NAJAM, Judge.
Mary L. Anderson appeals the trial court's order setting aside its default judgment against Wayne Post 64, American Legion Corporation ("American Legion"). Anderson raises two issues for our review, but we address only the following dispositive issue: whether the trial court erred when it set aside its default judgment against the American Legion as void because the method employed by Anderson to serve process on the American Legion was not the method best calculated to inform the American Legion of Anderson's lawsuit.
On June 20, 2010, Anderson slipped and fell on property owned by the American Legion in Marion County. On June 15, 2012, Anderson filed a complaint for damages against the American Legion in the Marion Superior Court. On that date, Robert Eakins was the registered agent for the American Legion. Anderson requested service on the American Legion through the Marion County Sheriff's Department.
On June 20, Deputy Travis Jefferson filed the Sheriff's return of service with the clerk's office. According to the return of service, Deputy Jefferson left a copy of the complaint and summons at 601 South Holt Road, Eakins' registered address. The deputy later testified that he left those documents "attached to the door" at "10:48 a.m." because "Eakins was not present at that time, nor did it appear any other person was present." Appellant's App. at 178. Deputy Jefferson also mailed a copy of the complaint and summons by first class mail to that address.
The American Legion failed to appear or respond to Anderson's complaint. On July 24, 2012, the court entered a default judgment
On April 26, 2013, the American Legion moved to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6), arguing that the judgment was void because Anderson had not served her complaint on the American Legion and, therefore, the court had not acquired personal jurisdiction over the American Legion.
The American Legion also submitted the affidavit of Ken Cooper, its current registered agent. Cooper stated that he did not learn of Anderson's lawsuit against the American Legion until March 31, 2013. In particular, Cooper stated as follows:
Id. at 111-13.
Included in Cooper's affidavit was an aerial photograph of 601 South Holt Road. That photograph shows an L-shaped parking lot and two structures. In the northeast portion of the photograph is a large structure situated such that the L-shaped parking lot touches the structure's western and southern faces. The parking lot curves into the western face of that structure such that drivers can drive directly to a doorway, and that curved drive is partially covered. The southern portion of the parking lot has multiple paved sidewalks leading into this structure. There is also a large, fenced-in yard adjacent to the eastern side of this structure.
In the southwest corner of the lot is a smaller structure. Although it is not entirely clear from the photograph, it appears that the only parking near this structure is along its eastern face, which is the southernmost portion of the parking lot. As drivers enter onto the property, they pass along the northern face of the smaller structure to access the parking lot, which naturally leads them to the larger structure. This smaller structure bears the number "601" on its northern face. Id. at 166. It is not clear if the larger structure also bears this number, but Cooper's affidavit implies that the mailbox for the address is located at the larger structure.
On July 8, the court held a hearing on the American Legion's motion to set aside the default judgment.
Id. at 11. This appeal ensued.
Anderson appeals the trial court's order setting aside the default judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6). The parties first dispute whether our standard of review in such appeals is de novo or for an abuse of discretion. This dispute is not new to this court.
Santiago v. Kilmer, 605 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992), trans. denied; see also Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. M Jewell, LLC, 992 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. denied; Yoder v. Colonial Nat'l Mortg., 920 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010); Laflamme v. Goodwin, 911 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind.Ct.App.2009); LePore v. Norwest Bank Ind., N.A., 860 N.E.2d 632, 634 (Ind.Ct.App.2007); Hotmix & Bituminous Equip. Inc. v. Hardrock Equip. Corp., 719 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999).
In Swiggett Lumber Construction Co. v. Quandt, 806 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), we applied an abuse of discretion standard in a Trial Rule 60(B)(6) appeal. For support, we cited to Morequity, Inc. v. Keybank, N.A., 773 N.E.2d 308, 312-13 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied, and for support of that proposition in Morequity we cited In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). But In re Paternity of Baby Doe was an appeal under Trial Rule 60(B)(1), not Rule 60(B)(6). Moreover, we are persuaded by this court's reasoning in Santiago that a trial court has no discretion on how to rule on a Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion once a judgment is determined to be either void or valid. If a judgment is void, the trial court cannot enforce it and the motion under Rule 60(B)(6) must be granted; if a judgment is valid, the trial court cannot declare it void and the motion must be denied. Thus, we review de novo a trial court's judgment on a Rule 60(B)(6) motion.
That said, whether a judgment is void or valid is not a determination made by pulling a label from the ether. As we have explained in the context of a Rule 12(B)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction:
Sebring v. Air Equip. & Eng'g, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 272, 274 (citing LinkAmerica Corp. v. Albert, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind.2006)).
On appeal, Anderson asserts that she adequately served the American Legion and, accordingly, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the American Legion. In particular, Anderson contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that Anderson "must" have served Eakins pursuant to Trial Rule 4.1(A). See Appellant's App. at 11. Anderson further argues that leaving the summons and complaint at a building at the address listed for the registered agent, and following that attempt at service with copy service by first class mail, was reasonably calculated to inform the American Legion of her lawsuit.
"A trial court does not acquire personal jurisdiction over a party if service of process is inadequate." Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 57. "The existence of personal jurisdiction ... is ... a constitutional requirement to rendering a valid judgment, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. "[T]he Due Process Clause requires that[,] in order for constructive notice of a lawsuit to be sufficient, a party must exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a litigant's whereabouts." Id. at 60. "A party must provide `notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)).
In Indiana, "whether the judgment is `void' turns on whether the defendant was served with process effective for that purpose under the Ind[iana] Rules of Procedure." Glennar Mercury-Lincoln, Inc. v. Riley, 167 Ind.App. 144, 150, 338 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1975). Our review requires scrutiny of "the method of authorized
As an initial matter, Anderson's assertion that the trial court erred when it concluded that she "must" comply with Trial Rule 4.1 to effect adequate service of process misunderstands the trial court's order. See Appellant's App. at 11. The trial court's conclusion was that, in light of the facts and the circumstances of this particular case, Anderson's compliance with Trial Rule 4.1 would have been better calculated to inform the American Legion of Anderson's lawsuit than the method of service Anderson chose. The trial court's conclusion, if supported by the facts, is a correct assessment of the law. See Morrison, 559 N.E.2d at 368. As such, we turn to whether the trial court's assessment on these facts is also correct. We hold that it is.
There is no question that Anderson failed to serve the American Legion in a manner authorized by our Trial Rules. In particular, Trial Rule 4.6(A) states, in relevant part, that "[s]ervice upon an organization may be made as follows: (1) In the case of a domestic ... organization upon an ... agent appointed ... to receive service...."
And Rule 4.6(C) states:
Trial Rule 4.1 provides for service upon an individual. That Rule states as follows:
Here, Anderson, through Deputy Jefferson, sought to serve process on the American Legion through its registered agent, Eakins, pursuant to Rule 4.6(A)(1). Rule 4.6(B) thus directed Deputy Jefferson to apply Rule 4.1, with the provision that Rule 4.1(A)(3) could not be used absent certain circumstances not applicable here. There is no dispute that Deputy Jefferson did not comply with 4.1(A)(1), as he did not mail a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or other means that would demonstrate Eakins' receipt of those documents. There is also no dispute that Deputy Jefferson did not serve Eakins personally under Rule 4.1(A)(2) and that Rule 4.1(A)(4) does not apply to Eakins. And, since Rules 4.1(A)(3) and (4) do not apply here, neither does Rule 4.1(B).
We agree with the trial court that Deputy Jefferson could have effected service of process on Eakins and, thereby, the American Legion, by complying with Trial Rules 4.1(A)(1) or (2). To be sure, pursuant to Rule 4.6(C) Deputy Jefferson could also have left a copy of the documents at any American Legion office in Indiana with the person in charge of that office if he could not comply with Rule 4.1(A)(1). But Deputy Jefferson did not do that either. Thus, Anderson did not comply with the methods for effective service authorized by the Indiana Trial Rules.
But that is not the end of our analysis. Again, though Anderson did not comply with our Trial Rules, her attempt to serve process on the American Legion may still have been adequate if, in light of the facts and circumstances, her method was "obviously better calculated to give notice." Morrison, 559 N.E.2d at 368. As such, Anderson asserts that leaving the summons and complaint at the outbuilding, and following that act with copy service by first class mail to the registered agent's address, was reasonably calculated to inform the American Legion of her lawsuit. We cannot agree that this method was better calculated to give the American Legion notice than compliance with our Trial Rules.
For support, Anderson relies on Washington v. Allison, 593 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind.Ct. App.1992), and Storm v. Mills, 556 N.E.2d 965 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). In Washington, the plaintiff filed suit against a sole proprietorship and had the sheriff leave a copy of the summons and complaint at that business's address, which the sheriff followed with copy service by mail to the same address. The owner of the business asserted that he should have been served as an individual pursuant to Rule 4.1 rather than as an organization under Rule 4.6. We held that "[a] sole proprietorship does not fit within either" Rule 4.1 or Rule 4.6 but any technical failure of the plaintiff to comply with our trial rules did not render the default judgment void because "personal jurisdiction is acquired by any method of service of summons which comports with due process." 593 N.E.2d at 1275.
In Storm, the plaintiff served the defendant by leaving the summons and complaint with an identified employee at the defendant's business, which the plaintiff followed with copy service by mail to the business address. The parties agreed that the plaintiff's attempt at service successfully placed the defendant on actual notice of the plaintiff's action. We held that the plaintiff sufficiently served the defendant. Storm, 556 N.E.2d at 968.
Id. at 861-62 (footnote omitted).
We agree with the American Legion that Washington and Storm are inapposite to the instant appeal and that Kelly is analogous. In Washington and Storm, the plaintiff delivered the summons and complaint at the actual building from which the businesses were being conducted. That is not the case here. Rather, as with the sheriff leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the "office address" in Kelly, the evidence here fails to show that Deputy Jefferson left the summons and complaint with anyone in particular or at a building from which business was actually being conducted. See 732 N.E.2d at 860. Instead, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Deputy Jefferson left the documents at the outbuilding at 601 South Holt Road rather than taking those documents to the main building.
We reject Anderson's assertion that "[n]othing about the [outbuilding] would have put Anderson on notice that service there would be improper." Appellant's Br. at 13. Even though the outbuilding had the number "601" on its northern face, the outbuilding did not have a mailbox and, in reviewing the photograph attached to Cooper's affidavit, there is no question that the outbuilding was not the main building at that address. Rather, the large building on the northeast portion of the property was adjacent on its western and southern sides to both branches of the parking lot; it had a driveway that led directly to a covered entrance; it had multiple sidewalks to access the parking lot; and it had a large, fenced-in yard. The smaller outbuilding, on the other hand, had no attributes suggesting that it was anything more than an outbuilding. And Cooper's affidavit expressly stated that there was no mailbox at the smaller building, which suggests that the mailbox for the address was at the larger building. In other words, the undisputed evidence demonstrates Anderson did not leave the summons and complaint in a place or with a person reasonably calculated to apprise the American Legion of her lawsuit against it, let alone did she employ a method that was "obviously better calculated to give notice" than the methods authorized by our Trial Rules. See Morrison, 559 N.E.2d at 368.
Considering all the facts and circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Anderson did not adequately serve process on the American Legion. We hold that Anderson's attempt to serve process on the American Legion was inadequate as a matter of law and, thus, that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over the American Legion and its default judgment was void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order setting aside its default judgment.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
