CRONE, Judge.
Orval Snyder and his wife Nilah signed reciprocal wills that left the residuary estate of the first spouse to die to the surviving spouse, with the surviving spouse's residuary estate to be distributed equally among their seven children from prior marriages. Orval died first, and his residuary estate was distributed to Nilah. After Orval's death, Nilah transferred assets to a trust for which she had named her three children and First Friends Church and Earlham College as beneficiaries. When Nilah died, her probate estate had no assets. Orval's four children sued the trust beneficiaries for breach of contract and tortious interference with an inheritance. The beneficiaries filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the beneficiaries had not breached any contract or tortiously interfered with any inheritance.
On appeal, Orval's children assert that the trial court erred in granting the beneficiaries' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Finding no error, we affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed.
In January 1985, Orval and Nilah signed reciprocal wills, which provide that when the first spouse dies, the residue of the estate is to be distributed to the surviving spouse. After the death of the surviving spouse, the residue of that spouse's estate is to be distributed equally among the seven children and stepchildren. The wills also contain a provision stating that the testator and the testator's spouse had "made Wills containing certain mutual provisions in favor of each other and in favor of [their] respective children with the understanding and upon the condition that neither of [them] will revoke such provisions nor make any changes therein without the written consent of the other." Appellees' App. at 26, 29. Orval's will names Nilah as the executrix, and Nilah's will names Thomas Price II as the executor.
Orval died in April 1993, and his will was probated. The residuary estate was distributed to Nilah pursuant to the terms of the will. After Orval's death, Nilah transferred assets to the Nilah Snyder Trust, which had been created on the same date that the wills were signed. Thomas Price II is the trustee of Nilah's trust. Nilah died in September 2010. Her will was probated, but no estate was ever opened and no personal representative was ever appointed. Nilah's probate estate had no assets after expenses.
On February 23, 2011, Appellants filed a complaint against Thomas Price II (individually and as the named executor of Nilah's estate and the trustee of Nilah's trust), Barbara Monahan, Kay Price (Philip's widow), Kari Moore (Philip's adopted daughter), First Friends Church, and Earlham College (collectively, "Appellees"). Appellees are the named beneficiaries of Nilah's trust. On March 7, 2011, Appellants filed a two-count amended complaint, to which they attached Orval's and Nilah's wills. The first count is entitled "BREACH OF CONTRACT" and reads in pertinent part as follows:
Appellees' App. at 16, 17.
The second count is entitled "TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE" and reads in pertinent part as follows:
Id. at 18.
Appellees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(C), and Appellants filed a response. After a hearing, on January 23, 2012, the trial court issued an order granting Appellees' motion that contains extensive findings and conclusions, including the following trenchant observation:
Appellants' App. at 22 (conclusion 18). This appeal ensued.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is well settled that
Fox Dev., Inc. v. England, 837 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).
At the outset, we must express our frustration with Appellants' failure to include in their appendix a copy of either the pleadings or the filings related to Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 50(A). See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f) (stating that an appellant's appendix "shall contain ... pleadings and other documents from the Clerk's Record in chronological order that are necessary for resolution of the issues raised on appeal") (emphasis added). If Appellees had not included these documents in their appendix, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to review Appellants' claims of error regarding the trial court's ruling on the legal sufficiency of their pleadings.
Regarding the breach of contract claim, Appellants correctly observe that "an intended third-party beneficiary may directly enforce a contract." Appellants' Br. at 6 (citing, inter alia, Mogensen v. Martz, 441 N.E.2d 34, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)). That said, Appellants cite no authority for the proposition that a third-party beneficiary may enforce a contract against anyone other than a party or a privy to the contract. Cf. Guraly v. Tenta, 125 Ind.App. 527, 533, 132 N.E.2d 725, 727 (1956) ("Specific performance can not be enforced against one who is neither a party nor privy to the contract and on whom it is not binding, or by whom no duty under the contract has been assumed."), trans. denied; Alexander v. Dowell, 669 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Guraly). Appellees are neither parties nor privies to any contract between Orval and Nilah, but merely fellow third-party beneficiaries. Moreover, Nilah complied with her agreement not to revoke her will, and to the extent her transfer of assets to her trust may have been contrary to the intent of the reciprocal wills, Appellees are simply not the proper parties to answer for it.
As for the tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty claims, Appellants make no cognizable arguments in their initial brief. Consequently, any issues regarding these claims are waived. See Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 857 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("[A]ny argument an appellant fails to raise in his initial brief is waived for appeal."), trans. denied.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.