ROBB, Judge.
Mobile Home Management Indiana, LLC ("MHMI") appeals the trial court's summary judgment grant in favor of Avon Village MHP ("New Avon"), awarding New Avon ownership and title to seventeen mobile homes obtained through an auction. MHMI appeals, raising four issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive: whether New Avon complied with the timing requirements of Indiana Code section 9-22-1.5-1 et seq. in acquiring several mobile homes through an auction process. Concluding New Avon did not comply with the statutes, we reverse and remand for judgment to be entered in favor of MHMI.
In 2010, Bank of America began the foreclosure process against Avon Village, Inc., Avon Village Investors, LLC, and Avon Home Leasing, LLC ("Avon Leasing") (collectively, "Old Avon"). The foreclosed property was used as a mobile home park, and several mobile homes were on the property at the time of the foreclosure proceedings. Avon Leasing owned many of the disputed mobile homes at the time. Cocke, Finkelstein Inc. was appointed as receiver over the real estate. The real estate was sold at a sheriff's sale to Special Services Asset Management Company on August 2, 2011. New Avon then purchased the real estate from Special Services Asset Management on December 15, 2011. New Avon did not purchase the mobile homes that were on the real estate, and the foreclosure did not affect their ownership. In March and April of 2012, New Avon signed lot leases with tenants in seven mobile homes at issue in this case. The lot leases entitled the tenants to live in their respective mobile homes on the property; the agreements were not for the use of the mobile homes.
New Avon next acted to obtain ownership of the mobile homes. It searched bureau of motor vehicle records to identify recorded owners of the mobile homes, and then sent a notice by certified mail, with return receipt requested, ("First Notice") to Avon Leasing, the recorded owner of the disputed mobile homes, pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-22-1.5-3 dated May 29, 2012 and postmarked May 30. The notice read in part:
Appendix at 218. Avon Leasing received the notices on or about June 4.
New Avon sent a second notice by certified mail, with return receipt requested, ("Second Notice") dated June 13 to Avon Leasing under Indiana Code section 9-22-1.5-4(2). The Second Notice read, in part:
App. at 249. New Avon then advertised the auction in the Hendricks County Flyer newspaper once per week, for two consecutive weeks, as required by Indiana Code section 9-22-1.5-4(3). New Avon held the auction on July 9 and acquired seventeen mobile homes through the sale.
On July 15, 2013, MHMI purchased twenty-one mobile homes in the park from Avon Leasing (including the seventeen New Avon claims an ownership interest in)
On August 2, 2013, New Avon filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment to declare it the rightful owner of the disputed mobile homes. MHMI counterclaimed, also requesting it be deemed the rightful owner of the disputed mobile homes. MHMI also requested an order directing New Avon to surrender the mobile homes to MHMI and to recover all rents collected by New Avon for the time period after MHMI acquired the titles to the units. On October 15, New Avon and MHMI filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to who was the rightful owner. On December 18, 2013, after a hearing, the trial court granted New Avon's motion for summary judgment and denied MHMI's motion for summary judgment. MHMI now appeals.
We review a summary judgment order de novo. Neu v. Gibson, 928 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind.2010). A summary judgment order will be affirmed when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 559-60; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). The party appealing the trial court's grant of summary judgment has the burden of persuading the court that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Diversified Invs., LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, 838 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind.Ct. App.2005), trans. denied. The fact that the parties made cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review; we will consider each motion separately to determine if the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id.
It appears no other court has interpreted these provisions in the Abandoned Mobile Homes chapter.
Shaffer v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). The threshold inquiry in issues of statutory interpretation is whether the statute is ambiguous, and if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind.2011). When the statute is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, we must construe the statute to determine the apparent legislative intent. Id. We should construe the sections harmoniously, so as to hold no part meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Id. at 828. We may ascertain intent by giving effect to the ordinary and plain meaning of the language used. Id. at 829.
MHMI and New Avon disagree as to the interpretation of Indiana Code sections 9-22-1.5-2 through -4. MHMI urges
The three relevant portions of Indiana Code chapter 9-22-1.5 are as follows:
Ind.Code § 9-22-1.5-2 (2012).
Ind.Code § 9-22-1.5-3 (2012).
Ind.Code § 9-22-1.5-4.
Reading all provisions together, by the plain language, a property owner has the
Thirty days after sending the First Notice (assuming no extensions), the property owner may follow the steps in Indiana Code section 9-22-1.5-4. The property owner is required to send the Second Notice, with return receipt requested, to the mobile home owner and any lien holder and any other person known to claim an interest in the mobile home. Ind.Code § 9-22-1.5-4(2). The auction may be held no sooner than thirty days after the Second Notice's return receipt is received by the property owner. Ind.Code § 9-22-1.5-4(4). In the meantime, the property owner must also publish notice of the sale in a newspaper of general circulation in the county or post notice in the neighborhood. Ind.Code § 9-22-1.5-4(3). After all of these requirements are met, only then the property owner may hold an auction. This reading contemplates at least a sixty-day period: the property owner sends the First Notice and waits at least thirty days; the property owner then sends the Second Notice and waits at least thirty more days before holding the auction (more time may be added to the process if the mobile home owner requests an extension as a matter of right under Indiana Code section 9-22-1.5-3(b) or additional time is needed for the return receipt to be received by the property owner to start the thirty-day clock triggered by the Second Notice).
New Avon failed to comply with these statutory requirements. It sent the First Notice dated May 29, postmarked May 30, and then sent the Second Notice only two weeks later. It did not meet the thirty day mandate of Indiana Code section 9-22-1.5-3. Additionally, the auction was held less than thirty days after the Second Notice was sent,
Concluding the auction is void due to New Avon's failure to comply with the statutory requirements leading up to the auction of the mobile homes, we reverse and remand for judgment to be entered in favor of MHMI.
Reversed and remanded.
RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.