BRADFORD, Judge.
Appellant-Respondent S.M.B. ("Father") appeals the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to A.B. Father alleges that the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") did not provide sufficient evidence to support the termination of his parental rights. Concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the termination of Father's parental rights, we affirm.
A.B. was born on May 21, 2010, at which time she tested positive for both amphetamines and THC. L.F. ("Mother") also tested positive for drugs, specifically, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana while pregnant. Mother and Father used drugs together while Mother was pregnant. Father did not try to stop Mother from using drugs during her pregnancy. Despite the fact that A.B. tested positive for drugs at the time of her birth, Mother and Father were permitted to take A.B. home from the hospital.
DCS first became involved with A.B. on June 4, 2010, after police were called to Mother and Father's shared residence to investigate an alleged act of domestic violence against Mother by Father. In the course of investigating the alleged domestic incident, police determined that the altercation between Mother and Father began at Wal-Mart and continued into the home. Father was heavily intoxicated and Mother was heavily medicated at the time. Father drove the family home from Wal-Mart while intoxicated. At one point, Mother and Father were engaged in a physical altercation over who would hold A.B., with Mother trying to physically take A.B. out of Father's arms. While either Mother or Father was holding A.B., Father pushed Mother down the stairs.
On June 7, 2010, DCS filed a verified petition alleging that A.B. was a CHINS. The juvenile court conducted an initial hearing on July 2, 2010, at which it entered a denial on behalf of both Mother and Father. The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition on August 23, 2010, at which Mother appeared and admitted that A.B. was a CHINS. Father, however, did not appear at the fact-finding hearing. The juvenile court issued a dispositional order on September 20, 2010, in which it ordered Mother and Father to complete certain services. The juvenile court conducted a review hearing on December 6, 2010, at which it found that Mother and Father had not complied with A.B.'s case plan, visited regularly with A.B., or cooperated with DCS. A subsequent review hearing was held on March 7, 2011, at which the juvenile court found that Mother and Father had still not complied with A.B.'s case plan, had not fully cooperated with DCS, and that Mother, but not Father, had participated in visitation with A.B.
On May 25, 2011, DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of Mother's
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise his child. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is "one of the most valued relationships of our culture." Id. However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his responsibility as a parent. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore, parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id.
The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
Father contends that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was insufficient to support the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights. In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.
In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
In order to involuntarily terminate a parent's parental rights, DCS must establish by clear and convincing evidence that:
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2010). Specifically, Father claims that DCS failed to establish that either (1) the conditions that resulted in A.B.'s removal or the reasons for A.B.'s placement outside of his care will not be remedied, or (2) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of A.B. Father also claims that DCS failed to establish that termination of his parental rights was in A.B.'s best interests.
In arguing that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in A.B.'s removal from his care will not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to A.B., Father acknowledges that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find either that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to A.B. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Therefore, "where, as here, the [juvenile] court specifically finds that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the removal of the [child] would not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the [juvenile] court's conclusion, it is not necessary for [DCS] to prove or for the [juvenile] court to find that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the [child]." In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882. In order to determine that the conditions will not be remedied, the juvenile court should first determine what conditions led DCS to place A.B. outside of Father's care, and, second, whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will be remedied. Id.
When assessing whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside her parent's care will not be remedied, the juvenile court must judge the parent's fitness to care for his child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The juvenile court must also evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. A juvenile court may properly consider evidence of the parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate employment and housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, a juvenile court "`can reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the parent and the parent's response to those services.'" Id. (quoting In re A.C.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).
Here, the juvenile court found that DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove that the conditions that resulted in A.B.'s removal from Father's care were not likely to be remedied, and upon review, we conclude that the juvenile court's finding to this effect is supported by the record. In support of its conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in A.B.'s removal from Father will not be remedied, the juvenile court made a number of findings which Father now claims are clearly erroneous because the findings are not supported by the evidence.
The juvenile court made the following findings in support of its determination that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in A.B.'s removal from Father's care would not be remedied:
Appellant's App. pp. 15-16 (emphasis in original).
In challenging these findings, Father acknowledges that A.B. was born with drugs in her system and was removed from his care for the reasons set forth by the juvenile court. Father also acknowledges that he has a substantial criminal history, anger issues, and a history of substance abuse. Father, however, claims that these facts do not amount to a prima facie showing that the conditions will not change because the findings do not take into account the positive changes made by Father in the months leading up to the termination hearing. Specifically, Father claims that he has gained sobriety, obtained counseling for his anger issues, and stayed out of trouble while attempting to maintain a relationship with A.B. Father denies that he has a history of domestic violence and argues that, even if he did have a history of domestic violence, he has not engaged in any instances of domestic violence since the initiation of the underlying CHINS case. Father also argues that the juvenile court's finding that he does not have a history of providing adequate care for his children is not supported by the evidence, which he claims shows that he, at the time of the termination hearing, was providing adequate care for his son.
Upon review, we conclude that each of the juvenile court's above-stated findings is supported by the evidence. It is undisputed that A.B. was born with drugs in her system and that she was removed from Mother's and Father's care when she was approximately fourteen days old for the reasons stated by the juvenile court. It is also undisputed that Father had amassed a substantial criminal history and had abused drugs and alcohol for most, if not all, of his adult life.
The record reveals that, despite Father's claim to the contrary, Father did have a history of domestic abuse. At the time of the termination hearing, Father was participating in what he called a "batterers" therapy group. Father claimed that he was nearing completion of this program and that he had learned a lot about how to better control his anger issues. Father, however, steadfastly denied that he had previously engaged in any physical domestic abuse. Tom Sullivan, the therapist that lead this "batterers group" testified that Father had previously admitted to and accepted responsibility for his prior violent domestic acts and seemed to be responding well to the treatment provided during group sessions. Sullivan indicated, however, that Father's refusal to accept responsibility for these acts during the termination hearing was concerning because generally, one is not likely to change prior bad behavior if he has not accepted responsibility for and admitted the wrongfulness of such behavior.
The record further reveals that Father had not shown that he could adequately provide care for A.B. Again, A.B. was removed from Father's care when she was approximately fourteen days old. Father consistently used drugs and alcohol during the fourteen days that A.B. was in his care. On at least one occasion, Father operated a vehicle while intoxicated with A.B. in the vehicle and engaged in violent acts against Mother in A.B.'s presence. In addition, on at least one occasion, Father operated a scooter while intoxicated with A.B.'s half-brother sitting on his lap.
Father had a mixed record with regard to participation in and success with the services offered by DCS and did not appear to be receptive to advice from service providers. Sarah Cahillane, the visitation supervisor assigned to supervise Father's visits with A.B., acknowledged that Father's attendance at visits with A.B. had been more consistent in the months leading up to the termination hearing, but testified that Father had demonstrated a history of erratic attendance at visits with A.B. Cahillane also testified that despite Father's more consistent attendance at visits with A.B., the visits had not progressed to a level where she could recommend that Father be permitted unsupervised visitation with A.B. Debra Hackman, the CASA assigned to work with A.B., testified that A.B.'s interactions with Father during visits were more akin to a babysitting situation than a parenting situation and that Father had not demonstrated an ability to correct or discipline his son and A.B. during visits. A.B.'s maternal step-grandmother, who also acted as A.B.'s child-care provider, testified that A.B. would act out after returning from visits with Father. These facts support the juvenile court's finding that Father had not demonstrated that he could provide adequate care for A.B.
When considered as a whole, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in A.B.'s removal from Father's care will not be remedied. It was within the province of the juvenile court, as the finder of fact, to minimize any contrary evidence of changed conditions in light of its determination that Father's failure to provide a safe, stable, and drug-free living environment which led to A.B.'s removal was unlikely to change. See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
Furthermore, despite Father's claim to the contrary, the record reveals that the juvenile court's findings do take into account that, at the time of the termination hearing, Father appeared to have made progress and to have been doing well in his current stint in Drug Court,
The juvenile court clearly considered the evidence presented by Father in support of the progress that he appeared to be making, however, it is well-established that the juvenile court, acting as a trier of fact, was not required to believe or assess the same weight to the testimony as Father. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 320 (Ind. 1993); Nelson v. State, 525 N.E.2d 296, 297 (Ind. 1988); A.S.C. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Elwood, 241 Ind. 19, 25, 167 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1960); Haynes v. Brown, 120 Ind.App. 184, 189, 88 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1949), trans. denied. Father's claim effectively amounts to an invitation for this court to reassess witness credibility and reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred in determining that DCS established that it is unlikely that the conditions resulting in A.B.'s removal would be remedied. See In re C.M., 675 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's determination, and finding no error by the juvenile court, we need not consider whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to A.B.'s well-being because DCS has satisfied the requirements of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) by clear and convincing evidence.
Next, we address Father's claim that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in A.B.'s best interests. We are mindful that in determining what is in the best interests of a child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203. In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. Furthermore, this court has previously determined that the testimony of the case worker regarding the child's need for permanency supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests. Id.; see also Matter of M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
In concluding that the termination of Father's parental rights was in A.B.'s best interests, the juvenile court found as follows:
Appellant's App. p. 16. Father claims that the juvenile court's analysis of A.B.'s best interests misconstrues the options at hand and is representative of a clearly impermissible basis for finding that termination is in the child's best interests. We disagree.
Here, the testimony establishes that A.B. has a need for permanency and stability and that the termination of Father's parental rights would serve her best interests. DCS Case Manager Mary Deckard testified that she believes that A.B.'s best interests would be served by the termination of Father's parental rights because A.B. has a need for permanency and stability and Father has failed to demonstrate that he is capable of providing A.B. with said permanency and stability or with a home free of substance abuse. In discussing A.B.'s need for permanency and stability, Case Manager Deckard indicated concern that Father would be able to sustain his sobriety and general sense of stability that he claimed to have acquired in the months leading up to the termination hearing after the structure provided by the service providers and the Drug Court was removed in light of Father's habitual pattern of drug abuse, instability, and criminal behavior. Case Manager Deckard testified that Father had not demonstrated an ability to come up with a plan for continued improvements to his conduct without the aid of service providers and the Drug Court telling him what he needed to do next. Case Manager Deckard further testified that maternal grandmother provides A.B. with a sense of stability and emotional support that Father is unable to provide.
In addition, CASA Hackman testified that she believed that termination of Father's parental rights and adoption by maternal grandmother would be A.B.'s best interests. CASA Hackman opined that Father's parental rights should be terminated because A.B. required a sense of safety and security and should know that she will be well cared for, and that Father had failed to prove that he could provide A.B. with the necessary level of stability and care. CASA Hackman further testified that it would be devastating to A.B. to remove her from maternal grandmother's home because the home provides her with the sense of safety and security that she so desperately needs. The juvenile court also heard testimony that A.B. has adjusted very well to life at maternal grandmother's home and maternal grandmother has set up a loving and caring support system for A.B., including maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, and maternal step-grandmother, that allows A.B. to thrive.
The juvenile court did not have to wait until A.B. was irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development was permanently impaired before terminating Father's parental rights. See In re C.M., 675 N.E.2d at 1140. In light of the testimony of Case Manager Deckard and CASA Hackman, considered with the reasonable concerns that, in light of Father's habitual patterns of conduct, Father will be able to maintain his sobriety and a stable living environment once the structure provided by the service providers and the Drug Court are removed, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to satisfy DCS's burden of proving that termination of Father's parental rights is in A.B.'s best interests. Again, Father's claim to the contrary merely amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do.
Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove the statutory requirements set forth in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and BAKER, J., concur.
