NAJAM, Judge.
The Town of Cedar Lake (the "Town") dissolved its Parks and Recreation Department (the "Parks Department") and its Parks and Recreation Board (the "Park Board"). The Town appeals the trial court's partial grant of summary judgment for Gina Alessia, Candi Reiling, and Andrew Balkema, individually and as members of the Park Board (the "Park Board Members"), on their complaint against the Town and others. The Town raises two issues for our review, which we restate as the following four issues:
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
On March 1, 2011, during a regular meeting of the Town Council for the Town of Cedar Lake (the "Town Council"), the Town Council terminated the Park Board Members' positions on the Park Board and voted in new members. On April 12, the Park Board Members filed a complaint against the Town and the members of the Town Council, among others, alleging that they had been improperly removed from their positions and seeking reinstatement, back pay, and an injunction against the Town Council to prohibit it "from taking any action that would hinder, stop, or otherwise prevent the [Park Board Members] from acting in their official capacity." Id. at 40.
On April 26, the Town Council held public meeting after public notice. At that meeting, the newly appointed members of the Park Board each resigned their positions, and the Town Council accepted their resignations. The Town Council then heard Ordinance 1129 (the "Ordinance"), which sought to dissolve the Park Board and the Parks Department.
On April 28, at another public meeting held after public notice, the Town Council reinstated the Park Board Members and authorized payment of back pay up to April 28 in response to their complaint. The Town Council then adopted the Ordinance. The Ordinance begins:
On May 24, the trial court held a hearing on the Park Board Members' request for a preliminary injunction. At that hearing, counsel for the Park Board Members expressly acknowledged that "it's within the rights of a town to dissolve a park board by ordinance. That's clear in the statute."
Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court held a hearing on the parties' motions and, on May 14, 2012, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Park Board Members. Specifically, the court determined that the Town Council had illegally terminated the Park Board Members' employment; that the Ordinance "was improper[] and beyond the scope of [the Town Council's] authority under the Indiana Code"; and that the Town should be "enjoined from interfering in the workings of the Parks & Recreation Board," and that the Park Board be "re-instated and the parties returned to the status quo" as of March 1, 2011. Id. at 48. The court further determined that
Id. The court then stayed its order pending
As an initial matter, we note that the trial court entered findings and conclusions in its order on summary judgment. But, contrary to the Park Board Members' assertions on appeal, this "does not alter our standard of review, nor are we bound by the trial court's specific findings and conclusions...." Dible v. City of Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269, 272 n. 2 (Ind.1999). Rather, in a summary judgment, the trial court's findings and conclusions "merely aid our review by providing us with a statement of reasons for the trial court's actions." Id.
Our standard of review for summary judgment appeals is well established:
Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind.2009) (citations omitted). Where the facts are undisputed and the issues presented are pure questions of law, we review the matter de novo. Crum v. City of Terre Haute ex rel. Dep't of Redev., 812 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).
Here, the Town asserts that the trial court ignored the Town's authority under Indiana's Home Rule Act when the court determined that the Town had illegally dissolved the Park Board and the Parks Department. The Town further asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it ordered the Town to reinstate the Park Board Members and enjoined the Town from "interfering in the workings of the Parks & Recreation Board." See Appellant's App. at 48. Finally, the Town contends that the court erred as a matter of law when it determined that "it would be a conflict of interest for [the law firm] to continue to represent the ... Park Board and the members of the Park Board in any matters as the present interests of the Town and the Park Board are in opposition." Id. We address each of the Town's arguments in turn.
The Town first contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it accepted the Park Board Members' several
The Indiana Supreme Court recently described the import of Indiana's Home Rule Act:
Kole v. Faultless, 963 N.E.2d 493, 495-96 (Ind.2012).
Here, the Park Board Members raise four arguments against the Town's authority to dissolve the Park Board and the Parks Department, each of which the trial court adopted in its summary judgment order. Specifically, the Park Board Members assert: (1) the Indiana Code "is silent and gives no explicit authorization" for the dissolution of a parks department, Appellees' Br. at 6; (2) Indiana's Home Rule Act provides no authority for the Town to dissolve the Park Board or the Parks Department; (3) Indiana Code Chapter 36-10-3 establishes "a comprehensive legislative scheme" that preempts any authority the Town may have under the Home Rule Act, id. at 9; and (4) any authority the Town had to repeal is original enactments establishing the Park Board and the Parks Department is subject to the common law limitations discussed in Corn v. City of Oakland City, 415 N.E.2d 129 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981). We address each of these four proffered rationales in turn.
The Park Board Members first assert that the Town exceeded its legal authority when it enacted the Ordinance because the Indiana Code "is silent and gives no explicit authorization" for the dissolution of a parks department. Appellees' Br. at 6. The trial court agreed with the Park Board Members. The court erred as a matter of law.
Under Indiana's Home Rule Act, unless an act is prohibited it is allowed. This paradigm has replaced the common law rules relied on by the trial court for analyzing the power behind a municipality's authority. See Kole, 963 N.E.2d at 495-96. In particular, Indiana Code Section 36-1-3-3 is unambiguous: "(a) The rule of law that any doubt as to the existence of a power of a unit shall be resolved against its existence is abrogated. (b) Any doubt as to the existence of a power of a unit shall be resolved in favor of its existence." Further: "The rule of law that a unit has only [] powers expressly granted by statute... is abrogated." I.C. § 36-1-3-4. Instead, as a general rule, "a unit may exercise any power it has to the extent that the power[]is not expressly denied by the Indiana Constitution or by statute." I.C. § 36-1-3-5.
In agreeing with the Park Board Members' argument, the trial court expressly relied on Vesenmeir v. City of Aurora, 232 Ind. 628, 115 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind.1953), a sixty-year-old case in which the Indiana Supreme Court stated that "doubtful claims to power, as well as any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms used by the legislature[,] are resolved against the [municipal] corporation." That proposition was based on Indiana law prior to the 1980 enactment of the Home Rule Act, is plainly contrary to the language of the Home Rule Act, and has been expressly abrogated by the Act. See Kole, 963 N.E.2d at 495-96. As such, the Park Board Members' contention, with which the trial court agreed, that the Town needed express statutory authorization to pass the Ordinance is contrary to Indiana law.
The Park Board Members next argue that Indiana Code Section 36-1-3-8 explicitly prohibits the Town from abolishing the Park Board and the Parks Department. That statute provides: "a unit does not have the following: ... (3) The power
The Park Board Members' novel reading of Indiana Code Section 36-1-3-8 requires that this court interpret the statute. As noted above, when a statute has not previously been construed, our interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction. See Ind. Pesticide Rev. Bd., 916 N.E.2d at 181. Here, the express statutory language prohibits a unit from "impos[ing] duties" on another political subdivision. I.C. § 36-1-3-8. To "impose" is "to give or bestow ... authoritatively or officially." Webster's 3d New Int'l Dictionary 1136 (2002). A "duty" is an "obligatory task[], conduct, service, or function[]...." Id. at 705. The dissolution of the Park Board and the Parks Department is not equivalent to giving obligatory tasks or functions to them, which is what Indiana Code Section 36-1-3-8 prohibits. And, again, "[a]ny doubt as to the existence of a power of a unit shall be resolved in favor of its existence." I.C. § 36-1-3-3. Accordingly, Indiana Code Section 36-1-3-8 does not prohibit the Town from abolishing the Park Board and the Parks Department.
The Park Board Members also argue that Indiana's park and recreation laws, Indiana Code Sections 36-10-3-1 to -45, evidence a comprehensive legislative scheme that preempts the Town's authority to abolish the Parks Department and the Park Board. The trial court agreed and found particularly persuasive Indiana Code Section 36-10-3-3, which states:
The remainder of that chapter of the Indiana Code describes such events as the appointment and removal of park board members; the duties and salaries of the members of the park board; regular and special meetings of park boards; the assumption of gifts by park boards for their departments; tax implications of parks; fees that can be levied by a parks department; and the acquisition of property by a parks department.
While those provisions demonstrate a thoughtful legislative framework for the operation of park boards and parks departments, there is no language in those statutes that suggests the General Assembly sought to tie the hands of municipalities that create park boards and parks departments so as to prevent reconsideration of those decisions. Indeed, conspicuously absent from Indiana Code Chapter 36-10-3 is any restriction on a municipal corporation's authority to dissolve a park board and parks department. And, as plainly described by our Home Rule statutes, "a unit may exercise any power it has to the extent that the power[]is not expressly denied by the Indiana Constitution or by statute." I.C. § 36-1-3-5. The Park Board Members' argument, and the
Finally, in entering judgment for the Park Board Members, the trial court relied extensively on this court's opinion in Corn v. City of Oakland City. In Corn, we considered a municipality's pre-Home Rule Act attempt to repeal a prior enactment in which the municipality had created a judicial office. In considering the municipality's attempted repeal of its prior enactment, we described the municipality's common law authority to repeal prior enactments:
415 N.E.2d at 131-32. We further recognized that "abolition of [an] office must be done in good faith." Id. at 132 n. 2 (citing 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 239 (1971); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 467 (1948)).
The common law described in Corn and relied on by the Park Board Members and the trial court is based on Dillon's Rule that preceded the Home Rule Act. For example, nearly identical language to the language in Corn appears in Welch v. Bowen, 103 Ind. 252, 2 N.E. 722, 724 (1885).
Id. And Corn itself based its statements of the law on Vesenmeir and other authorities that preceded Indiana's Home Rule Act.
Accordingly, we do not consider the Park Board Members' arguments that they are entitled to summary judgment based on one or several of the reasons stated in Corn.
The Town next asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it ordered the Town to reinstate the Park Board Members to their positions on the Park Board.
Similarly, the Town asserts that the trial court erred when it "enjoined [the Town] from interfering in the workings" of the Park Board. See Appellant's App. at 48. As with Issue Two, the trial court's injunction was premised on its conclusion that the Town's dissolution of the Park Board was unlawful. Because there is no Park Board to interfere with, we reverse the trial court's injunction against the Town.
Finally, the Town argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the law firm may not represent the Park Board Members. In their complaint, the Park Board Members alleged as follows:
Id. at 71.
According to the Town, the trial court erred on this issue because the law firm "has never represented the individual plaintiffs." Appellant's Br. at 26. But the Park Board Members are plaintiffs in both their individual and official capacities, the Park Board Members are plainly representing the interests of the Park Board, and the Town does not dispute that the Park Board is a current client of the law firm. Moreover, we disagree with the Town's assertion that "there has been no showing ... that the Town ... and the Park Board ... are adverse to each other...." Appellant's Br. at 26. This litigation is itself conclusive evidence of the law firm's conflict.
According to Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(1), "a lawyer shall not represent a client if ... the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client...." Hence, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the law firm currently represents two clients whose interests are directly adverse to one another. As such, the designated evidence supports the trial court's order that the law firm may not continue to represent the Park Board in any matters. See, e.g., Reed v. Hoosier Health Sys., Inc., 825 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that the trial
The traditional rule in the law of municipal corporations strictly circumscribed municipal power. This restriction was based on the principle that there is no inherent right to local self-government, that local governments possess no inherent powers, and, thus, that local governments must depend totally upon state legislatures for every power they exercise. Under this rule, Dillon's Rule, a municipality could exercise only those powers specifically granted, necessarily implied, or indispensable to a municipal corporation. Before the Powers of Cities Act, this rule was firmly established in Indiana law. The Powers of Cities Act turned Dillon's Rule upside down. The Power of Cities Act and, later, the Home Rule Act changed the legal landscape of the relationship between the State and its political subdivisions.
Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it used Dillon's Rule to determine the scope of the Town's legal authority to dissolve the Park Board and the Parks Department. The proper legal inquiry is based on Indiana's Home Rule Act. Pursuant to that Act, there is no statutory prohibition against the Town's exercise of authority to dissolve the Park Board or the Parks Department. And any doubt as to the existence of such power is resolved in favor of its existence. I.C. § 36-1-3-3. Accordingly, the Town's exercise of that authority by enacting the Ordinance was lawful.
Given the Town's authority under Indiana's Home Rule Act, we reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the Park Board Members on their claims for illegal termination, declaratory judgment on the validity of the Ordinance, and injunctive relief. On each of those claims, we remand with instructions that the trial court enter summary judgment for the Town. We affirm the trial court's order that the law firm may not continue to represent the Park Board and its members in any matters based on a current conflict of interest.
The trial court's entry of summary judgment for the Park Board Members is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Town on Counts I, II, and III of the First Amended Complaint.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
Although we need not decide these arguments, we do note that the Town takes particular exception to the trial court's determination that the Town acted in bad faith when it abolished the Park Board and the Parks Department. According to the Ordinance, the Town Council had determined that "restructuring and reorganization is in the best interests of the residents of the Town...." Appellant's App. at 191. Thus, the Town continues, the trial court's substitution of its judgment for the Town's was "judicial usurpation." Appellant's Br. at 17; see Bd. of Comm'rs v. Three I Props., 787 N.E.2d 967, 976 (Ind.Ct. App.2003) ("We will not intervene in the local legislative process as long as it is supported by some rational basis.").
