BROWN, Judge.
Edwin Jones appeals his conviction and sentence for operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class A misdemeanor.
We affirm.
On May 29, 2010, at approximately 8:26 p.m., Indiana State Police Trooper Dan Madison was traveling northbound on Emerson Avenue and was stopped at a traffic light at Southeastern Avenue in Marion County, Indiana. After the light turned green, Trooper Madison began to proceed through the intersection, noticed a car driven by Jones approaching from his right side on Southeastern, and had to brake and let Jones pass because Jones did not stop at the red light. Jones passed "right in front" of Trooper Madison's police car and turned right to head northbound on Emerson, and Trooper Madison began to follow him. Transcript at 38. Trooper Madison observed Jones weaving in and out of his lane, crossing the center line twice. He also observed Jones attempt to pass in a no-passing zone and drift onto the shoulder of the road, almost hitting parked vehicles. When Jones attempted to pass in the no-passing zone, Trooper Madison was forced to swerve into oncoming traffic with Jones to alert the drivers to avoid Jones's vehicle, and he then initiated a traffic stop of Jones.
As Trooper Madison approached the driver's side of the vehicle he noticed a strong odor of alcoholic beverages and that Jones's eyes were bloodshot and red. He asked Jones for his license and registration, and Jones slurred his speech when responding and "fumbled through to get his driver's license out." Id. at 42. Jones also could not locate his registration. Trooper Madison asked Jones to step out of the vehicle and Jones "swung himself out" turning both feet and "tumbled on the ground first and then stood up." Id. at 43. Trooper Madison led Jones to the rear of the vehicle and noticed Jones stagger and lean against the vehicle to steady his balance. Trooper Madison then administered three field sobriety tests including the One Leg Stand, the Nine Step Walk, and the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus ("HGN") test, each of which Jones failed.
Based upon Jones's driving behaviors, Trooper Madison's observations of Jones, and Jones's failure of the field sobriety tests, Trooper Madison determined that he had probable cause to believe that Jones was intoxicated and he read Jones the Indiana Implied Consent Law and asked Jones to take a chemical breath test on a "BAC DataMaster" machine. State's Exhibit 4. Jones agreed, and Trooper Madison transported him to the Arresting Processing Center ("APC") where the closest certified breath testing device was located. While en route to the APC, Jones stated that "he should have listened to his friends" who did not want him to drive and asked Jones to stay at their place. Transcript at 69. Trooper Madison administered the breath test to Jones resulting in a "subject sample" reading of .18. Id. at 65. Jones was placed under arrest.
On May 30, 2010, the State charged Jones with Count I, operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class A misdemeanor; and Count II, operating a vehicle above .15 as a class A misdemeanor. On March 26, 2012, the court held a jury trial
The State proceeded to question Trooper Madison regarding the procedures he used in administering the chemical test, in which at the outset the State requested that the court take judicial notice of the chemical test procedures enacted by Ind. Administrative Rule 260 and the court did so. The State proceeded to ask Trooper Madison a series of questions to determine whether he followed the procedures in administering Jones's test, and at one point Jones objected to the State's questions as leading. The court overruled the objection, the State proceeded, and Jones entered a continuing objection to the State's questioning which the court noted and overruled.
Near the end of the State's direct examination of Trooper Madison, it introduced as State's Exhibit 5 the probable cause affidavit Trooper Madison completed "while [he] was waiting for the twenty (20) minutes at APC." Id. at 72. Jones objected to the exhibit as hearsay, the State responded that Trooper Madison "authenticated" the exhibit, and the court overruled Jones's objection. Id. at 74. The State did not question Trooper Madison regarding the contents of the probable cause affidavit, and it rested soon after the probable cause affidavit was admitted.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Jones guilty as charged. The court entered its judgment of conviction and merged Count II into Count I. On April 18, 2012, the court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Jones to 365 days with forty days executed to be served on home detention and 325 days suspended to probation.
The first issue is whether the court abused its discretion and violated Jones's confrontation rights by admitting the Certification. Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 2000). We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind.1997), reh'g denied. Even if the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Fox v. State, 717 N.E.2d 957, 966 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), reh'g denied, trans. denied. However, here because the issue is one of constitutional law, we review Jones's claim de novo. See King v. State, 877 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ind.Ct.App.2007)
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "A witness's testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 705 (Ind.2009) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3409, 177 L.Ed.2d 323 (2010); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821-822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). "Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69, 124 S.Ct. at 1374.
Jones argues that the Certification is a testimonial statement implicating his rights under the Confrontation Clause and that this court's previous statements that such certifications are nontestimonial are incorrect, noting in particular that our holding in Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied, is the only decision which has considered the issue since the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), and that at this stage "it is appropriate to reconsider this line of cases in light of" Bullcoming v. New Mexico, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). Appellant's Brief at 4. Jones argues that the Certification is testimonial because it "represents `statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,'" Id. at 10 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364), and he directs us to Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5, the statute which requires the certification, and in particular subsection (c) which states: "Certified copies of certificates ... are admissible in a proceeding under this chapter, IC 9-30-5...." Id. at 9-10. Jones argues that "[p]roceedings under `IC 9-30-5' are criminal prosecutions of individuals charged with OVWI, the very proceedings to which [he] was subjected," and that thus "the analyst who signs the Certification is on notice that the Certification constitutes prima facie evidence in a criminal proceeding for OVWI and that the results of a chemical test ... cannot be admitted ... unless the analyst certifies that the instrument is in working order." Id. Jones also argues that the Certification is a "formal document" and that accordingly, under Bullcoming, it is testimonial. Id. at 11.
The State argues that "[t]his Court has repeatedly held that such certifications are not testimonial" and that nothing in Bullcoming alters this analysis. Appellee's Brief at 6. The State argues that certifications like the one at issue here "are qualitatively different from the types of hearsay
In Ramirez, this court addressed whether certificates of inspection are testimonial thus implicating the Confrontation Clause. We began by observing that by Indiana statute chemical breath test results are inadmissible "unless the test operator, test equipment, chemicals used in the test, and test techniques have been approved in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Indiana University School of Medicine Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology." 928 N.E.2d at 216 (citing Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5(d) (subsequently amended by Pub.L. No. 158-2011, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2011))). We noted in particular that the person administering the test must be certified, the equipment must have been inspected and approved by the Department of Toxicology, and the operator must follow the procedures approved, and we observed that "Certificates issued by the Department of Toxicology indicating that breath test equipment is in good operating condition are admissible at trial and constitute prima facie evidence that the equipment (1) was inspected and approved by the Department of Toxicology and (2) was in proper working condition on the date the breath test was administered if the date of approval was not more than 180 days before the date of the test." Id. (citing Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5(c)). We also observed that Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5(b) mandates that such certificates "shall be sent to the clerk of the circuit court in each county where the breath test operator, equipment, or chemicals are used to administer breath tests." Id. at 216-217 (quotations omitted).
In addressing whether such certificates are testimonial, we observed that Crawford did not "provide a comprehensive definition of `testimonial,'" and in the years following Crawford this court has addressed this issue and "routinely concluded that the certificates are nontestimonial."
Id. at 217-218 (citations and quotations omitted). We also observed that "[o]ur holdings were substantially in accord with the decisions of other jurisdictions." Id. at 218.
As acknowledged by the parties, the Ramirez decision was handed down following the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements in Melendez-Diaz which "elaborated on the meaning of `testimonial' within the realm of forensic chemical testing." Id. In Melendez-Diaz, the State of Massachusetts introduced documents which were sworn to by state laboratory analysts before a notary public indicating that a substance seized from the defendant was cocaine of a certain weight. Id. The Court held that such documents were testimonial in nature triggering Sixth Amendment protections because they were "plainly" affidavits, or sworn declarations of fact, "which were admitted to prove that the substance was cocaine, and the documents were "`made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,' and they were in fact prepared for the sole purpose of providing evidence in a subsequent prosecution." Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311, 129 S.Ct. at 2532) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364))).
We then turned our attention to specific language in Melendez-Diaz which addressed concerns similar to those at issue in Ramirez, noting that the dissent in Melendez-Diaz expressed concern for the rule of that case as follows:
Id. at 218-219 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 333, 129 S.Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The majority of the Court responded:
Id. at 219 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n. 1, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 n. 1) (emphases added).
We held that Melendez-Diaz did not disturb this court's prior precedent and that, in particular, the exchange cited above "appears to leave our prior decisions intact." Id. We noted that although the statement that documents certifying equipment maintenance "may well qualify as nontestimonial" is "not decisive," it "at a minimum [] leaves the question unresolved and demands the same type of scrutiny that we have undertaken since Crawford" and as such our prior precedents remain valid. Id. In so holding, we stated as follows:
Id.
To the extent that Jones suggests Bullcoming changes matters, we observe that in that case, the Court began by reiterating its holding in Melendez-Diaz that "a forensic laboratory report stating that a suspect substance was cocaine ranked as testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause" because "[t]he report had been created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding" and that "[a]bsent stipulation... the prosecution may not introduce such a report without offering a live witness competent to testify to the truth of the statements made in the report." 131 S.Ct. at 2709. The Court noted that in the case before it, defendant Bullcoming was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and evidence was submitted in the form of a "forensic laboratory report certifying that [his] blood-alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for aggravated DWL" 131 S.Ct. at 2709. Below, the New Mexico Supreme Court had ruled that Melendez-Diaz was satisfied when, at trial, "the State called another analyst who was familiar with the laboratory's testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming's blood sample," holding that "although the blood-alcohol analysis was `testimonial,' the Confrontation Clause did not require the certifying analyst's in-court testimony" and that "live testimony of another analyst satisfied the constitutional requirements." Id. at 2709-2710. The U.S. Supreme Court held that such "surrogate testimony... does not meet the constitutional requirement" and that "[t]he accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist." Id. at 2710.
In so holding, the Court reasoned that such testimony would be akin to allowing an officer other than the one who observed factual events and recorded them in a police report to testify to such facts "so long as that officer was equipped to testify about any technology the observing officer deployed and the police department's standard operating procedures," which, the Court has stated "emphatically" is not allowable. Id. at 2714-2715. The Court went on to reiterate that in Melendez-Diaz, it held that "[t]he `certificates of analysis' prepared by the analysts who tested the evidence ... were `incontrovertibly... affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact' in a criminal proceeding.'" Id. at 2716 (emphasis added). It noted that the State's arguments in that case "fare[] no better here" than in Melendez-Diaz, because "[a] document created solely for an `evidentiary purpose,' ... made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial," and it addressed an argument advanced by the State that the report at issue in Bullcoming was "unsworn," rather than "sworn to before a notary public" as was the case in Melendez-Diaz, holding that the document was still considered formal and was an unavailing distinction which did not "remove [the certificate] from Confrontation Clause governance" because such a rule "would make the right to confrontation easily erasable." Id. at 2717.
Thus, the Bullcoming Court was not concerned with whether the certificate of
Also, similar to Jones's arguments based on Bullcoming and the second rationale from Ramirez, Jones scrutinizes the third rationale and argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected this rationale in Williams v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012), specifically arguing that a majority of the justices agree "that a `targeted' individual is not required to invoke the Confrontation Clause." Appellant's Brief at 15 n.6. Jones directs us to an exchange in Williams in which a plurality of the Court stated:
132 S.Ct. at 2242. Justice Kagan authored a dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, which disagreed with the Court's language of "accusing a targeted individual:"
Id. at 2273-2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Jones argues that the third Ramirez rationale is substantially similar to the "accusatory" test expressed by the plurality, and the fact that three justices agreed with the views expressed in Justice Kagan's dissent, plus the fact that Justice Thomas did not join with the plurality's reasoning regarding the "accusatory" test, indicates that a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court disagree with this rationale as valid Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
As noted above, the third rationale provided in Ramirez as to why certificates of inspection including the Certification at issue in this case are nontestimonial was stated as:
928 N.E.2d at 218 (quotations omitted). To the extent that the wording of this rationale resembles the "accusatory" test set forth by the plurality opinion in Williams, we are inclined to agree that any rationale which relies upon the fact that a piece of evidence does not target a particular defendant as a basis for determining that such evidence is nontestimonial appears to be disapproved of by a majority of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
However, we find that any confusion with the wording of the third Ramirez rationale indicating that it contains an "accusatory" element can be rectified by examining other statements by the Court regarding a statement's "primary purpose." As noted above, the Court held in Davis that statements are "testimonial" where "the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2274. Also, in Bryant the Court stated:
131 S.Ct. at 1155.
Here, the Certification's relevance is merely a creature of statute aimed at establishing the reliability of chemical breath test analysis results as a foundational requirement for submitting breath test results, which, we note, is a safeguard the legislature put in place for the benefit of the defendant.
Thus, based upon Williams and other recent statements from the U.S. Supreme Court, we reframe the third rationale articulated in Ramirez to provide that although certificates of inspection are kept on file by the court clerk and may be duplicated for use in court, their primary purpose is to ensure that certain breath test equipment is in good operating condition in compliance with Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5. However, we reaffirm our prior precedents and conclude that the Certification was nontestimonial and that the court did not err in admitting it.
Moreover, we agree with the State that any such error regarding the admission of the Certification and the attendant breath analysis was harmless. As noted by the State, it did not have to prove a certain blood alcohol level to sustain Jones's conviction, and it elicited from Trooper Madison extensive and explicit testimony demonstrating that Jones operated a vehicle while intoxicated. Trooper Madison identified multiple instances in which Jones displayed unsafe driving behavior consistent with a person being intoxicated including nearly hitting Trooper Madison's police car, weaving and twice crossing the center line, passing in a no-passing zone, and nearly hitting parked vehicles parked on the shoulder of the road. Trooper Madison noted that he smelled alcohol when he encountered Jones, that Jones's eyes were red and bloodshot, that Jones fumbled with his license and could not locate his registration, that when Jones exited his vehicle he displayed a lack of balance, that Jones staggered as he walked and leaned against his vehicle to steady himself, and that Jones failed three field sobriety tests. See Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 255 (Ind. 1997) (holding that "[e]ven if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we will reverse only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice" and that the error was harmless), reh'g denied.
The second issue is whether the court abused its discretion in ruling on certain
Jones argues that the court erred in allowing the State to admit the probable cause affidavit because it constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Jones notes that the State responded to his objection by stating that Trooper Madison "authenticated" the document and specifically points to the following colloquy:
Transcript at 73-74; Appellant's Brief at 16-17. Jones argues that a review of the transcript reveals that the probable cause affidavit was offered to prove the truth of the facts contained therein and "[a]uthentication" is not a hearsay exception. Appellant's Brief at 17 (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 803).
The State argues that although it agrees that "authentication" is not a valid response to a hearsay objection, this court may affirm an evidentiary ruling on any basis apparent in the record and here the probable cause affidavit was properly admitted as a present sense impression under Ind. Evidence Rule 803(1). The State argues that this hearsay exception applies because Trooper Madison "testified that he filled out the probable cause affidavit while he was waiting the prescribed twenty-minute period before performing the chemical breath test on [Jones] at the APC and finished the last part pertaining to the test results before he left the APC." Appellee's Brief at 18. The State argues that any error was at most harmless, noting that the "probable cause affidavit was merely cumulative of the officer's testimony describing the stop, his observations during it, the failed sobriety tests, the results of the breath test, and [Jones's] admissions" and that the State presented overwhelming independent evidence that Jones operated a vehicle while intoxicated "such that there is no possibility the probable cause affidavit contributed to the verdict." Id. at 18-19.
In his reply brief, Jones argues that the State cites no case law for admitting a probable cause affidavit under the present sense impression hearsay exception and that it appears to be an issue of first impression, that Trooper Madison indicated in his testimony he did not fill out the
Here, at the end of the State's direct examination of Trooper Madison, it introduced and the court admitted over objection the probable cause affidavit. Even assuming that the probable cause affidavit was offered for the truth and the State's reply at trial that Trooper Madison authenticated the document was not a viable reply, we find any error in its admission was harmless. As noted above, Trooper Madison's testimony alone demonstrated that Jones operated a vehicle while intoxicated. He identified specific instances of unsafe driving behavior displayed by Jones, noted that he smelled alcohol and that Jones displayed signs of intoxication including red and bloodshot eyes and a lack of balance, and that Jones failed three field sobriety tests.
The evidence presented at trial was overwhelming and, indeed, Jones does not identify a single fact that the State admitted into evidence via the probable cause affidavit which was not cumulative of evidence admitted via Trooper Madison's lawful testimony. To the extent that the court erred in admitting the probable cause affidavit, it tends "only to disclose a fact proven by other properly admitted evidence," and accordingly any error is harmless. Cornett v. State, 536 N.E.2d 501, 506 (Ind.1989).
Indiana Evidence Rule 611(c) provides: "Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness's testimony." A leading question is one that suggests the desired answer to the witness. Williams v. State, 733 N.E.2d 919, 922 (Ind.2000). The use of leading questions is limited in order to prevent the substitution of the attorney's language for the thoughts of the witness as to material facts in dispute. Id. The trial court is afforded wide discretion in allowing leading questions, and the court's decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Bussey v. State, 536 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (Ind.1989).
Jones argues that the court erred when it allowed the State to use leading questions during its direct examination of Trooper Madison which were objected to by Jones. Jones highlights examples including "(1) `Did you observe [Jones] for (20) minutes prior to the administering of the test?'; (2) `When you began the chemical test was the green Led light on the instrument displayed [sic] lit?'; (3) `When the please blow message appeared in the display, did you place a new mouth piece in the breath tube and instruct the defendant to blow into it?'" Appellant's Brief at 17-18. Jones argues that following his objection the court did not explain why leading questions were appropriate and the State made no attempt to question Trooper Madison in a non-leading fashion.
The State argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State's
At trial, the State elicited testimony from Trooper Madison, and Jones objected as follows:
Transcript at 61-63. The State asked Trooper Madison a few more yes/no questions related to administering the chemical breath test to Jones.
As noted above, the policy behind Ind. Evidence Rule 611(c) is to prevent an attorney from substituting his or her own language "for the thoughts of the witness as to material facts in dispute." Williams, 733 N.E.2d at 922 (emphasis added). The Indiana Supreme Court has likewise emphasized that a leading question is one "which, embodying a material fact, admits of a conclusive answer in the form of a simple `yes' or `no.'" Doerner v. State, 500 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (Ind.1986). Also, where a witness's testimony is not distorted to conform to the possibilities suggested by the question, any error resulting
Here, prior to the State's line of questioning at issue, Trooper Madison testified that he was certified as a chemical breath test operator by the Indiana Department of Toxicology. The State then asked: "Trooper Madison, what procedures did you use to administer the chemical test?" and he replied: "[Y]ou got to follow the guidelines. They're posted right above every instrument, and you look right up at it, and follow each line as you go." Transcript at 61. Following this exchange, the State requested that the court take judicial notice of the procedures, the court did so, and the State thereafter asked Trooper Madison the yes/no questions recited above establishing that he followed the procedures regarding Jones's test.
Based upon our review of the record, we find that the State's questioning challenged by Jones did not concern material facts which were in dispute. Indeed, Jones does not argue that Trooper Madison improperly administered the chemical breath test or otherwise demonstrate that Jones was prejudiced by the State's decision to ask yes/no questions establishing that the test complied with the procedures. In so holding, we again recognize that as noted above, evidence pertaining to the chemical breath test was superfluous to sustaining Jones's conviction as the State presented a multitude of other evidence establishing that he operated a vehicle while intoxicated. Accordingly, we conclude that the court's ruling regarding the State's line of questioning does not require reversal.
The third issue is whether the sentence imposed by the court was invalid. In Jones's abstract of judgment, the court stated that "following completion of the executed portion of the sentence defendant to be placed on probation for 325 days with special conditions set forth in the order of probation issued on this date," which included that Jones not consume alcohol and undergo a substance abuse evaluation and a mental health evaluation and follow the recommendations, attend an impaired drivers victim impact panel, perform eighty hours of community service, and incur a ninety day license suspension. Appellant's Appendix at 25. Thus, the court ordered Jones to serve his term of probation concurrent with the suspended portion of his sentence.
Jones argues that the court erred because it sentenced him "to a combined period of imprisonment and probation greater than one year, contrary to Indiana law." Appellant's Brief at 18. Jones argues that he was convicted of a class A misdemeanor and the court sentenced him to forty days executed, 325 days suspended, and 325 days of probation for a total of 690 days. Jones argues that "[i]n Collins v. State, the Court of Appeals recognized that a `term of imprisonment' under Indiana Code Section 35-50-3-1(b) includes both the executed and suspended portions of a sentence. 835 N.E.2d 1010, 1018 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied." Id. at 19.
Ind.Code § 35-50-3-2 provides in relevant part that "[a] person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year...." In addition, Ind.Code § 35-50-3-1(b) provides in part that:
(Emphasis added).
Here, the language contained in the abstract of judgment plainly states that Jones was ordered to serve forty days executed followed by a probationary term of 325 days, which is a combined term encompassing one year. To the extent that Jones suggests that the court's sentence of 325 days suspended should be added to the 325 days of probation for a total sentence of 690 days, we observe that in Smith v. State, 621 N.E.2d 325 (Ind. 1993), a trial court sentenced a misdemeanant to a term of 110 days executed to be followed by one year of probation. At the time, the relevant version of Ind.Code § 35-50-3-1(b) was unclear as to whether such a sentence was illegal, and the Indiana Supreme Court held that it was, stating "that a combined term of probation and imprisonment exceeding one year is inconsistent with the maximum term for conviction of a misdemeanor."
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jones's conviction and sentence for operating while intoxicated as a class A misdemeanor.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., concurs.
VAIDIK, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
VAIDIK, Judge, concurring in result.
I concur with the majority opinion in whole, including that the Certification asserting the accuracy of the breath-testing device is non-testimonial and therefore the trial court did not violate Jones's confrontation rights by admitting it into evidence.
I wrote the opinion in Ramirez v. State, 928 N.E.2d 214 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), which was decided before Williams v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012). I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court's later decision in Williams would not affirm the third rationale articulated in Ramirez. However, I disagree with the majority's refraining of
Despite this difference, I still agree with the majority that the Certification is non-testimonial and therefore not subject to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Following the first two rationales set forth in Ramirez, the certificate of inspection was "not prepared at a judicial proceeding or during police interrogation," and was not a "sworn affidavit[] and do[es] not contain formalized testimonial materials." Ramirez, 928 N.E.2d at 217-18. Instead, the certificate was prepared at the direction of the Indiana University School of Medicine Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology and in accordance with its approved procedures. The certificate also was not a sworn affidavit and only contained the results of a machine-calibration test. Unlike forensic analysis of an unknown substance, like that at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), the machine-calibration test in question in this case required no human interpretation or analysis to either run the test or obtain results, making it void of any testimonial material on which a witness would need to be cross-examined.
I therefore agree with the majority that the Certification is non-testimonial and the trial court did not violate Jones's confrontation rights by admitting it into evidence.
