OPINION

MAY, Judge.

Darrell Keck was stopped after police saw him driving on the left side of a county road. He was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated1 and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more,2 both Class C misdemeanors. Keck moved to suppress evidence arising out of the stop, arguing police should not have stopped him because road conditions were so bad he could not safely drive on the right side of the road. In granting Keck's motion to suppress, the trial court determined "driving left-of-center has become a necessity" because of poor road conditions in the county, and police therefore did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Keck. (App. at 17.) The State appeals, arguing the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Keck because he was driving left of center. We affirm.3

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 12, 2012, Keck was driving westbound on Highway 36. A sheriff's deputy was driving behind Keck and followed him as he turned left onto County Road 100 East. The deputy saw no violations as Keck was driving on the highway or as he turned onto the county road, but he stopped Keck after Keck drove in the center portion of the county road for one-quarter to three-quarters of a mile. There was no traffic approaching from the other direction. Keck was not driving erratically, but he was driving slower than the speed limit.

County Road 100 is a two-lane road, but it is not as wide as most. It does not have a center line. The surface is "chip-and-seal"4 in parts and gravel in others. The officer who stopped Keck testified the outside portion of the road was covered in gravel, and operating with one tire on gravel and the other on pavement was a potential driving hazard. The officer recalled at least two chuckholes in the road. However, the officer testified he was in his "driving portion of the roadway" while he followed Keck. (Tr. at 15.)

Keck's passenger testified the road was "terrible," (id. at 22), and "you have to" drive left of center because "you can't without hitting every hole in the road, you have to go left." (Id.) He testified Keck was driving "a little slower ... because of the road condition." (Id. at 23.) The passenger asked the officer why he pulled Keck over, and the officer told him it was because Keck was driving under the speed limit and left of center.

Keck moved to suppress the evidence the officer obtained from the stop on the ground there was no reasonable suspicion to stop him. In granting the motion, the trial court took judicial notice that the condition of the county roads makes it

(App. at 17.)

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The State has the burden to show the measures it used to seize evidence were constitutional. State v. Sitts, 926 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). In reviewing a motion to suppress, we do not reweigh the evidence, but determine if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. State v. Aynes, 715 N.E.2d 945, 949 (Ind. Ct.App.1999), reh'g denied. We look to the totality of the circumstances and consider all uncontroverted evidence together with conflicting evidence that supports the trial court's decision. Id. The trial court observes the witnesses and is the sole judge of their credibility and of the weight to be given their evidence, Robinson v. Priest, 146 Ind.App. 442, 445, 256 N.E.2d 582, 584 (1970), and we are required to accept the trial court's assessment of their credibility. Frasier v. State, 794 N.E.2d 449, 461 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Combs v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). A police officer may stop a vehicle when he observes a minor traffic violation. Id. Such a stop does not run afoul of either constitutional provision. Id. Whether an officer has an objectively justifiable reason for a traffic stop is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances. Sitts, 926 N.E.2d at 1120. An officer's good faith belief a person has committed a traffic violation will justify a traffic stop. Combs, 878 N.E.2d at 1289. But an officer's "mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith. Such discretion is not constitutionally permissible." Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied.

Ind.Code § 9-21-8-2(a) provides that on "all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway." But subsection (b) provides: "a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed5 of traffic at the time and place under the conditions then existing shall be driven: (1) in the right-hand lane then available for traffic; or (2) as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway." Ind.Code § 9-21-8-2(b) (footnote added).

The State argues subsection (a) controls and permitted the police to stop Keck when he drove on the left side of the road. Keck argues subsection (b) controls, and the stop was unreasonable because, in light of the road conditions, he was driving as close as practicable to the right edge of the roadway. There was evidence before the trial court to support a conclusion subsection (b) applies and Keck was not in violation.

The officer who stopped Keck testified the outside portion of the road was covered in gravel and operating with one tire on gravel and the other on pavement was a potential driving hazard. The officer recalled at least two chuckholes in the road. Keck's passenger testified the road was "terrible," (Tr. at 22), and "you have to" drive left of center because to avoid "hitting every hole in the road, you have to go left." (Id.) He testified Keck was driving "a little slower ... because of the road condition." (Id. at 23.) That evidence permitted the trial court to conclude the stop was improper.

In Combs, a police officer stopped Combs' car after he saw it traveling left of center on a street in Vincennes. Combs admitted she was driving on the wrong side of the street but testified it was necessary because vehicles were parked on the side of the street and she would have hit them if she had not done so. We found the stop was lawful but a subsequent search was not. Id. at 1290. The stop was lawful because there was evidence the officer "conducted a lawful traffic stop based on a good faith belief" there had been a violation.6 Id. at 1289. In the case before us, there was evidence to support the trial court's conclusion the traffic stop was not lawful because there was no violation.

In Ransom, the evidence reflected the officer's "mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation," which, we held, is not good faith. 741 N.E.2d at 422. The officer stopped Ransom for driving in reverse, an activity that is not necessarily unlawful. We noted there was not, as the State argued, any apparent violation of the reckless driving statute, or the obstruction of traffic statute. Thus, the officer did not have an objectively justifiable reason for stopping Ransom, and the trial court erred in finding that the stop was lawful. Id. Here, as in Ransom, there was evidence the officer had a "mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation," which does not amount to a good faith belief there has been a violation as in Combs.

Nor can we find the trial court erred to the extent it determined Keck could not have complied with Ind.Code § 9-21-8-2(a) and instead had to drive in the center of the road. In State v. Rhodes, 950 N.E.2d 1261 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), a traffic stop was premised on Rhodes' violation of Ind.Code § 9-21-8-25, which provides a turn signal must be given continuously during not less than the last two hundred feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes. Rhodes argued, among other things, the State did not show that it was possible for him to comply with the statute. The police officer who stopped Rhodes estimated Rhodes turned his signal on about 150 feet before turning, but the record did not reflect whether there was at least 200 feet between the place where he turned onto Market Street and the place where he turned into a nearby alley. We agreed "the State failed to show that compliance with the statute was possible under the circumstances.... Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred by concluding that Rhodes was not properly stopped for a traffic violation." Id. at 1265. Similarly, in the case before us, the trial court heard evidence that could support a conclusion Keck's compliance with Ind.Code § 9-21-8-2(a) was not possible under the circumstances.7

As the trial court heard sufficient evidence8 to support its conclusion Keck was in compliance with Ind.Code § 9-21-8-2(b) and could not have complied with subsection (a), we cannot say the trial court erred to the extent it found the stop improper. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and RILEY, J., concur.