Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ROBB, Judge.
M.H. ("Mother") appeals a juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her children M.V. and J.V (the "Children"). Mother raises several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the juvenile court's termination order is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Concluding the juvenile court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
On June 20, 2013, the Lafayette Police Department ("LPD") received a request for a child welfare check at the residence of Mother and T.V. ("Father").
Documentary Exhibit 1 at 2. At the time, Mother was seven months pregnant with J.V.
In early July, DCS removed M.V. from Mother's custody and placed M.V. in her paternal grandmother's care. Thereafter, DCS initiated Child in Need of Services ("CHINS") proceedings. On July 15, Mother entered a guilty plea to aiding a burglary, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to six years in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), suspended to probation. On July 31, M.V. was adjudicated a CHINS based on Mother's recent arrest, the presence of illegal substances in the home, the condition of the home, and parents' inability to provide a safe home environment. The juvenile court ordered M.V. remain in her paternal grandmother's custody.
Mother and Father subsequently moved in with the paternal grandmother, thus reuniting with M.V. On August 14, the court ordered Mother and Father participate in reunification services. Specifically, Mother, who has a history of substance abuse and bipolar disorder, was to submit to mental health and substance use assessments, and participate in case management therapy. She never participated in any assessment and cancelled some therapy sessions. Following the court order, Mother gave birth to J.V. J.V. was not immediately removed from Mother's and Father's care because they were residing in the home of the Children's paternal grandmother, had obtained employment, and were actively participating in services on M.V.'s case. On September 30, however, DCS filed a CHINS petition due to concerns regarding J.V.'s weight.
On October 8, Mother was arrested for violating the terms of her probation and was released on home detention. On November 8, however, Mother was again arrested for violating the terms of her probation and home detention when alcohol was discovered in her residence. After the arrest, DCS made a surprise visit to the residence. DCS discovered "spice"
On October 6, 2014, DCS filed a petition for termination of Mother's parental rights. In December, the juvenile court conducted parent-child termination proceedings. DCS' case manager testified Mother's parental rights should be terminated:
Transcript at 33-34. Moreover, because M.V. displays symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") and bipolar disorder, and J.V. suffers from respiratory issues, DCS expressed concerns about Mother's ability to care for her Children's special needs. DCS recommended the Children be adopted by their paternal aunt and uncle because the Children were thriving in their placement with those relatives. The court-appointed special advocate ("CASA") also recommended termination of Mother's parental rights, noting Mother could not "provide a safe, supportive environment for [M.V.] and [J.V.]." Id. at 82.
On February 27, 2015, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights. In doing so, the court noted, in relevant part:
App. of Appellant at 22-23. Mother now appeals.
"[T]he involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is designed to be used as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed." In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. 2011). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, what must be proven in order to terminate parental rights:
The State must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. 2009). "Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child's very survival." Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that "the child's emotional and physical development are threatened" by parents' custody. Id. (citation omitted). "[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a petition . . . are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship." Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). "When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility." In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260. Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the juvenile court's judgment. Id.
Because the juvenile court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in terminating Mother's parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We set aside a juvenile court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is "clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the . . . conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment." Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147.
Mothers contends the juvenile court's termination order was clearly erroneous in several respects. She claims DCS failed to prove the conditions resulting in the Children's removal will not be remedied; DCS failed to prove she posed a threat to the Children's well-being; and DCS failed to prove termination was in the Children's best interest.
First, Mother argues DCS failed to prove there was a reasonable probability the conditions leading to the Children's removal from her care will not be remedied. "In determining whether the conditions that led to a child's removal will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for her child at the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions." In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The court may properly consider the services the State offered to the parent, and the parent's response to such services. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Further, DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change, but only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d at 670.
In terminating Mother's parental rights, the court stated "Mother's history of criminal convictions, drug use, and mental health issues along with her unwillingness or inability to address those issues leads the court to find that the aforesaid conditions and circumstances will not be remedied." App. of Appellant at 23. Mother contends she has been drug free for the entirety of her incarceration, has completed classes in the DOC, and has been unable to complete mental health and substance use assessments due to her incarceration. We, however, must also "evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child." In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d at 670 (citation omitted).
Following the birth of M.V. in September 2010, Mother violated the terms of her probation stemming from a conviction for possession of marijuana, and entered a guilty plea on multiple charges, including public intoxication, unlawful possession or use of a legend drug or precursor, and aiding a burglary. After the initiation of M.V.'s CHINS proceedings in July 2013 and the birth of J.V. the following month, Mother again was arrested for violating the terms of her probation by missing required appointments; she was released on home detention. Mother then violated the terms of her home detention by having alcohol in her residence and was arrested; DCS later discovered "spice" and drug paraphernalia in the home during a surprise visit. Moreover, Mother admitted to using heroin twice after the birth of J.V., and J.V. tested positive for opiates.
Notwithstanding Mother's criminal history, it is worth noting DCS did not immediately remove J.V. from Mother's and Father's custody. Nearly two months after the birth of J.V., however, DCS removed J.V. for the same reasons M.V. was removed: substance abuse and conditions of the home. Therefore, Mother was aware of the conditions she needed to remedy and had an opportunity to do so. She did not complete a mental health or substance use assessment prior to her incarceration; instead, she opted to abuse drugs and violate the terms of her probation. Mother's unwillingness to take appropriate action—not her incarceration—evidences a "substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation." In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014); see also In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change."), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1161 (2002). The juvenile court did not clearly err in concluding the evidence shows a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the Children's removal will not be remedied.
Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children's well-being. However, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive and requires only one element in that subsection be true to terminate parental rights. See In re I.A., 903 N.E.2d 146, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to show a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the Children's removal will not be remedied, we need not determine whether the court erred in concluding continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children's well-being.
Finally, Mother argues DCS failed to prove termination was in the Children's best interest. Specifically, she contends the Children "have a relationship with [her], and it would not be in their best interests to have their relationship with their biological parent severed." Brief of Appellant at 14.
"In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the DCS and look to the totality of the evidence." In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted), trans. denied.
First, and as noted above, there is sufficient evidence that the conditions resulting in the Children's removal will not be remedied, and both the CASA and the DCS case manager recommended termination. Second, the DCS case manager testified the Children have adapted well to their paternal aunt and uncle and recommended those relatives adopt the Children:
Tr. at 35-36, 41. The CASA agreed, noting the Children's placement with relatives provided a safe home environment and assisted M.V. with her behavioral issues:
Id. at 82-83. Finally, we note the Children need a stable environment, especially in light of M.V.'s behavioral issues and J.V.'s respiratory issues; the paternal relatives have shown they can provide the necessary support.
Accordingly, DCS presented clear and convincing evidence from which the juvenile court could conclude that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the Children.
We reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of clear error. There is no such error here. DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the requisite elements to support the termination of Mother's parental rights. The judgment of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.