CRONE, Judge.
Charles Norris claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. Because no such denial occurred, we affirm.
On November 1, 2012, Norris entered a plea of guilty to class C felony possession of precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine pursuant to a written plea agreement, which provided for the dismissal of a class B felony charge and a class D felony charge. The agreement also provided for a six-year executed sentence and allowed Norris to "argue at sentencing to have the executed portion of the sentence served in a state approved work release program." Appellant's App. at 25. The trial court asked Norris if he was "suffering from any mental or emotional disability" or "under the influence of any alcohol or drugs[.]" Tr. at 5. Norris said that he was not. The court asked Norris if he understood that he would be giving up certain rights by pleading guilty, including "the right to a public and speedy jury trial[.]" Id. Norris said that he understood. The court asked Norris if he understood that by pleading guilty, he would be admitting that he committed the charged crime and would be sentenced to six years. Norris said that he did. The court asked Norris if he "or anybody else [had] received any promises besides the plea agreement" or "been given anything of value to get [him] to plead guilty[.]" Norris replied, "No." Id. at 8. The court asked, "So the guilty plea you're offering today is of your own free will and voluntary acts and it's still your intent to plead guilty?" Id. Norris replied, "Yes." Id. at 9. The court also asked Norris if he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. Norris said that he was.
Norris's public defender elicited a factual basis for the plea. The court found that Norris understood the nature of the charge and the possible sentence, that his plea was "freely and voluntarily entered," and that "there's a factual basis for that plea." Id. at 11. The court told Norris to help the probation department prepare a presentence report and said, "If I accept the plea agreement I will sentence you exactly within those terms. If you want me to consider a work release component I want you to make sure you qualify for work release by that time, okay." Id. The court set the sentencing hearing for January 3, 2013.
At the January 3 hearing, Norris's counsel told the court that Norris wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. The court remarked that no withdrawal motion had been filed,
Id. at 22 (emphasis added). The court asked Norris why he wanted to withdraw his plea, and the following discussion ensued:
Id. at 23-24.
At that point, the prosecutor asked whether it would be appropriate for another attorney to "review the case ... and see if there [are] grounds to withdraw the plea." Id. at 26. The chief public defender happened to be in the courtroom and said, "Judge, we would normally never, uh, appoint new counsel in regards to that matter." Id. at 27. The court told Norris, "I'm confident that the dialogue that I had with you that day and the answers that you gave were appropriate, uh, that we went over the agreement and ... I'm comfortable going ahead with the sentencing." Id. at 27-28. The court recessed the hearing to allow Norris to review the presentence report with his counsel. The court then denied Norris's oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea and heard argument from counsel. The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Norris to six years in the Department of Correction because he had not qualified to participate in work release. This appeal ensued.
Norris claims that he "was denied his fundamental right to counsel when he was questioned by the court without the assistance of counsel regarding his basis to withdraw his guilty plea as the proceeding was a critical stage and Norris did not waive his right to counsel." Appellant's Br. at 4. The State points out that Norris "never argues as to how having counsel present in the courtroom representing him at the time amounts to the trial court denying him his right to counsel" and that he "presents no argument and cites to no cases in support of the position that the Sixth Amendment entitles him to new or additional counsel merely because he disagreed with his counsel's legal advice and wished to present a motion to the court that his counsel would not file." Appellee's Br. at 7-8. We agree with the State that if
Id. at 12.
As indicated above, Norris took it upon himself to explain his reasons for wanting to withdraw his guilty plea and was not "forced to proceed pro se," as he contends. Appellant's Br. at 9. Quite simply, the trial court did not deny him his right to counsel, who appeared with and assisted him at the hearing.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and PYLE, J., concur.