OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

May a court order a parent to make a child available for an interview requested by the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") to assess that child's "condition" pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7, where the child's older sibling has made and then recanted allegations of sexual abuse against a family member who lives in the children's home? The trial court in this case answered that question in the affirmative, and we agree.

Facts and Procedural History

In November 2011, nine-year-old G.W. and her twelve-year-old sister, M.F., lived with their mother, A.W. ("Mother"), and stepfather, J.W. ("Stepfather"), in Trafalgar. M.F. told Mother that Stepfather had kissed her and rubbed her legs while they watched television and had cuddled with her in bed and touched her bottom. In response to these revelations, Mother took M.F. to a counseling session in Greenwood on November 14, 2011. Shortly after the session ended, Mother was contacted by DCS about M.F.'s allegations against Stepfather.

Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-1(a) provides that DCS "shall initiate an appropriately thorough child protection assessment of every report of known or suspected child abuse or neglect the department receives, whether in accordance with this article or otherwise." "If the report alleges a child may be a victim of child abuse, the assessment shall be initiated immediately, but not later than twenty-four (24) hours after receipt of the report." Ind. Code § 31-33-8-1(c). Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-6 provides that "[t]he primary purpose of the assessment is the protection of the child." Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7(b), the assessment may include "[a]n interview with the subject child." DCS requested an interview with M.F. Prior to the interview, DCS received copies of diary entries typed on a computer owned by M.F.'s paternal grandmother, but stored under M.F.'s password, that describe sexual intercourse between M.F. and Stepfather. Also, M.F.'s biological father reported to DCS that M.F. had told G.W. about Stepfather's inappropriate touching and that G.W. then told Mother about the touching.

During her interview at Susie's Place in Bloomington, M.F. recanted her allegations against Stepfather. She said that she made those allegations because she was angry with Mother for not spending as much time with her or doing as many things with her as she once had. M.F. also denied making the diary entries and said that she was the one who had told Mother about the touching incidents. Despite M.F.'s recantation, DCS requested an interview with G.W. Mother refused the request.

On December 15, 2011, DCS filed an amended verified emergency petition to compel Mother and Stepfather to make G.W. available for an interview. The petition reads in pertinent part as follows:

Appellee's App. at 1-2.

DCS based its petition on three statutes, only two of which are mentioned in the trial court's order. The first is Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7, which reads as follows:

The second statute is 31-32-13-1, which provides:

On December 20, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. DCS family case manager Ashley Collins testified that she wanted to interview G.W. "to make sure that she's safe and also discuss the inconsistencies" regarding how Mother learned about the alleged abuse. Tr. at 11. On December 27, 2011, the trial court issued an order granting the petition that reads in pertinent part as follows:

Appellant's App. at 5-6. The trial court stayed its order pending Mother's appeal.2

Discussion and Decision

Mother challenges the trial court's grant of DCS's petition to compel. We note that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects a parent's fundamental right to raise her child without undue interference by the state. In re T.H., 856 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). That fundamental right is not unlimited, however, because "the state has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children. When parents neglect, abuse, or abandon their children, the state has the authority under its parens patriae power to intervene." G.B. v. Dearborn Cnty. Div. of Family & Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (2002).

Here, Mother contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7 authorizes a court to compel a parent to make available for an interview a child who is not the subject of a child abuse investigation.3 Our standard of review is well settled.

KPMG, Peat Marwick, LLP v. Carmel Fin. Corp., 784 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 (Ind.Ct. App.2003) (citations omitted). Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia (on the same subject) and should be construed together to produce a harmonious statutory scheme. Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind.2009).

Appellant's Br. at 9-10 (citing Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7(b)(2)). Be that as it may, the statute also provides that an assessment, "to the extent that is reasonably possible, must include ... [t]he names and conditions of other children in the home." Ind. Code § 31-33-8-7(a)(3) (emphasis added). And the statute specifically contemplates that DCS may interview those "other children" to determine their conditions and obtain a court order if necessary to facilitate such interviews. See Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7(d) ("If a custodial parent, a guardian, or a custodian of a child [as opposed to `the child' or `the subject child' mentioned elsewhere in the statute] refuses to allow the department to interview the child after the caseworker has attempted to obtain the consent of the custodial parent, guardian, or custodian to interview the child, the department may petition a court to order the custodial parent, guardian, or custodian to make the child available to be interviewed by the caseworker.") (emphasis added).

Mother challenges the intrusiveness of and necessity for an interview in this case:

Appellant's Br. at 11-12 (citations to appendix and transcript omitted).

As for Mother's suggestion that Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7(a)(3) refers only to a child's physical condition, we disagree. The statute contains no such limitation, and we may not read one into it. See Am. Heritage Banco, Inc. v. McNaughton, 879 N.E.2d 1110, 1117 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) ("We may not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature."). In the context of a child abuse investigation, common sense dictates that DCS must assess the overall conditions of other children in the home, including their physical, psychological, and emotional status.

Regarding Mother's complaints about the proposed interview arrangements, she cites no statutory or constitutional prohibitions against them, and we are aware of none. In fact, Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-2 requires DCS to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency when it receives a report of suspected child abuse, and that agency must investigate the report in conjunction with DCS. Moreover, Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7(e) specifically provides that the court "may grant the motion to interview the child, either with or without the custodial parent ... being present." Also, nothing prohibits DCS from designating a third party to interview a child outside the home.4

Mother's insistence that an interview is unnecessary because M.F. recanted her allegations against Stepfather and denied writing the aforementioned diary entries disregards DCS's threshold obligation to assess the "conditions of other children in the home" pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7(a)(3). The trial court heard testimony from DCS's Collins that "recantation is a part of [the] disclosure process" and that the police were still analyzing the computer on which the incriminating diary entries were typed to determine whether M.F. had actually written them. Tr. at 14, 15. Mother's assertion that M.F.'s recantation and denial must be taken at face value is unsupported by either law or logic.

For largely the same reasons, we are unpersuaded by Mother's assertion that an interview of G.W. is unnecessary because there are no allegations of abuse involving G.W. and Mother testified that G.W. has never been in any danger. As the trial court noted in its order, M.F.'s allegations are serious, and she and G.W. are relatively close in age. Simply because no allegations have been made regarding G.W. and Mother has vouched for her safety does not mean that DCS's and the trial court's concerns are unwarranted. By the same token, G.W.'s school attendance proves little regarding her overall condition for purposes of Indiana Code Section 31-33-8-7(a)(3).

In sum, Mother has failed to establish that the trial court erred in granting DCS's petition to compel. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's order.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., concurs.

RILEY, J., dissents with opinion.

RILEY, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's opinion to affirm the trial court's order to make G.W. available for a forensic interview at Susie's Place in Bloomington. In reaching its decision, the majority equates the DCS's request for a forensic interview of a child who is not the subject of an abuse investigation with the statutory requirement that the DCS's assessment must include "[t]he names and conditions of other children in the home." I.C. § 31-33-8-7(a)(3) (emphasis added). Specifically, the opinion interprets "condition" as encompassing the possibility to subject the other children in the home to an invasive forensic interview.

The majority commences its analysis with the premise that DCS's argument arises out of a concern for G.W.'s `condition.' However, DCS's appellate argument contradicts its clear intentions as evidenced by its words and actions during the trial court proceedings. At no point during the proceedings before the trial court did the DCS ever refer to its concern for G.W.'s `condition'; rather, repeating a constant theme, the DCS hammered on its right to forensically interview G.W. and Mother's refusal thereof. DCS was overtly confident of its authority, to the point that it had scheduled G.W.'s interview at Susie's Place to take place two days after the trial court's hearing. To be sure, DCS's request is more invasive than a mere kitchen table conversation to assess G.W.'s condition in her home and in the presence of her parents. Instead, as conceded by DCS's family case manager, a forensic interview entails G.W. being taken from her parents and subjected to an examination by a certified forensic interviewer while several DCS employees and law enforcement agents watch from another room. It is my opinion that DCS lacks the statutory authority to conduct a forensic interview of a non-subject child residing in the home.

It is worth repeating that Ind.Code § 31-33-8-7 addresses the scope of assessment by the DCS and provides, in pertinent part:

Both parties acknowledge and I agree that the use of the word "child" or "subject child" within the statute references the child who is the focus of the DCS investigation, i.e., G.W.'s sister. As such, the only provision applicable to G.W. resides with I.C. § 31-33-8-7(b)(3) which specifies that the DCS may conduct an examination of any child in the home. However, because Mother refused to consent to the forensic interview, the procedures pursuant to I.C. § 31-32-12 had to be followed. See I.C. § 31-33-8-7(c)(2). Therefore, in the absence of parental consent, the trial court could only order an examination upon certification by a physician that an emergency existed. See I.C. § 31-32-12. No certification was filed in the instant case.

Although the majority initially appears to accept the statutory distinction between "child" and "other children in the home," it nevertheless then muddles the interpretation of the statute by erasing this distinction in its application of subsection (d). By finding that a child in subsection (d) encompasses the subject child AND the other children in the home, the majority effectively makes subsection (b) of the statute obsolete. See Humphreys v. Day, 735 N.E.2d 837, 842 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (Statute must be interpreted as a whole and in reference to all the other companion provisions.). In my interpretation, subsection (d) merely clarifies subsection (b)(2) — interview with the SUBJECT child — and allows the DCS to request judicial intervention to interview children who are presumed victims of abuse or neglect. Although the majority invokes its "common sense" in interpreting the statute, in essence, it just presented the DCS with a broad enlargement of its authority by effectively erasing the safeguards our Legislature granted to "other children in the home." See Op. p. 386. I refuse to subscribe to the majority's interpretation of "common sense."

My interpretation is in line with the substantial interests implicated in the case before us. Our courts have recognized on several occasions that the parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture. In re D.L.M., 725 N.E.2d 981, 983 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). In particular, an action involving a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his children pertains to "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests" recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Accordingly, a parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision is a commanding one. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Although the State has a significant parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of the child by intervening in the parent-child relationship when parental neglect, abuse, or abandonment are at issue, I do not find that, under the circumstance of the case before me, the State's interests trump the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. See E.P. v. Marion Co. Office of Family & Children, 653 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).

Even though G.W.'s sister made an initial allegation of sexual abuse, she has since recanted and clarified that she had been angry with Mother for not spending as much time with her. She has denied making the diary entries alluding to sexual intercourse and the DCS has not established any evidence that G.W.'s sister wrote the entries. Rather, DCS has conceded that the diary entries could have been written by anyone. Despite the recantation and lack of evidence, DCS still wants to subject G.W. to an intrusive forensic interview in a strange environment by unknown interviewers merely to clarify some inconsistencies in how her sister originally reported the alleged abuse. Without good cause to believe that G.W. may be at risk for sexual abuse and without statutory grounds to grant DCS's motion, I find the motion to compel Mother to subject her minor child to a forensic interview to be an impermissible extension of DCS's authority. I would reverse the trial court's order.