). Thus, if someone has an actual BAC of .15 percent, "they should test somewhere between .140 and .149" percent. (Tr. 88). On cross-examination, Nolley agreed that if a Datamaster is "out of calibration," a person with an actual BAC of .149 could test at .15 percent. (Tr. 100).

Over Watson's objection, the trial court also instructed the jury on operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent as a lesser-included offense of operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent. Specifically, the trial court instructed as follows:

(Tr. 292-94).

As to Count 1, the jury found Watson guilty of operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent, a class C misdemeanor, as a lesser-included offense. The State then made a motion to amend the charging information for Count 2 to operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent with a previous conviction for operating while intoxicated, a class D felony. The trial court granted the motion, and Watson pleaded guilty to Count 2.

The trial court held a sentencing hearing on June 30, 2011. For purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged Count 1 with Count 2 and sentenced Watson to 1095 days in the Department of Correction, with 715 days to be executed.

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DECISION

1. Jury Instructions

Watson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury.2

Gravens v. State, 836 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. Ct.App.2005) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

Here, Watson argues that the trial court improperly granted the State's request for an instruction on operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent as a lesser-included offense of operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent.

Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1231-32 (Ind.2008) (internal citations omitted).

Indiana Code section 9-30-5-1 provides, in relevant part, as follows;

The State originally charged that Watson, on or about September 18, 2010, "did knowingly operate a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least fifteen-hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol per 210 liters of said defendant's breath, to-wit: fifteen hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of the person's breath." (App. 1).

In Sering v. State, 488 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. Ct.App.1986), Sering appealed his convictions for operating a vehicle with a BAC of.10 percent and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. At that time, the former offense was a class C misdemeanor and the latter offense was a class A misdemeanor.

In determining whether the former was a lesser-included offense of the latter, the Sering court reiterated that an offense is a lesser included offense "if it differs from another `only in the respect that a less serious ... risk of harm ... to the public interest ... is required to establish its commission.'" Sering, 488 N.E.2d at 375 (quoting Indiana Code section 35-41-1-16(3)). There, the court determined that the risk of harm, namely, "the cost in lives and property occasioned by the intoxicated driver," to the public interest in the operation of a vehicle while intoxicated is the "same risk implicit in the BAC of .10% offense." Id. The Sering court's analysis continued:

Id. at 376 (original footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

The harm or risk of harm is the same threat to the public whether occasioned by a driver operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than.15 percent or a driver operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent. Operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent, however, is a class C misdemeanor while operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent is a class A misdemeanor. Given the disparate classification of the two alcohol-related offenses, it is evident that the legislature intended the former to be a lesser-included offense of the latter. See id.

Accordingly, we find that operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .08 percent but less than .15 percent is an inherently lesser-included offense of operating a vehicle with a BAC of at least .15 percent. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in instructing the jury on operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class C misdemeanor.3

2. Appointment of Expert

Watson next asserts that the trial court improperly denied his request for expert witness funds, where he sought to hire an expert to decipher the results of tests performed on the Datamaster used by Officer Holtzleiter.

Kocielko v. State, 938 N.E.2d 243, 254-55 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (internal citations omitted), on reh'g, 943 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind.Ct. App.2011), trans. denied.

On April 12, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on Watson's motion for public funds with which to hire an expert witness. During the hearing, Watson's counsel asserted that he sought funds for an expert witness "to find out if the maintenance reports" on the Datamaster used on September 18, 2010, "are correct."4 (Hr'g Tr. 8). He also sought "other general information about the accuracy of the" Datamaster. (Hr'g Tr. 8). Finding "no factual basis demonstrated for the necessity for expert witness funds ..., and no real clarification made as to the request itself as to what's being sought and why the expert is needed," the trial court denied Watson's motion. (Hr'g Tr. 9).

Here, Watson failed to show that the proposed unnamed expert could demonstrate that which he desired from the expert, and in fact, failed to set forth that which he desired with any specificity, only arguing that he sought "general" information. (Hr'g Tr. 8). Thus, it appeared that the purpose for the expert was only exploratory. Watson also failed to set forth the costs of an expert and whether the State would be expending substantial resources on the case. Moreover, Watson does not demonstrate that he faced particularly serious charges. Finally, Watson had the opportunity to, and in fact did, extensively cross-examine Nolley regarding the functioning, testing, and calibrating of the Datamaster.

Watson failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a need for the appointment of an expert. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in denying Watson public funds with which to hire an expert witness.

3. Motion in Limine

Watson asserts that the trial court improperly granted the State's motion in limine, which sought to exclude any evidence regarding the Datamaster's repair history. Watson argues that "[a]s far as evidence of guilt, ... there were the error reports of the Datamaster that seemed ripe for review by an independent expert witness." Watson's Br. at 20.

Simmons v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (internal citations omitted); Hollowell v. State, 753 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ind.2001) ("In order to preserve an error for appellate review, a party must do more than challenge the ruling on a motion in limine"). "It is well settled that an offer of proof is required to preserve an error in the exclusion of a witness' testimony." Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 287 (Ind. Ct.App.2009), trans. denied.

In this case, Watson fails to argue, or cite to that portion of the transcript reflecting such an argument, if any, that he requested relief during the trial from the trial court's prior ruling on the motion in limine or otherwise sought to present any evidence regarding the Datamaster's repair or test records. Watson therefore has waived his arguments regarding the trial court's granting of the State's motion in limine and exclusion of evidence. See Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1050 (Ind. Ct.App.2005) ("A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record."), trans. denied. See also Hollowell, 753 N.E.2d at 615-16 (recognizing that "[a]bsent... a ruling excluding evidence accompanied by a proper offer of proof, there is no basis for a claim of error").

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.